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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this thesis is to deepen understanding of how agency conflict 
arises in the governance of family businesses. The constructs were proposed arising 
from empirical research, involving four case studies of different Brazilian family-
owned companies, which were analysed inductively. Next, data from the literature 
was used to validate those constructs, which became part of the proposed Family 
Business Agency Conflict Model and to suggest articulated hypotheses.  
This model identifies factors that can potentially increase, and those which can 
mitigate, tensions between the actors involved representing family, ownership and 
management within family-owned firms. It was subsequently tested through a survey 
of 152 family-owned firms of varying size, which belonged to different economic 
sectors and regions of Brazil. Structural equation modelling was used to test the 
empirical validity of the model, with reference to hypotheses concerning the variables 
which influence agency conflict. The model was found to predict 38 per cent of the 
variance in agency conflict. 
Four variables were found which explain directly the agency conflict in family 
businesses: strategic alignment, social alignment, trust and impartiality. Therefore, 
the findings of this research besides focusing on the usual procedural aspects of 
governance, such as disclosure and control, include behavioural elements which 
constitute a step ahead in the study of corporate governance in family business. 
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My joy in learning is partly that it 
enables me to teach. 
Seneca  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
I.1. Background 
 
The concept and application of the principles of corporate governance have 
been consolidated in a more structured way from the end of the last century as a 
means of curbing opportunistic action of executives of large publicly held 
corporations, especially in Anglo-Saxon markets. In such companies, the 
shareholders have virtually no control of the company, which is effectively in charge 
of the executives. The natural consequence of the separation of ownership and 
control is that shareholders delegate to the executives the right to determine the fate 
of the company and the power to make day-to-day decisions. This situation favours 
the emergence of agency conflict which is a consequence of these individuals within 
a firm acting in the service of their own goals, at the expense of the goals of the firm’s 
owners. For Child and Rodrigues (2003) the role of corporate governance is precisely 
to minimize the agency conflict that arises from the clash of these different interests 
between ownership and control, ensuring alignment between shareholders and 
management. 
Much of the available literature related to the study of agency conflict is 
devoted to public companies, neglecting its effect of increased costs – called agency 
costs - in other ownership structures, especially those in family-owned companies. 
The apparent lack of separation of ownership and control in family-owned firms is 
responsible for most scholars not addressing this subject in such firms. However, 
some recent thinking has increasingly drawn attention to the fact that only the first-
generation entrepreneurial firm with a sole founder would be exempt from agency 
conflict (Ang et al. 2000). Family businesses achieving higher levels of complexity 
can choose to hire nonfamliy managers, thus becoming exposed to agency conflict. 
But even if they do not contract outsiders, typical family-business agency conflicts 
may arise with the arrival of a new generation in management, where a family 
manager can develop conflicts of interest with other family owners. Some authors 
even claim that in these cases, the agency conflict is potentially greater than in public 
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companies (Dyer, 2006; Herrero, 2011; Morck & Yeung, 2004; Schulze et al 2001; 
Schulze et al, 2003b). The fact is that in the existing studies that deal with this theme, 
a lack of consensus is evident, indicating an opportunity for research on the reduction 
or increase of agency costs by family control (Bartholomeusz & Tanawski, 2006). 
Additionally it is important to understand that in Brazil good corporate 
governance practices are becoming increasingly important for raising company 
efficiency, for facilitating access to capital and avoiding the flight of investors, and for 
guaranteeing stakeholder confidence. Mallin (2004) defends the position that good 
practices of corporate governance are essential for emerging countries eager to 
attract foreign direct investments at more appropriate rates of return. 
Research carried out by the consultancy Mckinsey & Company (2002) showed 
that Brazil is among the main targets of investors interested in paying a premium for 
the shares of companies that practise good corporate governance. 
The Korn Ferry International and Mckinsey & Company study (2001) entitled 
‘Panorama of Corporate Governance in Brazil’ showed that the perception of the tie 
between corporate governance and creation of value varies in accordance with the 
type of property. According to the study, the more family the company is, the more it 
is believed that corporate governance may contribute to the generation of value for it. 
This belief diminishes greatly, however, when control is shared between investors, or 
is in the hands of multinationals. 
In this way, this research becomes relevant to argue and understand the 
evolution of governance models and practices adopted by Brazilian family-owned 
companies, especially in one of its key contributions: how to manage and diminish 
their agency conflicts. 
 
 
 
I.2. Research motives 
 
This study gains in importance when one recognizes the present relevance of 
family businesses in the world scenario, and that this category of firm will remain an 
important economic influence in the future. Indeed, family-owned companies 
represent the predominant form of business undertaking worldwide. According to the 
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HSM Management magazine (2003), the organizations controlled and administered 
by families represent 80% of the business universe and their operations account for 
almost half of the world GDP - Gross Domestic Product. 
In the North-American economy, family-owned companies generate 50% of 
the GDP, are responsible for 60% of the jobs in the country and for 78% of the new 
jobs created, and moreover, represent around 35% of the companies listed by 
Fortune 500 (Perman, 2006, p.9). 
In Brazil the absolute majority of business undertakings are also family 
controlled, representing more than 90% of the total, according to Moreira Júnior and 
Altheman (2004). These enterprises are of extreme importance for the development 
of the country as they exercise great influence in the generation of jobs and 
participation in the GDP. 
A research carried out by the Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social 
Development – BNDES (2000, cited in Machado, 2006, p. 28) shows that family-
owned companies generate around two million jobs, contribute with a share in the 
GDP of 12% in the agribusiness segment, 34% in industry and 54% in services, and 
the majority of them are already second generation. In relation to micro and small 
companies, Pádua (2004) carried out studies with the objective of characterizing the 
profile of these companies in Brazil and revealed that 73% of the total are controlled 
and managed by families. 
Based on this data, the fundamental role of family-owned companies in 
economic development and the growth of societies is undeniable. 
Another fundamentally important point is the better understanding of the life 
spans of family-owned companies. Statistics show that many of these companies do 
not have a long life and there are few that survive generation changes. Independently 
of the country or of the culture only a small minority get to the second generation and 
far less to the third. In accordance with Gallo (1998) of every 100 family-owned 
companies, 30 pass through to the second generation and only 5 to the third. 
Therefore, facing this scenario, family controlled organizations have sought to 
equip themselves for survival and development in the midst of the challenges related 
to the generation transition, ensuring succession of the property and management, 
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and the creation of value for their shareholders. And it is in this that corporate 
governance consists, using a series of concepts that regulate the form of interaction 
between management, shareholders and the market, conferring greater transparency 
on the company and guaranteeing its lasting duration. 
What this research seeks is to propose a model that permits family-owned 
companies to identify the factors that generate agency conflict and through the 
adoption of best governance practices, achieve a healthier, more reliable business 
environment, and greater development for them. 
 
 
 
I.3. Research objectives 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to propose a theoretical model that allows 
us to identify the principal inducers of agency conflict in family businesses. Aware 
that in such companies, two distinct systems - the family and the business – do not 
necessarily interact harmoniously, the purpose of this study is to exploit each of the 
strengths and suggest structures and processes to neutralize the weaknesses 
created by the interface. This really matters when distinct family members play the 
roles of owners and managers, or when a nonfamliy manager plays an important role 
running the family business' destiny. In both cases, the agency conflicts are 
potentially relevant. 
Also, it is the intention to reach a better theoretical and empirical 
understanding as to how family-owned companies are governed, considering their 
governance structure, the existing corporate cohesion and alignment, the 
professionalization of management, the succession, the relationships between family 
and the company and vice versa, and the appearance of agency conflicts. 
This overall research goal is approached by addressing several more specific 
research questions, which are presented in Table 1.1. 
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TABLE 1.1: Specific research questions 
 
 
 
 
I.4. Contribution of the research 
 
This dissertation is based on the study of agency conflict in Brazilian family-
owned companies addressing the relationship between the actors involved in the 
three key elements, viz property, family and management. In a family-owned 
Number Questions 
1 
Who are the main actors in conflict in Brazilian family-owned 
companies? 
2 
Is the type of capital structuring of the company related to the level of 
conflict? 
3 Does the size of the company influence the level of conflict? 
4 
Do companies with economic-financial performance better than the 
average of the segment to which they belong have a lower level of 
conflict? Does inferior performance imply a rise in it? 
5 Do companies with nonfamily CEOs have a higher level of conflict? 
6 
Are the conflicts very different in a family-owned firm managed by the 
first generation owner-manager from those in a family-owned firm 
controlled by a second, third and subsequent generations and an 
extended family? 
7 
What about the tools and practices of management control: are they 
found to be in evidence in the Brazilian family business? 
8 
What is the real relevance of transparency and disclosure in family 
business and how can it be achieved? 
9 
Are the criteria for succession negotiated and made explicit in the 
Brazilian family business? And also, is there convergence on the natural 
process and the timing of its implementation? Is competence the most 
considered factor for hiring and promotion, regardless of the ties of 
consanguinity? 
10 
Is the Brazilian family-owned company basically managed by family 
members? Are they considered competent acting as managers? 
11 
Has the Board of Directors been a feature of governance adopted by 
Brazilian family businesses? Is its presence a factor in mitigating agency 
conflicts? What are its level of independence and efficiency? 
Source: Prepared by the author 
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company, one or more members of a family exercise most of the administrative 
control because they are owners of most of the capital, there being a close 
relationship between property and control. Thus, it is essential to understand how 
family-owned companies are governed, focusing on various elements related to 
ownership, control and kinship and how they affect agency conflict. 
Family businesses provide a fertile research context for corporate governance 
studies due to their unique features and the fact that governance research in the area 
has been little explored. In fact, the volume of studies on family-owned companies 
related to this subject is still very small compared to the research into the governance 
of widely held firms, which is abundant. Previous research on family business has 
mostly addressed questions regarding how to improve family relationships and a 
large part of past studies has dealt with management succession. 
Daily and Dollinger (1992) have suggested some reasons for the lack of 
scientific investigation of corporate governance in family businesses. First, they 
believe that researchers base themselves on the idea initially presented by Berle and 
Means (1932) that the control of businesses rests basically in the hands of 
professional managers, not families. Second, it is difficult to study both family and 
business systems simultaneously because each belongs to a different scientific 
research branch. And finally, there is a common belief that work and family exist as 
distinct, independent systems. 
This research proceeds in the opposite direction to this belief, seeking 
precisely to understand more profoundly and systemically the connection between 
these elements and the balanced mechanisms to keep alignment among all the 
stakeholders. 
This dissertation intends to make three contributions to research on family 
business and corporate governance: 
1st. First, to contribute to the small but emerging body of family firm 
research. 
2nd. Second, to provide a new framework for the agency conflict theory, 
relating the elements of property/family/management to the reduction 
of tension caused by the diversity of interests. 
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3rd. Demonstrate how the costs of implementing family governance 
mechanisms are compensated by a reduction in agency costs, 
making it easier for family-owned companies to adopt them 
voluntarily. 
 
 
 
I.5. Structure of the thesis 
 
The diagram below shows the steps for the development of this study. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Scheme representing the development of the structure of the thesis 
 
 
Source: Prepared by the author 
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I.6. Format of this document 
 
Chapter I provides an overview of the importance of family business and 
illustrates the gaps in the current literature concerning agency conflict in family 
businesses and how the objectives of this research will help to fill them. 
Chapter II includes a discussion of the literature regarding family-owned 
companies exploring their main attributes and peculiarities. Also there is a review of 
the literature related to corporate governance issues and the major implications of 
agency theory in family business. 
Chapter III presents the qualitative methodology used, combining grounded 
theory and the construction of case studies. Both methods and their application are 
presented. 
Chapter IV lists the detailed description of the four case studies conducted, 
highlighting the tensions via citations of the several interviews carried out. 
Chapter V presents a theoretical model built from observations of the four 
different case studies. Based on the findings of each case study, several hypotheses 
were proposed. Also, each construct from the grounded theory process was 
confronted with the literature in accordance with what other authors have proposed 
regarding its relevance, and mutual relationships with other constructs. 
Chapter VI presents the quantitative analysis, including the formation of the 
sample, the design and validation of the questionnaire, the survey application and the 
procedures for data analysis. Also, summarizes the hypotheses analysis, showing 
which are supported or not, and discusses the overall findings. 
Chapter VII offers the conclusions of the study, its limitations and suggestions 
for future research. It also discusses how this study makes original theoretical and 
practical contributions to knowledge. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
PRELIMINARY LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
II.1. Family-owned company 
 
 
II.1.1. Family business definitions 
As several studies indicate, the importance of family businesses has been 
continually documented by the academic literature since the early 90's (Lyman, 1991; 
Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Dunn, 1996; Fletcher, 2002; Rogoff & Heck, 2003; Ward, 
2004; Zahra et. al., 2004; Chrisman et al., 2008; Milton, 2008; Zahra et al., 2008; 
Chua et al., 2009; Debicki et al., 2009; Steier et al., 2009). However, there is no 
consensus in the specialized literature regarding the limits of what constitutes a 
family business, presumably because there are a great number of definitions 
(Chrisman et al., 1999). This occurs essentially due to the fact that this issue has only 
recently become the focus of attention of researchers, as well as having been 
approached at different levels of analysis, such as individual, interpersonal / group, 
organizational, and societal (Low & MacMillan,1988; Basco & Rodríguez, 2009). 
Nevertheless, regardless of the diversity of conceptions the undeniable fact is the 
representativeness and economic importance of this type of business in major world 
economies, as pointed out by Wang et al (2007): 
In most economies, family business is estimated to represent over two-thirds 
of all enterprises and accounts for about half of the economic activity and 
private employment contributing to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(Wang et al, 2007, p. 173). 
To understand the characteristics that distinguish a family from a nonfamliy 
business, Mustakallio (2002) proposes distinct classification criteria: (i) ownership; (ii) 
family involvement in management and in the strategic process; (iii) generational 
transfer; (iv) family view of longevity and its intention to continue as a family 
business; (v) family goals; and (vi) interaction between the family and business. 
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i. Ownership 
A family business is defined by Barnes and Hershon (1994) as one whose 
control of property is in the hands of an individual (or individuals) of a single family. 
Donckels and Fröhlich (1991) recognize that a family business is that in which the 
family owns the most assets, while controlling its management. Aligned with this 
position, Litz (1995) defines a family firm as one in which both ownership and 
management are concentrated in the hands of one family unit. 
Neubauer and Lank (1998, p.21) describe ‘a family enterprise as a 
proprietorship, partnership, corporation or any form of business association where 
the voting control is in the hands of a given family’. For Lansberg et al. (1988) a firm 
is defined as family-owned when members of the same family have the legal control 
of its property. 
Taking as a starting point the family's influence on the property axis, Sciascia 
and Mazzola (2008) argue that family presence in ownership can become a benefit or 
a disadvantage. The authors assert that in this context of interaction, paradoxical 
conditions are created, which can only be understood by analysing the degree to 
which this level of family influence on the property can generate benefits to outweigh 
its risks. 
ii. Family involvement in management and in the strategic process 
For Gallo and Sveen (1991) what characterizes a family business is that its 
members have to take part in the management as well as having an important role as 
decision makers. In most first-generation businesses, with their low level of 
generational ownership dispersion, the founder alone has complete control of his/her 
firm (Lansberg, 1988; Harvey & Evans, 1994). Such domination of the control leads 
to greater relationship conflict due to the low level of family members’ participation in 
decision-making (Ibrahim et al., 2001). In contrast, in the presence of a high level of 
participative decision-making, conflicts should decrease due to the open 
communication and sense of involvement (Eddleston et al., 2008). 
For Bornholdt (2005), a family business is one in which the family bonds are 
crucial in the succession process and where the strategic positions of the company, 
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such as the Executive Board or Board of Directors are filled primarily by members of 
the family. Handler (1989a) adds that a family business is that in which most 
decisions related to the leadership succession process are influenced by family 
members present in the management or on the Board of Directors. 
Dyer’s research (1988) shows that most first generation family businesses 
have a “paternalistic” management culture, characterized by hierarchical 
relationships, top management control of power and authority, close supervision, and 
distrust of outsiders. On the other hand, descendent-controlled firms tend to utilize 
more professional forms of management (McConaughy & Phillips, 1999). 
Regarding strategy, first generation family businesses are a reflection of the 
aspirations and values of the founder-owner. Thus, the owner’s strategies are likely 
to influence the development path of the business, especially in its early stages 
(Basu, 2004).  
According to Davis (1983) even when the family is not part of the management 
of the company, if its members exercise a decisive influence on the business’ politics 
and direction, this is enough to characterize it as a family-owned company. In this 
sense, Chrisman et al. (1999) stress that it is not sufficient for family members to be 
owners and/or managers of the company. What makes family businesses unique is 
that the pattern of ownership, governance, management and succession concretely 
influences their objectives, strategy and structure and their way of formulating and 
implementing them. For them: 
The family business is a business governed and/or managed with the 
intention to shape and pursue the vision of the business held by a dominant 
coalition controlled by members of the same family or a small number of 
families in a manner that is potentially sustainable across generations of the 
family or families’ (Chrisman et al., 1999, p.25). 
These authors explain the dominant coalition as being the one that includes 
the main actors of an organization that fully control the organizational agenda. So, 
according to this definition and regardless of ownership control or participation of the 
family in management, it is sufficient that the family controls the dominant coalition for 
it to be considered a family business. 
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iii. Generational transfer 
To discuss what is a family business from the perspective of generational 
transfer, one must first understand what characterizes a first-generation family firm. 
For Yan and Sorenson (2006) it is one started or acquired by a family, which involves 
more than one family member, belonging only to the first and founding generation of 
the family. First-generation family businesses are highly dependent on the founders’ 
leadership, who are usually strongly involved in the management and who are the 
ones that bring the technical know-how (Lansberg, 1988). Also, founders establish 
the cultural patterns of family-owned firms according to their own personalities (Dyer, 
1986). 
Chrisman et al. (2003), however, consider that ownership and management of 
the business by family members are not enough to define it as a family firm. 
Additionally, the intention to conduct the succession to the next generation must also 
be stated explicitly. Ward (1987) confirms that it is necessary to have the expectation 
of transferring control to the next generation, for a company to be characterized as a 
family business. The fact is that a growing number of studies have been focusing on 
the intergenerational aspects and succession as the essential characteristics that 
define a family business (Royer et al., 2008; Bigliardi & Dormio, 2009; Janjuha-Jivraj 
& Spence, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2009; Van der Merwe, 2009; Howorth et al., 2010). 
For Churchill and Hatten (1987), for a business to be considered a family 
business, the management transition, from an older to a younger member of the 
family, has to have happened or is still going to happen. However, Donnelley (1988) 
argues that a family business has to have lasted at least for two different generations 
under family control to be characterized as such. Chrisman et al. (1999) disagree 
with these latter authors about the theory that for a company be considered a family 
business, it has to have carried out one or two successions within the company. They 
think that the fact that parents are preparing their children to be professionals in a 
different area does not decharacterize the company as a family business. They 
support the idea that the definition of a family company may include those ‘family 
businesses owned by couples with young or no children, or those that pursue a 
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vision of the family business as a vehicle to educate the next generation for careers 
that exclude involvement in the business’ (Chrisman et al., 1999, p.25). 
iv. Family view on longevity and its intention to continue as a family business 
From this perspective, a business should be considered a family business 
when the members of the owning family ‘strive to achieve and/or maintain 
intraorganizational family-based relatedness’ (Litz, 1995, p. 103). Also for Chrisman 
et al. (2003) one of its peculiar features is the intention of maintain family control of 
the ruling coalition. Neubauer and Lank (1998), in turn, cite that, among the myriad of 
existing definitions about family business there has to be the intention that the family 
involvement shall continue to exist in the future. 
For Hoy and Verser (1994), despite all the difficulties that threaten the 
continuity of the family heading up the company, the owners of family businesses 
tend to have an avid aspiration for their businesses to exist and thrive over the long 
term. Therefore, it is often suggested that while first generation family-owned firms 
need to possess the special technical or business backgrounds necessary to start a 
business, subsequent generations need to be focused on maintaining and enhancing 
their business’ growth and success (McConaughy et al., 1998). 
Completing these several perspectives of family business, Donckels and 
Fröhlich’s (1991) conclude that the vision of longevity of the founders is that the 
business built by the family should continue under its control. And in order for this 
goal to be achieved, authors Fahed-Sreih and Djoundourian (2006) assert that the 
key to the longevity of a family business is conducting a planned and well-oriented 
succession process, allowing the change of control to occur in an orderly and non-
confrontational way. 
v. Family goals 
Donnelley (1988) identifies a company as a family business when there is 
mutual influence between its business policy (vision, values and goals) and the 
interests and goals of the family. Following this same line of thought, Distelberg and 
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Sorenson (2009) argue that to understand the family business it is necessary first of 
all to grasp the values and objectives that guide it. 
In the research of Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2007), the authors found that 
the goals of family businesses tend to rely on a long-term vision, in which the 
company is not perceived just as a financial tool for profit maximization, but also 
favours a win-win relationship with external stakeholders, especially with customers, 
suppliers and partners. In this sense, it is clear that It must take into account that 
family businesses have economic and non-economic goals (Olson et al., 2003), 
which makes it essential to understand from the very beginning, how each key 
individual of the family company defines success, and how much alignment exists 
around this understanding. Otherwise, distinctive conceptions of success or different 
pursued objectives, by these stakeholders, will certainly lead to conflicts (Astrachan & 
McMillan, 2003). 
vi. Interaction between the family and business 
Davis (1983) advocates that it is exactly the kind of interaction between family 
and business that characterizes the nature of a family business and defines its 
uniqueness. Chrisman et al. (2003) share this idea saying that what distinguishes a 
family business from other types of business is the involvement and interaction of the 
family with the business which results in unique, inseparable, and synergistic skills 
and abilities of the company. 
Recent studies, such as that of Nordqvist (2012), present the argument that 
members of the family business play a key role in developing the strategy of family 
businesses. Thus, the family interaction would be responsible for fostering a dynamic 
process that results in the strategic guidelines rooted in family values and the socio-
psychological dimensions of the owners (Nordqvist, 2012). Furthermore, for this 
author, the overlapping of values and the distinctive capabilities of family businesses 
would allow the development of unique competitive advantages.  
In fact, the interaction between family and business, besides characterizing 
the family business, can result in positive aspects for the enterprise. However, it is 
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worthwhile to attend to the risks and difficulties that are inherent in this business 
model, as pointed out by Martínez et al. (2007, p. 85): 
Among these advantages or strengths we can identify a closer monitoring, 
an essentially long run perspective, higher unity of goals among 
shareholders, quicker decision making, stronger culture that come from 
family values, and so forth. On the other side, some of those weaknesses or 
disadvantages are related to the overlap of family and business issues, lack 
of succession planning, nepotism, resistance to change and to 
professionalization, agency issues, and others.  
 
Adopted definition 
For the purpose of this study and given these various definitions of family 
business, the one proposed by IBGC - Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance 
has been chosen, which is that: 
The family business is one whose equity control (most of the percentage of 
voting shares) is in the possession of an individual family or group of 
families. Summarizing, companies can be classified primarily by family 
ownership and not by family management (2009). 
 
 
II.1.2. Family business characteristics 
To present the main characteristics which distinguish a family company, the 
criteria of Hollander and Elman (1988) which identify four distinct approaches were 
chosen: first, the rational; second, the one which focuses on the founder; third, the 
one which emphasizes the phases and stages of growth and the last, the systemic 
approach. 
i. Rational approach 
For the authors who share this thinking, one of the main distinguishing 
features of family businesses is the fact that feelings rather than logic control the 
decision-making process. Danes et al. (1999) define the company as being the 
rational arena and its family members as being the emotional. The family constitutes 
the core of the business and family members are tied by strong emotional bonds. 
Due to the fact that family and business are so intertwined by strong ties (Davis, 
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1983), it is virtually inevitable that emotions pass beyond the family boundaries and 
reach the business (Daily & Dollinger, 1992). 
The discussion about the kind of rationality prevailing in the family business 
has produced many studies that tried to attain a deeper understanding of the 
emotional ties that involve family members and business, as those of Zellweger and 
Astrachan (2008) who tried to examine how much the family owners valued 
subjectively their business. The work of Astrachan and Jaskiewicz (2008) that 
measured the costs and returns in the emotional context of family businesses can 
also be cited in this regard. 
ii. Focus on the founder 
Hollander and Elman (1988) affirm that much of the literature on family 
businesses has been concentrated on the figure of the founder as entrepreneur and 
main influence on the company’s destiny. The authors point to the conflicts that 
naturally arise in the growth process of the family business and the habitual inflexible 
nature of the founder. Therefore, they consider that the founder's personality and 
style can help to predict obstacles in the transition process that the company may 
have to surmount. Normally the founder brings tendencies, values and rules to 
his/her management, which actually are the results of his/her experiences and 
personal life history. 
Thus, the style of the founder does influence the operational culture of the 
company, affecting its development and the way it reacts to changes. The founder 
usually assumes multiple roles while the business grows, and involves him/herself 
personally, intervening at all organizational levels (Hollander & Elman, 1988). The 
difficulties begin to emerge when the company grows and it needs a more 
professional management, requiring more planning and delegation. New hiring 
practices, evaluation and promotion of personnel and management development 
must be implemented to allow the company to outlive its founder (Ward, 1987). 
In many cases the resistance of founders to hiring professional executives, or 
even to passing the business over to their successors stems from the concern to 
protect their legacy (Janjuha-Jivraj & Spence, 2009). Thus, even if unconsciously, it 
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is common for them to adopt a manner of speech that tends to underestimate the 
ability of their successors. To Janjuha-Jivraj and Spence (2009) this would be a way 
that founders show themselves to be crucial to the survival of the business, and 
putting off their retirement as long as possible. 
iii. Phases and stages of growth 
This is another important area of research that seeks to identify alternating 
periods of stability and transition that occur in response to changes and needs of the 
company, of the family and of the employees, members or not of the family.  
One of the more traditional studies in this field was done by Hershon (1975, 
cited in Hollander & Elman, 1988) which identifies three management standards that 
correspond to three different generations of the founding family. The first area is 
characterized by paternal and entrepreneurial management - typically a company's 
first generation. The second pattern occurs in the second generation companies 
characterized by a brotherlike management. And finally, the third pattern is one 
where collective management or family network prevails, run by brothers, cousins 
and other members of the third generation of the founding family. 
iv. Systemic approach 
Distelberg and Sorenson (2009) show that from the beginning of the 1980s, 
the area of family business studies has come to recognize the importance of theories 
based on a systemic view for understanding the complex universe of these 
companies. The school of thought developed within this perspective have contributed 
significantly to broaden the perception of family businesses as highly complex 
systems, developing a deeper understanding of the interaction between the family 
and business. 
Tagiuri and Davis (1996) proposed a referential framework to represent such 
interactions based on a three-circle model that represents three independent but 
overlapping subsystems: business, ownership, and family. An individual who is part 
of the family company system can position himself in each one of the seven 
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subdivisions that are formed by the overlapping circles of the subsystems, as 
presented in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: Three-circle-model 
 
            Source: Tagiuri and Davis, 1996, p. 200. 
 
In this model, these ‘three subsystems are taken into account to explain how 
individuals in family business make decisions or develop strategies that fulfill the 
goals of each subsystem and the whole family business’ (Parker, 2004, p. 56). 
Along this line of reasoning, Davis (1983) explains the idea of a joint system, 
which operates according to the practices built up from the needs on each side, 
family and business, to meet the needs of the whole. In this sense, Basco and 
Rodríguez (2009) found empirically that family businesses that consider the family 
and the business as parts of a whole system have better results when compared to 
those that seek to limit the governance only to the business area. This possibility of 
linkage between business and family was crafted by Beckhard and Dyer (1983) who 
propose mechanisms of articulation between the business and family, for example, a 
board of directors. Davis and Stern (1988) address the need for creating processes 
and social structures that can deal with family problems in a proper context, 
separating them from the business issues. Mustakallio (2002) points out, that such 
structures do not have a defined format, since they are not required by law, but that 
the forum seen to be more common in family-owned firms is the family council, which 
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consists of a group of family members that periodically meets to discuss the family 
relationship with the business, among other things. 
Hollander and Elman (1988) state a summary that some authors see family 
issues as elements external to the business, while others understand them as 
interlinked systems: two subunits, family and business, which together comprise the 
family business system. For the authors, the fact is that family processes and 
business processes are in a relationship of interdependency and interactivity. 
Therefore, to Olson et al. (2003) the key to the success of family businesses is not 
individually working family and business systems, but understanding this 
interdependence and effectively managing their superposition avoiding potential 
conflicts. 
 
Typology of family firms 
 
What can be learnt based on a more detailed analysis of the so-called family 
firms is that they do not form such a homogeneous group. For one to carry out any 
study in family owned firms, Gandra (1999) recommends as necessary and useful a 
division of them into two groups: the first corresponding to small and medium sized 
privately held companies with centralized control, and the second consisting of larger 
family companies, public companies and with decentralized control. 
 
 
II.1.3. Family business conflicts 
As is evident, the intense interaction between family and business, social 
institutions that are driven by different objectives, ends up making a family business a 
fertile ground for the emergence of conflicts. While the company's purpose is to 
produce products and services for its customers generating profit for their 
shareholders, the family mission is to care and provide security for its members 
(Mustakallio, 2002). Chrisman et al. (1997) and Davis (1983) point to the risk that by 
adopting the prioritization of non-monetary goals such as independence, prestige and 
job creation for family, the family company might reduce its efficiency and 
performance. In this sense, Sorenson (1999) points out the complicating factor of the 
presence of family members in the company when they start to be more concerned 
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with their own satisfaction and their level of participation in the company than with the 
actual business performance. Donnelley (1988) reinforces this idea, heeding to the 
fact that the company's needs can be neglected at the expense of family needs. And 
the trend is that in seeking to maintain good family relationships, family businesses 
end up focusing on issues important to immediate family and even those related to 
close relatives. This is particularly true when parents are involved more directly with 
the business, whether as owners, managers, employees or non-participating 
shareholders (Sorenson, 1999). Family businesses are then to be hostages of 
psychodynamic factors such as: sibling rivalry; lack of harmony between the couple; 
parent-child conflicts; and symptoms such as nepotism, role ambiguity, dispersion of 
ownership among family members; low competence in management and divergences 
between family members and nonfamliy employees. (Hollander & Elman, 1988; Dyer, 
1994; Schulze et al., 2001, 2003b; Martínez et al. 2007). 
Danes et al. (1999) cluster the family business conflicts in five distinct blocks: 
(i) justice conflict (concerns problems of compensation and quality of treatment along 
with allocation of resources); (ii) role conflict (confusion among roles when family 
members work together or when the family business employs others who are not part 
of the family); (iii) work/family conflict (those that surface at the intersection of the 
family and the business subsystems); (iv) identity conflict (involves family members’ 
need to differentiate themselves from family expectations and act as independent, 
autonomous people); (v) succession conflict (the effect of family business succession 
on harmony in the family business). 
Jehn (1997) identifies three different natures of conflicts in family-owned firms: 
task, process and relationship conflicts. Task conflict is about the discussion of goals 
and strategies. For the author, moderate levels of task conflict have been shown to 
be beneficial to the performance of top-management teams. Firms with very high 
levels of task conflict tend to have problems completing tasks and reaching goals, 
while firms with very low levels of task conflict often become stagnant and lack the 
development of new strategies. Process conflict is characterized by disagreement on 
how work should be accomplished and how members should be utilized and how 
much responsibility individuals receive. Family-owned firms with low levels of process 
conflict may have problems adequately adjusting family members’ responsibilities 
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and firm resources, while those with high levels of process conflict may suffer from 
role ambiguity, rivalry, and uncertainty (Jehn, 1997; Jehn and Mannix, 2001). 
Relationship conflict is the perception of personal hostility and incompatibility which 
includes affective components like annoyance, disappointment, and anger at others 
(Jehn and Mannix, 2001). It results in negative feelings leading to suspicion and 
resentment at the same time goodwill and mutual understanding decrease among 
individuals, interfering ultimately with work efforts (Jehn, 1997). 
On the other hand, Harvey and Evans (1994) categorize the conflicts in family- 
owned firms from the distinct fields they can originated in: internal to the organization, 
external to the family or families involved in the organization, and external to 
stakeholders (bankers, investors, suppliers, distributors, and members of the board of 
directors). Based on the three-circle model of Tagiuri and Davis (1996) these authors 
proposed three levels of conflict that can occur in the family business, which are 
illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2: Three levels of individual and collective conflict in the entrepreneurial environment  
 
                       Source: Harvey and Evans, 1994, p. 335 
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Level 1 conflict occurs when there is no interaction among the three entities 
and the conflict does not spill over to the other constituents. Level 2 conflict involves 
those occurring in two of the entities as they overlap, creating a more complex form 
of conflict; the conflict sources may be different, but when they are combined, the 
conflict is intense and more difficult to address. Level 3 conflict encompasses all of 
the interested parties in the family business, that is, the business organization, family, 
and external stakeholders. 
In summary, apart from the adopted criterion to categorize the conflicts in 
family-owned firms, there is a point of view common to all the researchers: how 
critical are the challenges that exist in managing conflicts for the firm’s survival (Dyer, 
1986; Sorenson, 1999; Ward, 1987). 
It is noteworthy that the issue of conflict in family businesses still represents a 
major subject in the production of recent academic literature in this area, either 
directly or indirectly linked to other issues. Table 2.1 gives a few examples. In this 
sense, it is one of the goals of this dissertation, to understand how corporate 
governance can be a helpful tool in managing such conflicts. 
 
Table 2.1: Conflict in Family Business Studies 
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Source: Prepared by the author 
 
 
 
II.2. Corporate Governance and Agency Theory 
II.2.1. The real meaning of Corporate Governance 
If the 19th was considered the century of the entrepreneur, witnessing the 
emergence of the modern corporation, and the 20th was the century of management, 
the 21st century promises to be, according to Tricker (2000), the century of corporate 
governance, to the extent that the theme has become one of the key issues in the 
management and regulation of companies. 
Corporate governance began to gain importance, especially in countries with 
more advanced capital markets like the U.S. and England, from the 1980s, basically 
because of three sets of problems: failures in relations between shareholders and 
corporations; the existence of boards of directors that were only collegiate pro forma 
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and ineffective in monitoring the interests of owners; and performance of managers, 
whose interests often conflicted with those of shareholders, whether controlling or 
minority (Andrade & Rossetti, 2011). These problems eventually create opportunities 
for the appearance of abuse of power, fraud and strategic mistakes that were made 
in companies of worldwide recognition. 
In response to pressure from influential groups that called for changes in how 
public companies were being managed, several codes of best practices in corporate 
governance came out around the world. In the United Kingdom, the key document 
was the report by a committee chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury, who emphasized the 
importance of the presence the non-executive directors, audit committees, disclosure 
of director’s compensation, disclosure of accounting statements, internal control 
systems, and the role of the auditor (Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006). According to 
Tricker (2000), the Cadbury Report, published in 1992, was notable for its influence 
on the thought of corporate governance around the world. Similar initiatives multiplied 
in the following years until, in 1999, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), which brings together the thirty most developed countries of 
the industrialized world, published its influential ‘Principles of Corporate Governance’ 
that became an inspiration for existing codes of corporate governance in several 
countries (Andrade & Rossetti, 2006). In the US, corporate governance has become 
increasingly important after the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, a 
legislative response to the ‘dot-com’ and ‘telco’ speculative bubbles at the end of the 
1990s: 
‘Provoked by the collapse of Enron (which used complex off-balance sheet 
vehicles to hide extraordinary losses leading to a write-down in shareholder 
funds of US$1.2 billion) and Worldcom (which used accounting improprieties 
to inflate reported earnings and cash flows by US$3.9 billion) the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) response, while similar in theme to earlier 
reforms, differs fundamentally in that the requirements are mandatory’ 
(Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006, p. 250). 
Monks and Minow (2004, p.329) refer to this new regulation as ‘the most 
significant piece of federal legislation concerning public corporations since the post-
1929 stock market crash legislation creating the SEC’. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
imposed rules for the purpose of increasing the independence of directors and 
auditors, in order to align the behaviour of executives with shareholders' interests, by 
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ensuring greater transparency and accountability and reviewing the structure and the 
effective participation of the boards of directors (Bhagat et al., 2008; Bebchuk et al., 
2009; Linck et al., 2009). 
In consequence, the corporate governance literature has been largely 
concentrated on the relationship between shareholders, board members and top 
management, characterizing an ‘outsider’ view, where owners depend on external 
elements to guarantee that managers are acting in their best interest (Monks & 
Minow, 2004). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out as an external element the legal 
system that defines property rights and sets boundaries within which the companies 
must operate. Kaplan (1997, cited in Mustakallio, 2002, p.31) indicates also the 
efficiency of capital markets as an important issue that impacts the way corporate 
governance is shaped in different countries. In this way, to promote strong capital 
markets ensuring access to global capital, countries, principally developing countries, 
need to align their companies and laws with international standards (Tricker, 2000). 
For Mallin (2004), however, corporate governance is related as much to external, as 
to internal aspects, such as internal control. From her perspective, corporate 
governance becomes an essential instrument for reaching corporate objectives. 
Thus, both from the external as the internal point of view, corporate 
governance can be defined as a set of arrangements, procedures, regulations and 
laws that allows investors (shareholders) to monitor the activities of the executives in 
companies where they have resources applied. It can also be defined as a set of 
values, principles and rules that regulate the power and control system, as well as 
the company management mechanisms, ensuring that they meet the needs of a 
given set of private and social interests. 
For Andrade and Rossetti (2006) the essential factor that compelled the 
development of good governance was the dispersion of company ownership and the 
consequent progressive distancing between the shareholders and executive 
management. According to the authors: 
‘The multiple partitioning of the property of large companies was due both to 
succession processes which led to the repeated division, with each 
generation, of the accumulated patrimony of the founders among dozens of 
heirs, as also to the expansion project financing of the business in the capital 
market … the publicly traded company led to the appearance of the most 
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varied forms of opportunism within them, from the mildly offensive nepotism 
to the most varied and aggressive forms of misappropriation to the detriment 
of the shareholders’ interests and rights’. (Andrade & Rossetti, 2006, p.1). 
Tricker (2000) confirmed this idea stating that governance appears whenever 
the ownership of a company is separated from its management: it concerns 
therefore, essentially, the exercise of power. In this way, the corporation has become 
defined, in part, by this separation between ownership and control and also by a 
control that is being exercised through a small participation in ownership. 
Consequently, ownership without control and control without ownership seem to be 
the logical result of the development of the corporate world (Means, 1931).  
For Means (1931), the essential characteristic of ownership seems to be the 
possession of interests in a determined company while the essential characteristic of 
control consists in having power over the company. With the development of the 
modern corporation, ownership interest and power have become attributes of distinct 
groups. A group of individuals (shareholders) has ownership interests while a second 
group has power. The power of the second group becomes effective through the 
management of the corporation and, in particular, through the Board of Directors. 
However, for many authors, the interests of shareholders can only be effectively 
protected if Board of Directors has the necessary autonomy with the inclusion of 
independent members (Dalton et al., 2008; Fogel & Geier, 2007; Gordon, 2007). 
Thus, the group that has the power to select the members of the Board and/or give 
the management directives is the group that effectively has control. Means (1931) 
also identified five types of control: (i) control through almost complete ownership, 
that is, where only one individual or a small group of associates is the owner of 
almost all the shares; (ii) majority control, in which an individual or group retains the 
majority ownership of the shares; (iii) control through legal device without majority 
ownership, that is, by the creation of holding companies, that allow an individual or 
group to have control, although holding only a small fraction of the company; (iv) 
minority control occurs when an individual or group possesses a minority holding, but 
can maintain control by attracting other minority holdings; (v) management control, 
which exists when the ownership is so disperse that no individual or group can 
dominate the company. While in the first case, separation between ownership and 
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control is purely incipient, in the last case, it is complete. The shareholders have 
almost no control over the company while those that detain effective control have 
merely a tiny proportion of the ownership.  
Thus, the degree of dispersion of ownership varies from closely held 
corporations, as family-owned companies normally are, where owners are often key 
managers, to very widely held corporations where individual owners have only a 
small fraction of the common stock. In the last case, a logical consequence of 
ownership separation is that the shareholders delegate the executives the right to 
determine the company’s overall direction and the power to control its everyday 
decisions. The issue that arises is whether the managers would appropriate 
resources for their own benefit, at shareholders’ expense, or run the company 
properly in the shareholders’ best interest. To Berle and Means (1932) the managers 
of such firms still pursue their own interests and neglect shareholders. To this 
divergence of interests between those who have the ownership to those who execute 
the control, the name agency conflict is given. 
 
 
II.2.2. Agency Theory within the Corporate Governance studies 
The concept of agency theory has a long history in literature and appears as 
an object of study in several disciplines, e.g., law, political science and sociology, but 
it is in economics and finance where its main applications are founded in the areas of 
welfare economics, internal firm organization, theory of the firm, and contractual 
relationships (Mitnick, 2006). 
From the economic perspective, the study of agency theory started with the 
work of Berhold (1971), Ross (1973) and especially Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
Ross (1973) proposed the concept of agency conflict by means of a mathematical 
formulation which indicated the existence of divergent interests between the doer, 
called 'agent', and the owner, identified as 'principal', the latter being the subject who 
is affected by the actions of the agent. 
Given the existence of such misalignment of interests, Berhold (1971) justifies 
the need for the principal to motivate the agents through monetary incentives, in the 
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sense of making decisions in accordance with his/her guidelines. For Jensen (1994) 
such an argument makes sense since even a self-interested person will always have 
an incentive to reduce losses produced by the conflicts of interest, if at the end, 
he/she can share the rewards. These incentives, in order to engage the agent, are 
identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as generators of agency costs. These 
authors coined this term not only in relation to the cost of incentives, but also to those 
incurred in policing and monitoring the agents, such as auditing, formal systems of 
control and budget constraints. Chrisman et al. (2004) confirm the cost of incentives 
and monitoring of managers, as agency costs and complement the list with cost 
sanctions, forging links and developing management processes for the alignment of 
interests. 
Monitoring and alignment costs are necessary because principals tend to be 
afraid that their agents act opportunistically, shirking, holding-up, cheating, stealing, 
self-dealing, adopting a free riding attitude, corrupting themselves, as well as seizing 
perquisites for their own use. (Perrow, 1986; Shapiro, 2005; Schulze et al. 2003a). 
One way to avoid the existence of opportunistic behaviour of the agent would 
be conceiving contracts that would impose penalties when deviations occur. For 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) the degree of deviation depends, among other things, 
on the rules which were agreed and the sophistication of the contracts drawn up. If 
the information was perfect and people had unlimited mental capacity, the principal 
and his/her agents could produce perfect contracts that anticipated all the actions 
and reactions of the agents (Williamson, 1975). It is known, however, that it is 
impossible to produce complete contracts because of the large number of possible 
contingencies in the relationship between agent and principal; the multiplicity of 
possible responses to them; the fact that you cannot predict how and when these 
contingencies will occur; or because, even if it were possible to determine them, it 
would be extremely costly to specify all of them in a contract (Klein, 1983). Fama and 
Jensen (1983b) call attention to the exact composition and enforcement costs of the 
contracts, saying that they cannot exceed the benefits in reducing agency costs. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) state, as a summary, that the agency 
relationships include, therefore, contracts, incentives, monitoring and bonding 
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instruments and other forms of social control adopted to minimize the agency costs, 
which are constituent elements of the contract. Young et al. (2008) emphasize the 
existence of various governance mechanisms aimed to minimize the agency conflict 
between managers and shareholders. The authors also argue that these 
mechanisms can be internal, such as boards of directors, ownership concentration, 
compensation packages to executives, or external, such as market competition, 
labour laws, codes of governance and the threat of hostile takeover. 
According to Bathala and Rao (1995), agency conflicts between principals and 
agents tend to be more clearly stated in large publicly held corporations, where top 
management is responsible for suggesting and implementing the main policy 
initiatives, while equity holders, who are largely diffused, assume the main part of the 
risk associated with those decisions. As management does not suffer a substantial 
portion of the wealth effects of their decisions, agency problem arises. 
In their research Ang et al. (2000) find that agency costs are really higher in 
companies that are not 100 percent owned by managers, and these costs increase 
as the equity share of the owner-manager declines. This finding confirms the 
prediction of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that an important source of agency conflict 
is related to the tendency that when the manager's right to property decreases, this 
also reduces his/her incentive to undertake significant effort in innovative activities, 
such as seeking new profitable ventures. 
However, Daily et al. (2003) show that the tendency of contemporary 
companies is to be increasingly characterized by the small ownership holding of the 
executives that manage them. Jensen and Meckling (1976) thus raise the question 
that if companies with diffuse ownership are more susceptible to agency costs, why is 
it the prevalent model today and why are millions of people willing to invest in 
companies run by professionals so little interested in their welfare? Because it is a 
safe investment. In 1932, Berle and Means published a study on ownership and 
control, considered the first emergent work on corporate governance, called ‘The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property’. In this work, the authors called attention to 
the fact that the existence of a corporation creates a system that exposes investors to 
risk no greater than their investment in a firm. Unlike a partnership, where all partners 
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are liable for all kinds of legal action even after the company is bankrupted, investors 
have no such risk. The reason is quite understandable: no one would buy stocks in a 
large corporation if the risk of losses were unlimited. The basis to invest in the stock 
market is to know that whatever happens, the risk of loss is limited to the amount of 
the investment (Monks & Minow, 2004). 
This rule allows corporations to make themselves capable of raising funds for 
the expansion of their business and financing their internal operations, not only 
through bank loans, from financiers that charge interest for the use of their resources, 
but also by other forms of raising capital, such as the sale of shares and bonuses for 
individual investors (Blair, 1995). In negotiating their shares in the public market, 
corporations promote the dispersion of ownership, which brings in its train the 
important consequence of the distancing of shareholders from managers (Tricker, 
2000). The increasing number of companies around the world that are becoming 
public and the consequent risks of agency conflict arising from the separation of 
ownership has led the study of corporate governance in public companies to 
dominate most of the researches in this field of knowledge. Thus, the effect of agency 
cost in other ownership structures, especially family-controlled, has been little 
explored. And the studies that have been undertaken show a lack of consensus 
regarding the possibility of agency conflict being or not mitigated in family 
businesses. The analysis of whether increased incentives from the controlling family 
reduces or not agency costs still deserves a systematic investigation (Bartholomeusz 
& Tanawski, 2006). 
It is worth considering the fact that in developing countries like Brazil, it 
appears that the main agency conflict occurs between majority and minority 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999, Young et al., 2008) This shift in relation to the 
traditional model of Jensen and Meckling (1976) is explained by differences between 
corporations from emerging countries compared to those from developed economies, 
such as high ownership concentration (especially in family businesses), little 
institutional protection for minority shareholders, and low effectiveness of governance 
mechanisms (La Porta et al. 1997, Young et al., 2008).  
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Taking into account that to Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2006), the agency 
conflicts in family-owned firms will differ in degree depending on the exact structure 
of governance prevailing, further study of agency theory in family businesses 
becomes essential.  
 
 
II.2.3. Agency theory applied to a family business 
One line of thought in the literature supports the idea that family businesses 
are free of agency conflicts, especially those in the first generation which are 
managed directly by their owner. Jensen and Meckling (1976) identify them as zero 
agency-cost firms. According to Anderson and Reeb (2003) the family’s large 
ownership stake provides a strong economic incentive to maximize firm value. For 
Blanco-Mazagatos et al. (2007, p. 201) ‘in this stage, the family is usually nuclear, 
with closed relationships that minimize information asymmetries between family 
members and lead them to maintain concentric objectives’. For Pollak (1985) the 
cooperative attitudes adopted by the family members will be influenced by the trust 
and altruism generated by strong kinship. Altruism, in its turn, promotes a 
governance system that is particularly efficient in the first-generation entrepreneurial 
firm (Lubatkin et al., 2005). 
For Pollak (1985), even those family businesses whose ownership is 
dispersed among other family members, governance costs are minimized by having 
alignment on growth and risk. This alignment of interests would be responsible for 
reducing the tendency to opportunistic behaviour, avoiding the need for formal 
control systems and incentive payments, and promoting communication, cooperation 
and consensus (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006) highlight the fact that the welfare of the 
family being directly tied to the welfare of the company makes it an incentive to 
reduce agency costs. Fama and Jensen (1983b) share the same thought by 
suggesting that family-owned firms tend to reduce agency costs in the presence of 
healthy family relationships, affecting the company positively. Daily and Dollinger 
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(1992) see, even, the family business as the most efficient form of organization, 
precisely because of the absence of agency costs. 
Herrero (2011), in turn has no doubts about the existence of agency conflicts 
in family businesses, although there is still no consensus on whether such conflicts 
are more frequent in family or nonfamliy businesses. There does exist a group of 
authors arguing that agency conflicts within family businesses are more significant, 
among them, Schulze et al. argue that ‘the dispersion of ownership in family-held 
firms drives a wedge between the interests of those who lead a firm - and often own 
a controlling interest - and other family owners’ (2003b, p. 181). For Dyer (2006), 
family businesses face significant agency costs due to conflicts caused by very 
different types of family involvement in business, which lead them to defend their own 
interests. La Porta et al. (1999) agree that in this kind of organization, the interests of 
the controlling family are often placed above the interests of shareholders and other 
stakeholders of the company. To Morck et al. (1988) and Young et al. (2008) the 
majority controllers tend to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders through 
excessive compensation, related party transactions and special distribution of 
dividends. In addition, family businesses would not be free to face the same reality as 
public companies, with managers focused on short-term results, showing aversion to 
risk and innovation (Davis & Harveston, 1998). 
For Schulze et al (2001) the fact that family businesses are free of the control 
imposed by the market, increases the risk of agency based on self-control. In this 
sense, Morck and Yeung (2004) show that the problems of governance in family 
businesses are worse than a public company. This is because, when such 
companies are poorly managed, the value of their share decline, inducing 
shareholders to open legal proceedings against the managers, and leading them to 
consider hostile takeovers and disputes in the general assembly. Moe (1984) adds 
that shareholders can withdraw their capital invested in companies whose managers 
fail to deliver the expected results. Another possibility, to minimize problems of 
shirking, would be to delegate the functions of control and monitoring to boards that 
have information and resources to promote the realignment of managers, or, as a last 
resort, dismiss them. Some studies indicate, in fact, that there is a greater tendency 
for shirking in family businesses since in some cases managers are chosen because 
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of family ties rather than their competence, resulting in poor performance and the 
creation of barriers to prevent dismissal (Herrero, 2011).  
In family businesses, specifically, replacement mechanisms of managers are 
contaminated by other factors beyond their ability, or lack of it, for their roles. When 
managers cannot be easily dismissed, Morck et al. (1988) explain that the company 
is experiencing a conflict of agency due to entrenchment. This type of situation is 
particularly found in family businesses where a family member can remain in an 
executive position, although not being sufficiently competent or qualified (Sciascia & 
Mazzola, 2008; Herrero, 2011). These authors demonstrated empirically that 
entrenchment reduces the value of the company. Hendry (2002) identified this 
phenomenon as 'honest incompetence' when the family agent does not act motivated 
by opportunism, but even so the conflict arises due to his/her inability to deliver the 
results that the company needs for a successful trajectory. 
Another aspect defended by Howorth et al. (2004) is that agency theory may 
provide only a partial explanation of the dynamics of family-owned firms. For the 
authors, when dealing with issues related to ownership and management, agency 
theory ends up focusing only on dimensions of a performance-based system whose 
primary objective is to maximize shareholder value. Also for Chrisman et al. (2004), 
imagining that the owners of family businesses consider only economic objectives of 
a company is a partial and limited view. They assert that many actions considered to 
generate agency costs in nonfamliy businesses may not correspond to the reality in 
family businesses that do not have financial goals as the main target. The controllers 
can see the family business as a place to shelter the family members, to generate 
family cohesion or even to act towards philanthropic or environmental preservation 
ends (Chrisman et al., 2005), even if it means a financial performance at a non-
maximized level (Chrisman et al., 2004). So if a family decides to employ its less 
skilled members, even with the future consequences of a loss of company value, this 
would be considered an agency conflict in nonfamliy businesses, but not in a family 
business.  
Thus, for a correct analysis of agency conflicts in family businesses, it is 
necessary to understand the interests of its owners, their decisions and actions, and 
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identify the activities, incentives, policies and structures that they introduce to prevent 
their interests being contested. (Chrisman et al., 2005). In this sense Young et al. 
(2008) emphasize that family relationships make the analysis of agency conflicts 
more complex in those organizations that employ family members as managers, 
since the relationship between the principal (family owners) and agents (family-
member managers) will be based on emotions, feelings and informal connections, 
resulting in a less intense monitoring of the latter. 
 
 
 
II.2.4. Criticisms of agency theory 
Agency theory supplies a strong framework for the analysis of organizations 
and has been used in the majority of empirical studies. However, its use is 
accompanied by dissensions and it has been criticized by several authors who 
disagree with the stereotype of the psychologically egoistic agent, who only acts in 
his/her own interest, who is capable of lying, cheating, stealing and shirking 
(Shankman, 1999). Even the idea of a purely mercenary relationship, where the 
incentives would be sufficient to align the agents with the objectives of the principals, 
is contested by Donaldson and Davis (1991), who maintain that not all agents are 
motivated solely by financial factors, but those that seek the intrinsic satisfaction in 
doing a challenging job, exercising their authority and responsibility and, thus, 
gaining recognition from their superiors, peers and subordinates, also have to be 
taken into consideration. 
This vision, of a managerial motivation in opposition to the agency theory was 
identified as stewardship. Stewardship theory claims that organizational managers' 
main motivations are to serve the organization's best interests and mission, in 
opposition to the self-serving and opportunistic stimulus proposed by agency theory 
(Davis et al., 1997). According to it, the manager seeks essentially to do a good job 
and be a good steward of the corporate assets (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). For Davis 
et al. (1997) the reason that the steward adopts a pro-organizational and collectivistic 
attitude, is related to the fact that ‘by so doing, the steward's utility functions are 
maximized’ (1997, p.25). In the context of family businesses several recent studies 
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argue that stewardship theory offers a different and complementary understanding of 
the purpose of these organizations showing that the family owners and managers are 
not driven solely by economic interests but also act altruistically to the benefit of 
stakeholders, guided by their family values (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006;. Prencipe 
et al., 2008; Granata & Chirico, 2010; Howorth et al., 2010; Scholes et al., 2010). 
For Pieper et al. (2008) two factors encourage stewardship behaviour: intrinsic 
motivation and organizational identification and commitment. Managers who are self-
actualizing base their conduct on intangible needs or have high degrees of self-
leadership. Those with high levels of organizational or value commitment believe in 
and accept the goals of the organization with, consequently, less goal conflict with 
that organization (Mayer & Schoorman 1992). Meyer and Allen (1991) and Riketta 
(2002) identified a correlation of commitment with satisfaction, intensity and duration 
of the work undertaken, as well as with the motivation to contribute with an additional 
effort to the interests of the collectivity. 
Consistent with this view, it is expected that within family-owned companies, 
the family member’s commitment to their firm leads to a stewardship behaviour 
supporting the organization’s mission and goals (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). But 
this not always the case. Corbetta and Salvato (2004) propose when each framework 
in the study of organizational behaviour, agency or steward, is more appropriate than 
the other: 
When financial goals prevail in a family, family members’ motivation to 
operate in the family firm will be based on lower order needs and extrinsic 
factors, thus favouring the emergence of agency relationships. On the 
contrary, when non-financial goals prevail, this will foster motivation based 
on higher-order needs and intrinsic factors, thus favouring steward-principal 
relationships (2004, p. 357). 
For these authors the values of the owning family determine the structure of 
the model of man that will dominate in its organization from the second generation 
ahead. When the model favoured is that of the self-serving, economically rational 
model of man, the agency relationships tend to prevail, especially among brothers 
and cousins, and those family members who act as employees/agents will tend to 
use all their discretionary power in their own interest, and to the disadvantage of the 
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other shareholders/principals. On the contrary, when the model of man chosen by the 
owning family is the self-actualizing man, steward relationships may prevail. 
Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2006, p. 77) corroborate this view, by stating that 
Family management [...] can reduce agency costs and increase attitudes of 
stewardship, thereby extending investment time horizons and building firm 
capabilities. But left unchecked, family management can be dangerous, 
promoting leadership irresponsibility, expropriation from minority 
shareholders, hubris, and excessive risk taking—in short, the antithesis of 
good stewardship. 
Another source of criticism of agency theory is stakeholder theory. This 
disputes the emphasis on the maximization of shareholder wealth, based on the 
management of the principal/agent relationship, maintaining that the company should 
assume multiple objectives, which take into account the needs of all stakeholders 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Ayuso et al., 2007; Laplume et al., 2008; Zellweger and 
Nason, 2008; García-Castro et al., 2011). It should be pointed out that stakeholders 
are all ‘persons or groups that have or claim to have ownership, rights or interests in 
a corporation and in its activities past, present and future’ (Clarkson, 1995, p.5). 
Included in this definition, therefore, are shareholders, their representatives on the 
boards, employees, suppliers, customers, government and other groups whose 
relationship to the corporation was primarily non-economic. 
Freeman (1984), considered the first author to discuss stakeholders’ theory 
explicitly, proposes a normative model in which the managers would have fiduciary 
duties not only towards the stockholders, but also the other stakeholders. McLaren 
(2004), however, recognises the difficulty of implementing such a system because as 
a rule companies give priority to the search for shareholder value, concerning 
themselves less with the generation of value for other stakeholders. The author 
maintains that the interests of the shareholders should be balanced against the 
interests of the other stakeholders because both are equally important to long term 
company sustainability and also because people have sets of interests that are not 
divisible. The adoption of this model represents the recognition that the inclusion of 
the perspective of publics other than the shareholders is relevant to the long term 
survival of the organization (Andrade & Rosseti, 2011). The legitimization of claims 
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arising from viewpoints other than the merely economic, and the review of ethical and 
moral principles that regulate business relationships constitute today relevant matters 
on the agenda of the post-industrial company. For Quinn and Jones (1995), such 
principles are regulators of market efficiency, and are therefore more important than 
any agency relation. The authors stress the following moral rules that should be 
observed: (i) respect for agreements; (ii) prevention of fraud; (iii) respect for 
autonomy and (iv) care not to cause damages to others. 
The first principle, of respect for agreements, is the central element of the 
principal-agent relationship, but at the same time it reflects a morality necessary for 
the working of markets. For Shankman: 
Without binding agreements, agency relations and therefore agency theory 
cannot exist, since agency theory takes as its focus the contracts between 
principals and agents. Without binding contracts, individuals are unable to 
engage in the kinds of activities that depend on principal-agent relations, 
namely the creation of wealth through the production of goods and services. 
That is, business enterprise itself cannot function without the implicit 
assumption that individuals will honour the agreements that they create 
freely (1999, p. 328). 
The second rule that of avoiding fraud is likewise necessary for the good 
working of markets. As Bowie and Duska (1990, cited in Shankman, 1999, p. 328) 
indicate a business community in which nobody trusts anybody cannot survive. 
The last two principles (avoiding harm and respecting others’ autonomy) are 
necessary for liberty to be established which in the last result is an essential condition 
for individuals to engage in the fulfilment of contracts (Quinn & Jones, 1995). For 
Quinn and Jones (1995), therefore, agent’s responsibility is far wider than merely 
guaranteeing shareholders their economic results, as agency theory presupposes. 
The pressures of moral behaviour in relation to the markets and to the other 
stakeholders are equally important. 
Shankman (1999) concludes that agency theory is subsumed by stakeholder 
theory, and that due to its restricted perspective, managers should run a company in 
accordance with the stakeholder model of the firm. 
The contrary position to stakeholder theory, of authors like Jensen (2000) 
should be mentioned, maintaining that the company should follow only an objective 
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function, which is the value seeking of the company. For this author, the multiple 
objectives of stakeholder theory are in reality only strategic, and value creation, this is 
really the principal object to be attained. In this same sense, Sternberg (1999) calls 
attention to the fact that managers can sustain themselves through multiple diffuse 
objectives in the organization to justify decisions that are not necessarily conducive to 
value maximization of stockholders, thus causing a serious diversion in the agent-
principal relationship. 
In spite of this array of critics, agency theory is a powerful theoretical 
framework in many research contexts. Thus, the option chosen in this dissertation 
was to consider agency theory, whenever it is applicable, with complementary 
theories, as recommended by Eisenhardt (1989a). 
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CHAPTER III 
 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
III.1. Research methodology approach 
 
In the development of this thesis, I decided to avoid unproductive confrontation 
between qualitative and quantitative approaches, discussing which method is 
superior to the other. My understanding is that such a view is reductive and is based 
on an already overworked scientific discussion, only tending to impoverish it further. 
Clearly, each of both methodological strategies has advantages and limitations that 
are inherent. The qualitative methods, for example, are suitable for situations where 
one wishes to construct theories, allowing a greater depth in relation to research 
subjects and the reality that surrounds them. In turn, quantitative methods are 
pointed out as ideal for testing theories on the basis of statistically generalizable 
results. Yin (1994) indicates that questions like ‘how’ and ‘why’ have a more 
explanatory nature and should be treated by qualitative methods, while questions of 
‘who’, ‘what’ and ‘where’ have better treatment as quantitative data. 
Zhang and Wildemuth (2009) point out that the essential difference between 
quantitative and qualitative methods is that the former are deductive, aiming to test 
hypotheses generated from theories or previous empirical research. In contrast, 
qualitative methods are basically inductive, ‘grounding the examination of topics and 
themes, as well as the inferences drawn from them, in the data’ (Zhang & Wildemuth 
2009, p. 380). 
It is important to note that qualitative research is not necessarily opposed to 
quantitative; on the contrary, in certain situations, they can and should be 
complementary (Triviños, 1987; Goldenberg, 2002). Goldenberg (2002) maintains 
that the integration of quantitative and qualitative analysis is extremely important in 
allowing cross-checks and conclusions, through the technique of methodological 
triangulation, which aims to maximize the understanding of a phenomenon, in which 
the limits of one method are complemented by the other. Weber (1990) also pointed 
out that the best content-analytic studies use both qualitative and quantitative 
operations. 
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In line with this proposal, the present study was developed from an approach 
that combines qualitative and quantitative research. In its qualitative stage the use of 
non-participative direct observation was adopted at first in order to identify macro 
categories of corporate governance relevant in the study of family business in Brazil, 
which could then be refined through successive interviews within the process of 
building multiple cases, generating at the end a statement of theory. These case 
studies have allowed the identification of factors related to the tensions and conflicts 
involving the actors present in the family, ownership and management dimensions. In 
this sense, the qualitative phase was essential in providing the elements for the 
construction of the Family Business Conflict Agency Model, proposed by this 
research. 
 
III.2. Grounded theory 
 
As a qualitative methodology the grounded theory 
goes beyond merely counting words or extracting objective content from 
texts to examine meanings, themes and patterns that may be manifest or 
latent in a particular text. It allows researchers to understand social reality in 
a subjective but scientific manner (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, p.1). 
Among the existing qualitative methods, grounded theory was initially chosen 
as a methodology where theory emerges directly from real-world data collected 
during research. On the premise that a theory evolves through a process of research, 
Taber (2000) defines grounded theory as an inductive method of formulating theories 
through systematic and simultaneous processes of data collection and analysis, 
which are continuously interpolated. For Lings and Lundell (2005) the ultimate goal of 
grounded theory is to propose the construction of theories differing from other 
methods that claim only to verify the validity and applicability of certain theories to 
certain situations. 
The grounded theory grew in importance and recognition in the sixties by 
Barney Glaser and Andelm Strauss’ publication The Discovery of Grounded Theory, 
which sought to diminish the distance between theory and empirical research in 
social science. The authors intended in this way to offer an empirical basis for 
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theories based not on hypotheses, but on data, suggesting a logic and specificity for 
them and legitimizing qualitative research. 
In the following years, the originators of grounded theory continued to develop 
the method independently of each other, promoting a bifurcation in the original 
model. Warburton (2005) explains that Glaser emphasised a more ‘purist’ approach 
in which the construction of the theory was not influenced by the preconceived 
knowledge of the researcher, emerging directly from the data. But Strauss 
subsequently joined Corbin and both started to defend the legitimacy of the 
researcher associating other methodologies to grounded theory and applying their 
pre-existing perceptions and experiences whenever appropriate because what 
counts is to ensure the end result, which is to elaborate or extend existing theory 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Therefore, their assumption was more ‘pragmatic’ 
defending a more ‘structured’ attitude to theory building, and prescribing the use of a 
set of analytical tools and guiding principles (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). 
To Zhang and Wildemuth (2009) grounded theory comprises a process 
designed to condense raw data into categories or themes based on valid inference 
and interpretation. This process combines a deductive attitude to data analysis with 
inductive method. Through an inductive approach, researchers carefully examine and 
carry out data comparison, leading to the emergence of themes and categories. 
Otherwise, the approach is deductive when concepts or variables are proposed from 
theory or from previous studies (Berg, 2001). 
Thus, following Charmaz’s (2000) understanding of how grounded theory 
should be developed, this study chose to combine the two approaches, resulting in 
an iterative deductive / inductive process leading to successive approximation theory 
generation. This in no way invalidates the conduct of this research in accordance with 
the principles of grounded theory, after all, as expressed by Langley (1999) ‘we 
should not have to be shy about mobilizing both inductive (data-driven) and 
deductive (theory-driven) approaches iteratively or simultaneously as inspiration 
guides us’ (1999, p. 708). 
Before each step of data collection shown in Figure 3.1, in addition to the 
categories that have emerged in the process of data analysis of each of the cases 
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(inductive domain), the literature review carried out during the development of the 
study has influenced me, allowing me to make new connections with what was 
perceived during the development of cases, adjusting questions and making 
inferences that influenced the setting the questions and which, therefore, helped to 
shape the final model (deductive domain). 
The literature review which is presented in section V.5, therefore, cannot be 
interpreted as if it had been conducted after completion of all four cases. 
 
Figure 3.1 - The grounded theory 'data dance' 
 
 
 
          Source: Adapted from Kelsey, 2003 
 
In this recursive approach, each round of data collection is conditioned by 
what has been learned in the previous round of data analysis. This ‘data dance’ 
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proceeds iteratively so that theory is progressively refined, until a point of theory 
saturation is reached (Kelsey, 2003). 
An important point that should be stressed is that to conduct a case study, the 
development of the theoretical foundations represents the basis of support of the 
whole scope of the research, helping the researcher in the deepening and mastering 
of the theory. As Yin (1994, p. 28) recognizes in affirming that ‘theory development 
prior to the collection of any case study data is an essential step in doing case 
studies’. Such a statement, nevertheless, runs counter to the basic principal 
defended by grounded theory, eliminating the naive spirit that is expected of the 
researcher in his work. For Glaser (1998), whenever one opts to combine the use of 
both methodologies maximum care must be taken to ensure that basic principles of 
the development of a case study do not deform true emergence for theory creation. 
Thus, in combining the use of grounded theory and the case study, it should be made 
clear which of them is guiding the investigation. 
The fact that I have chosen as the basic theme of this dissertation, corporate 
governance in family-owned companies, which is for me a field little explored 
previously, has made the adoption of grounded theory more genuine, without 
significant contamination. Therefore, in this research the grounded theory was used 
as the prevalent methodology. 
 
 
III.2.1. Initial data collection 
 
According to Warburton (2005), the two conventionally acceptable sources for 
data in grounded theory studies are first person observations and face-to-face 
interviews. For the initial data collection, the non-participative direct observation tool 
was chosen. 
 
Non-participative direct observation  
 
Observation is one of the methods of data collection much used in the 
investigations of social sciences. In the method of non-participative observation the 
researcher observes the facts occurring in the group studied without manifesting 
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himself. These facts are observed directly by the investigator without intermediaries, 
reducing subjectivity. The researcher places himself in a situation that allows him to 
see the manifestations of the phenomenon to be studied without becoming involved, 
filling the role of spectator. This type of methodology is flexible because it permits the 
observer to register aspects perceived relative to facts and behavioural patterns as 
they occur and permits change of focus of observation should another become more 
interesting and suitable. Gil (1999) mentions specifically that among other 
advantages, observation permits obtaining the elements that define research 
problems. 
 
Unit of analysis 
 
In view of the scarcity of the literature on corporate governance in family- 
owned companies in Brazil and due to the easy access to the companies 
participating at family business programmes delivered by Fundação Dom Cabral1, the 
researcher has opted initially to convey a non-participative direct observation in the 
Programme for Shareholder Development - PSD, group MG-7, which started its 
activities in October 2006. The PSD includes family-owned companies that seek to 
develop present and future shareholders, providing them with the capacity to 
comprehend and exercise their responsibilities and rights related to management, to 
preserve and maximize the family patrimony. In the same way, they are encouraged 
to reflect on the succession processes, to ensure the longevity of the company. 
Each group develops itself in sessions of a day and a half per month, for one 
and a half years, delivering structured activities such as lectures, testimonies, formal 
classes, and in house project monitorships. Throughout the component activities of 
this programme, the researcher observed behavioural patterns and testimony in the 
debates, panels and exchanges between the participants within the programme. 
Ten companies made up the PSD group MG-7, all of them family-run, with the 
following profile (base Dec/2006): 
                                                 
1
 Fundação Dom Cabral (FDC) is a Brazilian business school founded in 1976, located in Minas Gerais State, 
Brazil. According to the 2011 Executive Education Ranking, published by the English newspaper the Financial 
Times, FDC reached the 5
th
 position among the most important business schools in the world. 
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Company Annual 
revenue 
Economic 
sector 
Time of 
existence 
Generation 
in control 
Capital 
structure 
Board of 
Directors 
Minas Medical 
School 
US$6.5 Mi Education 35 years 1
st
 Privately 
held 
None 
Kent and 
Brower Ltda. 
US$26.7 Mi Pharmaceutical 
and cosmetics 
retail 
29 years 2
nd
  Limited 
liability 
None 
Honey 
Designing  
US$2.8 Mi Furniture 
manufacture 
19 years 1
st
 Limited 
liability 
None 
Better 
Achievement  
US$14.0 Mi Technical 
Engineering 
Services 
11 years 1
st
 Limited 
liability 
None 
Go-gas US$160 Mi Petrol 
distribution 
23 years 2
nd
 Privately 
held 
None 
Milk & Candies 
S.A. 
US$192 Mi Dairy produce 45 years 1
st
 Privately 
held 
Present 
Bental US$950 Mi Telecom & 
Agribusiness 
52 years 3
rd
  Privately 
held 
Present 
Prize US$31.0 Mi Prefabrication of 
building 
components 
47 years 2
nd
  Privately 
held 
None 
Minas Agro 
Group 
US$14.0 Mi Fertilizer 
production 
14 years 2
nd
  Privately 
held 
None 
Mainstream 
Drugstore 
US$4.8 Mi Drugstore chain  73 years 1
st
 Limited 
liability 
None 
 
 Average annual revenue: US$ 140 Mi. (with large dispersion, ranging from a 
minimum of US$ 2.8 Mi. /year to a maximum of US$ 950 Mi. /year). 
 Economic sector: 30% industry, 30% services, 20% trade and 20% of 
agribusiness. 
 Average time of existence: 34.8 years, the oldest 73 and youngest 11. 
 Generation in control: 50% in the first generation, 40% in the second 
generation, 10% in the third generation. 
 Capital Structure: all observed firms were privately held. 
 Only two companies had a formal Board of Directors. 
 
 
III.2.2. Application of the method 
 
This stage lasted about a year, from October 2006 to September 2007. 
Despite the long-term investment, this was at the end vital time for the development 
of this research, since it was my first extensive contact with the universe of family 
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businesses. In my academic and professional history, my previous experience 
included the state-owned enterprises and multinationals in Brazil. 
Sixty hours were invested to monitor the initial modules of the program, which 
addressed the following issues: 
i. The vision and the dynamics of family business 
ii. Building relationships of trust 
iii. Pulverization of the patrimony and the new Civil Code of 
Brazil 
iv. Corporate asset and liability of owners and managers 
v. Organizational solutions: Shareholders Agreement, Holdings 
and Family Office 
vi. The basis of success and causes of failure in family business 
vii. Family myths and family and business relationships 
viii. Succession in ownership and in management. 
 
The initial intention of this phase was to establish the most relevant constructs 
on family business matter. I concluded, however, that the group’s dynamic was not 
supplying the necessary data that could contribute to this end. One of the central 
points that became increasingly clear was that the attitude of the group was only 
reactive to the points brought up for discussion by the professors, and was therefore 
contributing little to the emergence of genuine content that could actually 
characterize this stage as a real grounded theory process. 
From this assumption, I decided not to invest a further six months observing 
the other sessions and to start working directly on multiple-case studies, and from 
them, raise the hypotheses to be tested at the quantitative research stage. 
This observation stage, however, was positive for getting to know the group 
better, identifying the companies that best deserved to be the object of case study 
construction, and for establishing contacts that would facilitate the subsequent 
planning of the interviews. It was also important for the identification of common 
points of concern that should be taken into account in the preparation of the interview 
guide for the subsequent interviews in the case studies phase. 
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III.2.3. Results of non-participative observation 
 
Table 3.1 presents the main dilemmas that were identified during the 
application of the non-participative observation method in the PSD group MG-7. 
Table 3.1 - Results of non-participative observation 
 
 
Observed dilemmas Description 
Longevity 
Central element of concern of the firms participating in the 
programme. This is quite understandable, as the PSD´s proposal is 
exactly the training of shareholders of family-owned companies with 
the view to making the company’s life a long one. In the programme 
the role of family in management, the attributions of shareholders and 
the process of family succession were discussed. 
Principles and values 
According to participants' opinion, these elements act as ‘glue’ 
keeping the owning family bound to the company at the same time as 
they promote the continuation of the founders’ purposes. 
Succession 
It has emerged as an element of concern, albeit in a veiled way, 
especially when in the presence of the founder. Around this theme, 
special reference to the discussion about the importance of the level 
of competence required for key positions, and the tendency of parents 
to overestimate the abilities of their children were made. 
Presence of family 
members in 
management 
This was also a subject of discussion. Different types of family 
businesses were compared from the working family company, which 
admits every family member who wishes to work in it, regardless of 
their training, to those that are classified as family-run businesses, 
where the rules are very clear for admission of family member. 
Companies with family governance, where family members are 
incorporated only in the governance bodies were also considered. 
Trust 
The establishment of relations of trust also emerged as a major 
theme, whether between family members, or in relation to nonfamily 
managers. In this regard, two questions have attracted attention. The 
first was for a possible confrontation between confidence and 
competence; after all, what is more important: to have a reliable 
professional or one who will be able to deliver the expected results to 
the family? This apparent dichotomy, as if those attributes could not 
coexist, or even more, as if competence was not one of the main 
attributes for building trust in the business environment, creates the 
possibility of justifying the preference for family professionals because 
he/she naturally is the first choice in terms of reliability. 
Mechanisms of 
control 
Another issue that deserves mention was the discussion regarding to 
what extent the presence of trust reduces the need for more robust 
mechanisms of surveillance. 
Separation of family 
and company’s 
assets 
An awareness of the need to separate family assets from those of the 
company appeared as an element of concern regarding the 
professionalization of the company. 
Board of Directors 
The relevance and benefits of the adoption of a Board of Directors, as 
well as the presence of independent directors, has emerged as a topic 
of discussion. 
Source: Prepared by the author 
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Finally, another point of great interest was to understand how the IPO would 
be beneficial for family businesses in Brazil. To understand why this issue has 
entered in the agenda of meetings of the PSD, it has to be considered the historical 
capital market in Brazil in 2007. The volume of funds raised by Brazilian companies 
in initial public offerings that year amounted to $ 60.5 billion, a jump of 380% over the 
previous year, according to data from Thomson Financial Consulting, representing a 
total of 105 operations. On the same basis of comparison, the sector operations 
worldwide have expanded only 17%. 
The global financial crisis of 2008, however, strongly affected investor 
confidence, slowing the rush of companies to assess the possibility of seeking 
financing on the capital market and leading the researcher to no longer prioritize the 
IPO variable as part of the research. Figure 3.2 presents this evidence. 
Figure 3.2: Evolution of the Brazilian capital market 
 
              Source: ANBIMA and CVM (Brazilian SEC), 2011 
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III.3. Case studies 
As defined by Yin (1994) case studies are empirical studies of particular 
instances of a phenomenon that are usually based on a variety of data sources. We 
may build theories from case studies using one or more cases to create theoretical 
constructs from empirical evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989b). In constructing the 
theoretical model of agency conflicts in family businesses, I decided to use multiple 
case studies to build grounded theory, inasmuch as ‘theory building from case 
studies is likely to produce novel theory, juxtaposing contradictory and paradoxical 
evidence’ (Eisenhardt, 1989b, p.546).  
It is known that the case study is a method that allows investigating a 
particular problem in depth, identifying specific cases that stand out for their wealth of 
information, making it possible to shed light on a phenomenon more generally, from 
this specific example. Founded in US in the early 20th century, the case study was 
used primarily in the administration area, but it is currently adopted in the 
investigation of phenomena from various fields of knowledge (Gil, 1999). In the case 
study, I seek numerous and detailed information about the object of study in order to 
grasp the situation in its entirety. Although it is not possible to draw generalizations 
from a single case, since we cannot say that the results will be repeated in all the 
examples of the phenomenon under investigation, the detailed study of a particular 
case results in comprehensive knowledge of a specific reality, and the results 
achieved can enable hypotheses to be formulated for guiding further research 
(Triviños, 1987). It was so in the present study, seeking to understand the main 
tensions in relations between business and family, allowing the construction of a 
theoretical model of the prevailing conflicts in family businesses. 
Furthermore, the adoption of the multi case study method, as recommended 
by Yin (2005), allowed a deeper analysis of the phenomenon, encompassing the 
logic of planning, data collection techniques and approaches specific to their 
analysis. In addition, one must consider that multi cases have the advantage of 
showing results, generally considered more compelling and robust compared to 
single case studies (Yin, 2005). According to Eisenhardt (1991) multiple cases 
enable comparisons to be made to clarify whether a finding is valid only for a single 
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case or whether it is replicated in several cases. The line of reasoning used was the 
replication of results. After each significant discovery was announced, from a single 
experiment, the attempt was made to replicate it, refining the categories initially 
identified, through the second, third and finally the fourth case. 
After completion of the analysis of each of the four cases, the final step was 
initiated for the construction of the questionnaire to be used in the quantitative stage. 
In addition to the evidence and the results that unfold from the analysis of the cases, 
the theoretical basis was used as a counterpoint to the empirical results achieved, 
allowing the identification of gaps or strengthening the theories adopted. It followed, 
therefore, the logic provided in grounded theory, that the literature must only be 
researched in the final stage of the analysis, when the theory discovered might be 
confirmed. Thus, the contrast between the adopted theoretical and empirical 
evidence was used to structure and justify the elements present in the Family 
Business Agency Conflict Model. 
 
 
III.3.1. Interviews 
 
The method of data collection utilized for categories’ refinement was semi 
structured interviews. The main task in interviewing is to understand the meaning of 
what the interviewees say (Kvale, 1996). Thus, this is a technique of data collection 
very suitable for obtaining information on people’s sentiments, desires and intentions. 
It can be defined as a face to face dialogue between the investigator, who collects 
data, and the person investigated, who supplies information. According to Gil (1999), 
it provides a good opportunity to obtain information of greater accuracy and depth, 
and the possibility of clarifying doubts. 
The interview can be either formal or informal. The formal interview follows a 
concerted plan of action and is used when one wants in-depth information that can 
be found in private and with respondents recruited from predetermined sites (Chenitz 
& Swanson, 1986). The formal interviews can also be structured or unstructured. The 
structured interview is based on the premise that all responses should be comparable 
with the same set of questions capturing the differences between individuals. In the 
case of unstructured interviews, the interviewer doesn’t always try to get the same 
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kind of response using the same type of questions: the purpose is to get the 
information in the respondents' own words, get a description of situations and clarify 
details. Also to be mentioned are interviews where the two types are combined at 
different times, or  ‘hybrid interviews’, called semi-structured, which are moderately 
standard, but allow modification of the sequence and number of questions, and even 
the words used in each question. 
Important also to note, that the success of this method depends fundamentally 
on the level of the personal relationship established between interviewer and 
interviewee. The initial contact established during the period of accompanying the 
PSD - MG VII group has facilitated data collection via interviews. Even if not all the 
players necessary for data collection took part in the PSD’s activities, those who did 
constituted important channels of entry for all necessary interviews, including those 
that did not. All interviews were conducted personally by me, and in addition to the 
notes made at the time were also recorded. Thirty-four hours and thirty-nine minutes 
of recordings related to the interviews were stored, which after transcription, 
generated a vast amount of material for analysis. 
 
 
III.3.2. Interview guide 
 
A script to assist in conducting the interviews was developed as a data 
collection instrument. The main elements raised in the preliminary stage of non-
participative observation and supported by the initial literature review guide the 
formatting of the questions to be investigated in the interviews, as can be seen in the 
Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Origin of interview guide and its main questions 
 
 
Issues Source of issues Questions comprising the  
interview guide 
Agency 
conflict 
Berhold, 1971; Berle & 
Means, 1932; Jensen & 
Meckling. 1976; 
Mitnick, 2006; Ross, 
1973. 
Examples of conflict situations due to: 
 Lack of impartiality 
 Loss of confidence 
 Interests of the controlling family not 
being pursued 
 Lack of competence 
 Family rivalry 
 A quarrelsome succession process. 
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Competence Dilemma emerged 
during non-participative 
direct observation. 
 
 To what extent the criteria of 
competence are taken into account in 
hiring and promoting managers, 
regardless of kinship. 
Corporate 
cohesion and 
alignment 
Dilemma emerged 
during non-participative 
direct observation. 
 
 Family vision about the business. 
 Alignment of values between 
shareholders 
 Sharing of the vision and strategic 
alignment 
 Family unity and its impact on the 
alignment of the decision making 
process. 
Family 
Council 
Mustakallio, 2002  Existence of Family Council. 
 Family Council contribution in conflict 
management. 
 Family Council role in the planning of 
succession and in preparation of new 
generations. 
 Family Council as a tool of 
strengthening values. 
Family goals Astrachan & McMillan, 
2003;  Chrisman et al., 
1997;  Chirsman et al., 
2005; Davis, 1983; 
Olson et al. 2003. 
 Family definition of success. 
 Main financial goal outcomes 
considered by owners. 
 Dividend payment polices. 
 Family role in goal achievement 
IPO choice Dilemma emerged 
during non-participative 
direct observation. 
 
Mustakallio, 2002; 
Neubauer & Lank, 1998. 
 Projected growth and need for raising 
funds from third parties. 
 Interest in going public: reasons to 
compel and to prevent it. 
Longevity Dilemma emerged 
during non-participative 
direct observation. 
 The way the owning family considers 
longevity: keeping its control or, 
independently of this, preserving the 
existence of the company following its 
mission. 
 Possible trends regarding merges and 
acquisitions. 
 Risk profile of the family ownership 
group. 
Mechanisms 
of control. 
Dilemma emerged 
during non-participative 
direct observation. 
 
Jensen&Meckling, 
1976. 
 The decision making process within 
the company. 
 Mechanisms of planning and control 
adopted and its contribution to the 
business evolution. 
 Existence of a system of 
accountability which permits 
delegation, reward and attribution of 
responsibility for success and failure in 
the attainment of strategic targets. 
 Analysis of results compared to the 
defined strategies. 
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Presence of 
family 
members in 
management 
Dilemma emerged during 
non-participative direct 
observation. 
 
Chrisman et al., 1999. 
 History of the business and the 
involvement of family members in the 
company. 
 Policies concerning employment of family 
members. 
 Level of autonomy of nonfamliy 
managers. 
 Competitive advantages and limitations 
with the presence of the family in the 
business. 
 Source of income for the family members. 
Principles and 
values 
Dilemma emerged during 
non-participative direct 
observation. 
 
Basu, 2004; Donnelley, 
1988; Hollander & 
Elman, 1988. 
 
 Family values and cultural characteristics 
that influence the way the business is run. 
 
Role of Board 
of Directors 
(BD) 
Dilemma emerged during 
non-participative direct 
observation. 
 
Beckhard & Dyer, 1983; 
Moe, 1984. 
 
 BD existence and its real role. 
 BD details about its size, composition and 
profile of members. 
 CEO’s selection and performance 
appraisal. 
Succession Dilemma emerged during 
non-participative direct 
observation. 
 
Danes et al., 1999; Davis 
et al., 2000. 
 Description of previous succession 
processes. 
 Existence of rules of succession. 
 Competence and merit as principles for 
succession. 
 Process of legitimation of the successors, 
if any. 
Trust Dilemma emerged during 
non-participative direct 
observation. 
 
Bowie & Duska, 1990; 
Pollak, 1985. 
 
 Situations of breach of confidence. 
 Presence of opportunistic behaviour. 
 Lack of the necessary competence to take 
the organization within range of business 
results. 
 
Source: Research data 
 
 
An interview guide ensures that the same general areas of information are 
collected from each interviewee, but still allows a degree of freedom and adaptability 
in getting the information, which is essential in a grounded theory process. 
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III.3.3. Unit of analysis 
 
The body of qualitative research consisted of 26 individuals belonging to the 
four family businesses studied. These were chosen from among the twelve 
companies participating in the PSD group - MG7. 
As selection criteria, companies with different volumes of revenues, 
companies with different generations heading management, and companies with 
somewhat peculiar succession histories were chosen. 
In order to comply with the commitment to confidentiality assumed with those 
interviewed, all details such as the names of the company, of the founders and the 
family members were substituted by fictitious names, and data that could help to 
identify the organization were suppressed. 
Respondents were selected intentionally, rather than at random, which confers 
more objectivity on the data collection, because, as stated by Thiollent (1988), the 
delimitation of respondents represents an intentional way to access relevant 
information on the subject studied, from one group of informants. The choice fell on 
the following actors, when present in each of the companies: 
i. The owner(s) acting as CEO and/or Chairman of the Board of Directors. 
ii. The CEO/Chairman of the principal business whether member of the family 
or not. 
iii. At least one more member of the owning family (if any) that is active in the 
company business (as member of the board and/or employee). 
iv. At least one member of the owning family (if any) which has no participation 
either as member of the board or company employee. 
v. At least one active member of the owning family (as member of the board 
and/or employee) that represents a generation distinct from those previously 
represented (as a means of guaranteeing a multi-generation perspective). 
vi. At least one nonfamliy member in senior management of the principal 
business. 
vii. If there exists a significant nonfamliy partner who should be interviewed. 
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Regarding the definition of the number of respondents, the level of access and 
availability of the research subjects together with the criterion of saturation presented 
by Alberti (1990) were considered. This author states that at any given time, the 
interviews end up becoming repetitive, both regarding their content as also the 
manner of construction of the narrative, that the time has come to terminate the data 
collection. 
 
 
III.3.4. Secondary data gathering 
 
As a complement to the interviews, the basis of primary research data was 
supplemented by other documents requested such as statutes, minutes of meetings, 
internal reports, manuals and codes of ethics and conduct. Secondary data were also 
collected related to the organizations studied, including: newspaper clippings, 
information posted on company websites, articles, dissertations and other scholarly 
publications related to the organizations in question. 
The combination of primary and secondary data was important because it 
helped me to progressively broaden my understanding of the critical issues affecting 
the companies and incorporate new questions throughout the interviews which had 
not emerged naturally from the previous interviews, but which could then be explored 
in the following interviews based on what had been gleaned from the secondary data. 
Thus, I sought to establish data triangulation from the use of multiple sources 
of evidence, which, according to Yin (2005), enabled me to encounter a range of 
issues of a historical and behavioural nature and relative to attitudes, which have the 
advantage of consolidating converging school of thought. 
The objective here was to collect information that allows the researcher to: 
i. Construct the general profile of the owning family and of the company. 
ii. Map the principal strategic and business movements. 
iii. Describe the principal demographic and contextual data of the company 
environment. 
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iv. Register the principal results of the companies through financial reports, 
balances and others. 
v. Understand the governance model, the family structure and their 
interconnections. 
vi. Effect triangulations to corroborate information collected during interviews 
and observations. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
INTRODUCTION OF CASE STUDIES 
 
 
 
IV.1. The Milk & Candies Case 
 
 
IV.1.1. The company 
Milk & Candies S.A. is a company with activities in the dairy foods sector with 
the production of powdered milk, cream, condensed milk, chocolate preparations, 
milk-based sweet, butter and milk caramel. It is located in the state of Minas Gerais, 
and maintains branches or distributors in all the main commercial centres in Brazil. 
The company was created from the merger of two separate companies: 
Candies Brasil founded in 1935, in the interior of the state of São Paulo and White 
Milk, founded in 1948, in the State of Minas Gerais. In 1955, the then Candies Brasil 
initiated the manufacture of milk caramels, a product that became its trade mark. In 
its turn, in 1958, White Milk, which up to then had produced only butter, initiated the 
production of powdered milk. The acquisition of White Milk by the present controllers 
– Edgar Mills and Friedrich Haag – occurred in 1961. In 1963, the partners also 
became owners of Candies Brazil. Up to 1969, however, the two companies 
continued to operate totally independently. In this year, the Minas Gerais Integrated 
Institute of Industrial Development (INDI) was created, which offered various tax 
incentives to the controllers to transfer the White Milk factory from São Paulo to 
Minas Gerais. As the two factories were small, the controllers opted for merger, as 
they would gain greater economy of scale, due to the grouping of all the production in 
only one industrial unit. In this context, the current company name was chosen: Milk 
& Candies S.A. 
It is valid to emphasize that the tax incentive contract signed with INDI was not 
honoured by the Government of the State of Minas Gerais, a fact which brought great 
difficulties in its train for the new recently-incorporated company. It had repercussions 
during the whole of the 1970s, forcing the shareholders to make big sacrifices to pay 
off the liabilities acquired with the investments made in the structuring of the new 
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plant. In spite of all the difficulties, in 1973 they managed to complete the expansion 
of the powdered milk manufacture, going from a volume of 20 thousand to the 
processing of 120 thousand litres /day. 
In June 1980, a joint venture was made with Kraft Foods, the largest North-
American company in the food sector at the time, which took over 40% of the capital. 
In 1982, Kraft exercised the option of increasing its participation, becoming the owner 
of 60% of the share control of Milk & Candies. At this moment, Haag and Mills left the 
company direction, remaining only as members of the Board of Directors which had 
been established. In addition, at this time, Friedrich Haag and his family decided to 
return to Germany. 
In 1985, due to restructuring in its operations in Brazil, Kraft decided to relieve 
itself of the business, leaving it to Haag and Mills to resume the share control. These, 
in their turn, confirmed the executives that were in the command of the company, 
remaining themselves outside the daily routine of management. 
In 1990, the Collor Plan2 was decreed by the Brazilian Federal Government 
which involved the confiscation of company investments in the country, bringing new 
difficulties for Milk & Candies. The company, which had large stocks to meet demand 
during the off season, ended by entering into an accommodation with creditors.  
One of the consequences of this creditors' agreement was the acceptance of 
the entry of a new partner, John Harris, in order to leverage the necessary capital to 
recover the firm’s financial health. The amount made available by this current 
minority partner, was first contracted as a loan. Subsequently, he was invited to join 
the company due to the high interest he was charging and the incapacity to pay off 
the debt at that moment. Thus, from this moment on Milk & Candies’ capital structure 
has followed this distribution: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The Collor Plan was one of the three plans to stabilize inflation carried out during President Collor's two years 
in power. The first approach, adopted in March 1990, was freezing government liability (such as internal debt) 
and restricting money flow in order to halt inertial inflation. 
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Table 4.1: The Milk & Candies’ capital structure 
 
In 1993, Edgar Mills supported by his partner Friedrich Haag, decided to return 
to the company direction, bringing with him his sons, to be part of the executive body 
of Milk & Candies. 
The family management was sufficiently effective to turn the situation around 
and initiated, from 1994, a period of great dynamism, bringing vigorous expansion of 
the candies line with the acquisition of high production capacity equipment. In 2000, 
the project was concluded that represented the largest investment in one stage in its 
history (R$ 32 million), utilizing only its own resources. This project envisaged an 
expansion of the installed capacity in dairy product processing, jumping from 300,000 
to 800,000 litres of milk/day. 
In 2005, the company started its condensed milk, cream and milk-based drink 
plant, expanding processing capacity to 1,100,000 litres /day of milk. 
Since the return of the Mills family to the management, Milk & Candies has 
grown at an average rate of 18.5% per year, leading their controllers to estimate that 
even before 2018, it will be the largest dairy products family company in Brazil. 
Table 4.2 gives the evolution of some performance indicators of Milk & 
Candies from 2004 to 20073: 
Table 4.2: Milk & Candies’ Business Performance 
 
 
             Source: Research data 
                                                 
3
 This case study was undertaken in 2008, and therefore contains data only up to the year 2007. 
Shareholders % Capital 
Edgar Mills 
Friedrich Haag 
John Harris 
37.5 % 
37.5 % 
25 % 
Source: Research data  
Evolution of the figures  2004 2005 2006 2007 
Number of employees 1,110 1,226 1,223 1,443 
Net profit (in thousands) R$ 12,112 R$12,845 R$ -1,689 R$23,468 
Sales (in millions) R$ 286 R$ 347 R$ 346 R$457 
Net worth (in millions) R$27.4 R$39.0 R$ 37.3 R$54.9 
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IV.1.2. Profile of the interviewees 
Table 4.3: Milk & Candies’ profile of the interviewees 
 
 
 
 
IV.1.3. Members of the families 
In the following charts, the members of the Mills and Haag families are 
presented, those that were interviewed for this case study being given in green. 
 
Figure 4.1: Haag Family Tree 
 
 
Chairman 
Board 
member 
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Figure 4.2: Mills Family Tree 
 
 
 
Source: Research Data 
 
 
IV.1.4. Top Management Team 
Figure 4.3: Milk & Candies’ executive team 
 
 
 
IV.1.5. From the present harmony to the uncertain future – the succession 
issues 
In spite of various difficulties, including the creditors' agreement phase, the 
work and commitment of the two main partners of Milk & Candies were responsible 
for the company clearing up its debts and continuing growth. In this sense, in addition 
to the entrepreneurial profile of both, the fact that their views are in good alignment 
Edgar Mills Jr.
CEO 
Sales 
manager 
Adm/Fin. 
Director 
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and the relationship of trust constructed between them are pointed out, several times, 
as essential factors in the success of the business. 
(CI01) I think that the great trump card in the success of this company is that 
the two [Edgar and Friedrich] never left a subject pending. When they got out 
of step about a matter, which they couldn´t resolve immediately, they used to 
say: tomorrow we´ll return to this subject’. Sometimes one gave in, at other 
times it was the other, or perhaps the two found a happy medium between 
the two positions. (I02). 
(CI02) The two families have an almost absolutely identical idea in relation to 
the company and its development. [...] We are in such perfect harmony that 
it couldn’t be better. [...] I know that it is almost unbelievable, but Edgar and I 
have never had a disagreement. (I03). 
(CI03) It is very good seeing them always in agreement. It’s a positive thing. 
The day will never dawn when Edgar gives an order and tomorrow Friedrich 
countermands it (I05). 
(CI04) They work together, with cohesion. I think the respect that exists 
between them is very important. I think that my father and his brothers 
succeed in achieving this also, and it is something that I shall try to do and, I 
believe all my cousins also. (I06). 
(CI05) The integration between them is important even for keeping the staff 
pleased. We can see that they think together, from now to 20, 30 years 
ahead. They are almost 80 years of age and still think about what they are 
going to do in 10 years’ time. They create a common vision of the future. 
(I04). 
This alignment is perceived and appreciated even by the minority shareholder, 
who added:  
(CI06) They have been more than 50 years together. I have been a partner 
for 10 years and during this period I have always seen how the relationship 
between them is very good. Excellent indeed. (I07). 
In addition to valuing such alignment, John Harris has shown that he trusts the 
leadership of the Mills family, the reason why he systematically supports the main 
strategic decisions. Actually, he recognized that more than trust, the principal 
attribute that makes him agree with the other partners is the competence of the 
managing family. 
(CI07) They are very competent. It is not just a question of trust. It is that 
they are really competent, within the operational area as well as the 
financial, the responsibility of [Alexander] and [Edmond] respectively. What 
makes the difference is their quality. (I07). 
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In fact, both the 2nd and 3rd generations of the Mills family show that they 
deserve the recognition that they have from the other partners, as regards their 
competence, as well as from the staff and other family members. 
(CI08) In management, [Edmond] can already substitute [Edgar] in the 
function of CEO. And will do it very well. The other son is a well-centred 
person, the one who is directing the plant. And there is the first son who is in 
the company, but in a more subdued role. A grandson should also be 
mentioned who was nominated general sales manager for Brazil, not 
because he is a family, but because of his capacity, with my full agreement. 
He is 27 and does a very good job of work. Therefore, the sequence of the 
company management will certainly remain in the hands of people from the 
Mills family. (I03). 
(CI09) I joke with him [Edgar] that his children are better than he is. Because 
we had this concern about what would happen when he [Edgar] died. But I 
don´t worry about this anymore. [Edgar] has brought up his children based 
on professionalism and not on paternalism. (I04). 
Contrasting with this recognized competence of the Mills family in 
management, Milk & Candies has already gone through conflict situations arising out 
of the limited capacity of a nonfamliy CEO, Ernest Lopes. This happened precisely 
during the period immediately preceding the Mills’ return to the company and post-
creditors' agreement. There was the need for a strong restructuring process and 
Ernest did not come up to the demands that the company’s new moment required. 
Edgar Mills described his profile as being 
(CI10) [...] a very good person, a man of great good character, but very 
conservative (I01). 
For Edmond, there was a clear divergence of viewpoints between the 
controlling families and this CEO, on the investment profile and the risks that should 
be accepted to stimulate the growth of Milk & Candies. In his opinion, Ernest made a 
grave mistake in 
(CI11) [...] not looking at the market as it should be looked at, what direction 
it was taking and where we should position ourselves to increase our market 
share. The company went through a period without any investment in its 
industrial park, which certainly harmed it (I02). 
But in addition to this episode, the company also faced the typical agency 
conflict due to bad faith in the management of company resources. According to 
Edmond, the fact of the company Head Office previously being in Rio de Janeiro, far 
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from its industrial park, made greater control over company operations difficult, 
reinforcing the risk of opportunistic behavioural patterns. 
(C12) In April ‘97, [...] when we were doing an audit, we discovered fraud. It 
was a time of 40% inflation a month, which created a favourable atmosphere 
for deviousness. They had taken part of the company invoicing and 
deposited it in their own bank account, keeping the result of the financial 
applications and at the end of the month, returning only the value of the 
principal to the company [...] even directors were involved: and everyone 
was dismissed. They had set up a real racket there. So, we made the 
changes necessary to give transparency to our financial operations. (I02). 
If on the one hand, the harmony between the shareholders and the 
competence of the family managers seems to have removed any source of agency 
conflict in the short term, the succession process still remains a pressing source of 
tension. Apparently, it is tacitly agreed that in the absence of Edgar, the management 
will be assumed by his son Edmond. Although this decision appears in some minutes 
and documents required by creditor banks, the subject has never been formally 
discussed between the person succeeded and his potential successors. 
(CI13) It is not that this is a taboo subject. But we never sat down to talk 
about it. My brother [Alexander] himself has already said: ‘[Edmond], I don´t 
have the slightest desire to deal with the business. It ends up with a CEO 
now and again having to curry favour with the politicians, to participate in 
social events. I am very well here in the factory, I like what I do. I don´t want 
to leave here. As far as I am concerned, you can definitely count me out’. He 
says to me: ‘the person my father is preparing is you’. OK, but dad [Edgar] 
doesn´t encourage discussion of this subject. Because he doesn´t say 
clearly when he is going to leave. (I02). 
Even without the existence of formal planning to guide the passage of 
management from the 1st to the 2nd generation, Edmond states that he feels up to 
taking over the challenge of running the family business. Supported by his long 
experience within the organization and in the establishment of good relations with the 
principal stakeholders involved in the business, he sees the transition as a natural 
process and actually already occurring. Although the reluctance of the person about 
to be succeeded in defining the date of his departure, or even the excessive respect 
shown by everyone in even mentioning the subject, permits everyone to have their 
own opinion as to when this process will actually come to pass. 
(CI14) So the natural order of things is that I will take over the position of 
CEO. And I even believe that it will be next year. My father said years ago 
that he would go on until he was 80. Now that the 80 is arriving, he might 
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even change his mind. But even he, now and again says: I am really very 
tired’. (I02). 
(CI15) I personally promised my children that I would retire when I was 85, 
but I am already regretting it, because it is arriving. It is going very quickly. 
And I think that naturally I will be succeeded by [Edmond], as my other son 
really likes the production side. (I01). 
(CI16) My grandfather’s life is the company. Whenever I went to the factory, 
ever since I was small, he showed it to me as if he was pointing out a baby 
in the nursery [...]. Sincerely, I don't see him today leaving the business 
alive. Only if his body doesn´t let him [...]. And I told him to stay 15 days or 
so at the farm, to rest a little. Then he starts to say that we want to get him 
out of there and said: I only leave in a horizontal position’ (laughter). And I 
think that this will be precisely what will happen. His life is in here. (I05). 
As, therefore, the most probable outcome for the succession has never been 
discussed openly, the possibility cannot be completely ruled out that after Edgar’s 
death, conflicts or disputes will break out in the controlling family. Nor can the 
possibility be entirely disregarded of the existence, even if veiled, of divergent 
interests that have not yet surfaced out of respect for the presence of the founder, 
perceived as the moral reference of the family and the company.  
Another point of apparent disagreement, relates to the insertion of the 3rd 
generation of the Mills family in the business. Such concern is justified by the 
increase in complexity of the corporate issues due to the multiplication of the number 
of shareholders and potential successors when one considers the members of the 
coming generations.  
(CI17) Unfortunately my grandfather is not eternal. Therefore, I hope that his 
successor, who will probably be my father, or one of my uncles, has the 
vision that he has. Now, when the turn of the grandchildren arrives, I do not 
know how it will be. Because now it is easier to deal with the succession, as 
there are only three options. But, when we get to the next generation, with 
ten grandchildren, it will not be so easy. The people are still young and not 
all of them are here within the company. There will have to be preparation, 
an overseeing of everyone (I06). 
In order to resolve this problem, the creation of formal rules to regulate the 
entry of family members in the company is stressed as indispensable. The prevailing 
idea is that capacitation and competence are primordial factors for the insertion of 
family members in the business. And that, accordingly, the adoption of objective 
criteria will help to prevent family ties speaking louder in the contracting processes of 
new managers. Edmond highlights among them: three years external experience in 
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organizations that do not belong to the family; a year abroad, working in one’s area 
and; a post-graduate or MBA course in areas related to the occupation that one 
wants in the family company. But such rules still seem to be more in the field of 
intentions than of effective application, in accordance with what can be gathered from 
the quotes below in connection with this matter. 
(CI18) This is a question that I am very concerned about. I see my cousins 
entering the company and I think that they should be tested a little more. But 
they are entering. I am third generation and how can I question another 
member of the same generation that is also entering? I have to stay silent, 
but I am a little worried about it. (I05). 
(CI19) If the family member is a good professional, why refuse him or her? It 
doesn´t make sense. But it also cannot become a rule, where everyone gets 
something for a relation, a son, a husband. (I06). 
(CI20) I have requested our HR Manager to put in place the conditions as 
regards the entry of family members into the company. I told him exactly 
what I wanted. To go in is one situation, to rise up is another [...]. We cannot 
allow this to become a ‘jobs for the boys’ situation for the family [Mills]. (I02). 
To pass a phase of one’s career working in another company that is not 
owned by the same family seen as an important factor in making it possible for the 
successors to accumulate prior experience and to start in the company with the 
capacity to aggregate new visions and ideas. In addition, professional maturity and 
the recognition achieved in the market are also perceived as fundamental for raising 
the self-confidence of the successor, helping him or her in their legitimization with the 
executive group and the other family members involved in the business. 
(CI21) I think that it is very important working outside! Because I did, I was 
promoted, I had a good career. This I think gives you a little more 
confidence. Whoever works in the family company, deep down, right deep 
down, always has that doubt: ‘if I were a normal employee, what my salary 
would be? Would I be here in this position?’ I am untroubled, because I 
came here earning the same salary that I was earning in the market. But 
before I really had this doubt: ‘Am I here only because I am a grandson?’ 
(I05). 
The fact is that, based on the discourses of the interviewees of the 3rd 
generation, the bond existing with the company is patent, as also is the desire to 
make their careers there. 
(CI22) My future is working in [Milk & Candies]. I never thought that my 
career would be here. I left, but my path brought me back. (I05). 
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(CI23) I know that [Milk & Candies] is priority in my life. You grow up hearing 
about the company, at the family lunches everyone is there speaking. I 
always had this curiosity. Ever since I was a child I visited the factory [...]. 
And I am very close to my grandfather. I had a lot to do with him when I was 
small. So I have many stories, I am very linked to all this. It is part of my life. 
And it is not easy to disconnect from a thing like this, from a bond like this. 
(I06). 
 
 
IV.1.6. Values, conduct and role comprehension 
The controllers of Milk & Candies demonstrate that they run the company 
based on solid values, which can help in the alignment of the family members, 
providing a common vision of the business, a greater convergence in the decisions 
and, also, attenuating the risk of disputes and family conflicts. 
(CI24) I think that I and my cousins grew up with the same values: the ethics, 
the same human understanding, the same value that people give each 
other, are things that we learned since we were small. (I06).  
A quite common posture to be found in family-owned companies is the 
difficulty of the separation between company assets and those of the owners, 
especially in those with more than one controlling family block, as is the case of Milk 
& Candies. The attitude of benefiting from company services for personal ends, in 
addition to creating costs for the company, can nourish quarrels with the other 
partners in the business. On Edgar’s part there exists great zeal in avoiding any 
patrimonial posture that could encroach on the other two family blocks that delegate 
to the Mills family the management of the company. This concern seems be a value 
that is transferred to the other generations. 
(CI25) It is striking how careful he [Edgar] is with this. He separates this very 
well. He knows that he is only one of the partners in the company. For 
example, he has a farm and if he takes a refrigerator there, he wants to 
charge for the use of the company truck. We can even argue: ‘But [Edgar], 
the truck’s got another delivery nearby, we´ll have to go past the front door’. 
But he will not accept it. He separates company assets from his own very 
well. (I04). 
(CI26) A thing that troubles me is when someone of the family takes a driver, 
I know not where. This irritates me profoundly. Because I don´t do this, ever. 
I think that the business has to maintain the family in a different manner. It is 
not generating expenses for the company, but through dividends. (I05). 
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It is valid to point out that these family values do not affect only the future 
generations of the family, but also influence the vision of the company staff and their 
conduct. Accordingly, it is possible to infer that the family character of the company 
can help in the dissemination of a code of conduct for all who work in it and to 
contribute to the establishment of a healthy work atmosphere. From the operational 
point of view, these aspects are translated into a low rate of rotation. 
(CI27) I feel good working here. I see that he [CEO] has ethics. [...] I think 
that to work in the family company, you find this ethical spirit. No one has the 
courage to propose anything wrong to him [Edgar]. Therefore, he is an 
example for the staff. His children also were brought up this way. This was 
the direction that he gave them [...] my pride in working here is because of 
the ethics. [Edgar] taught the staff here to reflect his attitudes. (I04). 
(CI28) I think that this family environment is a very good place to work in. So 
much so that staff rotation is very low. This helps the professional to grow, 
which can be seen by the fact that many staff that started with me in the 
lowest functions are today already in positions of leadership. For the family, 
honesty is everything. And whoever works in the company gets this 
message. (I05). 
In relation to the nonfamliy managers, the controllers seek to adopt salary 
policies identical to those practised for the family managers. Equality of treatment 
indicates that there exists a maturity in relation to the understanding of the roles of 
the controllers, who understand that salary and professional valorisation should 
extend to the whole executive body of the company, independently of the existence 
of family ties. It can be inferred that this posture can help in the convergence of 
viewpoints between controllers and managers, minimizing the risk of agency 
conflicts.  
(CI29) The directors have the same salaries [...]. I mean, all directors, family 
or nonfamliy, have the same salary and, they are evaluated in the same way 
by the delivery of their results. (I01). 
Another fundamental point, capable of contributing to the alignment between 
owners and managers, relates to the tradition of internal promotion, giving priority to 
the staff longer in the company in the assumption of management positions. 
Promoting on the basis of time in the company is, up to a certain point, a career plan, 
albeit informal, and generates Fidelity in the executive body by providing growth 
opportunities within the company. The reservation to the adoption of such a policy is 
that the filling of executive positions only by internal promotion brings with it the risk 
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of maintaining the same strategic vision, making the rise of other, perhaps more 
innovating, ways of thinking, more difficult. These might be aggregated if experienced 
professionals drawn from other companies were to be contracted in the market. On 
the other hand, the promotion of managers linked for decades to the company 
presents the advantage that it maintains and deepens the already incorporated links 
of trust, minimizing the occurrence of opportunistic behavioural patterns or actions of 
bad faith on the part of the managers. 
(CI30) He [CEO] has not sought directors in the market. He has sought 
internal promotion, finding the in-house potential that we have. [...] Internal 
valorisation is a company practice. (I04). 
(CI31) All our directors [...] are men that have been more than 25 years with 
us. [...] they are very committed and always much aligned. (I02). 
It is important to emphasize that the work of nonfamliy managers is positively 
evaluated by the family members who work in the company, who state that it is an 
advantage to maintain distance between them and possible family problems, which 
would affect directly the managers belonging to the family. In this sense, at present, 
of the seven directorships, only three are held by family managers. It is valid, 
however, to stress that this panorama can suffer alterations due to the interest in 
management positions shown by the 3rd generation, whose members are already in 
the majority concluding their higher education and looking for their space in the work 
market.  
(CI32) Our company is a family managed one, but this does not prevent 
executives who are not shareholders having the possibility of reaching an 
executive position. We have four directors that are not shareholders; we are 
not people who only think about their children and grandchildren. The 
company is for those who have the ability to exercise the function for which 
they are nominated. (I03). 
(CI33) Many people that are here today as directors, are not family 
members. They are extremely respected and fulfil an essential role. Nor 
does everyone from the family have the aptitude for the positions that the 
company offers. And perhaps the management of a person who is not from 
the family even avoids family conflicts. (I06). 
Respect for the hierarchy of the organization is stimulated by the family 
managers even in cases that involve individuals belonging to the family, placing the 
authority of nonfamliy managers above kinship ties. This standard of behaviour helps 
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to strengthen the clear separation between family questions and the organizational 
environment, in addition to avoiding the draining away of the authority accumulated 
by the nonfamliy managers. 
(CI34) To be in the company, to be of the family and have a hierarchical 
superior that is not from the family, I don´t have a problem with this. My boss 
is a nonfamliy director and I never go over his head. I always try my utmost 
to see that the decisions flow through him [...] And I get on very well with 
him. (I05). 
(CI35) So much so that my son when he came here to do an internship, we 
had a meeting, I, him and the [nonfamliy director] and I said: ‘look, I asked 
her [director] and she met my wishes with this internship. Now, you are here 
inside the company, it depends only and exclusively on you. If she arrives 
tomorrow and tells me that you are not interested in anything, it´s not going 
to work out. It´s over, my friend, I am not going to keep you here’. I cannot 
demand results from her with a team that I want and that she doesn´t. So 
this was clearly established in his head [...]. It is not because he is a son, a 
grandson that he will be favoured. I said to him: ‘you have come to work 
here; your boss is her over there, sort what is necessary out with her. Don´t 
involve me in your questions of work’. (I02). 
On the other hand, due to the double role concentrated in the figure of the 
family members, that is, of staff and also of future shareholders, it was possible to 
detect the existence of a differentiated treatment by some nonfamliy managers of 
company heirs. This fact does not cause great surprise, as the power relations rooted 
in this type of organization demand of nonfamliy executives the capacity to articulate 
politically with the potential successors who will substitute the present controllers as 
much in the field of property as of management. 
(CI36) Clearly they treat us differently in the company. It is a natural thing. 
The directors, even with me being in a position below them, they talk in a 
different way, only because tomorrow I shall be a company shareholder. 
(I05). 
(CI37) There is this... (laughter). I myself, if I could choose I would prefer to 
have working below me someone who is not the owner’s son. Even if they 
do know very well how to separate these things, not demanding privileges, 
we end up adopting a more reserved posture. It’s natural. (I04). 
 
IV.1.7. Family management, property and governance 
In agreeing to the entry of a new partner, John Harris, during the crisis period 
that the company was going through at the start of the 1990s, Mills and Haag, had to 
live with the a partner, that apparently did not share the same vision and values that 
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they had, which always brings with it the possibility of conflicts between majority and 
minority shareholders. This latent tension is evinced in the following quotation.  
(CI38) During the period 1985 to 1993, when we had the problem of the 
creditors' agreement, he was our customer (really he is a customer to this 
day), who loaned money to the company, at very high interest: a real 
moneylender. And when we saw that this was going to harm us a lot, we 
admitted him as a partner and today he has 25% of the voting capital, being 
part of our Board. (I01). 
Up to the present, Harris has behaved as passive partner, filling the role 
known as that of sleeping partner. Sleeping partner is one that invests money in a 
company, but does not involve himself in the daily routine. This type of partner can 
represent a useful source of short term funds, however, in the long term some 
conflicts can emerge as pressure builds up for the entry of members of his family 
block to take over managerial positions in the company. In addition, there can be 
pressure to increase the margin of annually distributed dividends on the result 
achieved by the company. This second point is especially relevant in the case of Milk 
& Candies, as, historically the controllers have used the company’s positive results 
for new investments to stimulate growth, always relegating the distribution of 
dividends to second place. Such problems, however, did not break out, but, as if 
anticipating this possible situation the majority controllers have already been ready to 
buy the shares belonging to the minority partner, but due to the continuous phase of 
growth that the company was passing through in recent years, this offer has been 
systematically declined. 
(CI39) He [John Harris] thinks that [Milk & Candies] is a guarantee of his 
future, of his wife and children. He is partner of a very certain business, very 
cohesive. Accordingly, his attitude is always one of not opposing anything, 
always following our opinion and that of [Haag], which are very much based 
on consensus. The effective decision is always from all of us. (I02). 
(CI40) [Mr. Haag] now and again says: ‘Ah! There is no dividend?’ But if 
there is an investment further down the line and the company will require 
cash, he is not greedy and agrees in cutting dividends. Now it is more 
difficult with [John Harris] because he is an investor. He entered the 
business, so he wants his return at least that guaranteed by law, 25%. (I02). 
(CI41) My children are working and for the time being I do not see the least 
need to think about them entering the company. If tomorrow or in the future it 
becomes necessary, then we can sit down and talk. But not now. (I07). 
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In relation to the corporate issues present in the Mills family, Edgar affirms that 
in the future he sees the creation of a family holding company, directing the members 
of the coming generations to fill positions on the board or simply exercising the role of 
company shareholders. This option would be a way of preventing positions in the 
company being disputed by future generations of the family, which, naturally are 
growing at a rate far superior to the company’s capacity to absorb them. In addition, 
in the absence of the current CEO, the risk is eliminated that family ties are utilized 
as a criterion for contracting executives, in detriment to the level of competence 
required for the function. Among the present initiatives which are in harmony with this 
objective, the participation of various Mills family members in a programme for the 
development of shareholders can be singled out, which seeks to prepare the coming 
generations to carry out this function satisfactorily. 
(CI42) I have a project for a family holding, because there are no ‘jobs for the 
boys’ here. If not, I would be prejudicing the company. What will they be? 
They will be partners of the holding company and will have shares of the 
firm. Thus, no-one will be automatically an employee. […] Today they are 
grandchildren, in a short while they will be great-grandchildren. And after that 
comes daughter-in-law, sons-in-law. (I01). 
Regarding the maintenance of the company under the control of the family, the 
existence of three family blocks has to be taken into consideration, each with its own 
conditions and interests. Obviously the greatest stake is that of the Mills family, if only 
because of the already mentioned desire of the third generation in making their 
careers within the company. In the case of the Haag family, Friedrich has two 
daughters and no grandchildren, which, in the future could signify a change of this 
interest as regards the maintenance of share participation. The fact of them living in 
Germany leads one to believe that succession in the Haag family will be limited to 
participation of the successors only on the Board of Directors. 
(CI43) On the part of the family [Haag] my daughters evidently will have 
more the function of board members, of watching as the company develops 
and taking care of their patrimony. (I03). 
(CI44) For me there is a very big question mark [...]. Today [Mr. Haag] is 
over 75, so if there is some problem with him, I do not know what the course 
of the daughters will be as regards the company [...]. What I perceive of him 
today is that he is concerned with integrating his daughters with the 
business. One year one comes, another year another comes to Brazil. 
Formerly they were not very linked, but now they seem more interested. One 
of them already is even a board member. (I05). 
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(CI45) Our intention is to maintain control in the present families. But one 
never knows what will happen in the country. I always keep my mind open to 
other possibilities, although not in the form of concrete plans. But the 
intention is to continue as a family company, as it is now. (I03). 
(CI46) We have already had offers of acquisition. And they were definitely 
not rejected. We have a business to negotiate. They make their due 
diligence and I make my valuation. After that, I multiply by five. If they accept 
it, we have a deal. (laughter). (I01). 
In order to regulate all the issues that surround the property of the company a 
shareholders' agreement has already been developed and signed between the 
partners and main heirs of the business. However, as the informal relationships and 
the ties of trust between the controllers of the 1st generation prevail, who still account 
for the company shares, the agreement is perceived as an instrument intended to 
become effective only for the coming generations. 
(CI47) I see this shareholder agreement merely as formalization and which 
will be much more useful for the coming generations. Because, while [Mr. 
Edgar] and [Mr. Haag] are talking, the word will be much stronger than any 
formal document. So, when we drew up the shareholder agreement, those 
who were working here, we all signed it, with the intention of defending the 
company patrimony. (I02). 
In relation to the governance structure, Milk & Candies possesses a Board of 
Directors that functions only in a pro forma way. Because it is a closed capital 
corporation, at the moment with only three distinct shareholders – the two majority 
shareholders demonstrating a high degree of alignment – in the view of the 
controllers, a more structured and active board is unnecessary. The Milk & Candies 
board is at present composed of six members, who are:  
 Friedrich Haag (chairman); 
 Edmond Mills (Vice-president); 
 Gemma Haag (Member and daughter of Mr. Haag); 
 Alexander Mills (Member and brother of Edmond); 
 John Harris (Member and minority partner); 
 Evan Smith (Member and longest serving employee in the company). 
Haag gave voice explicitly to his belief that an active board is necessary only 
for larger companies and that the reigning informality is even an advantage because 
it confers greater agility on the decision taking. 
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(CI48) What occurs is that because of family questions I am here in 
Germany and I am leaving the executive part for [Edgar], for his colleagues 
and sons. But we are permanently in contact by telephone, and e-mail, and 
naturally personally. Depending on the problems I go to Brazil, or we meet in 
Paris to discuss them, mainly the most important matters of strategy. (I03). 
(CI49) We are extremely informal. At times, we decide things by phone and 
afterwards draw up the minutes. Now we have the possibility of having 
electronic meetings. We didn´t even have this before. (I01). 
(CI50) Speed of reply. I think that our great trump card is this. (I02). 
(CI51) [The decisions are] very fast. It is one of the advantages of working in 
[Milk & Candies]. Rapid and with quite a lot of autonomy. You do not have to 
continually be asking for a blessing. When the directors trust you they give 
you autonomy [...]. They look at the results. They do not pester you every 
day. It is a company that responds very rapidly. (I04). 
Despite the perception of the suitability of the governance model in force in 
Milk & Candies, where the two main shareholders are the real strategic decision 
takers, there is a concern demonstrated by the probable successor, where a formal 
board may be an important element for his legitimization in the absence of his father, 
and may help in possible disagreements with the other family managers. 
(CI52) I think that we will have to be more methodical and work accordingly. 
Because, before, the company was much smaller, making it easier to control 
the business. But from three years ago up to now, we went from four 
directors to seven. [...]. It is not so easy to manage the company as it was. 
We will have to improve the governance of our board, still more faced with 
[Edgar]’s possible departure of As he is the founder, there exists very great 
respect, but when I sit in his chair, what will it be like? My brother is another 
director and I will be the CEO. Will he respect my position? Everything will 
have to be negotiated so that there does not exist any doubt. (I02). 
In spite of his physical distancing, in opting to return to his country of origin, 
Haag insists in keeping close to the reality of the company, reinforcing the bonds 
existing between the two controlling families. 
(CI53) [Mr. Haag] is not involved in the daily routine. He lives in Germany, 
but whenever he can, he is here [...] And his relationship with the family is 
very strong. He always comes for birthdays, family parties. I think this is very 
important, as it keeps the ties tight. (I06). 
(CI54) I accompany everything: the invoicing, the financial data, the 
launching of new products. But I am also watching even the social part, the 
parties with staff. 
 
75 
   
IV.2. The Bental Case 
 
IV.2.1. The company profile 
Bental is a family controlled, closed capital corporation, with a professional 
management, active in different economic segments, and established in various 
Brazilian states. It takes this name in honour of its founder, as a result of joining 
BENedito with TALma. 
Enjoying good financial health, in 2007 it reached a value of over US$1 billion 
for net income from operations, EBITDA of more than US$ 200 million, and CAPEX 
of around US$120 million. 
 
 
IV.2.2. Profile of the interviewees 
 
 
Table 4.4: Bental’s profile of the interviewees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Code Name Position Reason to be interviewed Date Duration 
I8 Antônio 
Luiz Talma 
Chairman Member of the owner family 
acting as Chairman (2
nd
 Gener.) 
7/5/2008 1h34 min 
I9 Pedro 
Talma 
CEO Member of the owner family 
acting as CEO (3
rd
 Generation) 
7/5/2008 1h32 min 
I10 Maria 
Talma 
Silveira 
Chair of the 
Family 
Council 
Member of the owner family not 
active in the company (3
rd
 Gen.) 
6/3/2008 1h05 min 
I11 Margareth 
Talma 
Silveira 
Commercial 
Assessor 
Member of the owner family 
active in the company (3
rd
 Gen.) 
5/3/2008 1h50 min 
I12 Júlio Talma Board 
member 
Member of the owner family not 
active in the company (4
th
 Gen.) 
7/5/2008 1h25 min 
I13 Kleber 
Barbosa 
HR Director Non-family member in senior 
management position 
5/3/2008 1h27 min 
I14 Emerson 
Dias 
Controller Non-family member in senior 
management position 
19/3/2008 1h13 min 
I15 Giuseppe 
Mancini 
Board 
member 
Former non-family CEO and 
actual board member 
20/9/2008 1h08 min 
Source: Research data 
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IV.2.3. Stages in the development of the company 
It is possible to analyse Bental’s evolution divided into six distinct phases: (i) 
foundation, growth and diversification; (ii) time of crisis and start of 
professionalization stage; (iii) building trust in a contentious environment; (iv) 
transition phase with other nonfamliy CEOs; (v) the return of the family to 
management control and the future generations; (vi) establishment of formal 
structures of Governance. In Figure 4.4 below the time line that details these different 
phases can be visualized. 
Figure 4.4: Bental time line 
 
          Source: Prepared by the company. 
 
 
(i) Foundation, growth and diversification 
The history of the group studied goes back to the enterprising activities of its 
founder, Benedito Talma, born at the beginning of the last century, son of Portuguese 
peasants. In search of better opportunities, his father decided to follow in the 
footsteps of his brothers and move to Brazil in 1914, leaving behind his wife and four 
children. As the eldest son and the ‘man of the house’, Benedito had to start working 
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while still young, to help in the family upkeep, without, however, abandoning his 
studies. 
The family was united again at the end of the 1st World War, when the father 
returned to Portugal to fetch them. The whole family moved to Brazil, in 1919, when 
Benedito was then 12 years old. The start of the Talma family in Brazil was beset 
with difficulties. Settled on a farmstead in the interior of the country, they gained their 
livelihood from the cultivation of the land. Benedito, who had four other Brazilian 
brothers, had several occupations in his youth: he was a mason’s mate, a smith, a 
mechanic, a lorry driver and became quite proficient in the handling and maintenance 
of machinery used in rice cultivation and processing. 
In 1933, he started his first business enterprise with his father and brothers, 
acquiring a machine for the processing of rice. From 1941 on, he changed his field of 
activity, convinced that the initial company would not be profitable, and rented a 
petrol station, succeeding in expanding this business. Subsequently, in 1944, he 
decided to merge his company with that of his brothers creating Irmãos Talma Cia. 
Ltda. which commenced its operations in the automobile / lorry resale field. Business 
prospered and, ten years later, Benedito led the constitution of a new company, 
Bental Services a public services concession which was to become the most 
outstanding business for him and for the group he had created. Benedito’s main 
reason for this new undertaking was to provide the region with an essential service 
that it lacked, with the quality and ready availability necessary to meet the 
population’s needs. 
In 1959 and 1964 respectively, Nilton, the eldest son, and Antonio Luiz, the 
youngest entered the business, coinciding with a period of rapid business expansion 
through the acquisition of other companies. However, as a result of the government 
policy of nationalization of services in the field where they operated, launched at the 
start of the 1970s, the company was deprived of possibilities for growth through 
geographical expansion. Even more important than this was the fact that, Benedito 
and his sons, afraid that the licence would possibly not be renewed, started to seek 
out new investment opportunities, which led to a great diversification of the group. 
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In this period, it is important to note that in addition to the business success 
achieved, the essential principles and values that to this day permeate the family and 
the organization were laid down: 
(CII01) The principles and values of an organization are born with its 
founder, and we greatly venerate the figure of our founder. Not because of 
the success that he had or the material gain that he achieved. But for the 
principles and values that he preached his whole life. (I09). 
  
It is commonly said that the company ends up being a mirror of the family, and 
reflects, accordingly, the values that are the basis of the family group. The Talma 
family has always cultivated firmly-rooted values such as work, thrift and simplicity, 
values which have been transferred to succeeding generations and have also 
influenced the organizational culture. 
(CII02) The business culture is a catechism. It is an act of faith. […] The 
example has to come from the controlling shareholder. And this has much to 
do with the manner of being, of the family DNA, so to speak [...] The 
fundamental thing for the transfer of these values is our leadership by 
example. If you don’t have the CEO practising them, and the directors and 
managers as well, it will not happen (I09). 
Although this initial phase of growth and development was a period of 
establishing such principles and values of the founder, which have started to 
permeate the whole organization and be a reference for future generations, this 
period also became marked by difficulties related to the interface between the family 
and company dimensions. Benedito Talma was known as a rigid man in his treatment 
of employees and family, but at the same time, a person with a ‘soft heart’. He did not 
see the company predominantly from the economic perspective, thinking only of 
profit. Because of his childhood with its great financial restrictions, the emigration of 
uncles and father in the search for work outside the country of their birth, and the fact 
of taking over the responsibility for the other siblings so early, Benedito started to 
have a vision that the company should be a means of livelihood and a guarantee of 
jobs for the whole family. It should be remembered that being a Portuguese family, 
the first generation of the Talma’s in Brazil adhered to those typical Portuguese 
characteristics of attachment to tradition and concern for strengthening family ties. 
Such characteristics formed a suitable environment for the forceful presence of 
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Benedito’s altruism, leading him to contract family members to work in the company, 
independently of their capacity, competence or level of commitment.  
(CII03) Dad came from Portugal to find work. He got it into his head that he 
should generate jobs for the family to work, so that they were not 
unemployed. And every time you tend to extremes there are abuses. So 
there were people from the family who drew their salaries without working, or 
producing very little. Together with these, there were others who worked 
themselves to the bone to cover them. [...] My father [the founder] took his 
brothers-in-law who didn´t have a profession, didn´t have anything, they 
were simple people, and he gave them a position as managers. […] They 
didn´t want to work, didn´t want to do anything. They harmed the 
organization. (I08) 
Another point that deserves mention was the absence of formal mechanisms 
of control and management in the organization. The entrepreneurial profile of the 
founder up to a point was able to impose the objectivity and dynamism necessary for 
the growth of the business. However, allied to the lack of a distinction between the 
family and professional roles, the absence of a system of structured management led 
the company into difficulties.  
(CII04) At the start, the company was a family thing. Everyone entered it, 
thought they were the owners of it, and it was a mess. Imagine it! There 
were no rules. (I15)  
 
(ii) Time of crisis and start of professionalization stage 
Between 1987 and 1988, Bental went through a severe financial crisis, 
because of a phase of accelerated diversification, added to the altruistic practices 
and also to the lack of appropriate management mechanisms, as reported by one of 
the nonfamliy executives that experienced it. 
(CII05) [...] we went through a great crisis. We had diversified the group a lot 
[...] and we invested much money and we did not have the scale to obtain 
competitive prices. Therefore we sank. Suddenly we were up to our necks in 
debt. At this time we had 64 separated companies. We had a big debt and 
13,500 employees working in the group. And we did not have a 
management model where the holding company had control, had power, 
had command and had rules. So each company did it its own way, the way it 
liked it. The great truth is that we were lost with the management of the 
group as a result, mainly, of this absence of having things formalized. (I13). 
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Additionally, Nilton, the eldest son and Benedito’s natural successor, whose 
support was seen as essential, principally in financial issues, had died in the previous 
decade, at the age of 42. Antonio Luiz who was the youngest of the three brothers 
(the sister in the middle, Neuza, went to study in the capital, got married and never 
involved herself with the family business) opted for a career of engineering and on 
finishing his studies, entered the company as Operational Director. His relationship 
with his father was marked by respect, but also by significant divergences. Both had 
forthright and explosive personalities, and adopted attitudes that were always firm, 
and which generated constant conflicts. Antonio Luiz was characterized by boldness 
and the will to expand the business, but Benedito was more restrained. The 
treatment of financial questions was a source of disagreement between them, 
especially after the loss of Nilton. 
Benedito’s succession, making Antonio Luiz the effective leader, did not 
happen in an official and direct way. The consequences of a CVA (cerebrovascular 
accident) gradually made it impossible for him to continue his functions. The year 
1987 can be considered the turning point, when Antonio Luiz started to respond more 
effectively for Bental’s destiny. 
This transitional period, with the gradual withdrawal of the founder, the death 
of the elder brother, the stress of the financial manager, added to the financial crisis 
that had installed itself, was extremely delicate for Antonio Luiz. He recognized that 
his academic background in engineering was not sufficient to help him control a 
highly-diversified company with a high degree of indebtedness.  
(CII06) [...] when we had a financial crisis, [Nelson] was our financial 
manager and he was considered the wizard of finance [...] But he started to 
suffer from exhaustion. [...] then the doctor gave him thirty days rest. When 
the 30 days were up, he gave another 60. When the 60 were up, another 6 
months. And I started to accumulate that financial position also. I was never 
very keen on it... I know how to spend money, better than count it. I detest 
the number after the decimal point; for that, there are specialists. […] This 
was a very difficult moment for me, also seeing my dad’s capacity draining. 
Then, we started to look for someone to help us. (I08). 
At this time, the greater part of the companies of the Bental group were not 
profitable, some of them being run by unqualified family members, without anything 
being done, out of respect for family relationships. There was clear evidence of the 
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presence of family altruism in Bental. The good intentions of the founder (in 
generating employment and income for his family) started to generate agency costs 
for the business, reflected in the opportunism of some of its members who were 
compromising the company patrimony. 
Faced with this scenario, Antonio Luiz, after two years at the head of the 
group, decided to hand over the executive direction to a market professional, from 
outside and not belonging to the family. After a long negotiating stage, Giuseppe 
Mancini was contracted, and entered the business establishing a strong, professional 
management and rigorous control. On his entry, Giuseppe presented a detailed plan 
of measures that should be taken for clearing up the financial side of the company 
and for the adoption of a highly professionalized management. In compensation, he 
negotiated his autonomy in the form of a contract, governed by a fine in the event of 
breach, proportional to the time of operation, demanding total freedom in decision 
making. 
(CII07) I prepared a plan in which I set out in detail everything I wanted to 
do. And the plan was approved. I asked: ‘I would like to be authorised to do 
this. These are my conditions for taking on the position of CEO. And if I am 
not successful you are authorised to dismiss me and I assume this 
commitment. But I would like total authority to be able to undertake this 
programme’. [Benedito and Antonio Luiz] signed this contract and I went into 
action. (I15). 
 
After taking over the position, Giuseppe Mancini concentrated on three fronts 
of action: making the structure of the group slimmer; creating suitable management 
systems and; defining clearly the role of the family concerning the business. In the 
view of one of the present directors, Mancini was able to carry out the necessary 
shock treatment, starting from the adoption of rigorous measures, to reverse the 
company’s delicate situation. 
(CII08) Was it a risk? Yes, it was. Because it meant handing over the 
management of the business to a stranger. I mean, he [Antonio Luiz] knew 
[Giuseppe], but he was an outsider as far as the family was concerned. So 
the command of the executive management left the family and went to a 
professional executive. And this executive arrived and did a lot. He closed 
companies, sold companies, he changed business, he established rules, he 
introduced accountability. He established planning rules, set up the strategic 
planning, created the budget meetings, he dismissed company presidents, 
he developed a programme for the withdrawal of personnel from the group 
(at the time we reduced the group from 13,500 people to 6,200), and he 
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dismissed family members who were in the command of companies or that 
had work positions in the company that he judged were not contributing 
anything. It was a very painful process; we had some crises even in the 
family. And at the moment that we were having these crises he took the 
contract and put it in front of everyone: ‘I have a contract that gives me 
powers for this. Either you comply with the contract or I go’. I will say this, it 
was painful for everyone, but I think it was the salvation of the group at the 
time. (I13). 
With regard to the scaling down of the holding company structure, Mancini 
reduced the Bental group from a universe of 64 companies to only 14 and managed 
to attain an average growth rate of 22% per year between 1992 and 1997. It is 
possible to infer that the good results were responsible for keeping him in the 
position, in spite of the manifestations existing against him, above all within the 
controlling family. This restructuring phase of the holding company is narrated by 
Mancini as a period of numerous tensions, although essential for the constitution of 
the new group, in accordance with the explicit statement in the following fragment. 
(CII09) The expansion process was over the limit. There were 64 
companies, totally out of control. There was no structure to run 64 
companies. [...] A small-mentality reigned in which the accounting had to be 
something ‘secret’. We had many difficulties even with the signed contract. 
There were continual disagreements, but everyone understood that it was 
the only way to set up the group. (I08). 
In relation to the creation of a new management system, the concept adopted 
by Mancini, which they call ‘the network company’, deserves special attention. To this 
end, results centres were set up, tied to an evaluation and bonus system for all the 
company staff. In addition to this, he maintained the focus on customer satisfaction, 
based on the belief that a high level of customer satisfaction would guarantee the 
maintenance of the market and, consequently, the productivity and cash flow 
essential to the business. 
(CII10) This is something that we introduced when I came in 1989. We 
introduced into the company the system of ‘Network Company’, which is a 
system of involving the people, considering them not as employees, not as 
numbers, but as associates. Involving the people in all the decisions of the 
company itself and of the group. [...]. You should treat the people as an 
integral part of the company. (I15). 
(CII11) A more participative system in the decision-making process where all 
associates have a bonus, have a variable remuneration tied to the result of 
the company. Then they participate in fact, because they are associates and 
not employees. He [Giuseppe] had a whole set of activities to introduce, 
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which we call a ‘Network Company’. Network because we function as small 
results centres and you are responsible for that result of your centre. In 
addition to your commitment to the result of your centre, you are also 
committed to the whole for you to receive your variable remuneration. (I11). 
The third point worked on by Mancini while he was at the head of the group 
was the question of the insertion of the family into the business. The posture adopted 
was an aggressive one, and involved the dismissal of various family members that 
held positions in the company. Initially, an attempt was made to improve the 
capacitation and formation for some family members that were managing companies 
in the group. However, in the event of refusal to adapt, they were immediately 
dismissed. 
(CII12) And at first we tried to re-educate these partners, we tried to 
introduce a group management model in those companies that were directed 
by these partners who were relations, but it did not work. There was much 
reluctance on their part. And the group ended up by selling its participation in 
these companies. The funny thing is that some relations who were 
dismissed, in the end recognized that it was necessary to do what was done. 
Others feel resentment to this day. (I13). 
It is possible to infer that such steps were only tolerated due to the moment of 
strong crisis faced by the group. In this sense, on being questioned about how the 
shareholder and former family CEO, Antonio Luiz, faced this phase of dismissals, 
one of the older directors of the group stated. 
(CII13) He knew that it was necessary to do this. The pill was bitter, but 
needed to be swallowed. And he suffered a lot. [...]. He came under much 
pressure from family and friends. Of the following type: ‘aren´t you the 
master any more in that company? Did you give your company away, did 
you give it to [Giuseppe]? Who calls the shots there? Is it you or him? But 
[Antonio Luiz] is a very intelligent person. He knew that what was being done 
was very painful but had to be done. And that he wouldn´t do it, first because 
of his big heart, and second because of the emotional involvement that he 
had with people. So it was very difficult for him, but not for [Giuseppe]. 
[Giuseppe] did not have this commitment to anyone. He had a commitment 
to the shareholders to change the group, to transform the group, to 
professionalize the group. (I13) 
Some interviewees highlight the exemplary effect of this large number of 
dismissals of family members orchestrated by Giuseppe Mancini, which gave him the 
merit of inculcating into the family members of the company the importance of 
adopting a selection process based exclusively on the criterion of competence, 
without any granting of privileges.  
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(CII14) Be in no doubt about it. He [Giuseppe] also made the family see the 
light. The other family members did not want to place their patrimony at risk. 
They are not going adventuring. They know that today if you don´t have 
competence, you can´t run a company. (I13) 
Although the criterion of competence has been accepted and afforded value 
by the controlling family, there is disagreement as regards the degree of radicalism 
defended by Mancini, who did not hesitate to remove all family members that worked 
in the organization. 
(CII15) He [Giuseppe] was extreme. And we had some clashes with him in 
relation to this. And in fact it was a lot of ‘stick’. He fired my grandfather’s 
brother. He fired my father. But they were family members who did not want 
to adjust themselves to the new management. They did not want to do any 
training, so they didn´t change in accordance with the business. Now, to go 
from that to closing the door to the whole family, that´s wrong. (I11)  
In the view of Antonio Luiz, a family member undergoing a selection process 
should not be privileged nor, at the same time, undervalued simply by belonging to 
the family. In other words, in his view, the process of entry into the organization 
should occur with family and nonfamliy professionals competing on equal terms, 
competence only being used as the classifying criterion. 
(CII16) And I started to analyse that situation... you have to professionalize 
the company. But professional, we all are. If you have a work card you’re a 
professional. This does not mean that you have competence. If you can 
have a person of the family competent and come to work, excellent! Now 
what you can´t do is getting someone who is incompetent and put him to 
work [...]. Competence doesn´t depend on blood. You may have a 
competent person within the family and you may have a competent person 
outside the family. So today, my concept of competence is totally free. I 
don´t label anybody, in this way, if you’re in the family, you’re no good. (I08) 
 
However, it is possible to perceive contradictory elements in the discourse of 
the interviewee in affirming that in the event of a ‘draw’ in the selective process, the 
kinship ties would end by assuming the function of a casting vote, so to speak, 
overturning the apparent impartiality of the process and favouring the family 
members.  
(CII17) Today one procures people with competence. Independently of 
colour, party, family or nonfamliy. Obviously, if you have two competitors, 
with the same level of competence, one from the family and another from 
outside, I think that nothing would be better than bringing this family member 
into the company. (I08) 
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In spite of evincing a certain predilection for family members, Antonio Luiz also 
admits that the mixture of roles can bring about difficulties for the family company, a 
position evident in the following section. 
(CII18) The professional executive, when he gets fed up or when he doesn´t 
turn out right, goes to another company. For the executive shareholder to 
change his company is impossible. There is no way for him to do it. So, it is 
a risk that needs to be well calculated by both parties. Because if it does not 
work out right, the consequences for the executive shareholder are greater 
than those for the professional executive. The professional executive will find 
another place in the market. And the shareholder executive will have to 
continue to live with the company as shareholder. This aspect I think is a 
little more complicated. (I08). 
The fact is that in Bental, starting from the 2nd generation criteria involving 
professional qualifications for entry of members into the company started to be 
utilized, restricting in part the entry of family members. From this time also criteria of 
competence and merit started to be used in the promotion of members, both for 
family as for nonfamliy members. The main criterion established by the family is 
consolidated professional competence. 
In parallel with the mass withdrawal of around twelve family members of the 
company, Mancini worked on the structuring of the holding company, defining the 
corporate participation of the different family blocks and developing a shareholders' 
agreement with clear rules on the entry and withdrawal of shareholders. This process 
was to be fundamental for the separation of the family and company spheres, 
maintaining the family members only as shareholders and/or on the Board, and the 
management in the hands of nonfamliy professionals. In Mancini’s view, keeping the 
controlling family’s concern focused on the property sphere, tied to a highly 
professionalized management was indispensable for the greater transparency of the 
group. 
(CII19) Each has his or her salary, there are the dividends, and there is 
absolutely no double dealing. And you know that it is completely prohibited, 
everything is extremely transparent. The taxman who knows us very well 
when he enters already knows that [Bental] is an absolutely transparent 
company. It is all very clean. I always say, it is a glass house, everything is 
transparent. No one appropriates anything improperly from the company; 
everybody is controlled including the chairman and all the shareholders. 
(I15) 
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(CII20) In 1989, we made a shareholders' agreement. This agreement was a 
little non-participative. When [Giuseppe] entered, he organized the structure 
of a holding company that did not yet exist. (I11) 
Figure 4.5 presents the current corporate structure of the Talma Group, 
comprising three family holding companies which control Bental and that correspond 
to the three different family blocks. Each block presents unequal capital 
concentrations that vary from 20.2% to 58.5%.  
Despite the fact that the family already has members up to the 5th generation,  
the capital control is still somewhat concentrated. 
 
Figure 4.5: Corporate Structure of the Talma Group 
 
       Source: Prepared by the company. 
 
 
A factor that explains the differences in the share quotas of the three holding 
companies was the accumulation of shares owned by Antonio Luiz, due to the 
bonuses received during the time he worked direct with his father. 
(CII21) Initially, my brother did not work in [Bental] and had a business of his 
own, having worked here for a very short time. My sister and brother-in-law 
were never part of the business. And I have worked in this institution all my 
life. I never had another business. Every time there was a subscription of 
capital, I increased my participation, through my bonuses which were 
converted into company shares. When my father died, obviously his shares 
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were divided by three. We were three heirs. And the shares that I had, plus 
the shares that my father left me, gave me the share control. This was good 
because it brought about a certain security. A certain unity to avoid the 
dispersion of the group. (I08) 
If on the one hand the share concentration present in one of the blocks is 
capable of establishing a certain unity of command, imprinting greater objectivity on 
Board decisions, on the other hand, the difference of power share between the 
majority and the minority group brings us back to the discussion concerning agency 
theory, abundantly covered by the literature, in that the majority group can utilize its 
power to influence decisions to the benefit of its interests and to the detriment of 
those of the minority. This tension between majority and minority is latent in Bental. 
Starting from the analysis of the section (CII22) it is possible to see evidence that 
some strategic decisions relative to, for example, the diversification of the group were 
taken apparently by the imposition of the will of the majority and not starting from the 
construction of the consensus between the three blocks of shareholders. 
(CII22) The fact that the company is diversified is due simply to my 
headstrong uncle, who didn´t like selling anything. It is a profile completely 
different from mine. [...]. This is his, not the family’s. The group takes after 
him a lot. Because he is the majority and he is the man. (I11) 
(CII23) The corporate participation is not equal. You have one branch of the 
family that has most of the shares. So this part makes the rules. This has 
already generated conflicts. (I13) 
Understanding that the adoption of corporate governance mechanisms is a 
viable alternative for the regulation of agency theory, establishing rules focused on 
more transparent practices, on better accountability and fairer treatment for the 
minority shareholders; the Board of Directors becomes one of the main instances 
charged with this process. In spite of the existence of a board in Bental, its character, 
initially, was decidedly pro forma, and made it impossible for the minority to have an 
active voice in the organization. The evolution of the profile of the Board of Directors 
and the creation of a Family Council are pointed to as fundamental for the definition 
of roles and a greater harmonization of the relations between the different groups of 
shareholders. These two themes will be dealt with in detail in the next section. 
(CII24) When my uncle [Antonio Luiz] left the management he felt a need to 
set up a board. He set up a board, but it was an advisory board. It was a 
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board constituted just by friends. It was a rubber-stamping board, because 
they told him what he wanted to hear. (I11). 
(CII25) It was that board where the friends had a meeting with the chairman 
during the morning, followed afterwards by a good lunch, with a good bottle 
of Portuguese wine. Because it was a Portuguese family. And on that board, 
the friends, because of affinity, did not have the independence to go against 
the opinion of the chairman. (I09). 
 
(iii) Building trust in a contentious environment  
Mancini had been contracted initially for a period of five years, but after a year 
and a half of the contract running, he decided to open a discussion to check whether 
the owning family was satisfied with the results, presenting a positive balance sheet, 
with strong reduction in debt and great restructuring of the company management 
model. Mancini’s attitude had the purpose of establishing a relationship based more 
on trust than on the rigid rules of a contract. Typically, a trust that emerged from his 
capacity to deliver the expected results. This was sufficient to maintain Giuseppe 
Mancini at the head of the company for eight years, in spite of the conflicts still 
existing. Antonio Luiz recognized that  
(CII26) Conflicts always exist, every day and at all times. But the important 
thing is the trust in the CEO that was chosen to command the company 
(I09). 
The first years of Mancini’s term were especially difficult for Antonio Luiz. In 
addition to all the autonomy conceded contractually and used by him, in facing the 
presence of the family in the company, as already remarked, the fact of the 
inexistence of an established board led Antonio Luiz to remain without a formal role. 
Kleber relates a typical situation arising out of the difficulty of repositioning his 
corporate function, that: 
(CII27) There was no formal board, he stayed in his room. He kept an eye on 
things ... (I13). 
Antonio Luiz himself recognised that: 
(CII28) No longer making executive decisions, the withdrawal from the daily 
routine and in addition having a CEO in your place: my God, this is 
traumatic. I took a long time to adapt to this new situation. (I09). 
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In spite of the numerous advances achieved by Mancini in his management, 
growing conflicts flourished in the relationship between him and Antonio Luiz, and 
reached an unsustainable level. 
(CII29) [Giuseppe] went too far in not leaving a space for our Chairman. 
[Antonio Luiz] is an engineer, a man that was born within [his sector of 
activity]; he is one of the people that know more [of this area] in Brazil. He 
has his ideas, he is a machine of ideas. He is a person that wherever he 
goes he will invent things and [Giuseppe] developed a certain aversion for 
his ideas. He thought that if they came from him, the ideas couldn´t be any 
good’. [...] So as not to be run over, as frequently occurs in the family 
company when the CEO is from outside, he ended up by isolating himself 
too much. (I13). 
(CII30) [Giuseppe] did a lot of good in the company. He cleared up part of 
the debt, but he started to generate a certain conflict. He started to quarrel 
with my uncle [Antonio Luiz] even in the meetings of the Board of Directors. 
And this started to become very explicit. At times my uncle wanted 
something at the strategic level and [Giuseppe] did not. And they had epic 
arguments at the meetings. (I10). 
(CII31) He [Antonio Luiz] couldn´t keep quiet. And the executive that came in 
didn´t like justifying himself very much. [Mancini] liked doing things and at 
the end of the year show the result. And this led [Antonio Luiz] to suffer 
much. He dismissed his colleagues, he dismissed his relatives, and he was 
changing a pile of things that [Antonio Luiz] had created. And up to a certain 
point he did keep quiet but sometimes, he entered the fray. [...]. And, finally, 
they had a bad row, and they came to the conclusion that it was time to wind 
up the contract. (I13). 
However, even being removed from management, Mancini’s competence was 
recognized and he was immediately invited to join the Board, which had already been 
formally structured. Because of his long experience at the head of the group, Mancini 
is still today seen as having a different level of authority from the other board 
members:  
(CII32) He continues on the board. When there is some problem in the group 
[Giuseppe] is contacted to help to resolve it. He is always heard. When there 
is the need to take an important decision in the group [Giuseppe] is, much 
more that the other members, the first to be heard (I13). 
This fact indicates that, in spite of the traumas left by Mancini during the phase 
of the rupture, his work has been duly recognized and has generated bonds of trust 
with the family. 
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(iv) Transition phase with other nonfamliy CEOs 
After the withdrawal of Giuseppe Mancini from the management, Bental tried 
two more nonfamliy CEOs. The first of them, a market executive, Hans Mueller 
worked between 1998 and 2001, conducting the company to another financial crisis. 
Antonio Luiz comments: 
(CII33) He was reliable, but he did not manage to produce the results that 
we expected. He was withdrawn. He stayed a very short time... two years 
only. He was an extraordinary person, but he had come from a very big 
company, with a large staff, with many advisors. Perhaps, with access to a 
lot of resources. It didn´t work out right in a company from the interior, a 
simpler one. (I08). 
But Pedro Talma reveals that this decision of Antonio Luiz was not so easily 
arrived at. Convinced of the inadequateness of Mueller for the position, Pedro 
pressured his father, and Chairman of the Board, to substitute this nonfamliy CEO. In 
accordance with the evidence provided by the following quotation, the conflict 
between father and son reaches a limit situation where the successor threatens to 
leave the company if the father does not accept the dismissal of Mueller from the 
position. 
(CII34) We arrived at a situation where clearly the performance of this 
professional CEO was very poor. The company entered a terrible financial 
crisis and I found myself in a very acrimonious debate with our Chairman. He 
saying that he would not discard the executive that he had nominated, 
because that was the only executive that he had nominated and that he 
would absolutely not give way. This conflict even got to the point of placing 
the company at risk and my relationship with the chairman became 
intolerable [...] and led to a conflict between two generations: that of the 
successor and that of him who had been succeeded. It got to the point of me 
saying: OK then, I’m leaving the business! Because I have a professional life 
in front of me and I am not going to participate in a catastrophe’. This 
affected him profoundly and he came to the conclusion that he really would 
have to substitute Mueller. (I09) 
In the middle of this critical situation, Antonio Luiz accedes to his son’s 
request, terminating Mueller’s contract, in accordance with that related by one of the 
executives heard: 
(CII35) It was a disaster. The group only did not have a more serious 
problem because [Giuseppe] had left things very well structured. He had left 
his followers […] as disciples, with very strong management practices. 
[Hans] is an excellent businessman, but not a man of operational 
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management. So, it was almost three years of ostracism, after which his 
contract was finally rescinded (I13). 
It is important to stress that the rescission of the contract with Hans Mueller 
happened because of his inadequateness for the position and not because of factors 
such as lack of ethics or dishonesty. When questioned about opportunistic attitudes 
related to bad faith on the part of executives, the controlling family members were of 
one mind. 
(CII36) No. [Dismissals] linked to bad faith no, but linked to results and 
values. Bad faith on the part of a CEO no. A CEO’s bad faith we never had. 
(I11). 
(CII37) You do not have a CEO that is directing his company acting in bad 
faith. It is a position of trust. You were chosen and take over a position of 
confidence and the chap acts in bad faith? I’ve never heard of it (I08). 
(CII38) Developing business is an obligation. The executive that does not 
produce results you remove and put in another that does. Now this question, 
for example, corruption, lack of ethics, is not mentioned in here. Lack of 
respect. If the chap gives 10 reals to obtain business worth one million in the 
result, he will be sent packing because he gave the 10 reals. (I09). 
After Mueller’s dismissal, a career staff member in the company was invited to 
take over as CEO. Distinguished by a certain stability and little action the 
management of Rui Pacato extends up to 2005, when there was, once again, a 
return to family management. 
 
(v) The return of the family to management control and the future generations 
In 2006, the family returned to the command of the management, in the figure 
of a 3rd generation successor, Pedro Talma. Pedro is an economist, with diverse 
professional experiences in other companies and specialization obtained abroad. In 
accordance with his declarations, he gained positions in the company little by little, 
thanks to his own merits. In this process of conquest by recognition, Pedro supported 
various company expansion and improvement projects, demonstrating his ability as 
an operations manager, up to the time when he was guided by Giuseppe Mancini to 
assume corporate responsibilities, as Pacato’s direct assistant, who had taken over 
the position of CEO. 
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The departure of Rui Pacato from the position of CEO consequently set off the 
succession process in Bental, leading to discussion in the Board of Directors 
regarding what would be the ideal profile of the new CEO. In this context, the debate 
about the possibility of contracting a family member to the position was rekindled. 
Although no formal succession plan existed, Pedro already possessed wide 
experience of working within the group, and emerged as the natural successor. 
(CII39) There was no defined plan of succession […]. Surely, this always 
was in the head of Dr. [Antonio Luiz]: the idea that [Pedro] could be the CEO 
of the group. This he manifested several times with me confidentially. 
[Pedro] was prepared in the following manner: he did an internship outside 
the group; than he did an MBA in the United States. He came later and 
worked for a time in [Bental] in the area of operations, as a manager. He was 
not even a director. Afterwards, he started to participate on the executive 
committee, to be able to see how an executive committee works, what the 
business management of the group was like. He stayed some 3 or 4 years 
as a special member of the executive committee, and as assistant to [Rui 
Pacato]. So this gave him a good background. Then, therefore, although a 
written plan had not been drawn up there was a logical sequence. Until he 
ended by being nominated CEO as his father wished. (I13). 
It is interesting to emphasize that the phase when Bental was under the 
command of nonfamliy managers was important not only in the sense of inculcating a 
greater level of professionalization into the business, but also in breaking with the 
personalistic and patrimonial traditions inherited from the founder. Accordingly, it is 
possible to infer that the sudden separation between the family and management 
realized by Mancini accelerated the restructuring of the group, avoiding potential 
conflicts between family managers and the other members of the controlling family. 
(CII40) If Dr. [Antonio Luiz] were to this day in the command of management 
and he were to pass it to the son now, I imagine, from the nature of the son 
and the way he is, this would work out over time, but it would be much more 
complicated, costly, painful and laborious for everybody [to succeed in] 
breaking with what needed to be broken with. It would take a decade. Now 
the fact of him having found the group, or participated let us say in an 
evolution of the group with a well-defined management model, with clear 
rules, with a defined mission, with values defined, and with modern 
management tools, [...] all this shortened a period of [...], let us say, of 
ideological disagreements with the father. (I13). 
In addition to the possible conflicts and disputes for power, the succession in 
family organizations is commonly marked by the need to legitimize the successor 
before the family and other stakeholders. Accordingly, a point that attracts one’s 
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attention in Bental relates to the immediate acceptance of Pedro Talma as the new 
CEO, both by the controlling family and by the other nonfamliy managers. 
As to the family, the fact of Pedro being the son of the controlling shareholder 
and of not existing any other family members interested in disputing the position, 
simplified the succession process. As his father, Antonio Luiz, states, in addition to 
not having any other potential successors in the family, Pedro’s only sister was never 
interested in working in the company. 
(CII41) This is not her line. She doesn´t like it. She likes dealing with art. She 
likes dealing with painting, she likes dealing with a million things. Except the 
daily routine of the company. (I09). 
The acceptance of the new family CEO by the other managers of the group 
was explained, by Pedro himself, as a result of the construction of his legitimacy 
during his time in the company. Thus, in addition to having good professional 
training, the fact of Pedro having passed successfully through various positions and 
having worked in different hierarchical levels within the group for more than five 
years, facilitated the gaining of the respect and recognition of his competence by 
everyone.  
(CII42) It was surprising. He is well liked within the company. People admire 
him. They like him. Because he was never a stuck up person, giving orders 
where he had no business to, never was a person to use power, never was 
an ostentatious person. [...]. Then this way of his, when he was nominated 
CEO, all I heard was praise. People saying things like: what a good thing!’. 
People congratulating, wishing success, people prepared to collaborate. 
(I13). 
(CII43) I have a history of preparation over a long period that I think is the 
ideal. First you have to expose the person to the external world. So that he 
has a taste of success and develops some self-esteem. And for him to have 
some self-esteem formed and a successful trajectory. […]  The hour that he 
arrives at the company, he gains the respect of his colleagues. And through 
this trajectory of conquering different positions within the company, he will 
conquer his space within the organization. (I09). 
Another point stressed by Pedro would be his concern in not being seen as 
the ‘son of the boss’, but, as someone with the capacity to be part of the business. 
Accordingly, instead of simply imposing his formal authority, the ideal way for the 
successor would entail the conquest of his space through his work trajectory 
involving all the members of the organization. In the view of the interviewee, even the 
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prior success of the father is interpreted as an element capable of outshining the 
activity of the successor in the business. The figure of the person succeeded could 
represent an obstacle in imposing a comparison, a mark to be overtaken or at least 
equalled by the successor. 
(CII44) Generally, the executive shareholder has to conquer his or her space 
within the company. Because it is not the fact of being a shareholder or even 
the controller that will make him eligible up to an executive function. So the 
first thing is that if he does not carve out his space he does not have 
people’s  respect. The second point is the following: the son of a successful 
father has to seek his own light. Therefore I think that I adopted a trajectory 
of carving out my space within the company as far as possible outside my 
father’s shadow. But always remembering that you have to use his 
experience and success, having him to guide you in the best possible way. 
(I09). 
In many family organizations the overlapping of roles, such as the 
father/succeeded and son/successor, can start friction or conflict situations due to the 
intromission of affective issues in professional matters. If family managers do not 
have the capacity to distinguish these two dimensions in a mature way, the confusion 
of roles can lead to an environment that oscillates between affection and criticism, or 
even between exigency and an excess of protection. In this case, the successor 
affirms that in spite of the ideological differences or disagreements between him and 
his father, the professional issues were always worked on without negative 
interferences in the family relationship. 
(CII45) There exists a very great mutual respect between us two. We have 
already had friction and serious arguments within the company, but, thank 
God, we have succeeded in leaving all this in here. We leave here and there 
has never been any resentment, any bad moods, nothing like this. The 
relationship of respect of father and son and admiration continues, 
independent of professional conflict or of professional arguments. (I09). 
 
(vi) Establishment of formal structures of Governance 
It is fundamental to emphasize that the idea is not defended here that an 
absolute separation between the affective and professional spheres in the context of 
a family company is possible. For this we would have to deny the complexity inherent 
in such organizations. Although the coexistence among the family members in the 
daily round of the company is connected in an indissoluble way to the roles and 
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issues present in the bosom of the family, it is believed that the invention of spaces 
and suitable communication channels is possible so that each type of demand is 
worked on in its proper context. That is, that the family questions are debated in the 
field of the family and business issues are restricted to the company environment, 
minimizing as much as possible the level of friction between these two spheres. 
Accordingly, among the mechanisms of governance existing, the structuring of a 
Family Council is precisely the most recommended instance for the creation of a 
zone of consensus, with the objective of harmonizing family interests with the needs 
of the company. At Bental, the creation of the Family Council occurred in parallel with 
the evolution of the Board of Directors and sought to educate the diverse family 
members in the satisfactory performance of their roles in the organization. 
(CII46) We needed to create rules of relationship between the shareholder 
and the company because this is a strong source of conflict: if the 
shareholders are constantly in disaccord, the business could be finished. We 
see this happen all around. Then I started to push forward to develop of a 
Family Council. We brought in a consultant, run a workshop and we have 
succeeded in writing our family constitution, which deals with the three 
parameters: family as family, family as shareholder and family as employee. 
It is a way of regulating this relationship. We wrote the constitution but to 
practise what was written was rather a complicated matter. (I09). 
(CII47) The Family Council was created to work on making the family 
conscious of the difference between being a working family, an investor 
family, a business and being a family as family, as relations. [...]. Then, to 
organize the family. To put in place rules, open the debate on the role of the 
family. Organize the communication with the family, what the family should 
not see. What should and should not be the family business. To discipline 
withdrawals, participation, dividends, these things. (I13). 
(CII48) I think the main the role of [a Family Council] is the integration of the 
family and of perpetuating and passing family values on to the coming 
generations. The family history is what really strengthens the ties. [...] And 
the family tie can increase the longevity of the company. [...] The family has 
to focus on this: in strengthening its ties. (I10). 
After the creation of the Family Council its members were elected and the 
mapping of what would be the expectations of the group of heirs carried out. This 
established the directives for saving the history of the family and the business; the 
perpetuation of the culture and the values of the group; the respect for the diversity of 
interests within the family, and the creation of clear rules for the entry of family 
members into the group management. The following step was the creation of training 
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programmes focused on the young heirs who would wish in the future to become 
group executives, as also on those who wanted to open their own business or 
develop their careers independently of the company. Another programme stressed as 
fundamental would be the development of the shareholders, covering the knowledge 
necessary for family members to develop the capacity to understand and interpret the 
data generated by the Board of Directors. Thus, it would be possible to level the 
knowledge between the family shareholders and develop them for the active exercise 
of their role as Board members, through the consolidation of a legitimate interface 
between the spheres of the owning family and of the management. 
(CII49) I believe that [the development of the family shareholders] is the 
principal role of the Family Council. Not principal, but the initial role. Because 
how can you really have a Family Council with people who can discuss and 
report issues to the Board of Directors without this preparation? I don´t 
believe it is possible. So we end up with the idea that this preparation should 
be, in my opinion, the starting point of the Family Council. (I12). 
However, in spite of the advances made by the Family Council, various 
obstacles were encountered. The main one, in the view of the interviewees, was the 
lack of commitment and interest on the part of the family in involving itself in its 
activities. 
(CII50) It is challenging for you to prepare a person for the role of 
shareholder, who very often does not have an interest in the company, does 
not have an interest in the business and has a parallel career. So, it is very 
difficult to contribute to the development of the life plan and preserve the 
company patrimony. It´s a bit like that, isn´t it? The heir thinks that he has to 
milk something from the company and not contribute to it. (I10). 
(CII51) Each [family holding] has a different dynamic [...]. The members of 
[Talma 3] don´t involve themselves much in the business, they don´t 
participate. They want the dividends and to do their own thing. [Talma 2], 
which is my uncle’s, is more involved. It´s him and my cousin. On the other 
hand my other cousin is not involved. And there in [Talma 1], I am the one 
most involved. And it is good this way. The involvement is small with regard 
to the business. So today, there are few who sweat. There is no family 
involvement of the type: ‘let´s get into this business, or let´s do that’. I don't 
see the family as an entrepreneurial family in this sense. There is no 
harmony in this sense. (I11). 
In section (CII51) it is evident that the growth of the family, allied to the 
different characteristics present in each family block, may contribute to the lack of 
harmony, and to the loosening of the family ties that generally maintain the unity of 
the controlling family in relation to the business. From the moment that three or more 
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generations live together in the daily routine of a company the phase denominated 
consortium of cousins starts (Gersick et al., 1997) marked by an increase in the level 
of complexity of the issues that surround the family, property and management 
spheres. 
Figure 4.6 below presents the current family configuration, demonstrating the 
complexity incurred by the growth of the family that has already reached the 5th 
generation, representing a universe of 31 shareholders or heirs. This figure also 
shows the three family holdings (Talma 1, Talma 2 and Talma 3) with their respective 
members. The controlling family members interviewed are highlighted in green. 
 
Figure 4.6: Structure of the Talma Family in 2008 
 
 Source: Research data 
 
In parallel to the structuring of the Family Council there occurred the evolution 
of the Board of Directors that, gradually, became the more strategic and directive 
instance in the organization. At present, the Board of Directors is composed of 11 
members: two being honorary members, including the CEO; 4 internal members and; 
5 members who are independent. The present profile of the Board is highlighted by 
the current Chairman in the following section. 
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(CII52) Our Board of Directors is composed of three distinct teams. It 
has the family members, with representatives of the three family 
holding companies that have a statutory right to a seat on the board. 
Besides this, we have professional Board members. For example, 
[Giuseppe] is a board member to this day. And we also have members 
who are businessmen. The family members usually have a more 
passive approach. The professional Board members want to see the 
figures, want to see the third decimal point. And the businessmen 
want to know about the business, what is being done, what is the 
course... So I think that our board is very well balanced. (I09). 
In addition, the Board of Directors is being advised, since 2004, by three 
permanent committees: the Audit Committee, the Human Talent Committee and the 
Corporate Governance Committee - each with its own working dynamic. Other 
governance practices adopted and that impart greater transparency to the 
organization were the adoption of external audits and the opening and disclosure of 
information to shareholders and market by means of formal reports. According to the 
2006 Bental Report, the functions of control are exercised by the work of an internal 
audit, an independent external audit and a statutory audit committee. The external 
audit is always carried out by a specialized and internationally recognized company. 
It evaluates the general level of risks of the organization and the level of compliance 
with laws and regulations. The present configuration of the Bental governance model 
can be visualized in Figure 4.7. 
Figure 4.7: Governance Model of the Bental Group in 2008 
 
    Source: Prepared by the company. 
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In relation to the activities of the Board of Directors, its schedule is composed 
of four annual meetings with previously fixed agendas. The first meeting deals with 
the financial statements and the rendering of account of the internal and external 
audits. The second meeting is dedicated to the analysis of the first quarter, covering 
the performance rates and the results attained. The third meeting carries out a 
strategic analysis of the segments in which Bental is active, discussing the long term 
directives. In addition to this, issues relative to social responsibility are also 
addressed. Finally, at the fourth meeting of the Board, the focus is on annual 
performance and the approval of the budgeting for the following year. This meeting 
includes also the performance assessment of both CEO and Board members. 
These four meetings of the Board are given schematic form in Figure 4.8, 
presented below. 
Figure 4.8: Schedule of activities of Bental’s Board of Directors 
 
     
   Source: Prepared by the company. 
 
 
The effective participation of the Board of Directors in the Bental planning 
process reinforces the formality and structured nature of their cycle, as the 
description of the investments approval process demonstrates. 
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 External and Internal Audits 
 Performance in the First Quarter 
 Human Talents 
 Results of 1st Semester / benchmarking 
 Social Responsibility/Long Term Corporate 
Directives 
 Annual Performance/Budget for Following Year 
 Long Term Plan 
 Evaluation of the Board/Members/CEO 
1
st
 Board Meeting 
2
nd
 Board Meeting 
 
3
rd
 Board Meeting 
 
4
th
 Board Meeting 
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(CII53) At the August meeting, we discuss with the board of directors what 
are the strategies and directives of the operations and of the group. We take 
suggestions and the board approves or makes some requests for alterations 
or recommendations. This goes back to each of the companies and from 
then on they set up their investment plan. Each investment project is, 
therefore, discussed internally within each business unit. After this, it is 
brought to [Bental] in an event that is called an investment committee. We 
analyse investment by investment in terms of rate of return, pay-back, 
present value and alignment with corporate strategy. Then, after preliminary 
approval, these investment projects go back to the company that 
contemplates this in its long term plan and budgeting, checking its 
coherence. These investments go back again to the holding company for 
discussion of the final budgeting and of the long term plan. Being approved 
at the level of the holding company, they are then taken to the Board of 
Directors for final approval. (I14). 
It is important to emphasize that the present stage of the Bental Governance 
Model was not achieved without clashes, conflicts, errors and successes. It should be 
remembered that firstly just a pro forma board was created, in 1995, which was 
reformulated along the lines of the Board of Directors in 1998 and from then on, 
evolved in the direction of best governance practises.  
One of the principal challenges initially faced was the delimitation of the 
function of the Board of Directors, removing it from an operational focus towards a 
more strategic profile, in order to avoid power disputes between the executive 
management and the board. 
(CII54) I would say that there is a conflict of interests between the executive 
management, eager for power, and the board of directors which wants a 
hand in the operational side. This was our first phase and we tried to define 
very clear rules for good performance of the executives, of the board and of 
the shareholders. (I09). 
(CII55) There was a moment when the Chairman called the attention of all 
my executive team. Afterwards I had to say to him that he was going over 
my head and that as Chairman he should deal only with me. (I09). 
At present, some control and supervision mechanisms of the board over the 
management have already been created. The evaluation of the CEO would be based 
on the results achieved and on a corporate climate survey of the whole group. In their 
turn, the executives are evaluated at the meetings related to the performance of the 
company’s main areas. In this context, they would be questioned about the positive 
and negative results of their respective areas. 
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(CII56) The board evaluates the CEO by the results, by the performance of 
the business. There are not many ‘monologues’. We don´t use any 
sophisticated instrument of assessment. It is direct: how is the result doing? 
How is business doing? How is the indebtedness? What was the profit? 
What is the EBITDA.? This is the evaluation of the board. Also, the 
organizational climate is taken into account. These are the two relevant 
things: the result and the organizational climate. (I13). 
(CII57) The simple existence of a board educates the executives through 
knowing that there exists a higher body of governance where they, family 
member or not, will be evaluated. So each executive goes there and renders 
accounts to the board. (I11) 
The control exercised by the Board of Directors over the management of the 
group is pointed to as a source of tension between the members and the executives. 
Such fact occurs due to the active and even incisive posture of the board members in 
the demand for results in relation to the group managers. 
(CII58) My perception is that the executives do not like board members very 
much. Because they think that the board members keep sticking their noses 
in where they don´t understand anything, that they don´t know the real 
situation. And when you have a more active board, the board member opens 
his mouth. He says what he thinks and what he feels. He asks difficult 
questions. As a responsible party, he needs to know what is happening. And 
the executive doesn´t like explaining very much. (I13). 
In Pedro’s view, the current CEO, the presence of an active board is 
fundamental to the development of the organization. According to him, many 
companies in Brazil started to implement Boards of Directors merely with the 
intention of complying with a market exigency, with the intent only of transmitting an 
image of transparency to attract new investors. Thus, the primordial objective of the 
board would be frustrated, that is, a board consisting merely symbolically would not 
be capable of acting in the strategic plan of the organization, directing and regulating. 
(CII59) The companies are setting up Boards of Directors because the 
market requires it. [...] The company speaks like this: I am going to launch 
shares, the SEC requires me to have a Board’. Then it runs after a lot of big 
shots, and sets up a board full of ‘nobodies’ just with titles and says: ‘here it 
is it´s set up!’. It is more something to lull the market than really something to 
aggregate value. (I09). 
Although the Bental Board of Directors presents an interesting trajectory, 
towards an increasingly directive and less consultative role, it is necessary to 
consider that, due to the family character of the business, the board is also still in a 
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rather unprivileged position in relation to the power equation of the company. This 
question is made explicit when we analyse the content of the speech of the current 
Chairman and majority partner of the group. 
(CII60) You cannot let the board decide. At most you have to take options 
and in accordance with the experience of the board members they can say: 
‘this option is better than the other’. (I09). 
(CII61) This is because in the end you know exactly that the Board of 
Directors’ decisions go to the shareholders assembly and it is the 
shareholders general meeting that decides, it is the majority of votes that 
decides. Because the majority of the votes belongs to the family [Talma]. 
Then in the end it is the family [Talma] that decides. The Board of Directors 
of a company that has the share control belonging to a family, [...] should 
always take into account before what is the opinion of the family to be able 
to discuss with it and try to convince per decision. (I15). 
From the analysis of section (CII60) it is possible to perceive that the advisory 
nature of the board still remains alive, even if residually, as the actual Chairman does 
not totally accept the premise that the strategic decisions should be taken within the 
ambit of the board, but that, in reality, the board ‘at most’ should signal, based on the 
experience of members, which of the alternatives under discussion would be ideal. In 
section (CII61) it is interesting to note the conscience of one of the members and ex-
CEO of the group on the primacy of the family in relation to board decisions. In this 
sense, the board should always seek a consensus with the controlling family 
members, as the current level of independence would not allow the board to impose 
a decision without the consent of the family shareholders. 
However, an emblematical moment for Bental regarding the level of 
independence of the Board of Directors occurred from the clash between Antonio 
Luiz and the other board members. The board members decided that it would be 
important to carry out the sale of a Bental asset. In disagreeing, Antonio Luiz 
threatened to dismiss the whole Board if the decision were not rethought. In this way, 
in the case in question, the authority of the majority partner was evoked in order to 
brake a decision of the Board considered contrary to the interests of the shareholder. 
Pedro Talma relates: 
(CII62) There were terrible moments of tension... And the meeting of the 
Board where the sale of the subsidiary was being decided, it lasted from 8 in 
the morning to midday. And in the interval he [chairman and majority partner] 
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said that he would not let the sale proceed and that he would dismiss the 
whole board. Then I said: ‘so you dismiss the board because you have 
already used all your arguments and the board will not reconsider it. The 
board is decided to approve this sale. And you will put at risk not only the 
sale and the financial situation of the company but throw down the drain 10 
years of corporate governance. Because from the moment that you do this 
[...] we are going to send a signal to the market that the one who calls the 
shots here is the shareholder and not the Board of Directors’. Then, thank 
God, he reflected and did not dismiss the board. [...] And it was really a proof 
of the independence of the board, which voted on a question running 
counter to the chairman’s position (I09).  
Finally, it is valid to emphasize that the Board of Directors has been gradually 
advancing towards a prominent position in relation to the strategic directions of 
Bental, being cited as an important element for the perpetuation and longevity of the 
company. 
(CII63) The role of the board is in the performance of the organization and its 
perpetuity. The board functions as a parameter of evaluation of the 
proposals of the management for their short, and long term plans of 
operational strategy. We have four meetings annually and we take to the 
board both operational problems and virtues, and strategic points to be 
discussed, approved and monitored by the board. Then, this situation of 
having someone that is looking at your performance, I think that is very 
important. (I14). 
In addition to the independence of the Board of Directors, another fundamental 
point in the indication of the presence of good practices of corporate governance is 
the level of transparency reigning. Companies that seek resources in the stock 
market for the funding of their expansion and development are obliged to adopt a 
posture of transparency. Bental, even being a closed capital company, values such 
principle highly, constantly concerned with the disclosure of information to the 
shareholders and to the market. 
(CII64) In terms of corporate governance, of transparency of information, we 
already do this as if we were a publicly traded company. (I09). 
(CII65) One of our values is transparency. This facilitates things, because 
our executive knows that he really has to render account. [...] We do not 
have anything to hide. The principle that information must flow well in the 
company is not new for us - we have already been practising this a long 
time. (I11).  
All the shareholders have privileged access to the information necessary to 
follow affairs. There are formal quarterly meetings with the family members, including 
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all the generations, where a formal presentation of the economic-financial balances 
and operational data is made, the forecasts of profits or losses, with the intent of 
awakening the interest of the new generations in the business where the family 
resources are allocated. Transparent practices also are adopted that permeate all 
executive levels, making it possible to follow the attainment or not of the results so as 
to identify their possible causes. 
(CII66) We have always been very transparent. By tradition, by culture. [...]. 
So much so that, for example, it is a characteristic of ours, at the meeting of 
the board of directors for the principal group executives to appear. They are 
invited to give information that may be necessary or to make some 
presentations. (I14). 
Finally, it is concluded that the development of the governance model and 
professionalization of Bental, in addition to the transfer of the command of the 
company from family to nonfamliy executives and afterwards returning to family 
management, show a case of extreme wealth, based not merely on the longevity of 
the organization, but also on the level of complexity of the obstacles overcome in 
more than five decades of history. In this sense, the descriptive analysis of this case 
had as its objective to map out the kernels of meaning present in the discourses of 
the interviewees, with respect to the role of governance and of its influence in the 
minimization of conflicts and the mediation of the succession processes and 
professionalization at the core of the company. Thus, the main elements emerging 
from the analysis of content were utilized to aid in the construction of the Family 
Business Agency Conflict Model, whose results will be discussed in the quantitative 
stage of this thesis. 
 
 
 
IV.3. The Prize Case 
 
IV.3.1. The firm 
 
Prize Construções e Empreendimentos was incorporated in 1959 with the 
objective of producing slabs for popular housing. Its founder, Richard Goldman, while 
still a young engineer, had participated in the building of the new capital, Brasília, at 
the end of the 1950s. As everything had to be erected quickly on that immense site, 
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he developed the concept of industrialization applied to building, which consisted 
basically in the prefabrication of components such as slabs, stairs and ramps. 
Inspired by this experience, Richard started his own company, a small industry 
that was a pioneer in the technology of prefabricated concrete parts and that, 60 
years later, was one of the three largest Brazilian companies in the field. 
Established in Minas Gerais, a state of the Brazilian South-East, with an area 
of 100,000 m², the company has today a production capacity of 2,000 m³ of 
prefabricated parts per month, and can proudly point to activities which enjoy 
acceptance throughout Brazil. 
The Prize prefabrication system is a model of industrialization and optimization 
of building which utilizes reinforced concrete structural parts, manufactured in 
accordance with the works project. These parts are transported to the site and 
assembled directly from their transports in their definitive positions. 
The industrialization of civil construction has been very common in the 
industrial and commercial segments, allowing the building of shopping malls or 
industrial warehouses in a short space of time, but is still little used in the housing 
segment. To occupy this space, Prize opened recently a new work front consisting of 
the construction of residential buildings, not only as a supplier, but also as 
entrepreneur. The company has closed partnerships with three regional contractors, 
where Prize offers the building solution and the precast parts. Such a solution 
reduces the average time for the building of a residential block from a year to six 
months. This strategic option occurred due to the large repressed demand in Brazil. 
According to federal government statistics, there is a need to construct 1.7 million 
housing units a year, in the next five years, just to meet the existing deficit of around 
8 million units. 
Table 4.5 presents the evolution and growth of Prize using parameters such 
as the number of employees and annual generated revenue, the company projecting 
invoicing of the order of 200 million reals for the year 2012. 
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Table 4.5: Prize’s Business Performance 
 
Source: Research data 
 
 
 
IV.3.2. Profile of the interviewees 
Table 4.6: Prize’s profile of the interviewees 
 
 
 
 
IV.3.3. Family issues in Prize 
One of the principal factors in understanding the family questions present in 
the Prize case is the succession. The current CEO of Prize, Elton Goldman, 
belonging to the 2nd generation of the controlling family, has a successful trajectory in 
the company, but one that was not without its difficulties and challenges. 
His formal link with the company commenced in 1982, when he started to work 
as a purchases assistant. From there he went through the costs, financial and 
commercial areas, in this way ranging over all sectors of the company. Elton affirms 
that one of the motives of his growing involvement with the family company, above all 
 Evolution of the figures  2006 2007 2008 
Number of employees 360 500 800 
Net profit (in thousands) 10% 10% 10% 
Income (in millions) R$40 R$60 R$ 90 
Sales (in millions) R$56 R$70 R$ 120 
 
Code Name Position Reason to be interviewed Date Duration 
I16 Elton Goldman CEO Owner(s) acting as CEO 
(2
nd
 Generation) 
5/5/2008 
and 
9/12/2008 
2h36 min 
I17 Kate Goldman Adjunct Financing 
Director  
Owner(s) active in the 
company (2
nd
 Generation) 
9/5/2008 1h20 min 
I18 Neil Brooks Operational 
Director 
Non-family member in 
senior management 
9/5/2008 1h13 min 
I19 Amber 
Goldman 
Shareholder Owner(s) not active in the 
company (2
nd
 Generation) 
6/6/2008 42 min 
I20 John Goldman Heir Member of the owner family 
not active in the company 
(3
rd
 Gen.) 
24/6/2008 49 min 
 Source: Research data 
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from the end of 1980, arose out of the need to take over some functions due to the 
withdrawal of the founder, who at that moment was involved with the management of 
a new business. 
(CIII01) My father has this entrepreneurial nature, and in the 80’s he started 
up an undertaking in the area of information technology, which was Quartzil 
Informática. It was a business that was much larger than he had anticipated 
and which ended up consuming a lot of his time and took his mind 
completely off Prize. This was the end of the 80’s and I was already in Prize 
at this time. Therefore, naturally, I could see this situation, his absence, and 
increasingly focused on resolving the problems of Quartzil. And I felt an 
obligation to take on the questions of Prize. So my involvement was very 
intense, but also very spontaneous. (I16). 
Another important question was the health condition of the founder, who, 
stricken with Parkinson's disease, gradually had to withdraw from the daily routine of 
the company. 
(CIII02) And soon after, at the beginning of the 1990s, he started to have 
some health problems that for a time greatly diverted his attention from work. 
This upset things a lot and affected us significantly. (I16). 
It is important to stress that neither the insertion of the successor, nor even the 
areas of his activities in the family organization occurred through imposition, or any 
pressure on the part of the founder. The successor stresses that since childhood he 
had developed a spontaneous interest in the family company, in observing the 
father’s routine and his dedication to the business. 
(CIII03) I was always very involved since childhood, always accompanying 
my father. Work always held an important place in his life. So I also became 
involved very early on. [...] I don´t think he used his paternal authority for me 
to take over a determined position within the company. This sort of thing: 
‘From now on you will remain responsible for such and such an area’. He 
never said anything like this! He never told me where I was going to work in 
the company. Did he observe me working? Of course he did! And certainly 
without me noticing it, he must have given some guidance, but it was all very 
much my own initiative, to go on filling spaces (I16). 
In spite of having started his career in the company and the withdrawal of the 
founder not having been an abrupt change, the successor faced several difficulties to 
legitimize himself with the older directors and other company staff. The professional 
respect and charisma concentrated in the figure of the founder made it a symbol for 
the company and its staff. It was thus a hard task to substitute him who had been 
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responsible for the foundation and growth of the company, and resulted in the loyalty 
of many workers changing into mistrust and lack of identification with the successor. 
(CIII04) Elton’s yoke is a heavy one. One of the reasons is this: you still have 
factory staff who would give their lives for Dr. Richard. This is very fine, but 
at the same time it complicates things! For example, sometimes, and I am 
not saying this happens, an employee can subvert the authority of the 
successor, because he is still linked to the figure of the predecessor. [...]. I 
think people have to realize that organizations must be lasting, but that 
everything undergoes change. And that we, human beings and 
professionals, have our expiry dates. (I18). 
Another factor presented as an obstacle by Elton was the fact of being 
regarded by many staff as the ‘boss’s son’, who was there merely because of his 
kinship ties and not because of his competence to execute the work. While this was a 
factor of great discomfort for the successor, he considers it one of the motives for his 
persistence in carving out his space and demonstrating his value to the company. In 
the words of one of the present directors, from the second generation and Elton’s 
sister, the gradual transition of power from the predecessor to the successor did not 
facilitate the process: 
(CIII05) It really didn´t make things easier! Because for a long time Elton 
worked with him [founder], but he was very young, and was seen by a large 
number as a boy, and a boy who was even a nuisance there. (I17). 
(CIII06) I really found things very difficult, because this business of being the 
‘boss’s son’ is terrible. It is a heavy burden. And with me it was no different. 
So when I had a function within the company, the company had already 
existed for many years. There was already a group there who was at the 
head of the business, manager, director, salespeople... [...]. I came to work 
and they said: ‘The club dues are all paid up, go to the club’ or ‘What are you 
doing here? Go for a walk, go and have a swim...’. It was more or less like 
this! [...]. But I was also a person who didn´t give up easily. So I wanted to 
impose myself and to be recognised. (I16). 
From the middle of the 1990s, Elton was already at the head of Prize, having 
to live up to the image and brilliant performance of his father in the company, and 
having to stamp on it his own style of management. And, in addition, prove that he 
was competent enough to run the business. Before his status was legitimized by 
employees and executives, there were some conflicts. Elton came up against several 
instances of resistance from the old executives; men who had worked in the 
company for many years and that were absolutely trusted by the founder, and who 
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seemed not to believe in the competence of the heir to manage the family business. 
There was an atmosphere of a ‘veiled boycott’ of the successor’s management. 
Facing up to this scenario, Elton started to dismiss some executives that 
belonged to the former management group formed by his father, in order to recycle 
the team, bringing in new members that he trusted, and at the same time removing 
staff who were out-of-date or too set in their ways. 
(CIII07) They were people who had been contracted by my father and who 
had been in the company for 30 years and that ended up almost becoming 
part of the family. Then there came a new management, with the need for a 
lot of changes. And they were not fitted for these changes. They would even 
contaminate and jeopardize the team that was in there. [...]. And it was not 
only one person: there were three executives that had exactly this profile 
from my father’s time. They were really necessary at that time, but with the 
passage of time they had become outdated, they didn´t keep abreast of new 
developments, they had that defect of being too set in their ways. They had 
a very rigid and completely inflexible posture. They really had to leave the 
company. (I16). 
One of the most critical moments in this process was the withdrawal of one of 
the older directors of the company who had made his career at the side of the 
founder and that, because of this, felt he was the rightful heir to the position of CEO. 
In this way, the wrangling for power, waged implicitly between the successor and the 
former director, resulted in the reduction of Elton’s authority, and installed a conflict 
situation that ended with the dismissal of the former director, in a tense and 
quarrelsome process. It is interesting to note that this decision, in addition to a 
practical effect, that is, the resolution of the conflict, also came accompanied by a 
symbolic effect, that of a demonstration of force, making it clear to all members of the 
organization who really was at the head of the company, and helped to raise the self-
confidence and the level of authority of the successor. 
(CIII08) Some years ago, I think that this was a decisive moment for the 
growth trajectory of Prize, a focused, sustainable and planned one. It had 
much to do with a change that we made in our management. I removed a 
director who had already worked in the company for 30 years, the 
commercial director. [...] he merged his position of executive with acquired 
rights and was not contributing anymore, he was not aligned. [...] It was not 
easy to take this decision, nor was it easy afterwards to take the 
responsibility for taking it, but it subsequently proved to be the right one. This 
also ended by giving me much more self-confidence (I16). 
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(CIII09) He [the former director] thought that he had the right, that he was the 
principal executive of the company. The principal executive was [Elton]. [...] 
but the withdrawal of this person was not a friendly matter. This was not 
[Elton]’s intent, nor surely the intent of the family. We did not cultivate the 
objective of discord. It was only that time ran out... the expiry date arrived. 
We wanted to try another model. (I18). 
As can be seen, in relation to the old staff, the process of legitimization of the 
successor proved to be a contentious one. However, as to the family, such process 
occurred more naturally and spontaneously, even if, with some apprehension and 
fear. The relative tranquillity and ready acceptance of the successor by the other 
family members can be explained, at least in part, by the lack of other candidates to 
the succession in the bosom of family, interested in competing for the position. In 
addition to this, the long trajectory of Elton in the company was responsible for him 
acquiring experience, little by little, and being recognized by the family as the natural 
successor to the position of CEO. 
(CIII10) I think that in the beginning, [Elton] started when my father was still 
very active, so we didn´t worry, because Elton had his support there the 
whole time. But, as my father withdrew, he became unable to be there 
working all day, and with [Elton] taking over more and more, I confess that I 
really became a little concerned. If only because of his immaturity [...]. I think 
that with time he started to see the real situation. He committed many 
blunders, many, but I think also that my father pretended not to see, 
because [Elton] was the youngest. He was very patient during his learning 
process. But I think he learnt as he went along, like learning to ride a bicycle. 
You just do it. You fall, you get up, and then you just get it. (I19). 
(CIII11) I think that [Elton] managed to get respect for his proposals and for 
his strategic vision. He formed an executive group, who adhere to his ideas, 
I won´t say totally, but the vast majority... I, for example, today consider 
[Elton] a real leader. He conquered this, although it was not easy. And, this 
is very important, indeed: the company has to have one. (I17). 
At present, in addition to Elton, also connected to the management of the 
company is another family member belonging to the 2nd generation, Kate Goldman, 
who acts as deputy financial director. Figure 4.9 below presents the company’s 
current organization chart, in which is highlighted, in green, the position of the two 
family members who occupy managerial positions and of the nonfamliy manager, 
who were interviewed. 
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Figure 4.9: Organization chart of Prize 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Research data 
 
As to the 3rd generation, only a niece of the current CEO is connected to the 
company, doing an internship in the area of architecture. Although there already are 
members of the 3rd generation with the right age and preparation to take over 
positions in the company, there exists a certain resistance to their entry, clearly 
influenced by the vision of the founder, who always advocated the importance of the 
separation of company and family. Thus the principal orientation to the successors is 
to seek professional experience outside Prize, to only later try for a position with the 
organization. 
(CIII12) This has actually been discussed. We are very concerned about 
this. We do not want our relations, nephews and sons, to imagine that here 
is their natural place of work. We encourage precisely the contrary. Yes of 
course, Prize is a work option, but not the only one. What we want is that 
they have the best professional training they can get, that they acquire 
experience outside, and then bring it to Prize. (I16). 
(CIII13) I think that the family culture is not, and never has been that of 
making the company a haven for the whole family [...]. Well, now I think that 
our mentality is starting to change a little in connection with this. But up to 
very recently, the culture that was implanted by my father was followed to 
the letter. I think we even exaggerated a little [...] Starting fairly recently, we 
have seen that things are not exactly like that [...] obviously even a family 
member, if he is no good, is not going to be kept on in the company just 
because of that . (I17). 
On being questioned about the possibility of the creation of formal rules to 
regulate the entry of family members, the members of the second generation showed 
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that they were conscious of this necessity, underlining the importance of a process 
oriented towards competence and not family ties as a selection criterion. Regarding 
this question, the current CEO relates that he even stopped one of his nieces from 
taking over a position in the company as he saw that it was being done mainly 
because of kinship rather than using the formal contracting procedures. Such 
decision, in spite of demonstrating a vision of equanimity and a consciousness of the 
importance of understanding roles, also generated a certain friction among the family 
members connected to the company. 
(CIII14) [In relation to my niece], I felt a very great desire in her to come into 
Prize and in truth I was the one who barred it. I did this because she wanted 
it so much that she was already considering herself working in the company. 
But this had not been agreed with me, or with Kate. So it was a point of great 
friction, to the extent that she considered her wish frustrated. [...]. We are 
going to have to have the ability to create opportunity without creating at the 
same time any conflict of an operational nature. I am absolutely not against 
having relations working in Prize. I think that Prize is a company of a size 
which allows this. We have a quite professional management and the people 
who come to work have to be in harmony with this management. They will 
have bosses! (I16). 
(CIII15) I think that we have to establish these rules [of the entry of family 
members into the company] as quickly as possible. [...].because there can 
appear problems of the type: ‘I have a right, I would like to, I can’ The next 
generation has only a notion, very superficial knowledge about the company. 
First of all we have to present the company to them: this would be the first 
step. And afterwards, faced with the interest of each one, prepare them for 
one day being able to enter the company, as a professional person like any 
other. (I19). 
The current commercial director, nonfamliy, points out that the market itself 
obliges the company to orientate its selection process by the criterion of competence, 
as, otherwise, the contracting of unprepared family members could lead to a 
reduction of efficiency and result in losses for the company. This being the case, 
provided that the prerequisite of competence is taken into account, there would not 
be, in his opinion, any restriction related to the contracting of relations for managerial 
positions. 
(CIII16) I don´t think that we can have this reservation that just because you 
are a relation you can´t be admitted. I think that this is a thing that the market 
has as a premise and we have seen it here. This has nothing to do with it, 
the chap can be the son of the boss and be perfectly competent to take over 
the business, as he can be the owner himself and not have the competence 
to run it. So I don´t think we should mix these things up. People have to 
prepare themselves. If they want to be an entrepreneur, if they have a 
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commercial flair and professional competence, so much the better if they are 
a relation. But it can´t be by kinship: Kings, queens, princes, that’s not the 
way to do it! (I18). 
In the view of one of the members of the 3rd generation, who today is making a 
career in the financial market, totally independent of the family company, and who 
demonstrates the desire to one day enter it, it can be perceived how it has strongly 
internalized the question of the need for qualification, in declaring that being a 
member of the family even represents a great source of pressure and that a career in 
Prize should not be initiated by a managerial position, but from a trajectory similar to 
that of the current CEO, who started at the operational levels, climbing up the ladder 
until he reached management positions. 
(CIII17) I think that if you are part of the family, the responsibility of working 
in a family company is even greater. I definitely do not agree that being a 
family member opens doors. You are evaluated in a different way; you are 
more criticized than the others. And I think that for you to bear this greater 
responsibility you have to have experience. I think that I have to be more 
qualified, more prepared, with more experience of the market. [...]. I also 
think that if I really join Prize, I do not imagine myself starting immediately as 
a director. I think that you have to start learning: being introduced to the 
company; knowing the business; seeing what its organizational structure is 
like. And I do not expect taking over the business, asking for a position, from 
the beginning [...]. but I think that as I already have experience, I do not need 
to start from scratch. But neither do I expect to start above everyone. I don´t 
think that’s the way. You have to follow some steps just to get prepared, to 
be qualified. (I20). 
Another point that emerges as a factor relevant for the longevity of the 
company in the hands of the family, concerns the organizational values set up by the 
founder and the feeling of pride in the company shown in the interviews of the 
members of the three generations. These aspects, in spite of being subjective and 
intangible, are responsible for the interest of the family in providing continuity for the 
business and passing it over to the coming generations. 
(CIII18) I think that we are very attached to Prize. To this brand Prize, to this 
image Prize, because it was built up with great dedication. And I think that 
before these values became the fashion, ethics, transparency, we have 
always been like this, which came a lot from the personality, from the 
character of my father, his posture. [...] We were not there, but Prize was 
very much inside our house. What my father did, the concerns, the priorities. 
This was very present. So I think that it is a thing that even not being there 
within the company, ends up with us building together. (I19) 
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(CIII19) When you treat the business as your own, that was built by your 
grandfather with much sweat, an entrepreneur, you are reflected in him and 
you do not want this business to die. So, I don’t want it to die. I would like 
one day for my path to cross that of Prize, just to maintain this legacy that 
my grandfather gave us, that my uncle brought this far. And if it is not me, 
perhaps it will be my cousin, perhaps my sister or perhaps two or three 
together. (I20). 
 
IV.3.4. Professionalization of the company 
One of the noteworthy features, cited as a true stigma in many studies on 
family-owned companies (Gonçalves, 2000a), is the existence of practices arising out 
of the absence of a clear delimitation between company assets and family patrimony. 
That means, in many cases, it is common for the controlling family members to 
appropriate goods or resources of the company, utilizing them for private purposes 
and thus generating a real depletion in the company cash. In the case of Prize, one 
point that attracts one’s attention is the clear division between the family patrimony 
and the company resources, present since the founder’s management and passed 
with emphasis to subsequent generations. 
(CIII20) In our family, no-one shoots the traffic lights. This sort of thing does 
not exist in the company: ‘Ah, I’m going to use the company car. I’m going to 
ask a staff member to do something for me.’ This liberty does not exist [...]. 
Everything is separated. When it was only my father, the business was 
already not mixed up in this way. ‘Ah, so-and-so coming round to do a little 
something for me, or I´m going there to get this and that, I’ll ask for an 
advance’. This does not exist. [...]. Naturally he passed this on to us. So, this 
fear of it becoming an informal business, where everyone does what he 
likes, I don't see this at all. (I19). 
As regards the professionalization of Prize, it can be seen that in the presence 
of the founder there reigned a high level of informality in the management practices, 
a lack of delegation. And in spite of occurring to a lesser degree, these aspects are 
still present in the management of his successor. 
(CIII21) There was little formalization of things in the company, just because 
my father participated in the whole process. The company was small. 
Therefore, he himself spoke, he calculated, checked, sold, did the marketing, 
he did everything in the company. And logically that has merit, but as the 
company grows, it becomes impossible to manage. And I think that he had 
to adjust himself to this. For a long time, delegating functions, delegating 
responsibilities was a difficult thing for my father as well as for [Elton]. (I17). 
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(CIII22) I think that today, [Elton] is already more sure of himself as a CEO, 
and succeeds in delegating more, although he also started with that same 
profile as my father. [...]. he, for a long time, did not delegate. It was that 
personal thing, just him. I think that there has already been a lot of progress 
in his behaviour. (I19). 
Recently, Prize developed its strategic planning, in an attempt to draw up their 
objectives aligned to strategic guidelines, capable of involving the whole 
management team. In the view of the current commercial director, it is still necessary 
to make progress in the internal alignment, to raise the level of commitment of the 
collaborators and, in parallel, move in the direction of greater decentralization. 
(CIII23) We have held some seminars, contracted some specialists and we 
did some alignment work. We have also developed a strategic plan. This is 
something that went well. I think that [Elton] is showing much business 
maturity in seeking out advisors, in relinquishing the exercise of power alone, 
in asking the opinion of someone who can collaborate. This is important. 
(I18). 
In order to tie the strategic planning to a set of targets, an evaluation and 
incentives system was created based on the participation of the staff in the net profits 
of the company. Some of the adopted evaluation criteria are: gross margin; 
production goals; sales; revenue with the respective invoicing; level of customer 
satisfaction and; brand reputation. Although it represents a significant advance in the 
professionalization of the company, it was seen that the subjective character of the 
evaluation had to be minimized, starting from the development of a much more 
formal and objective performance measures. 
(CIII24) The first formal evaluation was done last year, through a movement 
of the company for profit distribution. All levels were evaluated. Even the 
directors were evaluated by [Elton]. I still think that we need to create better 
criteria. The evaluation is a little subjective. You have the parameters, but 
they need to be placed in a firmer rule. I don’t think that it is only the 
numbers that we have to evaluate. It should be the numbers, as well as, the 
behaviour. (I18). 
In order to attain the necessary balance and focus, the current CEO is trusting 
to the growth of the company as a trigger to carry out a continuous renewal of his 
team, looking for professionals in harmony with his business vision, and results 
orientated. 
(CIII25) Seeking the growth of the company is an interesting issue because it 
makes possible for you to form a team aligned with your strategic planning 
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and the challenges that you proposed. When the company grows you need 
people attuned to what you are proposing to do. And these people have to 
arrive committed to your challenge, your purpose. Therefore, as the 
company has grown I have found it easy to form this team and also of 
breaking down a lot of resistance. [...] So this dynamic of company growth I 
think that has been the vehicle that has enabled me to attain a management 
that reflects my style of running the business. (I16). 
 
IV.3.5. The formalization of the Board of Directors 
In addition to the discussion on the succession process and its peculiarities, 
and the trajectory of professionalization of Prize, a treatment of the Board of Directors 
as the principal instance of governance becomes necessary. 
At first, a Board of Directors was set up in which only the controlling family 
members participated, resulting in the discussions being conducted in an informal 
manner. Accordingly, the Board represented a pro forma instance, working only in a 
rubber stamping capacity, with all the decision-making power concentrated in the 
figure of the CEO. As things changed, Elton invited people of his inner circle to be 
part of the Board and, although still maintaining a much more advisory than directive 
character, the simple opening up to the recommendations and opinions of the 
external members already represents a significant step in Prize detaching itself from 
a personalist management concentrated merely in the vision of its executive family 
members. 
(CIII26) I think that the difference is that between wine and water. I think that 
the Board has become professional. Because a Board formed just with 
family members is very informal, with little requirements, with few targets. 
When the external members came in with their experience from other 
companies and other scenarios, I think that it became much more 
professional, and you can see this clearly through the improvement in the 
company performance. (I19). 
(CIII27) Well, I think that this is a first sign of the professionalization of the 
company. Because we know that when we have a long-standing, traditional, 
family company, with capital safeguarded by the family itself, you are a 
company that has an owner. Then the owner’s voice ends up being almost a 
rule or a law. And the formation of a Board with external members, this, in 
some way, helps a lot, because we have the obligation of discussing the 
positions of the owner with professional Board members. (I18). 
On being questioned regarding what should be the tendency of the Board – if 
it should remain consultative or move in the direction of a directive profile – the 
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interviewees asserted that the expectation is to build a directive and active Board, 
which will be done gradually with the maturing of the family shareholders, in the 
sense of accepting directives that up to a point could run counter to the family view of 
the business. 
(CIII28) This is the situation when you have a family company: you have 
management by reason and management by emotion. This is natural and we 
need to see this with great clarity and with great tranquillity. I have the 
consciousness of being the director of a company that has an owner. But 
when you set up a 100% professional board, soon the will of the Board will 
end up being different from that of the owner. And I think that this is a point 
that requires more developed maturity from the family of shareholders, which 
means living with the controversial, living with differences. And of having to 
accept, even against one’s own wishes, the consensus of personnel that are 
there to make some contribution to the company. (I18). 
(CIII29) This requires us to submit to opinions of others, because the 
company cannot live with this personalist management, and decision making 
process: the chairman wants it that way and that’s the end of the story. I 
think that this phase has already passed. (I19). 
The positive perception of the experience with the new Board is given as an 
incentive to implement in the future a formalized Family Council, making available a 
channel of communication open to all family members involved with the company. 
This instance would thus be charged with dealing with family questions, such as the 
policy of entry and opening up of opportunities for the coming generations, filling an 
important gap making sure the company endures, through legal instances and the 
search for consensus among the different family blocks. 
(CIII30) I think that the Board that we have already formed, now only tends 
to be institutionalized. The meetings will continue in the way in which they 
are happening with the right frequency. And I think that with time we will also 
start to think about moving towards a Family Council, a formal one, to insert 
the new generation and prepare them. Because I think that this is 
fundamental, something that hasn´t occurred with our generation. After the 
founder, we came in, but without much preparation, some even without any 
preparation whatever. So, I think that this will open the way to preparing this 
new generation right away, who are nephews, our sons and daughters. 
(I19). 
According to the interviewees, the profile of the external board members 
represented a fundamental aspect in making the experience of the new Board a 
success. They brought with them a new vision, based on their vast market 
experience. Another positive point was the capacity of the Board to accelerate the 
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speed of the decision making, perceived as usually slow by one of the current 
nonfamliy directors. In addition, the possibility of benefiting from the support of the 
external members is given as a positive reinforcement, raising the level of confidence 
and allowing less hesitation in the definition of the paths to be followed by the 
company. 
(CIII31) There are three external board members, who have been 
contributing a lot. Firstly because they come with wider vision, not confined 
only to the company, a good vision from the market perspective [...] this 
brought an interesting evolution. I think that we were very fortunate, because 
we got a person who has a concrete batching business, which has to do with 
our business and a person from the financial area, which I think was a very 
interesting addition. (I17). 
(CIII32) We have members of great quality that have experience of this 
market that is new to us. We are facing an extremely globalized market 
which has characteristics different from that of 50 years ago. These board 
meetings are very productive to give focus, to give direction to the decision, 
because one of the characteristics of a family company is that you do not 
have the same speed in the decision taking of companies that are already 
100% professionalized. Therefore, it is certainly very positive either for us, 
executives, or for the shareholders. Because their convictions or ours when 
corroborated by other people from outside, who have experience in the 
market, in the banking area, in the environment of big industries, brings 
greater certainty that the right path is being followed. (I18). 
Another gain with the structuring of governance has been the increase in the 
degree of understanding of the distinct roles, disciplining the activities of those who 
occupy more than one chair in the organization, which is the case of Elton, at the 
same time CEO and shareholder. This leads him to adopt more transparent practices 
in relation to the other shareholders. 
(CIII33) With the gradual withdrawal of my father, I increasingly took over the 
function of principal executive, because of the fact of being a shareholder 
and being very involved with the business. I nominated myself CEO, 
although I wasn´t. [...] really I only realized how much I was involving myself 
with the business much more than would be required by my responsibility as 
shareholder, when the family started to become interested in the business. 
When I saw that that business was not only mine. I had never thought of 
running Prize in a different way, as owner of only a part of it. I always ran it 
as if it were mine, as if it was my life there. And I think that was very 
important, after I became conscious that it belonged to the family, I tried to 
act more carefully. (I18). 
(CIII34) I think that we have made great strides on this question [regarding 
disclosure]. Due to the formation of the Shareholders Council and the 
Advisory Council, I think that there has been a great change, as today we 
have enormous transparency. Not that this generated conflicts before, but it 
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did generate a certain ill feeling... Because it was so natural for there to be 
no accountability for the family members within the company. This had a 
rather, let us say, heavy implication. Not everyone was in the company, so 
there had to be accountability. But today, this has all been peacefully settled. 
(I17). 
 
IV.3.6. The property sphere  
Finally, it is important to highlight some changes that occurred in the property 
sphere, influenced by the process of succession and by the greater formalization of 
the Prize governance mechanisms. 
In spite of being a company that has lasted for more than 50 years of activity, 
its corporate structure can be considered simple, being a closed capital corporation, 
composed at present of only four siblings, shareholders, belonging to the 2nd 
generation of the family, in accordance with that indicated in Table 4.7 following. 
 
Table 4.7: The Prize’s capital structure 
 
 
 
Coexistence between the partners is seen as harmonious and well aligned. It 
is possible to infer that this, at least in part, is due to the reduced number of 
shareholders and to their kinship. Thus, taking as a reference the model of Gersick et 
al. (1997), we could classify the current phase of the company as a ‘company of 
brothers’, in which the potential for conflict is less than that commonly observed in 
more complex organizations, like those ‘consortiums of cousins’, distinguished by a 
greater number of generations occupying the property sphere together. Accordingly, 
although each partner possesses a degree of differentiated access to the daily 
routine of the company, the nonfamliy director relates that the alignment between the 
Shareholders % Capital 
Amber Goldman 
Rose Goldman 
Kate Goldman 
Elton Goldman 
25% 
25% 
25% 
25% 
Source: Research data  
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partners is sufficiently satisfactory to guarantee that no disaffection interferes in the 
company management. 
(CIII35) I think that there certainly exists cohesion as regards the ends of the 
business, but with a differentiated involvement. We have [Elton] who is in 
charge of the operations, as CEO. There is [Kate] who is involved in the 
financial issues. There are the other two sisters who are a little more 
removed from the daily routine. And I don´t see any disharmony from the 
point of view of the shareholders regarding the main goals. There are clear 
objectives in the sense of trying to be a national reference regarding building 
solutions, of sustainable and increasing growth to create value, to attach 
value to the business, of seeking a different space in this market. We do not 
see any disagreements among the shareholders. Even if they existed, they 
didn’t get as far as here in the company. If they existed and didn’t get here, 
that’s already something to be thankful for, because it doesn’t create turmoil. 
But I do not even believe that they exist. (I18). 
Another point capable of playing an important role in the maintenance of an 
atmosphere of harmony between the partners is the figure of the founder and the 
values disseminated by him. Although he no longer exercises an active function in 
the company, due to bad health, he continues to enjoy enormous respect and 
represents the family’s moral foundations. 
(CIII36) I think that this [disagreements] doesn’t occur much because of the 
figure of my grandfather. I think although he doesn’t go into Prize anymore, 
he still makes everyone go more or less in the same direction. But, when my 
grandfather dies I don’t know. [...] I am definitely not saying that the day my 
grandfather dies the family will collapse, but I think that he is what has 
maintained it united to this day. He is that person over there, who today is 
very fragile with health problems and so forth, but who is the one that is an 
example for everybody. (I20). 
(CIII37) I think we are a very united family, but without that exaggeration: 
‘every Sunday, we all have lunch together’. There’s not much of that. What I 
think keeps us together a lot are the values, passed down by our parents, by 
my father and by my mother: the example of dedication, of work, of 
something worth doing, doing it well, of wanting things to come out right. I 
think that this is the great unifying factor. (I19). 
Another element that emerges as relevant is the payment of dividends to the 
shareholders. Although there is no record of conflicts in relation to this question, 
divergent orientations can be seen between those that are merely shareholders and 
those that also occupy managerial positions. According to the vision of the partner-
managers the first concern should be to reinvest profits to maintain company growth, 
only secondly would the focus return to the remuneration of the shareholders. 
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(CIII38) The distribution of dividends is a demand from the shareholders not 
working in the company. It comes more from my two sisters, and I accept 
this as the way it should be. But, for those who are involved in the company, 
our main concern is always in reinvesting, and I am very conservative in 
relation to this. I think that the company comes first, before the family 
members’ needs. (I17). 
The question of return for the shareholders has been receiving greater 
attention on the part of the current management, because, due to the custom of 
passing over share quotas to the coming generations, new shareholders and new 
demands will arise, making the drawing up of the shareholders' agreement an 
interesting option for the regulation of the entry into and withdrawal from the company 
(via sale of shares). Accordingly, there already exists an expectation on the part of 
the CEO that the next generation will be prepared to take on the role of future 
shareholders. 
(CIII39) My dream really is to succeed in the professionalization of the 
company management. What I want is to be able to offer security for my 
children by creating, consolidating a company that is sustainable from the 
business point of view. One that generates results and dividends. For my 
kids, my expectation is that they can fulfil the function of shareholders of a 
good business. (I16). 
In relation to the possibility of going public or even of a future merger or sale, 
different reactions from different shareholders are encountered. For one of the 
shareholders the option of going public is accompanied by the sentiment of 
apprehension, above all because of the need for transparency and the loss of 
confidentiality of the organization’s operations. On the other hand, there is also the 
idea that these options would be an almost inevitable path for the company to follow 
in the future. 
(CIII40) I think that this is a natural path. Now I do not understand this 
subject profoundly [going public]. But, at first it scared me a bit. It’s the same 
old story: ‘This business is ceasing to be ours’. (I19). 
(CIII41) I really don´t think that we have any pre-defined idea of maintaining 
control indefinitely. I think it is a tendency for us to have partners and 
participate in another economic group, using Prize and vice-versa. I think 
that this is an almost natural path. And I think it is good. I feel the lack of it 
today, given this very competitive, rapid market, sometimes capital intensive, 
human resources intensive. Sometimes when I see some companies and 
say: ‘Goodness, if we could use that from that company it would be an 
enormous gain for Prize’. Therefore in this sense, as a means of increasing 
our competence, I think that this opportunity is very welcome. (I16). 
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(CIII42) If it is for the survival of the business, because although Prize is a 
family company, the business of Prize is to make a profit, to make money. 
The family itself also depends on this. So I would prefer seeing Prize among 
others, in a merger with another company, or Prize being passed to another 
administration, another management than see it going downhill, declining. 
That is, I don´t even see this scenario. But if this situation were to prevail and 
if I were a manager, I would definitely not be afraid to take this decision. I 
think that the company might be family and all the rest of it, but in spite of 
everything it is a company. And it has to be run to make money. (I20). 
Finally, it is interesting to emphasize the vision of the interviewees on what 
would be success for Prize. In this regard, replies were received related to results, to 
pride, to tradition, to confidence and honesty of its members and to the possibility of 
perpetuating family values starting from the business itself. 
(CIII43) Results, certainly. But this business, as it was set up didn’t produce 
the results of the best businesses in the market. Consequently it is not the 
results which are the main thing in the business. I think it has a lot to do with 
carrying on the tradition of a business created by Dr. Richard: an 
entrepreneur, innovative, persistent. A long-lasting business. And they take 
pride in this. They are very proud. I think of course that the desirable pride in 
money enters into the equation as well, but the pride in building up a lasting 
business sometimes exceeds even that. (I18). 
(CIII44) One thing that I like, that I see a lot of in my business today is the 
following: it is being able to say that those people over there are honest. This 
is the characteristic of a family company that I think is a point in favour. The 
people do not want to compromise their names or the name of their 
company, and I like this in Prize. (I20). 
(CIII45) And I think that what is more important is that the values themselves 
continue the same. In terms of strategy, the perspectives in relation to the 
market segment can change, new products being introduced. So what I think 
is important is that the values, they can remain over generations. And I think 
these values are very good and have to remain. (I17). 
 
 
 
IV.4. The Case of Minas Agro Group 
 
IV.4.1. The company 
The history of the Minas Agro Group is strongly linked to the enterprising 
activities of its founder Eurico Fontes, who started his career in 1976, when, at 23, 
and recently-graduated as an agricultural technician, he moved to the southern 
region of the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil. From then on he made a successful 
career in the sales division of a large multinational company.  
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Soon after, he entered as a minority partner in a company specializing in the 
warehousing and trading of cereals. A short while after his entry into this company, 
he proposed the diversification of the business, widening its range to include the 
production of fertilizers. In this context, in addition to maintaining its activity in the 
trading of rice and beans for the state of São Paulo, the company commenced 
production and trading of fertilizers for the whole region in which it was situated, 
characterized by an essentially agricultural economy.  
This company lasted for approximately 15 years, until, in the middle of 1992, it 
was wound up due to personal reasons alleged by the majority partner. At this 
moment, Eurico received for his 10% participation, one farm, one liquor distillery and, 
in addition, a reasonable amount of capital. Still in 1992, this financial amount was 
invested in the creation of a new fertilizer industry that was the germ of the Minas 
Agro Group, which structure can be seen in Figure 4.10. 
Figure 4.10: Enterprises of the Minas Agro Group 
 
 Source: Research data 
 
After going through a long developmental phase, from 2002, Minas Agro 
established a strategic partnership with BUNGE fertilizers, a well-known multinational 
company in the Brazilian agribusiness field. In this new phase, the company 
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abandoned the production and the trading of fertilizers, concentrating only on the 
process of mixing the components of the fertilizers produced by BUNGE and on 
delivery of the final product to its destination. Inspired by his entrepreneurial spirit, 
Eurico allied the development of this undertaking to the creation of new businesses 
such as Minas Logistics, which was created solely to meet the demands of Minas 
Agro, but which, with the passage of time, gained space within the group. Thus, 
besides coping with the intense distribution movement of its own business, in off 
season periods in the fertilizers sector, the company started to offer services to new 
markets. It should also be pointed out that, together with the development of the 
fertilizer and transports businesses, Eurico also administered the distillery and the 
dairy cattle farm, occupying himself with a broad range of activities. The successful 
trajectory of Eurico Fontes was abruptly interrupted in 2006, when he was killed in a 
car accident, leaving the business group and the family abandoned. 
 
 
IV.4.2. Profile of the interviewees 
 
Table 4.8: Minas Agro’s profile of the interviewees 
 
 
 
Code Name Position Reason to be 
interviewed 
Date Duration 
I21 Heloísa 
Fontes 
CEO Founder’s wife and 
the present CEO 
11/09/2008 1h30 min 
I22 Patrícia 
Fontes 
Finance Director Owner active in the 
company (2
nd
 
Generation) 
11/09/2008 1h21 min 
I23 Vivian Fontes Not active in the 
company 
Owner not active in 
the company (2
nd
 
Generation) 
12/09/2008 43 min 
I24 Gabriela 
Fontes 
Administrative 
Director 
Owner active in the 
company (2
nd
 
Generation) 
11/09/2008 1h14 min 
I25 Cristina 
Fontes 
 
Commercial 
advisor 
Founder’s sister in 
senior management 
12/09/2008 1h00 min 
I26 Thomas 
Sampaio 
Board advisor Non-family member 
in senior 
management 
12/09/2008 1h13 min 
I27 Débora 
Brandão 
Legal advisor Non-family member 
in senior 
management 
12/09/2008 1h01 min 
Source: Research data 
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IV.4.3. Obstacles, clashes and challenges in the succession  
 
Without doubt, the most noteworthy aspect of this case revolves around the 
succession process, triggered by the sudden death of the founder. The victim of a car 
accident, Eurico Fontes was only 53 years old, and he left his widow and three 
daughters responsible for a business group whose activities and decisions had been 
concentrated solely in his person. In spite of two of the successors, Gabriela and 
Patrícia, having graduated in administration and of the desire of the founder of one 
day having them in the management of the business, the absence of a process for 
the preparation of the succession was responsible for the fact that they had not 
developed greater links with the company, and did not know the business. The other 
sister, Vivian, was fully occupied with her graduation in medicine, making her even 
more distant from the family business. 
(CIV1) The girls were no longer living with us. Gabriela, who is the eldest, 
had been in the USA for two years, where she was doing an MBA. Patricia, 
the youngest, had already lived there for six months, doing a course of 
English, but it was already settled that she would also return to continue her 
studies there. And Vivian, who is the one in the middle, was studying 
medicine in Barbacena
4
. (I21). 
(CIV2) This loss [...] brought much insecurity in its train, because [Eurico] 
was absolutely the centrepiece. He was very active. So everybody was 
unhinged. His daughters had never been here... They were very much 
removed from the company, and he also didn´t insist on it. [...] if I was his 
[Eurico] daughter I wouldn´t leave him alone. If they had stayed at least two 
years here in the company living together with him, they would have learnt 
the way. [...] so the two attitudes reinforced each other, he didn´t want it 
much and neither did they. (I25). 
The lack of succession planning in Minas Agro represents a typical case. 
Leone (2005) points this out as being a recurring trait in the context of Brazilian 
family-owned companies. In spite of the explicit interest on the part of the founder in 
preparing the daughters to take over the business, it is probable that the feeling 
existed that there was still a lot of time in which to plan the succession, causing 
certain complacency, and resulting in the absence of any formal planning. 
The positive side of all this is that the expectation of the entry of the daughters 
into the family business was preceded by the search for greater maturity and 
                                                 
4
 Barbacena is a city in the state of Minas Gerais, in Brazil, which stands out as a center of education. 
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professional experience in the market, before entering Minas Agro, in accordance 
with that stated by one of the successors in the following section. 
(CIV3) So I had some job opportunities in Belo Horizonte
5
 and he [the 
founder] was very pleased with this. He liked the fact that I was going to 
learn a little more, acquire a businessperson's viewpoint. Learn to have the 
discipline of an executive [...]. And he said: ‘I think that now is not the 
moment for you to return here. I think that you are still very green’. And went 
on: ‘you have to acquire more experience, broaden your perspectives. At the 
right time you will take over the administrative part of the company and I will 
go off to the farm’. (I22). 
But this distance existing between the successors and the daily routine of the 
company, on the occasion of the sudden death of the founder, brought with it, in 
addition to their natural hesitation and perplexity faced with the urgent need of 
providing continuity for the family business, an additional difficulty, which was their 
lack of connection to it. In this context, the emotional impact brought about by the 
loss of the founder, was added to their feeling of insecurity faced with the 
responsibility of taking over the management of a business group whose reality they 
knew nothing about. 
(CIV4) When the unexpected death happened, our aunt at the end of the 
wake said: ‘Now it’s up to you. Tomorrow we are going to be there together, 
we are going to pray with the staff and we are going to push this boat 
forward’. This strength of hers, at that moment, precisely on the day of the 
burial made a great impression on me and on my sisters. And I believe on 
my mother also. Because we were very shaken, but we hadn’t been able to 
think much. We went to bed and on the following day went to the company to 
work. We arrived here and there were a lot of people we had never seen. 
So, we got down to it, on a wing and a prayer, without thinking if it was going 
to come out right, or what could happen more into the future. It was a 
sudden succession. (IV22). 
Faced with such an unexpected situation, and Heloísa, the wife’s founder, not 
having had the preparation necessary to take over the company, the agreed decision 
was that Patricia and Gabriela would help their mother in running the business: 
(CIV5) However much she lacked expertise in fertilizers, alcohol, cattle, she 
knew what it was all about in general. She didn´t have the ability to run a 
company of this complexity, but we resolved to be near and also to find 
people who could help us. (IV24) 
(CIV6) I was living in the USA and was not going to return very soon. I was 
doing my MBA and was intending to work in some company there, to first get 
                                                 
5
 Belo Horizonte is a Brazilian city, the state capital of Minas Gerais. 
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experience, and afterwards return, if I did return [...] but at the start the 
impact was very great and at no time did I think of leaving my mother and 
sister alone. I thought that I had to hold their hands and we would march 
forward together. (IV24). 
(CIV7) I had concluded a course of business English in Orlando. I returned, 
but was already looking at MBA courses to do in the USA and was also 
considering the possibility of going to China to brush up the Mandarin I was 
studying in Belo Horizonte. (IV25). 
The decision that Heloísa would remain at the head of the company was 
intended to calm all the staff because of the respect that she inspired, because of the 
correctness of her treatment of everyone and the devotion that she had always 
dispensed to philanthropic works: 
(CIV8) [...] her presence, is primordial, is essential, in here. She shows 
respect for people and commands respect from them, because she is seen 
as the matriarch, the founder, even if she has not previously had a role in the 
management. (I24). 
(CIV9) We set up a foundation to help needy patients with cancer, of which I 
was the first president. Here in the city we don´t have oncology treatment. 
Our patients have to go to larger centres to receive this treatment. And we, 
together with the local government authority help out with travelling 
expenses, the purchase of drugs, and free psychological assistance... 
Everything is done with volunteer work. And we raise money through 
telemarketing, donations and charitable dinners. (IV21). 
In addition to their lack of preparation as regards knowledge of the business 
itself, another factor that generated great difficulty for the successors was the 
absence of formal mechanisms of control and management. As Eurico had 
centralized the decisions and memorized all the information relative to the business, 
when he died he took it with him, leaving the owners completely in the dark. One of 
the solutions found by the Fontes family was to resort to hiring an adviser to help 
them in the company direction. Thomas was chosen and his initial mission was to 
carry out an investigation on the feasibility and financial health of each company 
pertaining to the Minas Agro Group. 
(CIV10) Our father concentrated many of the things in his head. He kept 
everything to himself as regards company matters, even with his own family. 
We did not participate directly. We knew some things, but we did not 
participate in the construction phases of his business. (I22). 
(CIV11) My father was a centralizer. He took care of everything: he ordered 
things to be done, but he kept on top of things to check. I think that there are 
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remains of this and the girls are trying to change it, to ensure that each 
employee takes more responsibility for his work. (I23). 
(CIV12) Because he [Eurico] was a very entrepreneurial person, intelligent, 
he kept many things in his head, so my initial task was to make an 
assessment of the economic /financial situation and a budget plan of all the 
six companies. (I26). 
(CIV13) He [Thomas] has been with us for two years. And they [my 
daughters] trust him enormously. He is very intelligent and is a person who 
likes new challenges. And he is always following the market in all senses. So 
thus, with him coming here, things started to become easier (I21). 
Heloísa’s trust in Thomas actually predates his entry into the company and 
had been established from ties built up at the charitable foundation that she was 
president of. 
(CIV14) In the Foundation there was a person who carried out volunteer 
work very well and who was our executive director. And I was looking for 
someone who could keep an eye on and orientate the girls [...] he had 
worked for 30 years in the Bank of Brazil and was now retired. [...] At the 
Foundation he did volunteer work, unselfishly, without earning anything. I 
could see the love that he had for what he was doing and in this he seemed 
a little like me. I believed that he could do a good job, would work and take 
this responsibility regarding my daughters [...] and it worked. (I21). 
In addition to Thomas, other long-serving staff also facilitated the process of 
settling down the new managers, sharing their experience and establishing a means 
of access to some strategic information left only verbally by the founder. 
(CIV15) I felt secure with her [Débora]. First, because she was a person who 
did not withhold information. On the contrary, she had an open attitude 
which led us to trust her work. [...]. She [Débora] must have been here 11 
years. She worked directly with my father and was his right arm. [...]. So 
when we came in, she undertook the role of passing over much information 
which had been only in his head. She helped us a lot, doing some coaching 
work with us. (I24). 
In spite of the trust deposited in the nonfamliy managers at present in the 
company, when questioned about the possibility of contracting a nonfamliy CEO to 
run the business, the successors say that they feel insecure about this option. The 
lack of experience and the relative degree of ignorance of the handling of the 
business can have contributed to this attitude of insecurity, as without the existence 
of formal mechanisms of control and monitoring of the company results, the effective 
supervision of the acts of the contracted manager would be jeopardized. 
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(CIV16) We see difficulty in finding a reliable person. Just the fact of a 
person who is not from the family coming in, would cause an impact. Our 
insecurity has to do with the results that he would produce here in the 
company. We are studying this possibility, but we are not totally convinced 
that we are going to go for this idea [...]. For this to happen we need to be 
very secure, and today I really don´t feel comfortable with this idea, of putting 
in a person who will in practice take all the decisions of the company and 
map out the path for the business to follow. (I22). 
After taking over the Minas Agro group, the new managers sought, in addition 
to diagnosing the situation of each company, to promote the separation between the 
family patrimony and that of the organization. This helped directly in the elimination of 
abusive practices regarding company funds, avoiding the use of company assets for 
personal ends, and reducing the calls on the company cash arising out of the 
payment of family expenses. 
(CI17) As the business was all administered by him... he mixed up 
everything. The butcher’s bill was paid here in the company. It was 
everything in one sole cash. Today we are trying to separate this. [...] We 
want to form a group of companies with the family assets outside the 
business, totally disconnected. (I22). 
The separation of the family patrimony from that of the company is clearly a 
simpler process than the separation between professional subjects and family ones. 
The full understanding of the social roles, permitting each question, professional or 
personal, to be dealt with in its appropriate environment, is stated to have been a 
difficult process that demanded discipline and perseverance on the part of the new 
managers.  
(CIV18) At the start it seemed impossible to do it. Because work subjects 
were always dealt with at home and family subjects at work. Everything was 
mixed up and it did not seem possible to separate them. After several 
negotiations we succeeded in doing it. We no longer talked about work at 
home, and at the company we no longer talked about family matters. (I22). 
(CIV19) If we [the two sisters] had an argument at home for personal 
reasons, we brought it into the company. And here also we didn´t talk to 
each other, even if we had to decide on a work question. We went through 
an initial phase, behaving like this. But today we have learnt to deal with this. 
We are much better, through dialogue, and the interference of my mother. 
(I24). 
(CIV20) In the beginning when we were going to participate in important 
negotiations, my mother corrected me saying I had to speak in a different 
way. She poked me in the middle of the meeting for me to change my 
attitude. So all the time she said: ‘my dear, not like this’. And I totally lost my 
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credibility. So I was trying to speak properly about a certain matter and at the 
same time she was assuming the role of mother. I felt very small. (I22). 
In accordance with authors such as Dupas et al. (2003) it is important for the 
family to be able to develop a ‘zone of consensus’ with the purpose of minimizing the 
conflicts, directing the contentious questions towards amicable resolution. This notion 
that conflicts are part of a natural process of maturing, provided they are treated 
properly, is seen by one of the sisters, as a situation that was starting to exist in the 
Fontes family. 
(CIV21) The conflicts at home are making us grow more and more. [..] My 
sisters are very united. One is always drawing attention to the defects in the 
other and of themselves. Thus, one helps the other to grow. [...].Our family 
environment is very good. Of course it is not always absolutely marvellous: 
naturally there are conflicts, but by and large it is excellent. (I23). 
Another important question, implicit in the next quote (CIV22), relates to the 
building of the legitimacy of the successors. The distancing between the successors 
and the company, added to their youth at the moment of the succession, generated 
various difficulties, such as the low esteem by the body of the staff and the inevitable 
comparisons with the founder’s management. In this first stage, the search for 
legitimacy was accompanied by actions focused on the change of corporate culture 
rooted in the organization. 
(CIV22) When we started, it was very difficult to try to do something new, 
because the nonfamliy managers always used to say: ‘but in your father’s 
time we didn’t do things like this’. The search for our legitimacy was a 
constant struggle, as it was very difficult for them to believe that we were 
competent to succeed him. Their view was of: ‘two little spoilt girls, who lived 
abroad, travelling the world, want to come in here and pretend to be the 
bosses?’ So it was very complicated, we had to tread very warily (I24). 
(CIV23) It was very difficult for them. The first three months I was with them 
the whole time. As the girls were very young and considered spoilt, rejection 
was very pronounced. Staff members said: ‘I am not going to be told what to 
do by a few girls who are well brought up, but who know nothing’. It is 
difficult for you to change the way these people think and the rejection exists 
to this day. They are trying to change this, putting people they trust in. (I25). 
(CIV24) There are conflicts. Because they [Gabriela], [Vivian] and [Patrícia] 
are girls, are young. And they were seen by the staff as children. Only those 
children have grown up and there has been the loss of the father, the 
patriarch, but the staff has stayed the same. And the girls have started to 
command. So the first thing we worked on here with the girls was the 
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construction of their legitimacy. We worked eight months on a series of 
questions that marked this legitimacy. (I26). 
(CIV25) When we came in, there were many people that he had trusted and 
who felt secure with him. He was the one who said what had to be done or 
not. Everyone had a totally passive attitude, trusting that things would settle 
down from one hour to the next. This feeling of security that he had taken 
care of everything was gone. (I22). 
Another factor that influenced the process of building legitimacy of the 
successors concerns the question of gender. Authors such as Jimenez (2009) 
provide evidence that, in family organizations, the women, traditionally, assume roles 
disconnected from management such as those of wives, mothers and family leaders, 
limiting themselves to acting, in the majority of instances, only in the family 
environment. In the case in question, the reality is no different. Thus, in addition to 
the youth of the successors, the fact of being women is highlighted as an element 
that generated additional difficulties, until they succeeded in having their role of 
managers recognized by the body of the company staff. 
(CIV26) There still exists very great discrimination with relation to the role of 
women. When a woman is seen at the head of a business, I have already 
heard many times: ‘[this business] is not going to last long. In two years it will 
all be over’. Today things are already different, they are already saying: my 
goodness they are even changing things. It´s even working!’. I mean, I think 
that when a woman assumes a professional role, she tends to be better than 
the man. [...] in summary, the woman is more organized than the man in 
ideas and processes in general. (I27). 
The resistance of the staff, seen even at the management level, was 
translated into uncooperative attitudes. They ceased to share experiences and 
solutions and made decision-making on the part of the successors difficult, when they 
didn´t deliberately sabotage it. In some cases, such resistance changed into a clear 
posture of aversion, generating typical agency conflicts, which led to the withdrawal 
of four long-serving executives in the first two years of the new management. 
(CIV27) We had some difficulties with people in here. Even with a lady staff 
member who was from HR and who thought herself the owner of the 
company. She ruled the roost in here [...]. She also acted as administrative 
manager and was in conflict with the girls because as the girls assumed their 
roles, they started to call her decisions into question. (I21). 
The withdrawal of staff who were not capable of bringing themselves into line 
with the new style of management practised by the successors could have 
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contributed to the composition of a management group aligned to the vision of the 
new management, nourishing a climate of cooperation and commitment. 
Nevertheless, the loss of former middle managers, who dominated several 
fundamental processes in the company, is pointed to as one negative aspect brought 
about by the entry of the new managers into the business. 
(CIV28) After he [founder] died, the girls had difficulty in retaining the middle 
management who he had selected. And even difficulty in contracting new 
ones, even a little because of ignorance of the business itself. [...]. There 
have been significant losses. [...]. I think that at times patience has been 
lacking in analysing and accepting, even on the part of the partners who 
were coming in. Today I believe that they even feel, in part, the loss of some 
employee. [...]. The knowledge and length of service, knowledge of the 
business of this middle management are important in this transition [...]. 
(I27). 
Regarding governance, there is still no Board and no formal mechanisms in 
place. However, the recent creation of a committee of management, composed of 
Heloísa, Patrícia and Gabriela to deal with strategic subjects, can be considered an 
embryonic element for the construction of the governance structure of the Minas Agro 
group. The structuring of governance constitutes an essential stage with the purpose 
of arming the controlling family with elements for the overseeing and control of the 
group management. This option becomes especially important given the declared 
interest of the founder’s widow and current chairwoman of the group to assume 
gradually a counselling role. In addition to this, the possibility also exists, not entirely 
rejected by the successors, of eventually passing the management over to a 
nonfamliy professional and themselves occupying only seats on a Board of Directors.  
(CIV29) And initially we would want to create a board. [...]. After we 
discussed it a little, we decided to start with a committee. And we still don’t 
have external board members for it to be a board of directors. So, we are 
going to start like that, only with us three, a less ambitious format. And little 
by little we will build it up, making rules, defining the days of meetings, the 
manner of taking the decisions. So, all the important questions will be dealt 
with in this committee. (I24). 
(CIV30) We want to direct the important decisions, the more strategic ones 
and those concerning the direction of the business, the analysis of 
investment, of new businesses, the renegotiation of important agreements, 
and the formation of partnerships, to be dealt with in the committee of 
management. (I22). 
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In addition to mechanisms for the monitoring of management, governance also 
could help in the succession planning of the organization. The definition of who will 
eventually take over the position of CEO, after withdrawal of the matriarch of the 
business, can be made difficult by a possible dispute between the two successors 
who are already introduced into the business and who possess quite different 
profiles. In the view of Débora, the ascent in the hierarchy of any one of the two to 
the position of chairwoman, would lead to the need for changes in the arrangement 
of the current power equation in the company, and could lead to conflicts between 
the managers. In this sense, the formalization of a plan of succession could help in 
the definition of clear criteria for the choice of the new CEO, minimizing potential 
conflicts and friction between the family members involved with the company. 
(CIV31) One completes the other and I can’t see one with a position 
hierarchically superior to the other. How would the choice of one of them as 
chairwoman be? I think it would be difficult. [...]. There exist many conflicts 
among them. They complement each other, but with one acting in one area 
and the other in another, because if one interferes in the other’s area, there 
you have a problem: ‘You decide there and I decide here’. One of them is 
extremely financial and the other extremely human. (I27). 
The finding that the succession is not just a one-off event, but, above all, a 
process, is perceived by one of the successors who, after two years, does not 
consider that the succession process has come to an end. In this sense, in 
accordance with that pointed out by Lambrecht (2005), the succession does not 
terminate only by the transfer of the position of the person succeeded to the 
successors, but, considering it from a procedural perspective, it only becomes 
effective after the accumulation of experience and the full recognition of the 
successors as legitimate managers of the business. 
(CIV32) At the start we thought that this succession had already happened. 
But we simply took over as the managers of the business. And a little later, 
we perceived that the succession had still not happened. Because the 
founder, the founder’s wife, who has participated since the start of the 
construction of the company, she is still here in the company. So she is still 
part of the business [...] That is, the process is ongoing, and has still not 
being completed. (I22). 
Finally, it is valid to emphasize the interest demonstrated by the new 
managers in the maintenance of the property ownership and in its transmission to the 
coming generations. It can be seen that the values left by the founder and 
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disseminated both in the bosom of the family as also in the organizational context, 
have been capable of support the family cohesion and the identification of the 
successors with the business. The pride in the success of the company and the 
interest in preserving the memory of the founder through the continuity of the 
company in family hands, play a vital part in the perpetuation of the business and 
attaining longevity. 
(CIV33) It is a mixture of feelings. At the start, I felt more the question of not 
leaving them alone. But afterwards it seems that the business was getting 
into my blood. I started to see that I had the potential to work here, that there 
was something to conquer and something to improve. I arrived at the 
conclusion that I could make progress as a professional right here. [...] I 
started to see everything my father had constructed and that I should not let 
it fade away from one day to the next. And also it started to become part of 
my dream, when I saw that I could develop here. (I24). 
(CIV34) I don’t want the business to go right only for a while. If I have the 
ability and the competence of run the business giving it long life, for me that 
will be much greater success. And if my children one day participate in the 
business, this is something that will certainly give me great pleasure. (I22). 
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CHAPTER V 
 
THEORETICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
V.1. Building a theoretical model 
 
Theory can be defined as a systematic explanation of the relationship between 
a set of variables, or also as an explanation of a particular phenomenon (Kerlinger, 
1980). For Strauss and Corbin ‘theory consists of plausible relationships produced 
among concepts and sets of concepts’ (1994, p.278). Gill and Johnson (1997), in 
turn, define theory as a formulation regarding the cause and effect relationships 
between two or more variables, which may or may not have been tested. Therefore, 
from these definitions, it can be stated that the theory seeks to relate events or 
concepts abstracted from the reality that surrounds man, in order to explain it in a 
systematic way. 
Theories can be developed inductively or deductively, or obtained by a 
combination of both arguments, as proposed by grounded theory. As seen, the 
grounded theory methodology is a field that aims to generate theoretical constructs 
that explain the action in the social context under study. The researcher seeks to 
identify processes that are happening in the social scene, from a series of 
hypotheses, which, linked to each other, can explain the phenomenon, combining 
inductive and deductive approaches. 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) say that all the procedures of grounded theory are 
designed to identify, develop and relate concepts to formulate the theory. 
After observations, the steps for the construction of the theory are: (i) 
collection of empirical data, (ii) coding or data analysis, (iii) definition of the theory. 
(Stern, 1980; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
 
(i) Collecting empirical data 
It has already been stated that the collection of empirical data within this 
research was conducted through semi-structured interviews involving actors selected 
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by the four companies studied and from them, specific case studies were built, 
having been presented in the previous chapter. 
 
(ii) Coding or data analysis 
The analytical process conducted in this stage aims to build theory, using the 
methodological rigor necessary to help researchers to identify concepts and discover 
categories from the data collected, besides suggesting propositions of how these 
categories are linked to form a theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
After collecting the empirical data, the researcher examined the transcripts of 
each interview, line by line, identifying and labelling the key concepts found with a 
word or sentence that expresses its meaning (Warburton, 2005). Concepts are 
recognized to be the basic units of analysis since it is from conceptualisation of data, 
not the ‘raw data’ per se, that theory is developed. ‘The incidents, events, 
happenings are taken as, or analysed as, potential indicators of phenomena, which 
are thereby given conceptual labels’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p.7). Only by 
comparing incidents and naming like phenomena with the same term can the 
researcher gather the basic units for theory. 
The second step in the theory building through grounded theory is the creation 
of categories, which are wider and more abstract than the concepts they represent. 
Strauss and Corbin define them as ‘the cornerstones of developing theory [...] 
provid[ing] the means by which the theory can be integrated’ (1990, p.7). Bacellar 
(2005) suggests creating, initially, as many categories as possible, guaranteeing the 
coverage of all important aspects of the phenomenon in question. At the end of the 
process, however, there is the need to funnel them, finding common elements that 
may set up a theoretical framework. Indeed, a theoretical framework is formed from 
the proposition of generalized relationships between a category and its concepts and 
between discrete categories (Pandit, 1996). Glaser and Strauss (1967) have named 
this proposition of linking as 'hypotheses'. However, Whetten (1989) sees that the 
term 'propositions' is more appropriate since they involve conceptual relationships, 
whereas hypotheses require measured relationships. Pandit (1996) concludes that 
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since the grounded approach produces conceptual and not measured relationships, 
the former term is preferred. 
If, however, the proposed theoretical model becomes object of a subsequent 
quantitative research, as is the case that occurs in this thesis, the relationship 
between the constructs may be termed as hypotheses. 
In summary, data analysis involves breaking down, conceptualising, and 
reassembling it in a new way. These steps are conducted through three levels of 
coding process: open coding, axial coding and selective coding. The different phases 
of Strauss and Corbin’s grounded theory coding sequence could be illustrated as 
follows: 
 
Figure 5.1: The grounded theory analytic process 
 
 
 
                Source: Adapted from Harwood (2002, cited in Warburton, 2005) 
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fractionated datum (incident, event or happening) is compared with another concept 
and the similar ones are grouped together and receive the same conceptual label. 
This process of grouping concepts at a higher, more abstract level is named 
categorising (Pandit, 1996; Warburton, 2005). Categories and subcategories can be 
described depending on the number of grouping levels it is desired to achieve at this 
stage. 
The entire open coding sequence could be illustrated as follows: 
 
Figure 5.2: Open coding sequence 
 
 
Source: Strauss and Corbin (1998, cited in Warburton, 2005, p.8) 
 
 
Axial coding – creation and development of concept 
The second stage of data classification is axial coding, where there is a 
reorganization of information seeking to correlate similar open codes, summarizing 
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generated using the data as a reference. The researcher tries to discover the main 
problem in the social scene, from the standpoint of the actors or participants in the 
study and how they deal with the problem. Comparing all the data as they are 
received, the researcher makes a choice about the relative permanence of the 
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those related to the most significant. This process reduces the number of categories, 
as they become more organized. This grouping of categories is a theoretical form of 
analysis, where, as the integrations emerge, the grouped categories form others 
more general.  The vital step in this process is to discover the central variable that 
best explains the action on the social scene (Cassiani et al., 1996). 
The axial coding is the means that helps the researcher to achieve the 
integration of the categories. The goal is to gather data by developing connections 
between the categories and subcategories (Pandit, 1996). 
 
 
Selective coding – modification and integration of the concept 
At this stage, I sought to establish the relationship of the core category - 
chosen as the pillar of the emerging theory - with the other categories which validate 
it. The aim is to identify the causal and intervening conditions, context, 
consequences, covariances and contingencies that form the theoretical relationships 
in which the categories are related to each other and to the core category (Munhall, 
2007). Following this procedure I was led to develop the theory. 
 
 
After this step of coding the data, one passes to the next phase which is the 
reduction of the categories. 
 
 
(iii) Delimitation of the theory 
The reduction of the categories is the way to delimit the emerging theory, 
when the researcher can discover consistency in the original group of categories and 
can then formulate the theory with a small group of concepts with a high degree of 
abstraction. 
The theoretical saturation of the categories occurs when: no new or relevant 
data emerge; the development category is dense; and the relationships between 
categories are well established and validated (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
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V.2. The use of Atlas.ti 
 
The software Atlas.ti was developed by Scientific Software Development to 
help in the qualitative analysis of data, through a variety of tools that make it possible 
to manage, extract, compare and examine significant data within a text. 
Most of the texts to be analysed are extracted from transcriptions of interviews 
carried out during the exploratory research, where investigation is required to 
formulate theories based on replies that offer insights into complex, and perhaps up 
to then, unknown, questions. 
Based on the analysis of the texts collected it is possible to establish 
hypotheses which can be objectives of the research investigation, and the Atlas.ti is, 
accordingly, a tool of great utility for the development of the grounded theory. It can 
organize the diverse information through key words listing the common 
characteristics. It also provides a general view and permits the researcher to check 
the critical points and those of greater importance in the conclusion of the theory. 
It is developed from the creation of a hermeneutic unit where the primary data 
are grouped, including all data collected during interviews and field notes. These data 
are then broken down into quotations (relevant stretches) that are given codes (two 
numbers: one representing the source document, where the quotation derives from, 
and the other the numerical order of the quotation in that document) and annotations 
forming schemata (graphical representations of the relations networks). All these 
elements are commented to facilitate subsequent understanding of their meaning. 
After finalization of this process, the programme generates two reports: one 
shows the history of the analysis and codification process and the other describes 
and comments the elements of the theory. 
As far as is known, in grounded theory generation, recurrent themes are 
identified in the data and coded as concepts. The used coding sequence used the 
openaxialselective series. It is important that the codes and categories that label 
emergent concepts are derived directly from the data. Authenticity is enhanced by the 
use of in vivo codes which are labels named from the actual verbatim words found in 
the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
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V.3. The process described 
 
Following the method professed by Strauss and Corbin (1990), the first step 
was to open code all transcriptions of each interview using the Atlas.ti. Then, the 
subcategories were determined that capture the main theme of each paragraph and 
identify the more general category to which they belong. After that, the axial and 
selective coding were carried out to establish causal relationships, describing the 
phenomena, their contexts, intervening conditions, action/interaction strategies, and 
consequences (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). During the theory development process few 
subcategories that were relevant to the emerging theory were identified which were 
not captured by the initial categories previously selected. To bring these 
subcategories into the theory, a return to the cases for an additional round of open 
coding was necessary. Using an iterative process, the new chosen subcategories 
were recoded within the remaining categories and incorporated into the theory 
through axial and selective coding. 
Table 5.1 gives an overview of all the relevant categories and subcategories 
contained in the proposed theory developed through a grounded process. In it, are 
presented the quotations relative to the interviews, containing the main elements that 
cause tensions in the four companies surveyed. 
Of course, the literature review that was intended to expand the knowledge of 
the researcher was, over the whole process, reaffirming the importance of each 
subcategory and suggesting others, according to studies conducted previously by 
other scholars, and providing new elements that were incorporated into the interview 
guide in subsequent interviews. 
After the development of the fourth case, I considered that the saturation point 
was achieved, as little new data seemed to emerge from the field research and the 
relationships between categories appeared to be well established. Although it is 
difficult to exactly measure when the condition of theoretical saturation is achieved, 
Table 5.1 also shows how frequently each category and subcategory occurred in the 
cases. Most of each subcategory relating to the theory appeared multiple times 
leaving enough evidence to support the emerging theory. 
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Table 5.1: Coding scheme for all relevant categories and subcategories and the correlated quotations 
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V.4. Proposed theoretical model 
 
To propose a theoretical model the key variables must be identified and 
described. Then, the linkages between these variables have to be proposed. And 
finally, the explanation about the reasons of the existence of such relationships has 
to be presented (Voss et al., 2002). Wacker (1998) confirms these steps proposing 
as a general procedure for theory building: define the variables; limit the domain; 
propose relationships (model building); and predict the theory. Eisenhardt (1989b) 
also contributes to the theory building stating that the process of theory testing 
involves measuring constructs and verifying relationships. 
In an iterative process, like the one proposed by the grounded theory, the 
concepts, categories and relationships emerge shaping the theoretical model, during 
the coding process. This model shows as core category, the agency theory construct. 
Twelve other constructs that relate to this core category have been identified, three of 
which with direct relationship: alignment, trust and impartiality. 
Each of these constructs shown in Figure 5.3, and their hypothesized 
relationships, are elaborated in the subsequent section. 
Figure 5.3: Theoretical model construct on the basis of Grounded Theory 
 
                    Source: Research data 
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V.5. Validation of hypotheses and constructs through a comparison of the 
literature 
 
In this final step it is time to compare the emergent theory with the extant 
literature and examine what is similar, what is different, and why (Eisenhardt, 1989b). 
Certainly there is always some relevant literature to refer to. Voss et al. (2002) 
highlight the importance of reviewing the findings against the available knowledge to 
avoid reducing their degree of reliability. Thus, each of the constructs empirically 
raised must be contrasted with the existing theories for completion and validation. 
It must be said in justification that, because of the volume of constructs 
proposed in this theoretical model, the literature review carried out here cannot be all-
embracing, but at the same time it is not conducted only superficially. 
 
V.5.1. The Alignment Construct 
 
Alignment is one of the most obvious and expected constructs to compose this 
model, since it is the basis of the theoretical discussion of agency conflict: to what 
extent the objectives of the agent and principal are distinct or in agreement. For 
Mayer and Schoorman (1992) goal alignment reflects the overlap of goals and values 
of the owners on one hand and the management on the other. 
In this model, the construct alignment is intended to represent the relevant 
elements in the reality of a family business that may exacerbate the agency conflict in 
the absence of shared aims. Carlock and Ward (2010) suggest that family and 
business are different entities: the first related to caring and the second to money. 
Thus, besides the economic results which are the usual meaning for the existence of 
a firm, it has to be recognised that family owners may also considered social, 
psychological and even the spiritual objectives. In fact, the ‘three circle model’ 
suggests that strategy in family-owned firms must consider the different factors which 
are specifics for this sort of company, taking into account this dual identity of the 
family firm, and its business and social interests. (Ibrahim et al., 2004) 
For Schulze et al. (2003b) alignment in family-owned firms is more difficult to 
be achieved because family members are locked into the firm. This requires a greater 
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effort to get a clear comprehension of the individual goals, to avoid the consequential 
divergences related to a lack of alignment: 
Conflict can occur when family members are not clear about what goals are 
being pursued or when differences in priorities are not communicated as part 
as the family’s planning and governance processes. […] The multi-
generation family needs to confirm its shared, often multifaceted, values – 
and then agree on a vision that drives strategic thinking and planning for the 
family and business. (Carlock & Ward, 2010, p. 14). 
Besides alignment related to values, vision and strategy, other facets have to 
be considered. The preparation of the succession, the criteria for admission of family 
members, the definition of the role of shareholders, the remuneration of members of 
the family, among others, are issues of great importance. Figure 5.4 shows the 
aspects that arise from the four cases developed for this dissertation and which 
deserve to be researched as potential drivers in the increasing of the agency conflict. 
Figure 5.4: Categories of the Alignment construct 
Source: Research data 
 
Based on the understanding that a family business consists of family and 
nonfamliy members who, as individuals, try to maximise their chances of success 
and minimise their chances of failure, and who will therefore search for a more 
cohesive way to operate to the benefit of the company, it is argued that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the alignment among the family owners and between 
them and the managers, the lower the agency conflict. 
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Succession 
Although usually what matters in a succession is the effectiveness of the 
outcome of the transition, i.e. the ‘successor´s ability to keep the family business 
healthy by means of sustained growth and continued profitability’ (Venter et al., 2005, 
p.289) some authors suggest that the alignment with the succession process by the 
predecessor, successor, and other family member, is also of high importance for the 
future harmony within the company (Handler, 1989b; Sharma, 1997). This idea is 
also defended by Santiago (2000) who points out the importance of a leadership 
transition to be done so smoothly that the change does not disrupt the family or the 
business. 
To Venter et al.  
The more informed the family is about the generic issues, 
phases, and activities associated with generational transitions, 
the better able it will be to understand how succession has 
manifested itself in its particular case (2005, p.298). 
Churchill and Hatten (1987) have developed a life cycle approach to designate 
the succession process between predecessor and successor in a family firm. Four 
phases are proposed: (1) owner-management stage, where the owner is the only 
member of the family directly involved in the business; (2) a training and development 
stage, where the descendants learn the business; (3) a partnership stage, where 
father and son share experiences working together; and (4) a power transfer stage, 
where responsibilities shift to the successor. Negotiating with transparent deadlines 
for the beginning and completion of each of these steps is central to not creating 
expectations that will not be met and the consequent emergence of tensions. 
However, the most common attitude of the founder (and all who pass through 
this process) is to avoid committing him/herself to the implementation of the 
succession. Lansberg (1988) regrets this reality, noting that according to his 
research, the lack of adequate succession planning is one of the main reasons for 
the death of companies. The author points out that in addition to long-term benefits 
such as longevity and the evolution of family business, also in the short term the 
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company gains in efficiency by reducing the tensions stemming from uncertainty over 
the succession process. 
 
Vision & Values 
In a family business, a shared vision involves family members’ collective ideas 
about the future of the firm, including desired business domains, desired growth 
rates, and financial performance (Mustakallio et al., 2002). 
A shared vision provides a common framework which allows assessing 
available information and focussing on relevant issues, thus promoting coherence 
between stakeholders’ expectations and opinions on organizational goals (Ring & 
Van de Ven, 1994). Also, a shared vision reduces the threat of opportunistic 
behaviour and helps establish a social norm of reciprocity, which reinforces 
commitment to jointly agreed-on decisions (Uzzi, 1996). Haugh and Mckee (2003) 
suggest that in family-owned firms commitment and loyalty are shared values that 
promote better integration, not only circumscribed by the family innner cicle, but 
extending to include nonfamliy members who have become part of the team of 
employees. And when all actors in a family-owned firm share a common vision, the 
sharing of information intensifies, increasing alignment and improving decision quality 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
According to Leana and Van Buren (1999), a shared vision provides the 
members with the basis to be ‘good agents’ and to commit themselves to collective 
goals and actions, playing down their individual wants. Furthermore, Haugh and 
Mckee’s (2003) findings show that shared family values encourage autonomy and 
reduce the need for close supervision, avoiding costly and inconvenient monitoring 
mechanisms. 
 
Strategic alignment 
According to Dooley and Fryxell (1999), gaining commitment to strategic 
objectives is a challenge in all kinds of companies because strategic decision 
processes are replete with conflicts. Astrachan and McMillan (2003) suggest that the 
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first step in avoiding such inherent difficulty of achieving strategic alignment is trying 
to identify what ‘success’ means for the stakeholders. This is particularly important 
since the main objective of the strategy is to offer economic and non-economic 
benefits to shareholders, employees, customers and the community (Andrews, 
1991). Once objectives which meet the expectations of stakeholders in a balanced 
way have been defined, you must define a strategic plan that integrates, coherently, 
these objectives, policies and actions of an organization. (Quinn, 1991), 
Strategic planning is one of the most widespread tools which allows managers 
to construct alternative future scenarios, identifying the positioning of the company 
and its opportunities and threats (Boyd, 1991). It includes business and corporate 
plans, their approval at board level, setting an annual capital and operating budget, 
performance targeting, and performance assessment processes (Grant, 2003). 
Following all these steps, strategic planning in a family firm, would promote cohesion 
among managers, board and family members aligning the family’s expectation with 
the business’ needs, and as a consequence focusing efforts and preventing conflicts: 
Designing a business strategy aligned with the family’s vision 
will ensure that everyone shares a clear picture of the 
company’s future and the resources available to support the 
strategy. In a family business, management needs to consider 
the family’s values and vision carefully to ensure that the 
owners are agreed on their intentions and commitment ... [this] 
is a critical concern for management in planning the firm’s long-
term strategies and investments. (Carlock & Ward, 2010, p.40-
41). 
 
Risk taking 
The study of agency relations brings in its wake not only the discussion of 
control problems but also includes issues related to risk sharing. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), seminal authors of agency theory , assert that agents (managers) 
are usually seen as risk averse and the principals (the owners) are more willing to 
accept risk as greater risk is associated with higher potential return. For them, this 
distinction between the propensity to take risks or not leads to agency conflicts: 
managers making rational decisions, seeking to serve their own interests and 
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hedging against risks, produce decisions inconsistent with the interests of the 
owners. 
Eisenhardt (1989a) explains this misalignment concerning risk-taking, since 
agents have less ability to diversify their employment, while principals are able to 
diversify their investments. Kiser (1999) adds that the risk-averse agents tend to 
reject contracts that lead them to take the most risks, preferring contracts with fixed 
wages and even low values, but with less variation. 
The effective alignment of interest between owners and their agents in taking 
worthwhile calculated risks is, therefore, essential. 
 
Remuneration & Incentives 
Mitnick (1973) defines the incentive systems as a set of mechanisms, financial 
or non-financial, to align the personal goals of the agents to act in accordance with 
the preferences of the principal, superseding their own goals. For Eisenhardt (1989a) 
the best instrument to achieve this is a contract between the principal and the agent, 
based on common goals, which motivate agents to act according to the interest of the 
principal. His argument is that this type of contract aligns the main agents as the 
reward of both is now based on the same actions. 
An alternative approach that enhances the level of commitment of managers 
with the strategic objectives of a company is to make them shareholders by 
distributing shares as performance bonuses. Jensen and Meckling (1976) observed 
that as managers’ ownership of the firm’s stock increases, the interests of managers 
and outside shareholders become more aligned. 
It is interesting to note that Schulze et al. (2001) examining the effect of 
incentive compensation on the performance of closely held family-owned firms, found 
that nonfamliy managers are influenced by pay incentives, but not family managers. 
This means that variable pay does not serve as a governance mechanism in family-
owned firms, where the family members are leading the company. In another study, 
McConaughy (2000) compared the CEO’s compensation of family-owned firms in two 
distinct situations: those with family and those with nonfamliy CEOs. He found that 
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family CEOs have less need to receive additional incentives for higher commitment. 
Also, the findings of this study suggest that family controlled firms have to pay 
nonfamliy CEOs more to get comparable performance. 
O’Reilly and Chatman (1996) show the reasons behind this reality, when they 
compare agency and stewardship theories. While in the first, the formal control 
mechanisms, such as reward or punishment dominate, in the second, the social 
control mechanisms, such as shared values and achievement of expectations 
attitudes, impel the managers to higher performance. As family managers typically 
tend to fit the model of stewardship, it is natural to find a reduction in agency costs 
through compensation and incentives, when the CEO is family. 
 
Corporate Cohesion 
To ensure the perpetuation of a company, especially post-succession, the 
founder needs to define in advance how it will be managed and what are the rules of 
coexistence among the members, so that its goals and individual interests prevail. 
Therefore, it is necessary to establish an agreement between those who run the 
destinies of the company, how they relate over time. It is normal to establish official 
corporate documents (articles of incorporation or statute) with the minimum 
conditions of validity of the business in its legal form. But rather than presenting the 
minimum requirements for legal validity of the society, the formatting of a corporate 
agreement becomes, therefore, a means of disciplining power sharing, with limits on 
how members will exercise control. 
A shareholders' agreement, in addition to regulating the buying and selling of 
shares and voting blocks, as required by law, must express the goals, vision and the 
agreed criteria about: succession of patrimony and management; levels of decision; 
entry and exit of partners; distribution of dividends; private use of goods and services 
of the company; creation of private business of the partners, capital investment and 
financing; tag along and drag along clauses; rules for the valuation of the company; 
dispute-resolution mechanisms; transfer of shares; mergers and acquisitions, joint 
ventures, partnerships, bankruptcy and creditors agreement; distribution of dividends 
153 
   
and executive compensation; and board and the chairman selection (Friedman & 
Friedman, 1994; Alvares et. al, 2008). 
Moreover, being a multilateral agreement, in addition to the above themes that 
serve as parameters of content to be discussed among the shareholders, the 
agreement must have the full force of law with respect to contracts, dealing with 
topics such as confidentiality, notifications, modes of termination, and period of 
validity, irrevocability and irreversibility. 
 
 
 
V.5.2. The Level of Independence and Efficiency of the Board Construct 
The role of the board of directors has been central to the corporate 
governance studies in public firms, not only because it is a product of regulation for 
this kind of company, but also because of its importance in diminishing the distance 
between shareholders and management. On the other hand, literature specifically 
addressing the boards of directors of family-owned firms, most of them privately held, 
is still rare. However, those who investigate its beneficial adoption in such firms, 
recognise that it is one of the most important organizational mechanisms in mitigating 
agency conflicts. Ward (1991), for instance, emphasizes the value of boards in family 
corporations, addressing both business issues and the needs and interests of the 
owning family members. Hill and Snell (1989) see the board of directors as a 
corporate governance mechanism which helps to harmonize the interests of family 
owners and managers. Fama and Jensen (1983a) also register the utility of a board 
of directors in family businesses as a formal control mechanism, to align the interests 
of both groups. After all, the board of directors represents the interests of 
shareholders and seeks to align the interests of agents and owners through 
corporate governance mechanisms such as reporting, auditing, and policies (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). 
 
These considerations result in the proposal of the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2: The greater the level of independence and efficiency of a board of 
directors in family-owned firms, the greater the alignment between 
owners and managers. 
 
The Level of Independence and Efficiency of the Board construct in this study 
considers the following elements: 
Figure 5.5: Categories of the Level of Independence and Efficiency of the Board construct 
 
 Source: Research data 
 
 
Structure of the Board of Directors 
 
In speaking of the structure of a Board of Directors, three features should be 
considered: 
 
1ST SIZE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
According to Boyd (1990), to be effective, the board of directors of a company 
should opt for a number of members that will enable it to work properly as a 
team, without being too big or too small. Though a larger company and a more 
complex one require a board with greater experience and therefore more 
complementary skills, authors such as Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) suggest that large boards can be less effective than small ones. Ward 
(1991) also suggests that smaller boards are more desirable for family 
businesses since individual responsibility tends to dissolve in larger groups. 
The idea is that when Boards become too big, CEOs are more likely to have 
control of it, thereby increasing the agency problems (such as director free-
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riding), so that the board assumes a more symbolic role. In this respect, 
Andrade and Rossetti (2011) suggest a sizing with an average of seven 
members, with variation of plus or minus two, depending on the current and 
future characteristics of business. Nash (1995) and Newell and Wilson (2002) 
also share the concept that the most effective boards range between five and 
nine directors. 
 
2ND PROFILE OF THE BOARD MEMBERS 
Heidrick (1998) defines the ideal director as ‘a friendly, independent thinker 
who expresses his or her thoughts on a compatible basis… the ideal director 
is not a yes man or woman’ (1998, p.272). In fact, a board member who acts 
in an independent manner will counsel and demand the CEO during the 
decision making-process increasing the potential for optimal decisions both for 
the business and for the owners (Daily & Schwenk, 1996). 
For Nadler (2004) more than independence, the main attribute for a board 
member is the proper competence required for the function, not only 
accounting and public-reporting expertise, but also all knowledge related to the 
company, its environment, and its industry. His or her business experience 
must be sufficiently broad or deep that it allows him or her to deal with 
consultative challenges. 
But, besides cognitive attributes, the behaviour and posture expected from a 
board member must be also considered. Andrade and Rossetti (2011) 
highlight integrity, openness, a capacity to listen, outspokenness in expressing 
his or her points of view and constructive dissatisfaction, as those especially 
desired. Heidrick (1998) suggests that the best board member that can be 
chosen is intelligent, well-informed, analytical, and a team player. 
For Li (1994) the corporate board, with its mix of expertise, independence and 
legal power is a potentially powerful governance mechanism. 
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3RD STANDARDS OF OPERATION 
The Board should establish clear rules of operation. For instance, one must 
establish an annual schedule of meetings with the guidelines being prepared 
by the Chairman and adjusted with the directors and CEO. As for frequency, 
no more than six, and no less than three meetings per year are recommended 
(Gallo, 1993). Moore (2002) claims six meetings per year in alternate months 
as a good pattern for most companies. Gregory and Simmelkjaer (2002) 
present as the European average, eight meetings per year. Ward (1991) sees 
as the usual procedure in family business, board meetings at least four times 
per year, supplemented by additional monthly executive committee meetings. 
As for the decision-making process, they shall be taken by consensus, 
resorting to a vote only in extreme cases. Each member must have one vote.  
Adequate preparation for the meetings of the Board by its members is critical 
to its effectiveness. To this end, certain information must be submitted in 
sufficient time, at least five days in advance. (Gallo, 1993; Alvares et al. 2008). 
 
 
Representativeness versus competence level 
The main board tasks are approving investments for growth; counselling, 
monitoring and evaluating the CEO performance; hiring, firing and setting 
compensation for the top management; reviewing corporate strategy, goals and 
policies; and ensuring audit procedures. Moore (2002) suggests that the content of 
board meetings should include all key issues produced by the CEO and other senior 
executives to the board, such as the results of operations, the status and outlook of 
financial and strategic plans, proposed or rejected business deals, the current 
financial forecast and early signals on changing trends, the economic and 
competitive environment, public policy issues, shareholder matters, and any 
proposals for board approval. 
Cowling et al. (2001, p.372) added that the board of directors ‘can link a firm 
with its external environment and secure critical resources, including prestige and 
legitimacy’. 
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To accomplish these expected roles, Aronoff and Ward (1996) remind us that 
a board member might be 
‘an experienced, objective, knowledgeable outsider, usually an 
active chief executive, who brings to the table background in 
the particular strategic issues facing the business, as well as 
sensitivity to the special concerns of family-owned businesses’. 
(Aronoff & Ward, 1996, p. 30). 
Likewise, Mallin and Melis (2012) argue that for shareholders to protect their 
investment, they should constitute a competent Board ‘to manage the company and 
to ensure that effective strategies are in place for the company’s overall corporate 
performance and long term sustainability’ (p. 171). 
A board of directors, therefore, is a place reserved for the experienced 
professionals whose level of contribution can be effective. Thus, it is recommended 
that rather than being represented by directors who may not have the necessary level 
and are chosen simply because they are family, the ideal is that each block of a 
family company nominates independent directors that they can recognize as their 
true representatives. Aronoff and Ward (1996) also draw attention to the fact that it is 
best to involve independent directors on the board, even in the first or second 
generation, since it can later be much more difficult when the council is already filled 
with representatives from each branch of the family. 
 
 
Decision-making forum 
The Board of Directors usually has been identified for two important roles: 
oversight of management and counsel in the strategy process (Mace, 1972; Pearce & 
Zahra, 1989). This monitoring and control role is relevant to the protection of 
shareholders’ interests, but it is in the strategy process where it could really make a 
difference. Bathala and Rao (1995) recognise the board as the authority to give 
sanction to the major policy initiatives within a company. For these authors, it is the 
final instance in the decision-making process. 
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Board of Directors’ Independence 
According to Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) the most important factor 
determining a board’s effectiveness is its independence from the CEO. Of course the 
CEO would prefer a less independent board and as much power concentrated in 
his/her hands as possible, and a Board of Directors as dependable as possible. This 
is the case in most family-owned firms, where the CEO determines the functioning of 
the board and where his/her intense involvement in the selection process of directors 
may affect its independence (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Thus, it is fundamental 
to select board members whose commitments to his/her role is not impacted, at all, 
by any imposition of the CEO. Felton and Watson (2002) maintain that they should 
be free from commercial or personal ties that could prejudice their capacity to query 
and challenge the top management. 
Heidrick (1998) defends the idea that the presence of external directors 
contributes to increasing the independence of the board in family-owned firms. For 
him, a family member, an employee, or an outsider who depends on the family, 
acting as a board member, usually tells the CEO what he wants to hear. Kesner and 
Johnson (1990) see this kind of director adding concrete advantages to a family firm, 
when he/she has the necessary skills to act as a board member, a high capacity to 
understand the owning family and the nature of its relationship with the business, and 
a high independence to counsel and decide with freedom. 
 
 
External board members 
Regarding its composition, it is recommended that boards should be 
composed of a mixture of insiders and outside members. In the case of family-owned 
firms, Voordeckers et al. (2007) present three different configurations: family boards, 
composed solely of family members; insider boards, composed of family members 
and nonfamliy managers; and outside boards, with the inclusion of external board 
members. Outside members usually refers to those directors who are not part of the 
owning family or of the management (Ward & Handy, 1988). 
The advantages of each class of member are that internal members usually 
bring a better understanding of the organization’s activities and the outsiders usually 
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come ‘with expertise in capital markets, corporate law, or relevant technology who 
provide an important support function to the top managers in dealing with specialized 
decision problems’ (Fama & Jensen, 1983a, p. 17). Outside directors also are more 
likely to challenge established assumptions about strategy, inducing managers to 
reposition themselves regarding things they say they are certain about (Pearce & 
Zahra, 1989). This leads to a better strategic decision process and increases the 
company’s chances of survival (Daily & Dalton, 1994). 
Practice, in fact, has shown that family-owned companies that set up a Board 
with experienced external members, have shown superior results and guaranteed the 
perpetuation of their business (Aronoff & Ward, 1996). To Bathala and Rao (1995), 
external directors act as an important force for minimizing agency problems between 
managers and shareholders. Brickley and James (1987) found in their research that 
the presence of outside directors tends to reduce managerial consumption of 
perquisites and Weisbach (1988) proved that the higher the proportion of outsiders 
on a board, the more prompted is the board to substitute the CEO after a period of 
poor corporate performance. 
Not all authors are in accord on the value of outside members. Ford (1988), for 
instance, sees no value for privately-owned firms to adopt outside directors. His 
findings reveal that outside directors seem to have less value because of their lack of 
specific knowledge of the firm and their lack of availability to the firm. Jonovic (1989) 
claimed that an outside board member does not provide the best governance 
structure in the majority of family businesses due to their unique governance 
challenges.  
But the fact is that most authors agree that the mixture of external and internal 
members on the board may provide independent expert opinions, from the former 
and deeper understanding of the family culture from the latter, allowing all relevant 
views to be represented. 
Thus, although a mixed board seems to be the best option, a survey 
conducted by MassMutual Financial Group and Raymond Family Business Institute 
(2003) regarding the family business reality in the US shows that family members still 
have a majority on the board. This is due to the fact the entrepreneurs and family 
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owners usually resist bringing in outsiders because they do not want someone 
directing their actions or revealing family secrets (Nash, 1995). Heidrick (1988) see it 
as traumatic, at least initially, when family managers have to share information with 
and consider the viewpoints of independent outsiders, thus making it more difficult for 
them to adopt a more independent and, consequently, a more professional board. 
 
 
V.5.3. The Family and Business Interaction Construct 
 
In family-owned firms, the effects of good social relationships have to be 
considered, as in most cases board members, managers, and owners belong to the 
same family. Harvey (1999a; 1999b) points out that traditions, loyalty, altruism and 
bonding relationships compose a family system which normally influences the 
operation of the firm. For Mustakallio et al. (2002) these social interactions among 
family members contribute to create a common vision of the family firm’s mission and 
goals, which can improve the quality of the strategic decision-making process and 
managers’ alignment with the strategies.  
Furthermore, recent literature shows that family involvement within the firm 
plays a crucial role in aligning individuals with its goals by reducing transaction costs, 
by the establishment of better information flow, by the promotion of creativity and 
knowledge generation, besides the formation of alliances (Arregle et al., 2007). Also, 
Child and Rodrigues (2003) endorse the idea that close social interaction between 
managers (family members or otherwise) promotes mutual identification, friendship 
and even close ties. These ideas allow the following hypothesis to be postulated: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The better the interaction between family members, and between 
them and the company, the greater the degree of alignment. 
 
Considering the role healthy patterns of family interaction can play in reducing 
agency conflict, this construct is discussed from the categories highlighted in Figure 
5.6, as follows: 
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Figure 5.6: Categories of the Family and Business Interaction construct 
 
 Source: Research data 
 
 
Family Council 
 
One of the key roles that corporate governance in family businesses takes is 
to expand the interactions among their members by creating links with the company 
and the property (Mustakallio et al., 2002). For this purpose it is essential to promote 
from informal spaces, such as get-togethers, to formal family meetings, creating 
opportunities for family members to meet and discuss issues of their interest. 
Among the instances of governance capable of promoting harmony between 
the interests of family and business, the Family Council can be highlighted. According 
to Davis (2003), Family Council is a result of practices adopted by European family-
owned companies that for generations has been used it as a mediating forum, 
focused on preserving family cohesion and avoiding the appearance of conflict that 
can negatively impact the company. To Mustakallio et al. (2002) a family council 
helps extend social interaction, strengthening the family bonds and increasing family 
members' identification with the company. 
From the definition of rules and agreements, the Family Council becomes a 
space for rational and orderly discussion of issues related to the role of family in 
relation to the business. Lansberg (1988) adduces how important a Family Council is 
in a succession process, helping the family open the communication channels so that 
family members may discuss succession together and in different subgroups, 
reducing the possibility of undesirable resistance. 
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Bernhoeft and Gallo (2003) maintain that the family business also needs to 
develop a system of education for its members, seeking to strike a balance between 
individual interests and the demands of the organization, and strengthen the Family 
Council as a bridge for communication between the company and family.  Among its 
main tasks, they cite: 
 Managing all issues and family interests in its relations with society and 
company; 
 Attending to the values and the family history and their transfer between 
generations; 
 Acting as a representative forum of the families in their relations with the 
Boards of Directors and the Shareholders’ Committee, and vice versa; 
 Planning and coordinating meetings and family events; 
 Creating and managing training programmes for the family members 
developing their roles as shareholders; 
 Creating and managing vocational, professional and personal programmes 
for the young heirs, as a complement to the orientation of each family. 
 
 
Family Harmony 
 
Given the diversity of actors and the interests involved, the family business 
can be understood as a scene of constant negotiations, disputes and 
rearrangements of power, where different actors are immersed in games of interest, 
while seeking to build its legitimacy with different stakeholders (Pereira, 2010).  
Such tensions are enhanced by the concept of interrole conflict presented by 
Kahn et al. (1964). According to these authors the idea of interrole conflict occurs 
when the pressures that an actor suffers and which are associated with a particular 
role, will influence his or her performance with other social groups to which he/she 
also belongs. In a company family interrole conflict occurs, for example, when 
problems and responsibilities related to the work, interfere with the duties of the 
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family, and vice versa. Smyrnios et al. (2003) believe that the presence of interrole 
conflict in family businesses ends up being an inevitable reality. And therefore, 
disruption of family harmony, bringing rivalries and resentments to the business 
environment, will result in direct negative consequences for the company: 
Personal conflicts that dominate the interactions and remain unresolved 
distract from the grant-making business at hand. Bystanding family members 
and the nonfamliy administrators are reduced to keeping the peace or 
skirting controversial issues. A great deal of time and energy must be 
devoted to conflict management. In these situations the work of the 
foundation suffers, and valuable board members may become discouraged 
and withdraw. Nonfamliy administrators rarely avoid being caught in the 
family's political web, and, inevitably, their ability to perform routine tasks is 
affected. (von Lossberg, 1990, p. 378). 
Sharma et al. (2001) see the lack of harmony as leading to misalignment 
regarding the vision and to disagreement on the way to achieve it. For them, ‘the 
more harmonious a family is, the more likely it will be that its members will want to 
continue to pursue a shared vision in the interests of all concerned’ (Sharma et al, 
2001, p. 28). 
 
 
Family interest in the firm 
 
Dyer (1988) has suggested that the family business culture is an important 
factor in determining the success of the family business beyond the first generation. 
The strength of the culture and family norms determine how the family contributes to 
the success of the business (Harvey, 1999a). In this sense, shared values can 
directly influence the degree of interest of the heirs and therefore the longevity of the 
organization. 
Tapiès and Fernández (2010) point out that values are passed from 
generation to generation through the process of socialization and education of 
younger members. For the authors, the younger generation internalizes the values 
observing, listening and living with the previous generation. Kets de Vries (1993) 
confirms that this idea that socializing with the company since childhood, facilitates 
greater learning about the business and a greater bond that is established with the 
history and the present values of the company. 
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After all, they have been in contact with the business from early childhood 
onward. Breakfasts, dinners, walks, family gatherings, and summer jobs 
create opportunities to learn more about the business […]. This kind of 
knowledge may give family members a head start, compared with executives 
entering the business later on. Early training like this helps to explain the 
sometimes puzzling appointments of very young family members to senior 
positions. (Kets de Vries, 1993, p. 313) 
It is important to consider that the gradual increase in the number of offspring 
can lead to a loosening of the kinship that has bound them up to a certain point, 
making it more difficult to perpetuate the values for future generations. In view of 
Tapiès and Fernández (2010), the formalizing of family values by drafting a family 
constitution could help in the preservation and dissemination of these values for 
future generations. Thus, the organization's history, guided by the values that were 
significant for it, could be documented and passed on to successors, contributing to 
the construction and/or maintenance of a shared vision of the business. 
 
 
Kinship ties for perpetuation of the firm 
 
To achieve longevity of the family business, and escape from the statistics 
which appoints the usual short life span for family-owned firms, it is essential to 
increase the levels of interest and commitment of the successors in continuing to run 
it. Handler (1989a) calls attention to the precise need for the new generations to be 
integrated into the family business to ensure good long-term performance of their 
companies, while Cabrera-Suárez et al. (2001) highlight the need to transfer 
knowledge and information from the previous generation, to ensure the perpetuation 
of the family business. Of course issues such as the competence and training of 
successors are also extremely important. However, the basic premise underlying the 
perpetuation of the company is really the identification of the successors with the 
business they will become responsible for running in the future. 
The absence of heirs or successors with an interest in taking over the family 
business could mean the end of it, or at least indicate the need to seek nonfamliy 
successors to take over the management. It is important to emphasize, as evidenced 
by Rossato Neto and Cavedon (2004) that parental pressure can occur to force the 
children to take positions in the family business, in order to keep future generations in 
charge of it. But the level of commitment of the heirs, compelled to take over the 
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business, would hardly be the same as that of the founder. Thus, there is a risk that 
many members of the family business may have other types of motivations for the 
organization, with a lower level of involvement or disconnected from affective values. 
Some people work because they have to work, not because they want to 
work. This is the beginning of the demise of family businesses: the values 
are unclear, the loyalties divided and motivation is based on money. The 
succession plan for the family business depends on the commitment of 
people and the ability to transmit it (Rossato Neto & Cavedon, 2004, p. 6). 
However it is not merely the absence of successors which can negatively 
impact the business. Lima (2000) indicates the existence of a deep sense of 
contradiction in the family firm divided by opting to follow meritocracy or the norms of 
dynastic succession. Authors such as Stewart (2003) corroborate this view warning 
that when the importance of kinship ties is given precedence over the logic of 
efficiency, much harm is generated for the company. The most obvious distortion is 
nepotism, which will be discussed in more depth within the altruism construct. In the 
presence of nepotism, criteria of experience and ability are relegated to the 
background, often in favour of hiring unqualified relatives that cannot be easily 
dismissed (Lomnitz & Pérez-Lizaur, 1987; Whyte, 1996). 
Despite these disadvantages, Stewart (2003) states that kinship would also 
offer benefits able to offset its risks. The author points out that the benefits of kinship 
are linked to emotional aspects, affective support and cohesion in the family. The 
relatives would represent a source of social support, financial resources, advice and 
information and business channels (Stewart, 2003). 
For Davis and Herrera (1998) and Walsh (1994) cohesion represents the most 
fundamental measure of effectiveness in a family business. Cohesion reflects the 
level of mutual support and how strongly the members of the family group are 
connected, influencing the quality of relations between the company and family. 
Family systems with high cohesion are characterized by strong affective ties of 
interdependence, with the family spending most of their time together (Olson & 
Gorall, 2003). This factor can create a sustainable foundation of trust, confidence in 
raising the family directors and consolidating relations between the board and the 
CEO. 
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Integration of the family with the firm 
 
Harvey (1999b) argues that a reciprocal involvement between family members 
and the company can help to create shared visions of business capable of 
generating long-term value. In addition, the durability of these interactions creates a 
shared language and a collection of narratives that provides a knowledge base 
common to all family members (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). 
Barnett and Kellermanns (2006) defined three different levels of interaction 
between family and business: family influence dormant (low interaction); facilitating 
family influence (moderate interaction); restrictive family influence (intense interaction 
leading to excessive levels of family influence in the company). 
In the first case, where there is low interaction between family and business 
subsystems, although the company is not subject to the total control of the family, the 
opportunity of deriving benefits from family experience and knowledge is lost. 
(Astrachan et al., 2002). This may relieve uncertainty about the role of nonfamliy 
executives, but on the other hand, these businesses do not enjoy the positive 
aspects that family culture could provide, including the establishment of a strong 
sense of identity with the firm, generating a greater commitment to their values and 
goals (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006). 
At the other extreme are the family businesses that present an intense 
interaction between family and business. Barnett and Kellermanns (2006) indicated 
that this high level of influence can result in loss of autonomy of nonfamliy managers, 
creating agency problems unique to the family owned firms.  
In this sense, the ideal would be to reach a situation of moderate interaction 
between family and business, where the company would benefit from the 
involvement of the family, avoiding at the same time abuse of power on the part of 
family members (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006). 
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V.5.4. The Management Control Construct 
 
The main purpose of any management control system is to ensure that the 
behaviour and the actions of all workers are aligned with the company objectives and 
strategies. Thus, management control assumes an important role in the strategic 
alignment process, inducing managers to act to reinforce the strategy of the firm. 
This is exactly the reality demanded by agency theory, for which the principals 
must align their agents in relation to their interests. One of the main ways to make 
sure that this goal is achieved is to design an appropriate system of management 
control which can provide the proposed strategic direction to all stakeholders 
(Slagmulder, 1997). 
This concept leads to the following formulation: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The more developed the system of management control in the family 
business, the higher the prevailing alignment. 
 
The control mechanisms to be discussed in this section relate to issues such 
as: the effectiveness of boards of directors; the existence of economic indicators and 
financial control; the level of protection of the interests of shareholders; the level of 
autonomy of the CEO; and the attitude of shareholders in terms of their level of 
activism monitoring the business. Figure 5.7, introduced below, shows the structure 
of this construct: 
Figure 5.7: Categories of the Management Control construct 
  Source: Research data 
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The effective controlling role of the Board of Directors 
 
The Board of Directors, as previously discussed, has important functions. 
Corbetta and Tomaselli (1996) point out the roles of advice and guidance for the 
CEO, the responsibility of establishing links with the external environment and the 
role of representing the company to the community as the most important ones. In 
family-owned firms, its importance is also recognized in acting as a bridge between 
the company and the family. 
In their turn, Forbes and Milliken (1999) highlighted the role of the Board of 
Directors acting as a control and monitoring centre, hiring, compensating, disciplining 
and dismissing executives. The performance evaluation of the executives and the 
consequent decision concerning the ways of providing incentives can be based on 
the monitoring of their behaviour or the observation of performance resulting from 
their pattern of behaviour (Johnson et al., 1996). 
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) advocate the existence of two levels of 
control by the Board of Directors: strategic control and financial control. The strategic 
control usually includes subjective criteria, related to the drivers of future 
performance of the organization, while financial controls propose the use of objective 
indicators, representing the past and present performance achieved. CEOs have to 
have their performance regarding the delivering of results evaluated at both levels. 
Board of Directors of family-owned companies are challenged, however, to 
apply such assessments to family CEOs with exemption since they typically give ' the 
benefit of the doubt to the incumbent (e.g., bad luck or unfortunate circumstances 
rather than incompetence) when interpreting ambiguous performance data' (Gomez-
Mejia, 2003, p. 229). 
 
 
Presence of effective economic/financial control 
 
Companies that choose to create boards with family members, representing 
their own family branches, and who do not have the proper qualifications, are 
common on the Brazilian scene. They are often not even able to understand and 
interpret economic indicators and financial data presented by the CEO or the Board 
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of Directors in their balance sheets and reports. Thus, one has to understand that the 
Board is a place reserved for experienced professionals who can lend their expertise 
to the company's development. 
In addition to the formation of a professional board to exercise proper control, 
Eisenhardt (1989a) believes that effective information systems should be developed, 
avoiding the principal being deceived by the agents. For her, the better informed the 
principal is, the more he/she will make the agent work in line with his/her interests. 
But though the principal possesses the best mechanisms of control over 
his/her agents and has the right to dismiss at will, the question that arises is related 
to doubts about the ability to execute a perfect control, either because of lack of time 
or skill. Even, therefore, using quite non-lenient monitoring, the owner may not have 
sufficient financial sophistication to understand the operations and financial data 
(Ang, 2000). 
To minimize risk of agency problems due to lack of control, several economic 
and financial parameters can be established such as: reporting and detailed 
statements by the CEO; generation of reliable indicators of the company's financial 
health, based on best accounting practices; the existence of communication 
channels available to shareholders to provide additional information about the 
business. 
Information systems, an essential part of any control mechanism, serve to 
communicate the strategic outcomes throughout the organization. This prevents 
vertical information asymmetry, which together with the lack of agreement on goals 
are the main causes of strategic misalignment (Verhaegen, 1986, cited in Slagmulder 
1997, p. 132). 
 
 
Protection of the shareholders’ interests 
 
The agency problem can become worse when the principal is unable to 
adequately monitor or control the behaviour of agents. For Jensen and Meckling, 
(1976) principals can reduce divergent interests by increasing incentive alignment 
and diminishing the agency costs associated with bad decisions by increasing 
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control. For this, they may resort to a series of mechanisms both motivating and 
aligning the agents, such as compensation systems, and establishing a Board of 
Directors focused on monitoring the company's executive group. 
Pearce and Zahra (1989) argue that the increased level of monitoring of 
managers would be able to reduce information asymmetry between agent and 
principal. This would encourage the owner-managers to examine their industry, 
seeking opportunities and monitoring trends in its competitiveness. Also according to 
the authors, monitoring via the Board often relies on the contributions of outside 
directors, who are more likely to challenge established assumptions about the 
strategy, forcing managers to refine their positions. Moreover, the experience of 
these board members can also raise the quality of strategy discussions. 
According to Mitnick (1982) the principals seek to control the behaviour of their 
agents, and the agents, in their turn, must seek to control or manage the elements of 
their environment to meet their key objectives. Thus, the agency models usually 
focus on incentive systems that produce these controls. In respect of an incentive 
that exists between a principal and an agent, the principal must seek to use rewards 
and encouragement indicating the behaviour that is expected from the agent. To do 
this, the principal must assume the costs of identifying the agent’s actions that would 
satisfy his/her preferences and the costs of monitoring and ensuring compliance. 
The definition of models of executive compensation and incentives tied to 
company performance is emerging as a major form of internal control. For Steinberg 
(2003), fixed and variable compensation and stock options are internal mechanisms 
that contribute to minimize the problem of agency. Authors such as George (2002) 
warn that executives should not be responsible for the definition of compensation 
systems, emphasizing the importance of setting up a compensation committee, 
submitted to a Board composed of independent directors, to define the incentives 
and remuneration of top management. 
As noted by Oliva and Albuquerque (2007), the performance bonuses meet 
short-term goals while the stock option programmes, long term. The adoption of stock 
options is not exempt from risks; however, it is interesting to note that giving shares 
to executives, fulfils the role of bringing them closer to the interests of shareholders. 
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That is, the variable remuneration of the managers would be affected by fluctuations 
in share prices in the market, ensuring closer alignment between the interests of 
executives and shareholders (Oliva & Albuquerque, 2007). 
Note that many of the instances, regulatory and self-regulatory, that are 
designed to monitor the agency relationships, carry in themselves other agency 
relationships. These instances are represented by internal or external auditors, 
regulators, departments of internal affairs, government regulators, insurance 
companies, investment advisers and rating agencies, all acting on behalf of some set 
of entities. They may, therefore, also incur agency problems, the existence of 
shirking, co-optation, bribery or perhaps simply a lack of monitoring of the right 
things. As Shapiro (1987) asks in an escalating cycle of agents overseeing agents, it 
should be asked: who monitors those responsible for monitoring? 
 
 
Level of the present autonomy 
 
Autonomy is a basic human desire for independence, freedom and free will 
and that is usually found in situations of self-employment (Matthews et al., 1994). 
However, several authors have shown that if you can provide autonomy in the 
business environment, positive work attitudes and other outcomes, such as job 
satisfaction, are achieved (Hackman & Oldham, 1976; Karasek, 1979; Karasek & 
Theorell, 1990; Lawler & Hall, 1970). 
Although some employers fear that greater individual autonomy affects 
performance, some research suggests that it could even increase productivity 
(Bailyn, 1993a). For the agreed level of autonomy to be implemented without the 
appearance of unnecessary tension, the outcomes should be properly negotiated, 
the same way that checkpoints should be established. In order to regulate the level of 
autonomy granted to managers, Mitnick (1973) suggests the use of surveillance to 
restrict the freedom of agents, reducing the set of possibilities for discretionary 
choices. For him, within a principal-agent relationship, such policing mechanisms 
must be implemented to an extent which depends on the degree of freedom that it is 
willing to give, and the cost of implementation and maintenance of monitoring the 
agents.  
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It is important, therefore, that the level of control established serves as a 
support for the alignment of the goals of principals and agents, reducing the risk that 
the granted freedom ends up as an agency conflict. 
 
 
Laissez faire control 
 
Ang (2000) shows that agency costs tend to increase with more fragmented 
ownership structure for a company. As the number of shareholders is increased, they 
start to take a more passive attitude regarding the monitoring of companies. That is, 
the decreased ownership of these investors, can lead them to take less responsibility 
for the direction of the company, not recognizing the burden of monitoring the 
management. 
The criticism of the passivity of shareholders was reported by Robert Monks 
and Nell Minow who advocated the thesis that organizations that have shareholders 
who are dedicated to the effective monitoring of management tend to add more value 
and generate more wealth than firms that do not have the same follow-up (Monks & 
Minow, 2004). These shareholders rely on the law of least effort, understanding that 
their return will be constant, regardless of their attitude toward business. However, 
Monks indicates that these returns tend to rise if the shareholders assume an active 
posture, participating and monitoring the actions of the executives (Andrade & 
Rossetti, 2006). 
Of course, this phenomenon is less prevalent in family businesses, whose 
owners also usually accumulate the function of managers. But even there, where 
ownership is dispersed by the presence of a large number of family members or 
other types of shareholders, there is a risk of a looser control. Dyer (1988) points out 
that the major risk of a laissez-faire culture is that employees may not act consistently 
with the family's basic values and assumptions. They can lose sight of the objectives 
of the company, and the business can run out of control. 
Finally, the last discussion within this construct is related to how management 
control impacts on disclosure and transparency. Ge and McVay’s research revealed 
that 
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poor internal control is usually related to an insufficient commitment of 
resources for accounting controls. Material weaknesses in internal control 
tend to be related to deficient revenue-recognition policies, lack of 
segregation of duties, deficiencies in the period-end reporting process and 
accounting policies, and inappropriate account reconciliation (2005, p. 137). 
The authors remind us that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has increased disclosure 
requirements related to the effectiveness of internal control, the focus of SOX 3026 
being on disclosure of controls and procedures, while SOX 4047 focuses on internal 
control. 
This allows the proposition that: 
Hypothesis 5: The more developed the system of management control in a family 
business, the greater is the level of disclosure and transparency. 
 
 
 
V.5.5. The Trust Construct 
 
Trust is understood by Sundaramurthy (2008) as a fundamental element in the 
competitiveness of social organizations, especially given the increase in the levels of 
complexity and uncertainty present in the market. For the author, trust refers to a 
personal belief that the individuals engaged in processes of exchange will use their 
best efforts to honour their commitments without wanting any advantage for so doing, 
and so assuming opportunistic attitudes. Ring and Van de Ven (1992) propose that 
trust is a key element on which governance should be based, precisely because it 
would be capable of reducing the risk of opportunistic behaviour in principal and 
agent’s transactions. 
Complementing this idea, Lyons and Mehta (1997) define trust as 
a meaningful concept for the parties to a social relation if and only if at least 
one party is exposed to an element of behavioural risk. Behavioural risk is 
experienced by one party when he or she is uncertain about the behaviour of 
the other as it may materially affect him or her, and when such exposure is a 
                                                 
6
 Section 302 of the Act mandates a set of internal procedures designed to ensure accurate financial disclosure. 
The signing officers must certify that they are ‘responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls‘. 
7
 Under Section 404 of the Act, management is required to produce an ‘internal control report’ which must 
affirm ‘the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure 
and procedures for financial reporting. 
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matter of common knowledge between the parties. In other words using 
Oliver Williamson's (1985) jargon, behavioural risk can be understood as 
vulnerability to opportunistic behaviour (1997, p. 240). 
In accordance with Beccerra and Gupta (1999), the theme trust has been 
discussed by different sciences, such as psychology, the political sciences, 
economics and administration. These distinct fields of study seek to analyse the 
question of trust from different perspectives: trust between individuals; between 
organizations; between individuals and organizations; trust as a general 
characteristic of different societies; and lastly, trust as a personal attribute. 
For Nooteboom (1996), we trust someone, if it is probable that he/she 
cooperates even not being forced to and not having any material interest in doing so. 
This means that trust is associated with the non-egotistic forms of cooperation, based 
on the loyalty to a partner out of ethics, the ties of friendship or kinship, and not on 
the basis of coercion or self-interest. 
Among the principal benefits of trust, brought out by empirical research 
undertaken by Beccerra and Gupta (1999), the following should be mentioned: 
o Improving individual performance; 
o Acting as a “lubricant” of the social system; 
o Promoting interorganizational cooperation; 
o Developing competitive advantage and; 
o Reducing conflict. 
The relationship between the levels of trust present in the organizational 
context and the reduction of conflicts is found to be extremely important for the 
discussion proposed by this thesis, concerning agency theory in family-owned 
companies. That is, in accordance with that pointed out by Raskas (1998), the ties of 
kinship existing in this type of organization promote trust via a greater sharing of 
information and a sense of common purpose built up among the family members, 
which would result in lesser propensity to opportunistic behaviour. Wilkins and Ouchi 
(1983) share the same opinion, adding that trust creates a common interest and 
shared expectations which then facilitate the tolerance of both partial goal conflict 
and temporary periods of inequity within the relationship. 
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This discussion allows the formulation of the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: The higher the trust existing in the family and business spheres, the 
lower the agency conflict. 
 
This section will adopt the perspective of a discussion on the implications 
arising out of the level of trust deposited in family managers, in nonfamliy managers 
and between shareholders and managers. In addition, the question of the channels 
utilized for the identification of external executives is also discussed, starting from the 
network of relationships of the owner family. Such elements can be visualized in 
Figure 5.8 below. 
Figure 5.8: Categories of the Trust construct 
 
    Source: Research data 
 
 
Trust in family managers 
 
In family-owned companies, trust can be comprehended as a form of social 
capital imbued with considerable power, instilling in family managers attributes such 
as high professional integrity, and ends and values common to those of the founders. 
LaShapelle and Barnes (1998) maintain that trust can act as a mechanism of 
integration among the members of different generations of the family involved in the 
business. Thus, trust would be created and maintained by means of, and in addition 
to, the family, catalysing the succession processes and strengthening the alignment 
of the family managers with the business (LaShapelle & Barnes, 1998). Sharma 
(1997) complements this affirming that trust in the abilities of the successor 
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demonstrated by the predecessor possesses a significant influence on stakeholders’ 
satisfaction with the succession process. 
In the context of a family company, when trust is guided by ties of affection, 
the company tends to be run by informal agreements, based on a high level of faith in 
the intentions of the other party (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2000; Pollak, 1985). 
In spite of trust being indicated as a source of social capital for family-owned 
companies, it is necessary to state that it also possesses a negative side. As Shapiro 
(1990) points out, this fact becomes evident when the trust existing among family 
members is used as a justification for the selection of managers from the family, 
instead of experienced professionals present in the market. In addition to this, family 
members frequently tend to be generously remunerated, independently of their 
demonstrated merit. To this must be added the fact that, the stability in the company 
that the family enjoys, and the less rigid surveillance exercised over it, can raise the 
risk of shirking and act as a stimulus to other opportunistic practices (Shapiro, 1990). 
 
 
Trust in Nonfamliy Managers 
 
For Raskas (1998), trust, in family organizations, is the result of a number of 
shared experiences and common values, experienced through the proximity of the 
family members and the power of the family social structure. The nonfamliy 
managers, on entering the organization, are not always able to readily identify the 
role of the values disseminated by the family, or perhaps even share them. In 
addition, because they have not participated in the construction of these values, 
these executives do not generally enjoy the same level of trust as that shown to the 
family managers. This question is reinforced by the research carried out by Chrisman 
et al. (1999) which indicated that the more complex the business, and the greater the 
number of nonfamliy managers involved in management, the greater is the level of 
concern demonstrated by the controlling family in relation to the loyalty and 
involvement of the executive body. 
Another risk to be considered concerns the play of interests, contrived by 
individuals not belonging to the family who are capable of reading the family context 
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with the purpose of taking advantage of its weak points. Several researchers such as 
Babic (2003), Lodi (1998) and Oliveira (1999) are unanimous in affirming that family-
owned companies can suffer through hired professionals who on identifying the weak 
points existing in the relationships between the family members, stimulate conflicts 
only to gain more space and power for themselves within the organization. 
Beccera and Gupta (1999) argue that trust is not only based on the power of 
family ties. It can be based on the level of competence demonstrated by the manager 
and by a standard of behaviour imbued with honesty and ethics. In other words, a 
nonfamliy manager who does not have the benefits of kinship to gain trust, may 
conquer it either through ethical conduct or through competence in managing the 
resources of the principal. Nooteboom (1996) divides trust precisely into: 
o Behaviourial trust: the intentions of the agent not to defect willingly; 
o Competence trust: a partner’s ability to perform according to the 
intentions and expectations of a relation. 
Child and Rodrigues (2004, p. 143) in defining the role of corporate 
governance as a way to ensure "that the managers run the company honestly and 
efficiently, delivering over the fair and acceptable return to those who have invested 
in it" make clear that both sides in the trust, whether behavioural or competency 
based, must be present concurrently. 
Potts and Matuszewski (2004) defend the idea that the alignment of the 
executives with the ethical values of the company and their conduct at the head of 
management over a period of time are fundamental factors in establishing a 
relationship of trust. In this sense, the contracting of well-known executives in the 
market represents a chance of forming teams based on criteria of competence, and 
minimizes the risk of family ties being overvalued to the detriment of the ability and 
talent necessary for the function. 
 
 
Embeddedness 
 
Faced with the risks associated with the contracting of nonfamliy managers, 
pointed out in the previous section, it becomes relevant to discuss what would be the 
178 
   
best channels utilized by the owning family to select and hire these professionals. It 
should be understood that the families usually are part of a wider social field, 
establishing in their networks relationships constructed on the basis of trust. Thus, 
the principals operate in a context which involves multiple relations not only those 
related to the company: managers, customers, suppliers and other stakeholders. 
Consequently, it is natural that seeking for executives for their company, they reach 
out to these social network, which produces, therefore, a series of expectations, 
obligations, reproduction of social standards and inter-relations with other players 
(Veliyath & Ramaswamy, 2000). 
Granovetter (1985) studied how behaviour and institutions are affected by 
social relations, and this brought into evidence that even in modern organizations, 
they play an important role. Shapiro (1987) and Cook (2001) portray a quite different 
strategy in dealing with the agency problem, using the systems of selection, control 
and sanction of the agents. The authors point out that agency relations are 
introduced into a permanent structure of personal relations and that these networks 
of trust can be utilized as a strategy to minimize the risk of wrong selection in the 
agents’ recruiting process. 
The agents possess registrations of their career and reputations that can be 
accessed by the principal through the members of trustworthy social networks, in 
which both are embedded. However, Shapiro (1987), warns that conflicts of interest 
are not necessarily extinguished by contracting agents from personal networks, 
although their effects tend to be attenuated. The author maintains that agents and 
principal belonging to the same social network are more likely to share similar 
interests and values, than when they belong to unrelated groups. In addition, the 
agents would be more likely to act in a more committed, honest and altruistic way 
when invested with responsibility through the indication of ex-employers, friends, 
family, neighbours, colleagues, members of their church, and so on (Shapiro, 1987).  
Shapiro (1987) goes on to say that the monitoring of agents’ behaviour would 
also be facilitated in close and continuous relationships, where the agents are 
routinely supervised by the principal or his/her associates. Thus, the social networks 
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offer a rich variety of sanctions for the offending agent, such as: disgrace, ostracism, 
loss of reputation and other forms of social reproof. 
Although embeddedness is recognized as a source capable of transferring the 
trust of the social relations into the company, it also has its dark side. Shapiro (2005, 
p. 277) explains that  
because embeddedness is often an excuse to relax vigilant recruitment and 
monitoring, it provides cover, not only for wayward offspring or relatives, but 
also for confidence swindlers to feign social intimacy and thereby enjoy 
unfettered opportunism. 
For Heidrick (1988) the CEO and the family board do not need to rely on their 
own social network to fill the strategic positions in the company. In fact, the author 
suggests that they preferentially ‘avoid involving a close friend who may be as eager 
to please as family members or employees’ (1988, p.274). 
 
 
Trust between Shareholders and Managers 
 
A clash can be seen in the literature between those that adopt blindly the 
utilitarian presuppositions of agency theory, underpinned by relationships based on 
formal agreements and whose management relies on rigorous control mechanisms 
(Corbetta & Salvato, 2004) and those that, following the presuppositions of 
stewardship theory, focus on the trust systems to manage relational risk, through 
organizational structures which promote reciprocity, cooperation, social insertion and 
trust between those involved (Donaldson, 1990; Mayer et al., 1995; Sundaramurthy & 
Lewis, 2003). 
Control is about influencing the behaviour of the agents ensuring that they act 
in an effective and cooperative manner (Das & Teng, 2001; Lebas & Wiegenstein, 
1986). Trust on the other hand, is about allowing the other party to act with full 
discretion ‘based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party’ 
(Mayer et al., 1995, p. 712). 
The option for each of these mechanisms to the detriment of the other, can 
lead to a dysfunctional organizational dynamics (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). 
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Focusing only on control stimulates myopic decision-making and encourages a 
polarized board-CEO relationship with insufficient openness for advice interactions 
(Roberts, 2001; Westphal, 1999). Falk and Kosfeld (2004) also make it clear that the 
decision of the principal to implement rigid control mechanisms can be interpreted by 
the agents as a sign of distrust, and may reduce significantly the motivation and 
willingness of the agents to do their jobs properly. Thus, before adopting any 
mechanism of governance based on a view that “one-size-fits-all”, the principal 
should evaluate carefully the psychological aspects and remember that “what works 
well to control or motivate an opportunistic manager may not work well to control or 
motivate a steward” (Lee & O’Neill 2003, p. 212). 
Along the same line of reasoning, Ghoshal and Moran (1996) argue that 
hierarchical controls can raise the level of opportunistic behaviour and at the same 
time, diminish the positive feelings that the agents nurture in relation to the company. 
They assert that the more incentives and sanctions provided, the greater will be the 
tendency of the agents to behave in an opportunistic manner. For the authors, 
monitoring and rewards can alter the behaviour of the individual in accordance with 
that intended in many cases, but their attitude towards the organization will also be 
affected negatively. In this sense, organizations fail when they are unable to create a 
social context necessary for building trust and the exertion which are essential for 
maintaining cooperation, as in inducing the presence of trust, the necessity of 
monitoring itself is reduced (Ouchi 1980; Dyer, 1997). 
On the other hand, to base all relationships on trust only can lead to an 
environment of groupthink where the principal will rarely challenge the positions 
adopted by his agents (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). 
Thus, Bammens et al. (2009) propose that control and trust should be used in 
a complementary manner. Davis et al. (1997) recommend that such mechanisms 
should be utilized alternatively, depending on psychological and situational factors. 
And, finally, Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) reinforce the idea that both 
mechanisms, not only can, but must coexist. 
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V.5.6. The Disclosure and Transparency Construct 
 
Transparency and disclosure are concepts essential to corporate governance, 
guaranteeing an effective allocation of resources in society and lessening the 
information asymmetry between a company and its stakeholders (Popa and Peres, 
2008). Patel et al. (2002, p. 326) confirm this idea stating that ‘higher transparency 
and better disclosure reduce the information asymmetry between a firm’s 
management and financial stakeholders - equity and bond holders, mitigating the 
agency problem in corporate governance’. Andrade and Rossetti (2006) also 
highlight the fact that the practice of disclosure is closely associated with the search 
for the minimization of asymmetric information in the principal-agent relationship. For 
these authors, an agent in his/her fiduciary role has an obligation to act with full 
transparency to the principal, revealing any information that is relevant. In addition, 
the agent must disclose to the principal what his/her interests are, when divergent, 
not taking advantage of his/her position to obtain approval of his/her actions due to 
lack of adequate information. 
Therefore, transparency is central to producing reliability, fundamental for less 
conflicting relationships within the family business system, as posed by Child and 
Rodrigues (2003, p. 351). 
Greater transparency in the form of more open reporting of corporate data, 
monitoring of behaviour, and reporting of concerns, […] provide a more 
constructive alternative to traditional hierarchical control. It also helps to 
avoid breaches of trust stemming from unfair, even unlawful, practices that 
give certain groups undue benefits.  
This discussion allows the following hypothesis to be postulated: 
 
Hypothesis 7: The higher the level of disclosure and transparency of management 
transactions, the higher the level of trust prevailing in the family 
business. 
It is important to note that transparency occurs whenever information is 
accurately presented, not only including the firm’s financial situation, but also its 
performance, ownership structure and information regarding the governance of the 
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corporation (Mallin, 2002). Thus, the discussion of this construct will consider the 
degree of access and the level of dissemination of information present in the family 
enterprises, as well as questioning the level of transparency in the succession 
process. The requirement of executives to adopt transparent behaviour is also 
considered. 
Figure 5.9: Categories of the Disclosure and Transparency construct 
 
Source: Research data 
 
The degree of access to information 
Financial disclosure and business reporting are critical elements for the 
functioning of an efficient capital market (Popa & Peres, 2008), since they are 
important information sources for different stakeholders, especially those for public 
companies. Actually, disclosure is compulsory for this category of firms, since they 
are 
required by law to not only file financial information publicly on a periodic 
basis but also to disclose other information on the company, provide detailed 
data on new issues of securities and report any trade by insiders. (Arruñada, 
2011, p.379). 
Companies may resort to two classes of publishing variants through which 
they can reduce the informational asymmetry towards their stakeholders: mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure. 
Mandatory disclosure is determined at national regulation level through stock-
exchange commissions, accounting or government authorities, which usually uses an 
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international referential of business reporting. Its aim is to produce quality information 
to fulfil the stakeholder’s request in accordance with the applicable laws and 
standards (Popa & Peres, 2008). Despite its high cost of implementation, mandatory 
disclosure also encourages the executives to analyse and understand the business 
results, which means that its cost-effectiveness can be worthwhile (McCahery & 
Vermeulen, 2006). 
Popa and Peres (2008) state that it is possible to measure the benefits 
achieved by the adoption of disclosure for the firms listed through the cash flow and 
the transaction price increases. Eccles and Mavrinac (1995) studies show that the 
largest benefit is the increase of the firm’s credibility. They also included in their list of 
advantages the increase of share value, the increase of the number of potential 
investors, greater access to capital, the reduction of share volatility, the increase of 
share liquidity, the improvement of relations with the suppliers and the reduction of 
political interventions to regulate the market. 
On the other hand, voluntary disclosure is an additional offer of information, 
which is made public through the company’s free choice, aiming to attract investors. 
This is applied especially to non-listed companies, the case of almost all family 
businesses surveyed in this dissertation, which in most countries, like USA, Japan, 
Brazil, and others, are not obliged to disclose any financial information (Arruñada, 
2011). European Union countries regulate their financial disclosure differently in a 
very distinct way, requiring all companies to formally submit and publish their 
accounts. Over recent years, the Commission of the European Communities has 
made efforts to simplify the business formalities, an attitude, however, that may be 
counterproductive. Arruñada (2011, p. 378) argues that 'mandatory publication of 
accounts is not only an issue of reducing the costs of operating businesses but also 
of easing businesses' access to credit’. After all, says the author, mandatory 
disclosure of accounts by private companies relates to investors’ protection and 
credit information, thus helping their trading parties (mainly banks and suppliers) by 
estimating their credit risk, which in turn, expands firms’ access to credit and reduces 
its cost. For him, ‘publishing the accounts may be more credible and less costly than 
communicating them individually to contractual parties or handing them only to those 
parties who request them explicitly’ (Arruñada, 2011, p. 389). 
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McCahery and Vermeulen (2006, p. 32) suggests which information should be 
supplied in order to demonstrate accountability to the investors: 
(1) the company’s objectives; (2) principal changes; (3) balance sheet and 
off-balance sheet items; (4) financial position of the firm and its capital 
needs; (5) board composition and company policy for appointments and 
remuneration; (6) forward-looking expectations; and (7) profits and 
dividends. 
Companies that adopt voluntary disclosure using the cost-benefit analysis 
state that ‘management would publicly disclose up to (or towards) the point where the 
perceived reduction in the agency costs of equity capital equalled the increased costs 
of public disclosure to markets and the public domain’ (Holland, 1998, p. 30). 
Certainly, voluntary disclosure could be an important part of the present 
corporate reporting practice, for its proposal to cover deficiencies in some of the 
content of traditional financial reporting, thus increasing the investors' confidence and 
the market efficiency as a whole. However, Popa and Peres (2008) observed a 
negative correlation between the volume of information disclosed voluntarily and the 
reliability of the reports published. This means providing a significant amount of 
information does not necessarily mean a greater commitment to transparency. 
In the case of family businesses, a growing number have realized the benefits 
of a higher level of voluntary disclosure. When comparing family and nonfamliy-
owned companies, Chen et al. (2008) concluded that the family shareholder tends to 
have greater influence than other types of investors, regarding the level of 
transparency adopted in disclosure of the company's results. Silveira (2006) agrees 
with this view by pointing out the results of a study conducted by the University of 
Texas at Dallas, with family and nonfamliy-owned companies belonging to the S&P 
500. The survey revealed that nonfamliy businesses are less transparent about their 
governance practices, disclosing less information voluntarily. It also found that family 
businesses present higher quality financial information and are more likely to warn 
investors about bad news occurring in the business. The results reinforce the idea 
that the conflict between managers and shareholders, which is typical in the U.S. 
market, is lower in family-owned companies, as the closer alignment between 
ownership and management makes these companies less averse to disclosure of 
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bad news that could affect their profits during the period. Finally, the study also 
shows differences in the levels of transparency among family businesses whose 
founder is still active, serving as CEO. These tend to be more transparent than the 
companies that are in the second or third generations (Silveira, 2006). 
 
 
The level of dissemination of information 
The level of transparency of the business is intimately associated with the 
existence of efficient channels of communication and dissemination of its results. 
Widespread access to information, whether for individual or institutional investors, is 
a legal requirement (IBRI, 2007). It is worth noting that in the case of family-owned 
firms where ownership is concentrated in the hands of a single family group, the 
challenge of being transparent is related to the ability to harmonize the interests 
between different groups of shareholders, if any, leveraging the asymmetry 
information and avoiding the expropriation of minority shareholders by the majority 
(Andrade & Rossetti, 2006). 
The Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) makes clear in its 
rules that everyone should be informed at the same time and with the same quality of 
information, whether through the media, public meetings, websites, etc. The key is 
that the principle of equal and simultaneous access is respected and all audiences 
receive the same treatment (IBRI, 2007). 
In its publication named Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate 
Governance Disclosure the UNCTAD (2006, p. 29) recommends that  
‘relevant information should be available for users in a cost-effective way, 
preferably through the websites of the relevant government authority, the 
stock exchange on which the enterprise is listed (if applicable) and the 
enterprise itself. […] Some degree of harmonization of the location of 
corporate governance disclosures would be desirable to make the relevant 
data more accessible. Two possible approaches include putting all corporate 
governance disclosures in a separate section of the annual report, or in a 
stand-alone corporate governance report. […] Traditional channels of 
communication with stakeholders, such as annual reports, should be 
supported by other channels of communication, taking into account the 
complexity and globalization of financial markets and the impact of 
technology’. 
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It also important to note that the CEO and the Investor Relations Director, 
under the supervision of the Board of Directors have a responsibility to ensure that 
the disclosure is accompanied by maximum transparency. They should also provide 
security to the market, tending to safeguard the company's key strategies, without 
harming the disclosure of their real situation. 
Regarding instances of governance, shareholders can count on the support of 
an Audit Committee in order to ensure that the information provided by executives 
and the board of directors is reliable. As noted by Furuta and Santos (2010), the 
Audit Committee is a supervisory body mandated, but non-permanent, and should be 
installed at the request of shareholders. Among its main responsibilities are: to 
oversee the actions of administrators; submitting opinions on the management's 
annual report; provide feedback on the proposals of the management bodies to be 
submitted to the general assembly, relating to changes in capital; issue of debentures 
or subscription bonuses; distribution of dividends; merger or division; examination of 
financial statements for the fiscal year; among others (Furuta and Santos, 2010). 
 
 
The degree of transparency in the succession 
The timing of the succession is still commonly treated by many managers as a 
family and sporadic transient event, which can lead to great difficulties and failures at 
the time of its completion (Lambrecht, 2005). Together with the lack of planning, 
there is a predominance of patriarchal criteria defined unilaterally by one who will be 
succeeded without the participation of other family members. As Bernhoeft and 
Castanheira (1995) warn, the lack of a discussed and transparent process can lead 
to: conflicts of interest among members of the owning family; personal disharmony 
and distress; isolation and lack of synergy; tense and destructive criticism among 
stakeholders. 
Succession planning, a central theme in the discussion on governance in 
family businesses, has a great potential to assist in the orientation and conduct of 
succession, contributing to the structuring of a transparent and balanced process 
(Lansberg, 1999) The item of transparency can be reached from the discussion of the 
criteria of succession within a family council, open to all members of the owner 
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family. Among the main issues to consider in succession planning, it is possible to 
highlight: setting rules for the succession; guidelines for training and preparation of 
potential successors; criteria adoption to guide the professional management of the 
company; mandatory retirement rules; and definition of policies for financing the 
economic security of older members (Bernhoeft & Castanheira, 1995). 
Many authors, such as Lambrecht (2005), emphasize the importance of 
establishing a participatory orientation, guided by shared criteria for succession. The 
guidance issued by the UNCTAD (2006) recommended the adoption of transparent 
procedures to appoint successors, considering that the succession process should 
be subject to disclosure. It cites a number of codes that reference the succession 
process, namely: 
 OECD Principle IV.D.2, which stresses that overseeing succession 
planning is a key function of the board; 
 Dey Report (Canada), which considers it an important stewardship duty of 
the company; and 
 Vienot Report I (France), which recommends that the selection committee 
be prepared to propose successors at short notice.  
The ideal, taking into account the recurrence of the need for succession along 
the trajectory of the family business, is to consider succession as an ongoing process 
that satisfies the criterion of transfer to future generations, translating it into a 
multigenerational transition plan (Lambrecht, 2005). Thus, the family should be able 
to identify, understand and develop its own way of transferring the organization and 
its symbolic and real assets over generations. This would imply that rather than 
thinking about succession, the family, together, should create a standard for the 
conduct of their succession processes, which is able to guarantee the perpetuation of 
the company. 
 
Transparent behaviour of the executives 
The level of transparency and information dissemination within the 
organization is not limited to structuring well-articulated instances and mechanisms of 
governance but also includes the quality of communication established between the 
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agent and principal. As IBGC (2009) points out, the CEO must ensure that 
communication is done with clarity, substance prevailing over form. The language 
should be accessible to the audience in question, addressing both the positive and 
the negative aspects in order to give people a correct understanding of the 
organization. 
However, McCahery and Vermeulen (2006) note that executives tend to be 
reluctant to disclose sensitive information. Beccerra and Gupta (1999) understand 
that, in order to adopt the level of transparency required by good practice without the 
use of gimmicks that effectively bypass it, it is necessary to build trust in relations 
between managers and shareholders. The authors point out that when there is a 
strong bond of trust in relationships, there is a tendency to establish an open 
communication where people do not feel difficulty in sharing information, while relying 
on the information they receive. In this context, the executives would not be fearful 
that the information sharing could be used against them. 
In the opposite case, Beccerra and Gupta (1999) show that in organizational 
contexts marked by low trust in relationships, executives tend to protect themselves 
and avoid sharing information that might harm them, adopting more conservative 
positions in running the company. This type of conduct with its lack of transparency, 
coupled with a management unable to take risks, clearly goes counter to 
conventional maximization of the interests of shareholders, which may lead to the 
problem of agency. In family-owned firms, this question takes on particular 
characteristics due to the differences in status between family and nonfamliy 
managers. 
 
 
 
V.5.7. The Legitimacy Construct 
 
The dynamics of family organizations, as stated by Lopes (2008), is notably 
marked by the peculiarities of the family institution. The emotional aspects of kinship, 
characterized by solidarity, affection, trust and stability, coexist with conflict, 
competition and disaggregation typical of capitalist dynamics. The emotional-affective 
dimension frequently ends by forging relationships in the context of work, such as 
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instances of power and competition, and reflects the standards of management and 
organizational culture (Lopes, 2008; Davel & Colbari, 2003).  
In the arena of interactions that arise from the arrival of new generations within 
the family business, the definition of their roles, their commitment and competence to 
lead the company's future are crucial for the continuity or disruption of family 
businesses in the long term (Grzybovski et al., 2008). The expectations and concerns 
about their ability to take on such a role are only settled with the passage of time, 
when heir-successors can legitimize themselves with the family and the company. 
In the Weberian sense, legitimacy can be defined as the acceptance of the 
exercise of power, i.e., the capacity that an individual shows to cause the other to 
accept his/her command. And, according to Weber (1971), this can be achieved 
through tradition, charisma or by law. In the context of family organizations, this issue 
typically arises precisely when a new family member is incorporated within the 
company. Despite having the legal authority under the law of inheritance and future 
ownership, he/she must earn the respect of family and other stakeholders (Barach et 
al., 1988). 
These arguments lead to the following formulation: 
 
Hypothesis 8: The lower the legitimacy of family members in their entry into the 
company and at the moment of the succession, the lower the trust 
prevailing between owners and managers. 
 
In this section, the process of building the legitimacy of successors will be 
discussed from two perspectives. The first deals with the challenges of integration of 
the successor, the trend of the prevalence of kinship ties in the selection process, the 
difficulty of overlap with the image of the founder and/or predecessor. In the second, 
the level of formalization of the succession process is discussed, taking into account 
the importance of formal succession criteria and the question of recognition of family 
managers by the stakeholders. 
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Figure 5.10: Categories of the Legitimacy construct 
 
         Source: Research data 
 
 
Successor’s legitimacy 
 
The mere choice of successor by the predecessor is seen, in many family 
businesses, as a sufficient condition of a satisfactory succession process which will 
ensure business continuity. However, the process of succession does not end when 
leadership is transferred from one generation to the next. The successor needs to be 
legitimized, confirmed by various important stakeholders: key employees, investors, 
bankers, suppliers, and distributors (Harvey & Evans, 1995). Bernhoeft (1991) 
highlights how important it is for successful transition that the successor wins his/her 
own space, presenting results in his/her own right. 
Barach et al. (1988) comment that even with the legal authority conferred by 
the family name and the fact that he/she will be the future owner of the company, the 
successor must be able to prove his/her ability to other managers and gain their trust. 
These authors summarize this by saying that the parent can designate his/her son or 
daughter as successor, but cannot force acceptance by everyone in the organization. 
The successors are challenged to achieve credibility, showing that they are 
able to perform the job as well as their predecessor had done, reaffirming the idea 
that the authority and respect inherent in their position have been achieved not 
simply inherited (Barach et al., 1988). 
It is not uncommon to find successor resistance from the ‘upper echelons’ in 
family businesses. Lansberg (1988) explains that such resistance could be based on 
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reluctance to shift from a personal relationship with the founder to a more formal 
relationship with the successor, a threat to employment due to a change of 
organizational structure, or to a fear of loss in autonomy and influence. 
Harvey and Evans (1995) confirm this idea saying that 
Senior, "old guard," key functional experts within family businesses are the 
most likely candidates to lapse into circumventing the new power structure. 
They have a long-standing relationship with the founder […] They have 
earned credibility and social capital […] These key employees feel that they 
have earned the right to do what is best for the company and, tangentially, 
for the family. Their loyalty and feelings for both the business and the family 
make them quasi-family members. Without attributing any negative motives 
to these individuals, it can be said that they can undermine the fledgling 
power base of the next generation. […] The conflict that evolves from this 
lapse in the chain of command can affect other employees. 
A key factor in this process is the role played by the predecessor. It can act as 
a facilitator or make the process even more difficult for the successor. Leone (2005) 
states that, sometimes, the predecessor is in a dilemma with himself, when he is 
confronted with doubt and uncertainty generated by the transmission of power. 
Lansberg (1988) states that the readiness of the founder to leave the family business 
to a successor may be slowly consumed if the lack of competence and preparation of 
the potential successor becomes evident. Goldberg and Wooldridge (1993) confirm 
that the owner-manager's reluctance to leave the command of the company will 
actually be greater if there is uncertainty about the successor’s skills, willingness and 
desire to take control. Conversely, if the founder trusts his/her successor, there is a 
much greater chance that this will effectively take over the business (Sharma, 1997). 
However, even though the successor has the right profile and has completed a 
successful succession plan, and can, therefore, be relied upon, the founder can still 
continue to resist, and moving away from the centre of the arena, prefer to continue 
to influence the decision-making in the family business. 
Living under the shadow of the founder generates feelings of frustration and 
resentment that emerge among the founder’s offspring when they are repeatedly 
compared to the founder (Dyer, 1986). The higher the charisma and prestige 
achieved by their predecessor, the greater the challenge of gaining credibility with 
employees and family members. This continuing influence or interference of the 
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founder in the family business produces conflict, and threatens family harmony 
(Davis & Harveston, 1999). 
Research conducted by Davis and Harveston (1999) demonstrated that the 
conflict is higher in family-owned firms led by the third (or later) generation than those 
led by the founder or the second generation. This trend is to be expected, due in part 
to an increase in the number of members and the complexity of the family and the 
work relationships involved (Aronoff & Ward, 1994; Kets de Vries, 1993). The Figure 
5.11 below shows this reality. 
Figure 5.11: Conflict across Generations 
 
         Source: Davis and Harveston (1999, p. 318) 
 
Another significant discovery of these authors in the same study is that 
conflicts are manifested more in the presence of the founder’s generational shadow 
than in its absence. In fact, the presence of the founder still makes it difficult for 
his/her successor to assume the leadership role effectively, earning the respect and 
recognition of all. These findings suggest that ‘overall conflict is determined less by 
the transition or conveyance of leadership of the family firm to the second generation 
than by the refusal of the founder to let go of the control of the family’s business’ 
(Davis & Harveston, 1999, p. 320). 
It is important to note that the problem of generational shadow is sensitive only 
from the founder to the second generation. From second to third generation and 
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beyond, no kind of significant impact has been found by researchers. That is, 
although the level of conflict in the third-generation or later - is higher, its cause is not 
the constant presence or absence of previous generations in the day-to-day 
business. Figure 5.12 demonstrates this: 
Figure 5.12: Conflict and the Shadow Effect 
 
 Source: Davis and Harveston (1999, p. 318) 
 
Finally, research carried out by Churchill and Lewis (1983) found that an 
owner-founder’s gradual withdrawal from the firm, combined with more delegation of 
responsibility to managers, helps reduce resistance to succession. 
However, very often there has to be a real withdrawal of the predecessor, 
because in family businesses, due to the family bond, it is very difficult to delimit the 
spaces of the predecessor and successor. And even though there is no intention on 
the predecessor’s part of interfering with his/her successor, the successor needs 
physical freedom from his/her parents to fully develop confidence and self-image 
(Handler, 1990). Thus, the idea of changing the predecessors' office space, parking 
space, conference rooms, or other physical attributes is a symbol of power change 
that sustains the legitimacy of the successor (Harvey & Evans, 1995). 
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Legitimacy of family managers 
Heirs, by definition, achieve their positions in the family through birth, not merit 
(Berenbeim, 1990). But in order to be successful in executive positions in the family 
business, rather than receive them as an inheritance, they must make themselves 
worthy. Therefore, it is important to highlight the role of formal preparation and 
conduct of a planned and transparent succession process. 
Barach et al. (1988) call attention to the career planning for the next 
generation as an essential part of the implementation strategy of any family firm. 
Bernhoeft and Gallo (2003) argue that career planning for members of family 
businesses in fact will assist in the process of their taking over the top management 
functions. A leader must acquire knowledge of aspects of his/her particular business 
(i.e., mission, philosophy, products, production processes, suppliers, clients, 
financing, technology, and so on); knowledge about the industry in which his/her firm 
operates (i.e., competitors, financial sources, leaders and important contacts, 
regulations, history, present and future markets, and so on); besides leadership 
abilities (i.e., communication, motivation, and other managerial abilities) (Aronoff & 
Ward, 1994; Foster, 1995; Tsoukas, 1996). 
Another important recommendation in the training of the heirs is that before 
working in the company, they should have worked elsewhere before to gain 
experience. What should be avoided is that they consider the family business as an 
automatic haven in the event of not succeeding in finding other better positions 
(Jonovic, 1982, cited in Barach et al., 1988). For Barach et al. (1988, p. 55) work in 
nonfamliy-owned firms may 
provide a broader perspective on business and develop capacity to adapt to 
radical environmental change. Furthermore, achievement on the outside can 
win the entrant credibility and respect when joining the family firm. 
Berenbeim (1990) also argues that the heirs should win legitimacy through 
their achievements in other institutions, where they should compete on an equal 
basis with other professionals. By walking this path, the heirs tend to gain greater 
respect from employees and their families and, considered more important by the 
author, develop greater confidence in their own abilities. 
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But in fact, what usually happens is that most successors join the family firm 
upon completing their education. Jonovic (1982, cited in Barach et al. 1988) notes 
that almost 85% of all successors go to work for the family firm immediately after 
graduation. Even those who choose to do an MBA, usually say they don't intend to 
join the family firm when they graduate, but as soon as they get their degrees, the 
majority does precisely that at some point. 
A recommended option is that descendants should be gradually exposed to 
the reality of the company, through summer jobs and lower category jobs (Cabrera-
Suárez et al., 2001). Barach et al. (1988) report that the vast majority of family 
members use these entry models, which are considered effective in achieving 
credibility with important stakeholders. For the authors, this manner of entry can also 
provide the successor with valuable knowledge of the firm's operations which helps 
generate a feeling of confidence and respect. Cabrera-Suárez et al. (2001) also point 
out that the successor will gain benefits from being familiar with the business and 
his/her employees, facilitating future acceptance, gaining credibility and building 
relationships that may be quite important in the future. 
Figure 5.13: Comparison of entry strategies for succession in family business 
 
                                   Source: Barach et al. (1988, p. 53) 
Low-Level Entry Strategy 
Advantages Disadvantages 
1. Intimate familiarity with the 
nature of the business and 
employees is acquired. 
2. Skills specifically required by 
the business are developed. 
3. Exposure to others in the 
business facilitates acceptance 
and the achievement of 
credibility. 
4. Strong relationships with 
constituents are readily 
established. 
1. Conflict results when owner has 
difficulty in teaching or 
relinquishing control to 
successor. 
2. Normal mistakes tend to be 
viewed as incompetence in the 
successor. 
3. Knowledge of the environment 
is limited and risks of inbreeding 
are incurred. 
 
Delayed Entry Strategy 
Advantages Disadvantages 
1. Successor's skills are judged 
with greater objectivity. 
2. Development of self-confidence 
and growth independent of 
familial influence are achieved. 
3. Outside success establishes 
credibility and serves as a basis 
for accepting the successor as 
a competent executive. 
4. Perspective of the business 
environment is broadened. 
1. Specific expertise and 
understanding of organization's 
key success factors and culture 
may be lacking. 
2. Set patterns of outside activity 
may conflict with those 
prevailing in the family firm. 
3. Resentment may result when 
successors are advanced 
ahead of long-term employees. 
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Barach et al. (1988) present the advantages and disadvantages of an heir 
opting for immediate entry into the family business via the lower category jobs or 
delay this entry a little seeking alternative development outside the family business. 
Figure 5.13, above, presented an overview of this. 
Barach et al. (1988) also underscore the value of the interaction between 
predecessor/successor of the same family as a way to bring the successor to 
become aware of the predecessor's mental processes, ideas, experiences, and so on 
(Cabrera-Suárez, 2001). Clearly, therefore, the good relationship between them, 
characterized by respect, understanding, and complementary behaviour is critical to 
the success of the succession process (Handler, 1989b). However, as noted by 
Cabrera-Suárez (2001, p. 43) 
it must be taken into account that father-son relationships are usually 
characterized by a certain degree of ambivalence; on the one hand, a son 
identifies himself with his father and wants to be like him and, on the other 
hand, there are feelings of envy and rivalry that originate in the son’s 
childhood when they competed for the mother’s attention. 
In the research carried out by Barach et al. (1988), two patterns of time to 
achieve credibility with stakeholders by the heirs of a family business were identified: 
five years for those who followed the non-innovative path and two years for those 
using innovative behaviour. This, regardless of whether or not they had prior outside 
work experience. 
The credibility achieved through innovative behaviour is an excellent 
alternative in times of change. The authors comment that: 
there are pitfalls in attempting to be innovative before credibility is well 
established, but the executives who achieved credibility through initial 
innovative behaviour brought something to the firm which improved current 
operations. It is probably easier to do this during times of high flexibility, 
when the firm can afford to pursue new ideas, or during times of turbulence, 
when change is necessary (Barach et al., 1988, p.55). 
Finally, it is essential that the rules of entry of family members in the company 
are well agreed with all the existing family blocks, with objective and formal criteria, 
widely disseminated within the family. Lambrecht (2005) states that each family 
business is responsible for discussing and developing its own criteria, but in general 
should seek to identify whether the candidate has an entrepreneurial spirit, what is 
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his/her qualification via formal education, external experience acquired in other 
companies, his/her previous experience in their own family business (i.e. summer 
jobs) and qualification to perform planning and formal agreements. 
 
 
 
V.5.8. The Competence Construct 
 
Faced with the inexorable process of economic globalization that can be seen 
at the present time, Gonçalves (2000a) points out that companies, especially family 
ones, have been obliged to make themselves efficient, in their search for ways of 
surviving in a world of fierce competition. Competence has become the watchword, 
representing one of the principal competitive advantages of organizations, and many 
of those family-owned companies where an informal attitude, paternalism and 
nepotism were the norm, have been condemned to extinction (Gonçalves, 2000a). 
Drucker (1977), in relating competent bureaucracy to the modern organization, 
proposes the substitution of the tycoon by technicians and professional 
administrators as directors of the private company. In fact, several authors advocate 
the presence of "outside" directors and managers that can contribute to the company 
with new expertise and capabilities that are not present in the family business 
(Westhead & Howorth, 2006). This line of thought leads to the stigma that the family 
company has been stamped with, for a number of decades: that of a presupposed 
incompetence (Gonçalves, 2000a).  
However, for several authors, professionalization is not necessarily 
synonymous with removing family members from company management. Some 
family businesses, for example, which have carried out successful transitions, had 
invariably well prepared their heirs (Morris et al., 1997; Weinstein, 1999). And this is 
very important, as shown by Ward (1987), for whom successor development is one of 
the most important features in guaranteeing successful generational transition. In 
fact, the research carried out by Venter et al. (2005, p. 289) supports the proposition 
that ‘there is a positive relationship between the preparation level of the successor 
and the perceived success of the succession process’. 
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In this sense, in accordance with the argument of Lodi (1998), 
professionalization is the process by which the managers of the traditional or family 
organization adopt more rational, modern and depersonalized administrative 
practices; they assume a determined code for training or conduct; they start to 
substitute intuitive methods by impersonal and rational ones; and pass beyond the 
archaic or patriarchal forms of contracting work, relying more on salaried personnel. 
This discussion leads to the following formulation: 
 
Hypothesis 9: The lower the level of competence of family managers, the lower is 
the level of trust present in family-owned companies. 
 
This section will adopt two perspectives. Initially, I discuss the aspects related 
to the level of competence of the managers in family organizations. Subsequently, I 
deal with the relationship between the levels of competence present in management 
with the performance of the company, in accordance with that laid out in the following 
figure. 
                          Figure 5.14: Categories of the Competence construct 
 
    Source: Research data 
 
 
Capacity of the Managers 
 
The discussion on the capacity of the leaders in family organizations, usually 
leads to the debate on the distinguishing features existing between family and 
nonfamliy managers. For scholars such as Rosenblatt et al. (1985) and Ward (1988), 
family-owned companies have a unique type of human capital. This can be 
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explained, firstly, by the fact that the name of the family is intimately linked to the 
company, so that the family members feel naturally more motivated and committed to 
the business. This type of connection inspires loyalty with family members disposed 
to dedicate long working hours in very flexible patterns, to achieve the success of the 
business (Rosenblatt et al., 1985). 
Additionally, the family members have been, for the most part, introduced to 
the family company when they were very young, and understand the nature of the 
business, its customers and competitors, and have received training in the daily 
routine from the family leaders, who have the knowledge and the abilities essential 
for running the business (Dyer, 1986, 1992). This type of introductory process can 
become a significant source of competitive advantage, creating a body of highly 
motivated family managers that know the business profoundly, and who are also 
disposed to sacrifice themselves to achieve the growth of the company. 
On the other hand, it is necessary to bear in mind that family-owned 
companies possess a limited base for recruiting potential managers. This can result 
in the family not being able to meet the needs of the organization with the necessary 
number of managers with sufficient talent to fill the key positions. Companies that 
need a high level of sophistication or knowledge specialization, such as those with 
activities in technological sectors, for example, know this situation, at first hand. 
Thus, perhaps the family does not possess successors who are sufficiently qualified 
to take over the positions of management, and have to have recourse to nonfamliy 
managers, selected in the market (Dyer, 1989). If nepotistic practices are present in 
the organization, the risk is run of filling management positions with incompetent 
individuals, affecting company performance negatively, inhibiting company growth 
and generating true disadvantage in terms of human capital. 
Chittoor and Das (2007) defend the notion that the option for nonfamliy 
professionals to fill positions of management is justifiable when one considers the 
number of executives that exist on the market, with similar or, frequently, superior 
competence to the family members. The authors argue that the professional 
succession of the management increases the performance and the longevity of the 
organization, as the contracting of a nonfamliy professional can resolve disputed 
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management positions between the family members, in addition to stamping a new 
dynamic on the organization, in separating management and property. 
 
 
Installed competence for the delivery of results 
 
As has already been pointed out, a high organizational performance can be 
reached by both family and nonfamliy managers, and the results attained should 
represent the fundamental criterion for measuring the agents’ level of competence. In 
the view of Filbeck and Lee (2000), successful management requires the 
development of strategic plans and systems for monitoring company performance. 
For Smyrnios and Walker (2003), the contracting of nonfamliy managers that already 
have competences in strategic management, can represent the appropriate way to 
lead the company towards successful management. By contrast, the contracting of 
unprepared family members can generate resentment and act as a discouragement 
to senior nonfamliy managers, who will start to regard their competencies and merits 
as going unrecognized. 
Chittoor and Das (2007) think that the type of manager (family or nonfamily) 
necessary to raise the performance of the company will depend on the moment in the 
life cycle of the business. Thus, for these authors, the first years of a family 
organization represent the phase in which the company would need more of the 
entrepreneurial drive, present in the figure of its founder, than the managerial skills 
that can be found in the market. However, starting with the development and 
expansion of the business, the need for greater managerial capacitation becomes 
ever more critical, and is the appropriate moment to seek out competence among the 
members of the family or market professionals to take over the management of the 
organization. 
In harmony with this perspective, Miller and Rice (1967) point out that the 
strong personal ties existing between the family members can reinforce and provide 
support for the family leader of the company, contributing to better results. On the 
other hand, the authors also say that, in moments of transition or rapid market 
changes, management guided by personal ties can be disastrous for the company 
(Miller & Rice, 1967). Thus, the ties traditionally existing between the family 
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managers and the business can develop into greater resistance when confronted by 
situations that require a break with family traditions, as well as into less disposition to 
run risks than nonfamliy managers who do not share these ties. 
 
 
V.5.9. The Opportunism Construct 
 
This construct is central in Agency Theory, which describes opportunism as a 
direct consequence of the asymmetry of interests between principal and agent. For 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) human beings are rational and utilitarian, very much 
focused on their own interests and goals. According to this view, it is unlikely that the 
objectives of others are able to mobilize any individual to the point where he or she is 
as effective as they would be in the pursuit of their own interests.  
For Williamson (1985, p. 47) opportunism is explained by the tendency that 
mutually reliant parties have to ‘mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise 
confuse’ each other. Williamson (1975, p. 6) himself had already defined 
opportunistic behaviour as ‘self-interest seeking with guile’. Lado et al. (2006) states 
that the presence of opportunism exposes an exchange party to various risks, 
including from shirking to the exploitation of benefits from the exchange relationship.  
Given this reality it is important for both parties to develop safeguard 
mechanisms against such opportunism. Two kinds of actions are considered: ex ante 
and ex post. Ex ante opportunism is associated with higher costs of writing and 
enforcement of contracts intended to restrain deceitful behaviour of each party. Ex 
post opportunism imposes monitoring, the use of incentive systems to promote 
alignment and other forms of achieving reliable commitment (Williamson, 1985). 
Alternatively, some authors argue that improving trust between exchange 
parties is a strategy to be adopted to reduce opportunistic behaviour. Sutton-Brady 
(2000) for instance, equates opportunism as being inversely proportional to trust. 
Lado et al. (2008), in turn, present the conventional view that sees opportunism and 
trust as opposite poles, where the positive effects of trust tend to counteract (or 
reduce) the negative effects of opportunism within principal-agent relationships. 
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Nooteboom (1996, p. 14) understands that the ‘renunciation of opportunities for 
opportunism will enhance trust’. Morgan and Hunt’s (1994, p. 25) studies, on the 
other hand, support the assumption that ‘when a party believes that a partner 
engages in opportunistic behaviour, such perceptions will lead to decreased trust’. 
Based on these authors, I can postulate the following: 
Hypothesis 10: The higher the risk of opportunistic behaviour of managers, the lower 
the level of trust that prevails in the company. 
Considering the peculiarities existing in family businesses and the diversity of 
possible manifestation of opportunistic behaviour, this construct will be elaborated 
from the following categories: existing attitudes of shirking; white-collar crimes; 
distortions in executive compensation systems; patrimonialism practices 
(confounding business and private matters) and, expropriation of minority interests, 
as shown in Figure 5.15. 
Figure 5.15: Categories of the Opportunism construct 
 
Source: Research data 
 
 
Shirking 
 
Assis and Neto (2011) discuss the presence of shirking from the perspective 
of the concept of gaming, which refers to the situation in which the agents learn the 
‘rules of the game’ and start to ‘play’ in search of their own interest, even if this does 
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not correspond to the objectives of the principal. This is manipulation and bad use of 
the system, especially on the part of the agents. 
According to Hood (2006), specialists have identified at least three types of 
gaming and opportunistic behaviour concerning targets. The best known occurs 
when the agents think that the next targets will be influenced by the better 
performance that occurred in the past (the ratchet or snowball effect). Thus, they start 
to believe that if they work very hard during the year, they will only harm themselves, 
as an even higher target will be set up in the following year. Consequently, the 
agents tend to reduce productivity in the current period to be more comfortable in the 
future. 
A second type of gaming is known as the lower limit effect or threshold effect. 
It occurs when equal targets are set up for all the units of the system, resulting in 
there being no incentives to excellence and, also in those that have a better 
performance being encouraged to reduce the quantity and quality of their services in 
the direction of the minimum level defined by the target. Finally, the third type of 
gaming consists in the distortion of the objectives – ‘hitting the target and missing the 
point’ such as situations where response times are reduced but with a loss of quality 
of the service. In these conditions, the target definition process can resemble a game 
between agent and principal, in which whoever is the smarter wins. And the objective 
of better performance loses in this game. 
Anti-gaming mechanisms can minimize the occurrence of this phenomenon. 
Hood (2006) cites the definition of detailed specifications in relation to the indicators 
and targets, the realization of audits and the exemplary punishment of ill-intentioned 
agents. However, the implementation of these mechanisms becomes more difficult 
when we come to consider the reality of family-owned companies, where, frequently, 
the managers belong to the owning family. Thus, objective evaluation criteria and 
severe policies of punishment can be left aside, with the intention of maintaining 
family harmony, even to the detriment of the performance of the organization. 
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White-collar crimes 
 
As pointed out by Shapiro (1990), one thing is certain about the agency 
theory: there will always be agency conflict. The central question is to identify what 
are the major potential risks. The author tries to distinguish the main forms of 
manifestation of opportunism by agents. For him, besides shirking and exploiting 
perquisites, the term guile does not seem to be clear enough to express what agents 
are up to when they act opportunistically. The extreme boundaries of opportunistic 
behaviour could be made explicit by the expression white-collar crime. This term was 
coined by the criminologist and sociologist Edwin Sutherland in 1939, defining such a 
crime as one committed both by high-status individuals and also by corporations and 
other legal entities (Strader, 2002). Shapiro (1990, p.250), in turn, defines white-collar 
crime as ‘the violation and manipulation of the norms of trust — of disclosure, 
disinterestedness, and role competence’. 
Thus the white collar crimes in this study are understood as practices of 
misuse of foreign currency, fraud, misrepresentation and any other illegal means that 
agents can rely on in order to retain their executive positions, or embezzlement. That 
is, in this case it is not competence or lack of competence of the agents that has to 
be kept in check, but moral and ethical conduct. Coleman (1987), based on the 
interactionist theory of motivation argues that the criminal behaviour subsumed as 
white collar crime, would be a consequence of the confluence of opportunities of 
action by the agents coupled with the proper motivation. For the author, the 
motivation could be explained by the dissemination of a culture of aggressive 
competition in corporate contexts. The opportunity in turn, would be inversely 
proportional to the existence of effective control mechanisms (Coleman, 1987). 
 
 
Executive compensation 
 
Opportunistic practices related to compensation are found mainly in public 
companies where, normally, the definition of who is the controlling shareholder is not 
clear. In many of these organizations, the pay policy is defined by the agents 
themselves, leading to self-granting of benefits and the provision of exorbitant 
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salaries, by the executives. Moreover, such gains can still be derived from earnings 
manipulation or artificial valuation of the stock price. 
According to Oliva and Albuquerque (2007), directors' remuneration should be 
structured to be bound by the results through smart incentives that contribute to the 
generation of long-term value. Besides these conditions, it is expected that the 
person concerned has no power to decide on his/her own remuneration, leaving it to 
the effective surveillance of other parties. 
Daily and Dollinger (1992) think that managers are likely to use the firms’ 
profits to increase their own salaries, hire more staff to make their jobs easier, assign 
themselves extra benefits and perquisites to increase their own wealth and 
satisfaction. Owners will seek to maximize firm value and realize gains directly 
(Demsetz 1983). 
Wood Jr. and Picarelli Filho (2004) list the core elements of the compensation 
system as being: (1) fixed remuneration (functional, by skills, competencies and 
benefits including pension), (2) performance pay (variable, including payment in 
equities) and (3) the special form (created by the scope of the exceptional results). 
The conclusion is that the definition of remuneration of the executive is a 
strategic issue for the company. Thus, the recommended practice by IBGC is the 
establishment of a compensation committee linked to the board to take responsibility 
for the subject. 
 
 
Patrimonialism 
 
Following the Weberian sense, patrimonialism can be defined as a form of 
exercise of domination by an authority whose legitimacy is based on traditionalism – 
‘this is like this, because it always was” - and whose main characteristics lie in the 
individual power of the ruler, who, supported by his/her administrative apparatus and 
recruited solely on the basis of personal criteria, exercises political power in a given 
territory (Weber, 1999).  
The remarkable feature of this doctrine would be the absence or weakness in 
the distinction between the boundaries of public and private goods. In the family 
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business, the meeting between these two spheres, the private (family) and public (the 
company), may lead to the practice of patrionalism, which is named as a 
characteristic feature in many Brazilian family-owned firms. In this sense, the 
patrimonialist vision would allow the family to manage the personnel and company 
assets as if they were the same. Thus, the lack of boundaries between family assets 
and the company makes many family leaders consider the organization's assets, 
including those included in fixed assets, as personal property, while the liabilities are 
defined as obligations of the company (Gonçalves, 2000a). 
In an extreme degree, a patrimonialist attitude of managers may even lead to 
failure of the family business, or even can lead to major distortions commonly 
associated with family businesses, such as authoritarianism nepotism, use of 
personal confidence, and not of competence, for the choice of collaborators, and also 
as a form of paternalistic relationship with employees (Gonçalves, 2000b). 
 
 
Interests of the minority shareholders 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) argue that the main form of ownership structure found in 
the world is the one concentrated in a few majority shareholders, rather than 
pulverized among various owners. From this perspective, the agency problem ceases 
to be the conflict between managers and owners, and comes to be between minority 
and majority shareholders. If in a pulverized structure managers have incentives to 
act opportunistically, in concentrated structures the controlling shareholders are 
those who have a tendency in this direction, influencing the control of the company to 
their advantage. 
According to Srour (2005), the conflict of interest between the controlling 
shareholders of the firm and the other minority shareholders is based on the various 
ways in which the former can divert corporate resources, i.e., capturing the benefits 
of the firm to their sole benefit. The most common opportunism in this case are: 
transfer of resources from the firm in transactions with other companies, in the 
interest of the controller; preparation of fraudulent contracts; exclusive access to 
insider information; granting of loan guarantees for personal business dealings; 
expropriation of business opportunities; and others. Johnson et al. (2000) show, from 
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famous examples of firms from Italy, France and Belgium, how it is possible for the 
expropriation of private benefits by the controller can be done within the limits of the 
local law. 
Given the practices of expropriation sometimes used by majority shareholders, 
corporate governance rules are establishing themselves as key mechanisms for the 
protection of minority shareholders. As the expropriation of minority rights can occur 
in many ways, the legal framework assumes a key role in curbing these distortions 
(Srour, 2005). The main rights covered by a genuine policy of protection of minority 
shareholders are: the receipt of dividends on predetermined dates; participation in 
meetings and new subscriptions; the right to elect representatives to the Board of 
Directors; obtaining the same rights on the sale of the company as its controllers 
(tag-along) and others. 
According to Coffee (1999), the perception that stronger legislation would 
promote clear benefits for market efficiency has led to a convergence of the right of 
minority shareholders worldwide. Countries with little tradition in the protection of 
minority shareholders are beginning to make adjustments in the laws that would 
promote their participation in the affairs of the firm and impose, normatively, more 
rigid practices of corporate governance. 
 
 
 
V.5.10. The Impartiality Construct 
 
Despite the fact that the key executive positions are usually held by family 
members, most family-owned firms also hire nonfamliy managers. Therefore, 
choosing qualified nonfamliy employees and nurturing a shared vision and 
commitment are important factors for a firm to accomplish its goals. According to 
Barnett and Kellermanns (2006, p. 838) this becomes ‘more difficult if they do not 
perceive that decision outcomes, decision processes, and decision makers are fair or 
just.’ Lind (2001, cited in Barnett and Kellermanns, 2006) presents his fairness 
heuristic theory suggesting that whenever hierarchical relationships prevail, 
employees experience lack of self-confidence about their value and job status. This is 
quite understandable as nonfamliy employees are part of the business but not of the 
208 
   
family system (Mitchell et al., 2003). Therefore, they tend to compare the treatment 
they receive in situations such as performance appraisal, error handling, promotion 
and compensation with that dispensed to family members. Sir Adrian Cadbury 
stresses that ‘for both family and nonfamliy members, it is essential that rewards, 
whether financial or non-financial, are distributed fairly and transparently and 
accounted for in a clear and precise way’ (Cadbury, 2000, p.18) 
What is known is that family-business interactions may produce an 
environment that encourages favouritism which may lead to perceptions of unfair 
treatment among nonfamliy employees (Lubatkin et al., 2005; Schulze et al. 2003b). 
Baldridge and Schulze (1999) also see the risk of appearance of unfairness when the 
limits between family and business units overlap, resulting in agency conflicts. This is 
proved through Cropanzano and Greenberg’s (1997 cited in Barnett and 
Kellermanns, 2006) research which reveals that the inadequate use of authority by 
family members may cause agency conflicts as a result of nepotism, moral hazard, 
free-riding and adverse selection. 
This allows the proposal of the following assumption: 
 
Hypothesis 11: The more impartiality in the treatment of family and nonfamliy 
managers, the lower the agency conflict prevailing. 
 
The Impartiality construct comprises the subsequent categories showed in 
Figure 5.16. 
Figure 5.16: Categories of the Impartiality construct 
 
       Source: Research data 
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Error handling 
 
According to Greenberg (1990) the perceptions of fairness always involve a 
comparison of any input or output with a reference. Thus, within the company, an 
employee tends always to compare the treatment he/she receives with that 
dispensed to another colleague (Cropanzano, 1993). 
The reality found, in most family businesses, is that preference is given to 
family members in decision-making processes (Dyer, 1986). The studies of Shaw et 
al. (2003) show that whenever consistent and unbiased practices are used in family-
owned firms, nonfamliy employees’ perceptions of fairness are likely to be 
beneficially affected. Thus, the reverse is also true, leading to the emergence of 
inherent agency conflicts. 
Among the practices that lead to a greater difference in treatment between 
family and nonfamliy employees, there is the handling of errors. The most plausible 
explanation for this finding is the presence of altruism in the existing family 
relationships that strongly impacts the family’s ability to judge another family member, 
especially between parents and their children. This reality will be discussed in the 
analysis of the specific construct. 
Another factor that may explain differential treatment in the existence of an 
error is the phenomenon of social psychology called the actor-observer bias. He 
refers to the tendency that people have, in the same situation, to assign his own 
reaction to external causes, while attributing other persons' behaviour to internal 
causes. Basically, people tend to make different attributions depending upon whether 
they are the actor or the observer in a situation. The actor-observer bias tends to be 
more evident in situations whose outcomes are negative. This means, in a situation 
where a person experiences something negative, as an actor, he/she blames the 
situation or circumstances. When the same negative thing happens to another 
person, he/she, as an observer, often blames the individual for his/her personal 
choices, behaviour and actions. 
Taylor and Koivumaki (1976) have found that this kind of bias is usually 
caused by a lack of information about the needs, motivations and thoughts of these 
individuals. This makes it understandable that actor-observer bias is less observed in 
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close relationships, such as with family members, where people tend to use the same 
excuses that they would for themselves (Fiedler et al., 1995). 
 
 
Performance appraisal 
 
It will be discussed later how altruism affects the capacity of owning families to 
effectively evaluate family members (Dyer, 2006) and dismiss them (Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2001). This is dealt with by Lansberg (1983) who points out how difficult it is for 
founders to evaluate the performance of a close relative who works in the firm, 
particularly their own offspring. For this author  
the very concept of appraisal (that is, objective assessment of an individual's 
contribution and worth) in the context of a family system seems a 
preposterous idea. In a family system individuals are, by definition, seen as 
ends in themselves. The standing of an individual in a family is determined 
more by who the individual ‘is’ than by what the individual ‘does’. Applying a 
set of objectively derived criteria to evaluate a family member's performance 
goes against the very principles that regulate and define social behaviour in 
the family (Lansberg, 1983, p. 43). 
This phenomenon can be found even in a family company which decides to 
adopt governance mechanisms, such as a Board of Directors. In family-owned firms, 
board members show less disposition in monitoring a family CEO, on a more rigorous 
basis, assuming that a non-conducive environment is the real cause for any failure, 
instead of presuming possible incompetence of the CEO (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). 
On the other hand, several authors highlight how congruent a performance 
appraisal process is with the objects of economic productivity of companies (Amba-
Rao et. al, 2000; Barrett & Kernan, 1987; Eberlin & Tatum, 2005). Lansberg (1983) 
proposes that seeing individuals more as ‘means’ than as ‘ends’, allows firms to 
recognise those who contribute most to the attainment of organizational objectives. 
According to him, in the family system this perspective is completely different, 
causing a stressful situation for a founder if he has to conduct an appraisal of 
managerial competence of his/her own sons/daughters. 
As a consequence, founder-managed firms adopting formal performance 
appraisal processes is rarely found (Astrachan & Kolenko, 1994). They usually prefer 
a centralized assessment system which identifies individuals for membership of the 
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family rather than for their contribution to the achievement of results (Dyer & Handler, 
1994). The problem, however, is that such procedures lead to the perception of 
unfairness on the part of those who really make a difference. Barnett and 
Kellermanns (2006) confirm the idea that fair processes of performance appraisal, 
promotion and compensation can be important influences on the employees’ 
perceptions of justice. 
 
 
Absence of nepotism 
 
Nepotism is a result of altruism, common behaviour in family-owned firms, 
referring to the practice of hiring and promoting relatives usually in an illegitimate or 
unfair manner. Kruger (2003) defines it as a ‘kin selection’: the tendency to display 
bias in favour of family over nonfamliy members. 
For Kets de Vries (1993) nepotism contributes to the selection of family 
members to key positions, who are not necessarily competent, encouraging the 
adoption of unfair reward systems and making it difficult to attract professional 
managers. Gersick et al. (1997) comment on the existence of studies which show 
that in the presence of nepotism, firms have difficulty attracting and retaining qualified 
employees. Ward (1987) explains that since key positions are often reserved for 
family members, nonfamliy members may feel that their promotional opportunities are 
limited and prefer to quit the company as soon as this become possible. 
Lansberg (1983) in his studies points out the negative impacts of nepotism on 
companies’ management and results. On the other hand, some authors see benefits 
in the presence of nepotism. Nelton (1998), for example, agrees that nepotism can 
harm a company, but thinks that it can also help a firm´s development: all depends 
on how one manages it. He quotes Leon A. Danco, who in his book Beyond Survival 
wrote: 
Continuity of the family company is the justification for nepotism. I do not 
mean blind, untrained, irresponsible, immature nepotism. I mean planned, 
trained, and responsible nepotism. Whoever the nepot is - family or 
nonfamliy - this takes planning, and faith, and guts (Nelton, 1998, p.72). 
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V.2.11. The Altruism Construct 
 
The term altruism was coined by Auguste Comte in the nineteenth century, 
and its maximum - to live for others - become the basis of the moral doctrine of 
positivism8 (Alves et al., 2004). 
There are different definitions of altruism, as the science used as a basis for 
analysis. For theology, for example, it is a moral value that motivates individuals to 
act on behalf of others without any expectation of reward (Batson, 1990). According 
to this current, altruism is a gift from God and therefore an exogenous expression to 
individuals who may be acquired by means of moral education. 
From the standpoint of sociology, altruism presents itself as characteristic 
endogenous to an individual, based on feelings, instincts and emotions (Piliavin & 
Charng, 1990). Within the economic concept, altruism is the utility function that 
positively links the welfare of a person with the other (Schulze et al., 2003a; 
Bergstrom, 1989). 
In the family environment, altruism leads parents to transfer resources, 
tangible or intangible (e.g. love and security), to their children, acting with generosity 
to them. This feeling helps promote and maintain family links, creating incentives for 
the offspring to develop reciprocity, love, respect and trust, and encourages family 
members to show consideration for each other (Ling et al., 2001). Eshel et al. (1998) 
confirm that altruism encourages parents to care for their children, giving a sense of 
value to being a member of a family. 
Hunter (2007) indicates the presence of altruism when parents transfer family 
wealth to their children, hoping that the dynasty is benefited. Becker (1981), in turn, 
argues that it is common for an older generation to sacrifice itself spending less to 
invest in the education of its children, hoping that the family will benefit long-term. 
Carney (2005) transposes the idea of transfer of benefits between generations, 
                                                 
8
 Positivism is a philosophical movement founded by Auguste Comte, characterized by an unshakable 
confidence in the sciences. For all the positivists regard to human knowledge can be systematized 
according to the principles adopted as a criterion of truth in the sciences and biology. Positivism 
compares society to a biological organism, in which no party has an independent existence. In a 
positive stage, close to perfection, there would be no place for individualism, only for the development 
of solidarity and altruism of each one, in favor of the community. 
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promoted by altruism, to demonstrate the willingness of family members suffering 
hardship in the short term, to benefit the company's survival in the long run. 
For Ling et al. (2001) and Van den Berghe and Carchon (2003) altruism 
produces this level of solidarity in family groups, which leads their members to accept 
the goals of the family unit as their own, without having to take the agency costs. The 
authors point out that altruistic behaviour increases a sense of community among 
family members, reducing asymmetric information between family members, which in 
itself already reduces agency costs. Therefore, altruism appears to encourage the 
family bond, raising loyalty, interdependence and commitment to the family's long 
term objectives (Ward, 1987). Thus, altruism is an element of reducing conflict in 
family businesses (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004). 
For another school of thought, however, altruism is a cause for agency costs. 
Schulze et al. (2003a) are examples, pointing as evidence, the biased perception of 
parents about their child-managers, even when they show a lack of competence or 
commitment to the company's future. To Lubatkin et al. (2005) this approach inhibits 
the ability to monitor them, creating a distinction as to the other employees, and how 
they have their performance evaluated, how disciplined they are and what criteria are 
used for their promotion. In the same direction, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) show that 
altruism leads to a preferential treatment of family members which, in its turn, leads 
to increased agency conflicts. 
This leads to propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 12: The higher the altruism existing in a family business, the lower the 
presence of impartiality in the treatment of family and nonfamliy 
managers. 
 
Buchanan (1975) also reinforces the negative side of family altruism showing 
how this can lead children to be selfish individuals, a phenomenon that he identifies 
as the 'Samaritan's dilemma' - the parents continue to be generous with their 
children, even if they do not show gratitude or see what they get only as something 
they are entitled. For the author, the Samaritans live this dilemma because they seek 
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the instant gratification that comes from the act of sharing with their children. In this 
case, the immediate need for love makes parents tend to spoil them, feeling that it's 
too painful to deny forgiveness to children misbehaving (Ling et al., 2001). Buchanan 
(1975) calls these kids 'spoiled', Becker (1981) of 'rotten' and Bergstrom (1989) of 
'prodigal sons'. Thus, altruistic behaviour can lead to total dependence on the 
generosity of the children from their parents, causing them to squander the wealth in 
the hope that they will be redeemed when needed (Bergstrom, 1989). You can also 
triggering new conflicts in the business environment from the moment that the 
'prodigal son' commits future assets of other family members who do not have the 
same opportunistic behaviour (Lubatkin et al, 2005). It can be concluded, therefore, 
that altruism may induce family opportunism, leading to the postulation of a new 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 13: The higher the altruism existing in a family business, the greater the 
opportunism identified in the behaviour of the family and/or the 
nonfamliy managers. 
 
Thus, altruism here is assessed from three different categories, as shown in 
the figure below: 
 
Figure 5.17: Categories of the Altruism construct 
 
           Source: Research data 
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Firm main purpose 
 
The structure of incentives in family businesses is more complex than it needs 
to be in public companies since it has to look beyond the objective of generating 
wealth for the owner's family, considering also their intangible goals. In his 
dissertation, Zellweger (2006) points out that in addition to economic aspects, other 
goals may be present that are not easily perceived by nonfamliy managers. The 
author cites the example of hiring an outsourcing service from an external supplier 
which can bring positive financial results, but on the other hand, can compromise the 
family's social status within the local community. The family business literature 
discusses the need to broaden the understanding of the objectives of the owner 
families that usually transcend purely economic ones. 
Chrisman et al. (2004), for example, call attention to actions that are deemed 
responsible for the generation of agency costs in nonfamliy businesses, but do not 
correspond exactly to the family business reality that does not have financial goals as 
the main target. The controllers can see the family business as place to house the 
family members, generate some kind of family cohesion, or even act guided by 
philanthropy or environmental preservation (Chrisman et al., 2005), even if it means 
taking financial performance to a level not maximized (Chrisman et al., 2004). So if a 
family decides to hire its less capable members, even with future consequences in 
the loss of value of the company, this would be considered agency conflict in 
nonfamliy businesses, but not in a family business. Thus, for a correct analysis of 
agency conflicts in family businesses, it is necessary to understand the interests of its 
owners, seeking to understand their decisions and actions taken and identify the 
activities, incentives, policies and structures that they develop to prevent their 
interests are challenged (Chrisman et al., 2005). 
 
 
Altruistic selection 
 
We identify altruistic selection as an inducer of agency conflict that occurs at 
the time of hiring, where the principal believes that when selecting a family member 
as an agent, he/she will undertake all necessary actions to produce the desired 
results. But, once chosen, there is no guarantee that the agent will have the ability, 
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the commitment or the ethics expected to perform the job for which he is being hired 
(Moe, 1984; Chrisman et al., 2004). 
In fact, family-owned firms present agency conflicts related to altruistic 
selection, both induced by the appointment of relatives to key positions, which end up 
seeing the company a natural choice for the development of their careers, and by 
their lower ability to attract outside talent when compared to nonfamliy businesses. 
As for the difficulty of attracting outside professionals, Lubatkin et al. (2005) identified 
two basic reasons: first, the family-controlled companies are not willing to dilute the 
control actions such as offering bonuses to its executives, which makes them less 
attractive, and secondly, the lack of impartiality, with opportunities of promotions 
being offered to family members, to the detriment of those who have a better profile 
and skills for the job. 
 
 
Moral hazard 
 
Moral hazard arises when individuals or institutions do not assume fully the 
consequences of their actions and therefore has a tendency to act less carefully than 
they should, leaving the other party to assume the responsibility of the effect of its 
actions. 
According to Kiser (1999) in the principal-agent relationship, the agents always 
have better information about their actions and intentions than the principal, a view 
ratified by Lubatkin et al (2005) who adds that this fact may lead to an opportunistic 
attitude. For Bergstrom (1989), when sons and daughters belonging to the owning 
family are working in the family company, agency problems may arise because 
children can manipulate parents by working too little or spending too much. This 
author poses that this manipulation creates information asymmetries that hinder the 
action of parents to positively influence the conduct of their children. In fact, such 
behaviour may be the result of a permissive education, where even if the intentions 
were the best possible, parents may have encouraged their children to free-rider 
(e.g., leave an assigned household chore for a parent to complete or be a spendthrift 
with their parent’s money), shirk (e.g. misrepresent their actions), and demonstrate 
other forms of self-centred behaviours (Lubatkin et al., 2006). All of this misbehaviour 
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is expressions of moral hazard, leading to doubt how trustworthy are the family 
managers in ‘doing what they say they are going to do’. (Alchian & Woodward, 1988, 
p. 68). 
 
 
 
V.2.12. The Comprehension of Social Roles Construct 
 
A family company can be seen as a unique combination of rules and 
expectations characterized by a hybrid context, which gathers together at the same 
time market issues and family demands (Flemons & Cole, 1992). Leone (2008) 
points out that the family and the company have different purposes. According to her, 
while the family is a community of life based on bonds of affection and strongly 
rooted values, the company has a pecuniary objective, and submits to economic and 
rational principles. Because of this, the delicate challenge of distinguishing family 
roles from the professional responsibilities in the daily routine of these organizations 
arises. However, in accordance with Flemons and Cole (1992), there is no clear 
frontier objectively separating family from business. 
This intimate relationship between the two spheres can, without doubt, 
produce benefits, increasing trust and the level of commitment of the family 
managers to the company. However, this overlap can also feed problems and 
distortions, bringing with it disputes caused by conflicting interests which tend to 
overflow from the family into the business, in this manner worsening agency conflict 
(Miller & Rice, 1988; Kets de Vries, 1993). 
Examples of these tensions occur when parents are unable to distinguish 
between their roles as family members and as employees of the family business, 
adopting opportunistic behaviour by working less than expected, attitudes of shirking, 
and thinking that nothing can happen to them because of the protection afforded by 
kinship ties. They may also seek privileges, requiring compensation inconsistent with 
their skills and which they would never receive elsewhere in the market, or they may 
misappropriate the company's resources for use in situations of a private character. 
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Parents who act guided by altruism and, because of this, fail to realize the 
limitations of their children relative to the functions assigned to them, or who tend to 
justify their opportunistic behaviour, being totally partial in the treatment of error, 
performance appraisal and promotion to key positions, actually cannot separate out 
the feelings imposed by family relationships from the impartiality required of a 
manager. 
 
This discussion leads to the following formulations: 
 
Hypothesis 14: The lesser the degree of comprehension of their social role, by 
owners, the greater the risk of opportunistic behaviour. 
 
Hypothesis 15: The lesser the degree of comprehension of their social role, by 
owners, the greater the presence of altruism within the company. 
 
Hypothesis 16: The lesser the degree of comprehension of their social role, by 
owners, the lesser the impartial treatment afforded to family and 
nonfamliy managers. 
 
The understanding of the social roles will be approached from four directions. 
The first discusses the level of separation between the demands of the controlling 
family and business matters. Then the role fulfilled by the person succeeded faced 
with the succession process is dealt with. Next, the importance of evaluating the 
performance of top management is discussed and the level of agreement existing on 
the topic among the family managers. Finally, the new responsibilities of the 
shareholders who have withdrawn from management is analysed, discussing the 
functions and limits of their roles. Figure 5.18, below, presents the four perspectives 
cited. 
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Figure 5.18: Categories of Comprehension of Social Roles construct 
 
Source: Research data 
 
 
The distinction between family and company 
 
The perception of the family company as an overlapping system of different 
spheres is portrayed through the traditional model proposed by Tagiuri and Davis 
(1996), which has been already mentioned. This model has the merit of 
demonstrating the complicated overlapping of roles of individuals that are frequently 
linked to more than one sphere simultaneously. This complex web of relations, 
translated by the interaction of the different roles, interests and expectations, can 
lead to several conflicts, either between the different generations of the family, 
between separate groups of shareholders, or also between family and nonfamliy 
managers. It is, however, important to reflect on the usefulness and the limits of the 
model described. If, on the one hand, the three circles model makes possible a clear 
visualization of the insertion of the various subjects in the principal subsystems of the 
organization, on the other it runs the risk of interpreting the reality of family 
organizations in a static and overly simplified manner (Pereira, 2010).  
In relation to the distortions that can arise from this conjunction of roles, 
authors such as Gonçalves (2000a) point out the question of confusing company with 
family matters. Thus, such practices, given as a characteristic feature in numerous 
family organizations, would be triggered by the encounter of the private sphere (the 
family) with the public sphere (the company). This attitude allows the family to 
administer personal patrimony and that of the company as if they were one and the 
same private thing. The lack of defined limits between family property and company 
assets results in many family leaders considering the assets of the company, 
220 
   
including the fixed assets, as personal property, while the liabilities are understood as 
company obligations (Gonçalves, 2000a). This attitude can generate enormous 
losses for the organization, and may, in extreme cases, result in extinction. 
Another fundamental point, relates to the interaction between the family 
members of different generations. In this case, the challenge is to succeed in 
separating the family roles from the hierarchical obligations inherent in the roles of 
board member or CEO, who frequently have family members as subordinates. The 
risk is that of straying from professional and formal behaviour, in favour of a 
paternalistic posture in relation to the family members, which can result in either 
protectionist attitudes or criticism and censure. Bernhoeft and Castanheira (1995) 
state that company management is not strengthened by conflicts, but, above all, by 
the ability of the controlling family to administer them properly. On this point, it is 
argued that the development of a governance structure for a family company does 
not seek to eliminate clashes, but rather mediate them, and establish the clear 
delimitation of family roles by means of the creation of mechanisms and instances. 
 
 
Change of role post-succession 
 
For Davis and Harveston (1999) the founders are the essential actors in a 
family business since the technical skills they bring to the development of the 
company are unique attributes that make them distinct in the market (Carroll, 1984). 
Moreover, in constituting a company, they impress on it values that are the 
foundation for defining its corporate identity, guiding the formulation of the mission, 
goals, strategy and structure, and also establishing its operational standards. 
But Fenn (1996) draws attention to the founders' importance that goes beyond 
its managerial effects, to influence also the company's main social aspects. 
Owner-founders are portrayed as having high levels of commitment (Cyert & 
March, 1963), entrepreneurial skills (Davis, 1968), and strong personal ties 
with employees (Schein, 1983) that make them difficult to replace […] For 
these reasons, the transition between the founder and the next generation of 
leadership is often seen as the most critical and tumultuous (Davis & 
Harveston, 1999, p. 313). 
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Kets de Vries (1993) sees the founder-owner playing a special role in 
promoting peace and harmony in the family business by creating a common purpose 
among the family and employees and establishing the prevailing attitudes, norms, 
and values. Obviously, in the absence of the founder, the level of conflict is expected 
to be increased. 
At this time of transition, the founder-owner can help minimize conflicts arising 
from his/her withdrawn, or even expand them. Leone (2008) points his/her resistance 
as one of the situations that may raise insecurity, when he/she does not easily accept 
giving up power and having only a seat on the Board of Directors or leaving the 
company once and for all.  
If the predecessor remains highly engaged in the day-to-day activities of the 
family firm, giving the impression that he/she still maintains a "controlling" interest in 
the family business, ready to exercise the power to veto any decision taken by the 
successor, he/she will weaken the successor's credibility and leadership in relation to 
other employees (Harvey & Evans, 1995). 
Gersick et al. (1997) recommend that the predecessors should develop and 
train their potential successors for management and set up a process for the 
selection of the ablest leaders. They would therefore have to overcome any 
resistance to giving up power and help the new leaders to establish their authority in 
relation to the stakeholders of the company. However, the recommendation of the 
abovementioned authors should be seen as a problem faced with the need to ascribe 
a new significance to the role of the predecessor, which is usually responsible for this 
process being full of difficulties and resistance. 
The difficulty of the predecessor in understanding what his/her new role shall 
be with the family and the business, in accordance with Leone (2008), is overladen 
with strong emotional characteristics. He or she frequently feels that it is still too early 
to touch on the question of his or her removal, putting it off indefinitely, while the 
successors, through filial piety, avoid mentioning it. To this can be added the fear of 
seeing his/her successors destroy a dream constructed with much sweat and toil 
(Leone, 2008). Thus, according to the author, giving up one´s "life´s work" to the 
successors can be interpreted by the person being succeeded as a loss of identity, 
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as a loss of his or her usefulness, of the power of decision and the fear of no longer 
being listened to and respected. 
Oliveira Jr. (2009) points out that there also exists the fear of being pensioned 
off. To understand this fear it is necessary to understand that the person´s role in the 
company has been historically constructed in relation to the business, translating into 
the essence of value in the company. That is, for many founders who have been 
succeeded, work and company represent the meaning of life. For Bowman-Upton 
(1991), the intense involvement of the entrepreneur with the company increases the 
importance of the work in the constitution of social identity. Thus, ceasing work could 
be seen as synonymous with the loss of a part of oneself, having traditionally 
proportioned, status, respect, personal realization and financial return. 
Oliveira Jr. (2009) argues that, during the period of succession, there exists a 
greater propensity for conflicts to occur and different types of resistance to appear, 
involving both family members and nonfamliy managers that work in the company. In 
this context, it is indispensable that the predecessor is personally persuaded of the 
importance of participating directly in the process. Gonçalves (2000a) complements 
this, affirming that the play of the family unconscious tends not to prejudice the 
company while it is under the command of a patriarch, who uses this role to resolve 
conflicts or discipline them. For Bernhoeft (1996) the start of the discussions and 
analyses of the theme should be done by the actual person being succeeded. So that 
if the process is started when this person is still living, there exist good possibilities of 
success, demanding much renunciation and the ability to understand that his/her 
work and ideals should outlive the person concerned. 
In this sense, the awareness of the leader that he/she is not eternal and that 
the succession is part of the company trajectory would be the first step in overcoming 
his/her own resistance. After facing up to these psychological barriers, seeking a 
solution, the predecessor should define the future of the company, through a planned 
and organized succession process (Leone, 2008). For Oliveira Jr. (2009) it is 
fundamental that leaders of family-owned companies are aware that, in planning and 
organizing their succession, at the same time, the risks and the costs of the process 
will be minimized. Thus, a planned succession process, in which the predecessor 
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assumes a central role of one who facilitates and makes the process more dynamic 
raises considerably the chances of a smooth, less costly transition and one that 
guarantees long term efficiency and organizational competitiveness. 
Another important point of discussion is whether the retired CEO should 
assume the role of chairman as part of the succession transition. For Lane et al. 
(2006) the former CEO can stay on as chairman without undermining the authority of 
the new leader, only taking care not to feel compelled to demonstrate the possibility 
of his/her return to "rescue" the organization in case of an emerging crisis. 
 
 
Evaluation of performance of the CEO 
 
One of the managerial challenges for contemporary companies is to create 
systems of evaluation of performance at all hierarchical levels, to be utilized as 
criteria for evaluating remuneration, promotion and profit sharing and also as 
measures of efficiency analysis and operational and administrative effectiveness. In 
accordance with that envisaged in the Brazilian Code of Best Corporate Governance 
Practices, reissued by the IBGC (2004), it is expected that there exists a formal 
evaluation of the CEO, guided essentially by criteria of competence. 
In the United States, in accordance with Epstein and Roy (2005), the SEC - 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the NYSE - New York Stock Exchange 
have specified requirements for the listed companies, in the attempt to define criteria 
to be used in the evaluation of CEO performance. According to Oliva and 
Albuquerque (2007) such indicators should be founded on observable behaviour 
such as results, degree of transparency and level of effectiveness of corporate 
governance practices. As, however, the practice of evaluation can run up against 
cultural questions, there may be the concern that this process could be interpreted as 
a professional or personal offence on the part of the person evaluated. 
Considering more the reality of family-owned companies, it can be seen that 
the question of the evaluation of the performance of top executives becomes even 
more complex if the fact that the CEO frequently belongs to the family is considered. 
In part, this question can be clarified by the patriarchal tradition, outstanding in the 
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culture of various countries such as Brazil, in which the head of the family has 
historically filled the social role of provider and manager of the family space (Freyre, 
2003). In this context, the patriarch occupied a central position and the other 
components of the family possessed very well defined roles. Thus, the patrimony was 
carefully preserved, as the inheritance appeared as a guarantee of the perpetuation 
of the patriarch’s authority and the quality of the family relationships was measured 
by the respect shown to him (Freyre, 2003). 
Considering the strong reflexes of this social standard in family-owned 
companies, it is not surprising that a CEO, member of the controlling family, should 
reject having his/her performance evaluated formally and that, out of respect or fear, 
he is not confronted by the other family members. In accordance with that affirmed by 
Schein (1985) and Leach (1990), the founder usually concentrates the power and 
authority in the organization, in addition to representing the moral reference within 
the ambit of the family. In this sense, for the authors, this agglutinating force of the 
family leader tends to decrease with each generation that assumes the command of 
the company. Thus, companies whose second or third generation is in power would 
have greater probability of successfully structuring performance evaluation systems. 
The best way of evaluating the CEOs and the boards, among other actions, is 
to hear the stakeholders, evaluate the level of fulfilment of strategic directives, check 
voting histories, check the minutes of the meetings, check how the decision-making 
process has been conducted and what actions are foreseen to improve performance 
and increase the transparency of the organization (Oliva & Albuquerque, 2007). 
However, in accordance with Steinberg (2003) and Santos (2000), the evaluation of 
CEOs and of boards in Brazil has not occurred in practice or, when it does, is not 
formalized. 
 
 
Role of the family members outside management 
 
Family members exercise considerable influence on the decision-making 
process in family-owned firms and this interference should be analysed in relation to 
the distance that these members are from the management (Dyer, 1986; Astrachan, 
1988). Those owners outside management should develop trust in the managers, 
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family or otherwise, and delegate to them the accountability for the company 
operations, creating appropriate supervisory channels without interfering with day-to-
day business. (Lane et al., 2006). However, the task of delimiting roles and 
disciplining the family members of the organization is quite challenging. In 
accordance with the warning of Bernhoeft (2004) this difficulty can be aggravated 
when the business represents the only means of sustenance for the family. 
Of course in the start-up stage of the company, the family plays an important 
role in supporting the entrepreneur, that which can remain relevant in subsequent 
years, expanding to a level where it becomes a source of professional advice and 
ideas. Anderson et al. (2005) in their observations, found that family members 
outside the business 
continued to act as key network contacts and provided a range of assistance 
to entrepreneurs […] For example, retired parents continued to provide 
hands-on assistance, helping with day-to-day business tasks in pressing 
times. (Anderson et al., 2005, p. 164). 
 
These authors list the benefits from the support provided by family members 
who are not part of the management of family businesses: the high quality of the help 
provided; the different resources and viewpoints made available; the rapidity of the 
service provided and its low or non-existent cost. 
Despite these advantages, one must observe the risks of the entrepreneur 
being limited to seeking support only in the family, due to the likelihood of 
homogeneity, which in turn dilutes the richness of information and other available 
resources. 
It must also be noted that there are two groups who although not part of the 
business operations, should be considered, as they can exert pressure within the 
family that affects the business. The first consists of retired relatives and siblings, 
whose major concern is usually the income provided by the business: thus, anything 
that threatens their security may cause conflict. The second group consists of 
children and in-laws, which require attention that competes with the one required to 
grow the business profitably and that tend to complain that their own interests and 
desires are not met (Bowman-Upton, 1991). 
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V.6. Development of the Questionnaire 
 
Considering the characteristics of the present study, the survey was the next 
step, one appropriate for the data collection and for testing the proposed hypotheses 
and the theoretical model. And, since it involves the need of a large sample size in a 
large geographical area, such a continental country like Brazil, the questionnaire is 
the natural tool to be chosen. 
The questionnaire design is a very important step since its quality is 
fundamental for the success of a research study. Following Bagozzi’s (1994) 
perspective, five steps are considered necessary for the successful development of 
questionnaires: (1) problem definition; (2) preparation of a questionnaire draft; (3) 
execution of a pre-test and evaluation of the results; (4) final revision; and (5) 
questionnaire’s application. 
 
 
V.6.1. Problem definition 
Bagozzi (1994) states that the first step in research is to define well the 
problem one intends to solve or the theory one wishes to test. Therefore, the first 
step described in this chapter was the conceptualization of the model and the 
development of the research hypotheses, which specify what information was 
needed in order to achieve the objectives of this study. 
 
 
V.6.2. Preparation of a questionnaire draft 
To prepare a draft of a questionnaire it was necessary to define how to 
measure each conceptual construct proposed in the theoretical model. Next, the 
problems relating to the question wording and sequence are discussed. Finally, the 
design of the questionnaire is described. 
 
The constructs’ operationalization 
At this stage, the forms of measurement of the constructs developed in the 
conceptual model were defined. Constructs are operationalized by selecting the 
measuring scales for each item and the scale types (Hair Jr. et al., 2010). 
227 
   
The measuring scale were selected in accordance with the quotations 
extracted from the case studies in a grounded process of theory development and 
were confronted with the theory previously developed by leading scholars of the 
subject. 
Regarding the scale type, the preference has been given to the Likert scale 
with seven points so as to include a neutral midpoint (De Vellis, 2003) and giving 
preference to the use of, whenever possible, the same pair of polarities that would 
facilitate completion of the questionnaire: Totally disagree/Totally agree. 
The next step was to determine the format for measurement. The vast majority 
of constructs under investigation were operationalized as multidimensional in nature, 
and therefore multiple indicators were used for their measurement. 
 
Question wording 
The next step in the preparation of the questionnaire is the question wording. 
The writing of each question is a critical task, because inadequate phrasing of a 
question can cause respondents to refuse to answer it or to answer incorrectly, either 
on purpose or because of misunderstanding. This becomes even more important with 
e-mail questionnaires, where the researcher is not present to clarify doubts. 
Thus, great care was taken in writing the questions as simply and directly as 
possible, trying to use only words and expressions that respondents were familiar 
with. Care was also taken to avoid questions that suggested the “correct” answer, 
and polarities were sometimes inverted, to avoid bias at the time of completion. 
 
Question sequence 
Having defined the types of measuring scale and the form of wording of each 
question, the preparation of the questionnaire was initiated. Kinnear and Taylor 
(1991) call attention that the sequence in which the questions are arranged is 
essential to the success of the research, as it may influence the nature of the 
respondent's answers and cause error in the survey findings. 
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As a general guideline, I decided to leave the construct agency conflict to be 
measured in the final part of the questionnaire. As its questions could be perceived 
as sensitive, they should be placed late in the sequence and after a relationship has 
been established and the respondent involved in the answering process. Also, those 
questions with similar content were grouped together to facilitate to use of memory in 
answering the questions, and to maintain the focus of the respondent (Bagozzi 1994; 
Hair Jr. et al. 2010). 
 
Questionnaire design 
The aesthetics of the questionnaire should also be the object of attention: an 
attractive questionnaire can increase the chances of respondent cooperation 
(Bagozzi, 1994; Hair Jr. et al. 2010). 
I decided to use a combination of printed questionnaires with an electronic 
version sent by email. To ensure the good quality of the questionnaire in both 
versions, the services of a professional graphic designer were used (not included in 
this material, as it was prepared in Portuguese). 
To increase credibility with the respondents, the front page included the logo 
of the University of Birmingham, as well as that of the Fundação Dom Cabral, as a 
sponsor of the research, as this institution is of high repute in the Brazilian business 
market. 
Finally, an expression of thanks and appreciation to respondents for 
participating in the study was also included at the end of the questionnaire. 
 
 
V.6.3. Pilot test 
According to Oppenheim (1972, p. 47) ‘questionnaires do not emerge fully 
fledged; they have to be created or adapted, fashioned and developed to maturity’. 
Thus, a pre-test of the survey instrument has to be made, as recommended by 
Cooper and Schindler (2011) and Hair Jr. et al. (2010). As these authors suggest, the 
understanding of all questions, instructions and scales were verified, as well as 
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whether the instrument as a whole was able to capture the information of the 
respondents effectively. 
Questionnaires were applied to 50 respondents, and among these, 49 were 
considered valid. From the questionnaires analysed, a large body of missing data 
was found (20.27% of the base) which prompted concern because these levels 
indicate great difficulty in treating subsequent multivariate data (Hair Jr. et al., 2010). 
I observed that some variables that refer to technical terms and other highly 
restrictive names caused major loss of data. To get around this, I sought to adapt 
questions so that the technical terms were replaced by statements that express 
situations / contexts / objectives that match the organizational reality. The 
concentration responses were evaluated by standard deviation and those with 
variability above the 95% percentile (2.21) or less than the 5% percentile (1.40) were 
analysed for possible ambiguities or difficulties in understanding. Similar analyses 
were carried out on the averages of the variables, and based on these considerations 
an attempt was made to reduce the size of the questions to make them less technical 
and more easily understandable, as suggested by Cooper and Schindler (2011) and 
Hair Jr. et al. (2005).  
Finally, the degree of consistency and redundancy of the responses were 
evaluated by calculating both the Cronbach's α coefficient and the correlation 
coefficient. Those items with correlation greater than 0.900 in absolute terms (Kline, 
1998) were modified to reduce their similarity, and regarding the consistency, 
indicators with item-total correlation less than 0.400 were evaluated, seeking greater 
communality and convergence to the central concept of the constructs. Generally, no 
measure showed Coefficient α much lower than minimum threshold, i.e., 0.600 (note 
that this did not occur strictly in the final application of research). 
After these analyses, the necessary conditions to continue with the study were 
considered present. 
 
 
V.6.4. Final revision 
Based on the pilot test necessary adjustments were made to the questionnaire 
without however, changing its structure fundamentally. 
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The final sources of measurement of the constructs are illustrated in Table 5.2: 
Table 5.2: Source of Measurement of Constructs 
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The Appendix A presents the final model of the questionnaire that was applied. 
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V.6.5. Questionnaire application 
Once the questionnaire had been revised, the next step in the research 
process was to clearly define the population from which the information will be 
collected. Initially an FDC database of around 1,000 family-owned companies 
(usually founders, Chairmen or CEOs) was used. The questionnaires returned were 
around 6% of those sent out. The printed questionnaires were distributed during 
events at FDC involving family-owned firms, as well as events promoted by the FBN 
– Family Business Network Brazil. In these cases, participants were requested to fill 
them in at an appropriate time during the event itself, avoiding the possibility of not 
sending them later. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
VI.1. Data analysis 
 
This section deals with the analysis of data and concepts required to cleanse 
the data, evaluate the quality of measurements and test the effect of the hypothetical 
model of research. The descriptive analysis of the sample and of the scales of the 
study was the starting point and, subsequently, the evaluation of statistical 
assumptions and requirements for quality of the measurement was made. Finally, the 
test of the proposed theoretical model was conducted. Throughout the development 
of this chapter, the limitations of, and the care to be taken in the interpretation of the 
results, and their implications for the research model will be dealt with. 
The software packages used were SPSS 13, SmartPLS 2.0 and Microsoft 
Excel. SPSS is a tool that provides a wide variety of statistical methods for analysing 
data, while SmartPLS is a software application for graphical path modelling with 
latent variables, using the partial least squares (PLS) method. SPSS was used for 
the initial analysis and SmartPLS, when building, running, and validating the 
theoretical model. 
 
 
VI.1.1. Exploratory Analysis 
 
Prior to data analysis, the characteristics of the respondents and variables 
were examined, with emphasis on verification of assumption violations of the 
techniques used in the study (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Therefore, the purpose of 
this subsection is to present information about the variables and respondents. 
 
Description of the sample 
 
In order to describe the profile of research participants and their respective 
companies, a descriptive analysis of them was carried out. The following charts 
characterize the 152 respondents who form the basis of the valid questionnaires 
used: 
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o Profile of the respondent’s companies 
 
 
 
1% 2% 
34% 
26% 
24% 
13% 
Figure 6.1: Range of annual revenues of the company 
less than R$250 thousand
between R$250 thousand and R$2.5 million
between R$2.5 million and R$60 million
between R$60 million and R$170 million
between R$170 million and R$500 million
above R$500 million
16% 
55% 
29% 
Figure 6.2: Level of economic and financial performance of the 
respondent company 
below average for the segment
to which it belongs
in the midrange of the segment
to which it belongs
above average for the segment
to which it belongs
11% 
42% 
47% 
Figure 6.3: Number of permanent employees 
maintained by the company 
Less than 100 employees
Between 100 and 500
employees
Above 500 employees
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5% 
34% 
61% 
Figure 6.4: Regarding the constitution of the capital, the 
company is: 
Publicly traded
corporation
Privately held
corporation
Limited
4% 
21% 
41% 
29% 
4% 
1% 
Figure 6.5: Lifetime of the companies surveyed 
Less than 10 years
Between 10 and 25 years
Between 25 and 50 years
Between 50 and 75 years
Between 75 and 100 years
More than 100 years
61% 
39% 
Figure 6.6: % of respondents from companies with formal 
board of directors 
Without Board
With Board
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42% 
58% 
Figure 6.7: % of respondents from companies with 
independent directors of those who adopt a board 
 
With
Without
93% 
7% 
Figure 6.8: % of respondents from companies with 
Chairman from the controllling family 
Family Chairman
Non-family Chairman
91% 
9% 
Figure 6.9: Family, nonfamily CEO? 
Family executive
Non-family executive
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o Profile of the respondents 
 
43% 
42% 
13% 
2% 
Figure 6.10: To which generation does the family CEO belongs 
1st.
2nd.
3rd.
4th.
27% 
73% 
Figure 6.11: % of respondents from companies with Family 
Council 
With
Without
83% 
17% 
Figure 6.12: % of respondents members of the owner family 
Family member
Non-family member
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14% 
39% 
12% 
3% 
32% 
Figure 6.13: % of respondents belonging to each generation 
1 st.
2 nd.
3 rd.
4 th.
Not applicable / not
answered
89% 
11% 
Figure 6.14: % of respondents working in the company 
Employees
Non-employees
70% 
30% 
Figure 6.15: % of respondents who are shareholders of the 
company 
Shareholder
Non-shareholder
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Missing data 
 
A total of 168 questionnaires were received. Eight of them were previously 
discarded as they were not totally completed. Even so, the other 160 had a 
substantial amount of data missing: 1,181 missing data were detected, which 
represents 10.4% of the total data base (1,181/[160*71]=1,181/11,360). This is above 
the acceptable boundary of 5% and moreover, was concentrated only in a few 
variables (Hair Jr. et al., 2010).  
Considering that the presence or absence of the board of directors influenced 
the completion of the questionnaire, each block presenting respectively a larger or 
smaller number of questions answered, due to their nature, an assessment of 
missing data was conducted separately for each situation. This strategy was adopted 
to preserve the specificities of the companies, avoiding the distortion of responses 
from each group (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
However, when doing the Missing Completely At Random test (MCAR; p> 
0.05), I noted that the missing data were not meaningful. Nevertheless, it has been 
decided to exclude eight respondents with more than 17 missing answers (2 standard 
deviations above the average) and expunge those variables with more than 50% of 
missing data: variables XI.4, XI.5, XI.6, XI.7, XI.8, XI.9 (this occurs precisely due to 
the inexistence of several proposed actors in those firms without Board of Directors). 
It is important to note that there was a concentration of missing data in section 
XI of the questionnaire (41 % of instances of missing data). In all the other cases, the 
29% 
71% 
Figure 6.16: % of respondents members of the board 
Board member
Non-board member
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variables presented missing data below 20% which were replaced using a multiple 
regression procedure. This was necessary because of their large dispersion, the 
absence of identifiable patterns and the need to keep a reasonable sample size to 
test the model. 
 
Descriptive analysis 
 
This subsection deals with the preliminary assessment of the variables and, as 
suggested by Malhotra (2001), it is a fundamental step to anticipate problems and 
identify solutions to the model test. Table 6.1 describes the results of basic statistics 
applied in the sample. 
Table 6.1: Data descriptive analysis 
 
Observed variables N MIN MAX MEAN S 
I.1 158 1 7 4.77 1.640 
I.2 157 1 7 3.81 1.942 
I.3 157 1 7 3.86 1.972 
II.1 151 1 7 4.60 1.740 
II.2 151 1 7 3.80 2.157 
III.1 154 1 7 4.08 1.892 
III.2 156 1 7 4.87 1.814 
III.3 153 1 7 5.06 1.752 
III.4 156 1 7 4.71 1.843 
III.5 152 1 7 4.80 1.856 
III.6 149 1 7 4.38 1.915 
III.7 136 1 7 4.82 2.000 
IV.1 131 1 2 1.73 0.448 
IV.2 152 1 7 2.99 2.012 
IV.3 156 1 7 2.85 1.937 
IV.4 154 1 7 5.64 1.507 
IV.5 155 1 7 4.62 1.821 
IV.6 154 1 7 3.32 1.850 
V.1 159 1 7 3.36 2.085 
V.2 157 1 7 2.13 1.814 
V.3 156 1 7 5.69 2.005 
V.4 160 1 7 1.88 1.593 
V.5 140 1 7 5.51 1.962 
V.6 150 1 7 3.43 2.361 
V.7 159 1 7 5.01 1.971 
V.8 152 1 7 4.01 1.915 
V.9 150 1 7 5.08 1.770 
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PS: N is the number of valid answers; MIN is the smallest number found for this variable; MAX is the higher 
number found for this variable; MEAN is the arithmetical mean of the variable; S is the standard deviation of the 
variable. 
V.10 144 1 7 3.37 1.789 
VI.1 156 1 7 4.47 1.889 
VI.2 144 1 7 3.98 1.890 
VI.3 160 1 7 5.30 1.545 
VI.4 155 1 7 5.54 1.921 
VI.5 152 1 7 4.49 1.820 
VI.6 156 1 7 4.87 2.119 
VI.7 153 1 7 5.19 1.772 
VII.1 144 1 7 3.61 2.168 
VII.2 155 1 7 5.18 1.925 
VII.3 158 1 7 4.75 1.875 
VII.4 157 1 7 4.94 1.780 
VII.5 152 1 7 4.13 2.045 
VIII.1 147 1 7 3.85 1.987 
VIII.2 143 1 7 4.11 2.166 
VIII.3 157 1 7 4.93 2.013 
VIII.4 158 1 7 5.08 2.000 
VIII.5 157 1 7 3.52 2.117 
VIII.6 160 1 7 4.27 2.037 
VIII.7 158 1 7 2.80 1.894 
VIII.8 154 1 7 3.90 1.989 
IX.1 159 1 2 1.61 0.489 
IX.1_A 48 2 14 6.00 2.379 
IX.2 63 1 2 1.41 0.496 
IX.2_A 131 1 6 2.72 1.233 
IX.3 158 1 7 3.22 2.046 
IX.4 156 1 7 5.14 2.008 
IX.5 157 1 7 5.30 1.781 
IX.6 156 1 7 4.25 1.943 
IX.7 155 1 7 3.14 1.952 
X.1 157 1 7 4.66 1.960 
X.2 142 1 7 4.81 1.856 
X.3 151 1 7 2.33 1.624 
X.4 133 1 7 5.13 1.852 
XI.1 135 1 7 2.86 1.741 
XI.2 153 1 7 3.51 1.882 
XI.3 139 1 7 3.25 1.938 
XI.4 59 1 7 2.83 1.886 
XI.5 77 1 6 2.66 1.643 
XI.6 115 1 7 2.24 1.537 
XI.7 75 1 7 2.39 1.684 
XI.8 88 1 7 2.94 2.036 
XI.9 55 1 7 2.40 1.717 
XI.10 71 1 7 2.61 1.801 
Valid N (listwise) 7     
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Normality Test 
 
Determining the distribution of a response data set is an important and 
common first step in many statistical analysis undertakings. Distribution analysis is 
performed in order to understand the spread of the population investigated, but is 
also important since several other statistical methods are dependent on the type of 
distribution represented by the data. Normal distribution is the most common and well 
known and several other statistical methods rely on an assumption of normality. 
Therefore, the behaviour of variables is studied in order to verify the 
correspondence with the normal distribution which is the fundamental basis for 
inference in this field. A distribution would be normal if the data concentrate around 
the mean, median and mode, and with just a few data distant from this central 
tendency. Normal is used to describe a symmetrical, bell-shaped curve, which has 
the greatest frequency of scores in the middle, with smaller frequencies towards the 
extremes (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2004). 
It is desirable to achieve the presupposition of normality, because according to 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), it makes it more probable to obtain more reliable 
results, even using non-parametric techniques (those which do not presuppose 
normality). This follows from the fact that asymmetric distributions or excess kurtosis 
tend to underestimate the sample correlations. Such statement shows the importance 
of identifying the degree of compliance of univariate and multivariate normal 
distributions. 
By using graphical methods such as histograms with normal distribution 
curves and normal quantile-quantile plots (Q-Q plot), one can get a good indication if 
the distribution can be assumed to be normal. In the normal Q-Q plot diagram the 
observed values of a single variable are plotted against the values expected if the 
sample were from a normal distribution. Should the points cluster around a 
reasonably straight line, the sample can be assumed to be from a normal distribution. 
But, this is not the case of this sample. Graphical analyses were carried out 
(histograms and Q-Q diagrams) which revealed deviations from normality for all 
variables. Significant deviations from normal patterns by degrees of skewness and 
kurtosis of the data were also revealed, exceeding the suggested limits of ± 1 
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(Muthén & Kaplan, 1985) for several variables. Likewise, the formal tests of normal 
parameters (Z test) and normality (Komogorov Smirnov) revealed significant 
deviations for the two distinct subgroups analysed (with and without the board) and 
for the full sample. These conditions imply deviations from normality that limit the 
application of parametric analysis techniques, especially given the sample size of 
less than 200 cases (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  
 
Linearity Analysis 
 
Linear correlation between variables is a prior condition for the use of factorial 
and regression analyses and it is obtained through the Pearson coefficient test. In 
order to verify the overall quality of the measurement, scatter plots for each variable 
were drawn and searched for possible discrepancies in linearity. An increase of 5% in 
the R2 in the cubic relation compared to the R2 of the linear relation suggests, given 
the size of the sample, a significant deviation from linearity. But no such case was 
found in the 50 dispersion diagrams analysed, revealing linearity between the 
variables tested. 
 
Multicolinearity Analysis 
 
This analysis aims to identify those variables with multicolinearity, which 
means with high redundancy in the proposed model. The redundancy level analysis 
of the variables was carried out by means of the tolerance and variance inflation 
factor (Kline, 1998). 
The resulting correlation matrix demonstrated the existence of nine 
correlations outside the boundaries of ± 0.7. However, this was considered a 
marginal problem located basically on some items of agency conflict. It is concluded 
that this poses no threat to subsequent proceeding analyses, since these correlations 
are found in the indexes of the same construct and with estimates very close to the 
suggested levels. 
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VI.2. Analysis of the quality of the measurement 
 
Before proceeding to hypothesis testing it is necessary to evaluate the quality 
of the scales of measurement. When testing a model without evaluating beforehand 
the quality of the measures employed in the study, one incurs the risk of assuming 
that a relationship which is not confirmed in the sample may occur due to problems in 
the measuring instrument. Moreover, it might be alleged erroneously that certain 
indicators measure a construct, when in fact there is little empirical evidence for this. 
Thus, a fundamental step is assessing the congruence between the expected 
results of measurement and their empirical operationalization, looking for evidence of 
reliability and validity of measurement (Netemeyer et al., 2003). The following 
analysis is to assess the psychometric properties of the scales, covering the 
assessment of dimensionality, reliability and validity of measurements. 
 
VI.2.1. Analysis of the dimensionality 
 
At this stage, the data dimensionality was verified; checking if the number of 
suggested dimensions for each variable was effectively observed (Netemeyer et al., 
2003). For this purpose, the exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was employed. As 
suggested by Hair Jr. et al. (2010) and Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), the EFA allows 
the factors of the studied variables to be identified, and the indicators’ polarity to be 
analysed, whether the reverse items possess negative loads with their respective 
constructs. 
For each constituent construct of the model, the principal components 
extraction procedure was applied with direct oblimin rotation (oblique rotation), to see 
if more than one dimension was revealed for each construct (Malhotra, 2001). When 
the intercorrelations between dimensions are small, it is preferred to use the varimax 
orthogonal rotation procedure since it meets completely the requirements of EFA and 
the results are almost the same. In fact, during data analysis it is noticeable that 
almost all dimensions founded in multidimensional scales are nearly orthogonal, and 
therefore varimax rotation is preferred. 
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Considering that 152 valid questionnaires were left following the checks just 
mentioned and that the construct with the higher number of related items, in the worst 
case, was agency conflict construct with 10 questions, this results in around 15.2 
answers for each construct. Thus, as the most conservative boundaries suggest at 
least 10 answers per item to allow the use of Factor Analysis (Hair Jr. et al., 2010), it 
is possible to assert that the sample used in this research was of adequate size. 
In order to decide how many factors should be extracted from each construct, 
the following procedures have been used: i) analysis of the scree plot, considering as 
factors those with eigenvalues over 1; ii) analysis of the percentage of extracted 
variance (if higher than 50 or 60%); iii) checking of consistency and adhesion to the 
underlying theory. Also, I have identified those indicators that diverge from the others 
because they had been loaded in extraneous factors, as well as those with low 
association with the original factors (communalities below 0.400).  
Defining which loadings should be considered, those items with factor loadings 
higher than 0.5 were selected (Hair Jr. et al, 2010). 
The KMO measure of sampling adequacy and the percentage of variance 
explained of the constructs were used as a measure of overall quality of factor 
solutions. Whenever items load in a factor that presents more than one indicator, I 
decided to retain the item even if it does not show good measurement properties 
(communalities lower than 0.400 and loadings lower than 0.5) since its convergent 
validity is a preferable approach for identifying no convergence of items. At the EFA 
stage the analysis focuses only on identifying underlying dimensions with no 
warnings relative to the reliability and validity of the scales or items, since these 
concern subsequent analysis stages. 
Table 6.2 presents the results of applying these tests, including the factors 
extracted from each of the constructs originally proposed, and the loadings, 
communalities, variances extracted and KMO of each construct. Note that most 
constructs present just one dimension. In such cases when an indicator was reverted 
into two dimensions (marked with *), never more than two indicators were loaded into 
a second factor. 
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Table 6.2: Factor Analysis 
 
ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTS FACTORS EXTRACTED ITEMS LOADING COMMUNALITIES 
VARIANCE 
EXTRACTED 
KMO 
Alignment 
Strategic alignment 
 
III.2 0,737 0,654 
47,529 
0,809 
III.3  0,774 0,638 
III.4 0,765 0,622 
III.5 0,808 0,657 
III.6 0,709 0,547 
Social alignment 
III.1(i)* -0,792 0,633 
14,624 
III.7* 0,743 0,599 
Board Professionalism 
Family power within the Board 
IX.3(i)* 0,739 0,549 
25,869 
0,537 
IX.6(i)* 0,784 0,604 
Strategic role of the board  
IX.4 0,747 0,583 
33,195 IX.5 0,769 0,593 
IX.7(i) - 0,607 0,624 
Family and Business 
Interaction (a) 
Family Council importance 
IV.1** N.A N.A N.A N.A 
IV.2(i)* 0,948 0,900 20,475 
0,720 
Relationship between family 
members and among them and the 
firm 
IV.3 (i) -0,580 0,593 
45,439 
IV.4 0,832 0,698 
IV.5 0,795 0,639 
IV.6(i) -0,682 0,465 
Management Control Management Control 
VII.1 0,752 0,565 
55,740 0,766 
VII.2 0,803 0,646 
VII.3 0,857 0,735 
VII.4 0,718 0,515 
VII.5(i) -0,421 0,177 
Trust (b) 
Trust between owners and managers 
V.6(i) 0,635 0,406 
31,097 
0,562 
V.7 -0,760 0,594 
V.10(i) 0,666 0,445 
Embeddedness 
V.8* 0,800 0,671 
23,590 
V.9* 0,748 0,619 
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* shows that this indicator was loaded into a second factor. ** shows that this indicator was excluded in a previous step. The values in bold represent those below the 
recommended levels of 0.5 for the factorial loadings and 0.4 for the communalities. Despite low convergence these items were retained in analysis since factor analysis was 
used to understand the dimensionality of the constructs and not the validity of items. Items IX.2 and IV.1(i) were deleted in previous analysis steps. 
Transparency and 
Disclosure
Transparency
VI.4 0,838 0,702
55,170 0,711
VI.5 0,843 0,710
VI.6 A(i) -0,521 0,271
VI.7 0,724 0,524
Legitimacy
Successor legitimacy
I.1(i) 0,744 0,556
35,029
0,584
I.2(i) 0,772 0,598
I.3(i) 0,739 0,555
Legitimacy of family managers
II.1* 0,831 0,701
27,393
II.2* 0,842 0,710
0,474Competence Managers’ competence
VI.1 0,851 0,724
49,631VI.2 (i)
0,755
38,628
-0,590 0,348
VI.3 0,646 0,417
Opportunism
Shirking and misappropriation
V.1 0,581
0,779
0,569 0,638
V.2 0,581
V.4 0,345
0,909
0,758
20,842Abuse of privileges
V.3(i)* 0,780
V.5(i)* 0,687
Imparciality Imparciality
VIII.1 0,894 0,800
0,763 0,688VIII.2 0,913 0,833
VIII.3 0,810 0,657
Altruism
Altruistic selection
VIII.5* 0,791 0,764
25,320
0,616
VIII.6* 0,921 0,856
Moral hazard
VIII.4(i) -0,781 0,627
43,610VIII.7 0,721 0,611
VIII.8 0,752 0,590
Comprehension/acceptance 
of social roles
Comprehension of social roles
X.1 0,808 0,653
47,550 0,641X.2 0,813 0,661
X.3(i) -0,209 0,044
X.4 0,738 0,544
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(a) It is decided not to proceed with the first dimension of Family and Business Interaction since 
it was formed by just one item, preventing any attempt to verify the reliability and validity of 
the measure. Thus, this name was preserved for the second factor. 
 
(b) In the case of trust, I chosen to exclude the V.8 question for two reasons. First, if this 
indicator was retained, the second dimension of trust will have only one item, which does not 
allow analysis of the reliability and validity of the constructs ‘measurements. Second, looking 
at the non-rotated component matrix, it is noticeable that this item has the greatest loading on 
the second factor, meaning that this item is the one that forces the appearance of the second 
factor. In that case with the exclusion of V.8 the remaining items show a reasonable fit within 
a one factor solution. When V.9 was excluded, a marginal increment in the reliability indexes 
were found (=0.48; CR= 0.73). These indexes were lower when V.9 was included =0.45; 
CR= 0.70), but not so much to ensure the retaining of face validity of this item in order to get 
a more theoretically sound measure. On the other hand, the exclusion of V.9 increases the 
Average Variance Extracted to the suggested limits (AVE=0.49 against AVE=0.38 with V9). 
So the decision was to exclude V9. 
 
 
Agency conflict construct 
 
The analysis of the agency conflict construct required an EFA considering just 
the indicators XI.1, XI.2 and XI.3, as the complete sample using the other related 
indicators had high percentage of missing data (such characters simply do not exist 
in most firms). The results present good quality levels (KMO=0.650 and 68.29% of 
variance extracted) in a one-dimensional factorial solution. 
 
Table 6.3: Descriptive Statistics of the Agency Conflict Construct 
 
 
                Source: Extracted data 
 
 
 
Table 6.4: Correlation Matrix(a) of the Agency Conflict Construct 
 
 
                 Source: Extracted data      a  Determinant = ,421 
 
 
Mean Std. Deviation Analysis N Missing N
XI.1 2,84 1,676 152 0
XI.2 3,51 1,884 152 0
XI.3 3,23 1,903 152 0
XI.1 XI.2 XI.3
Correlation XI.1 1,000 ,554 ,404
XI.2 ,554 1,000 ,623
XI.3 ,404 ,623 1,000
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Table 6.5: KMO and Bartlett's Test of the Agency Conflict Construct 
 
 
                         Source: Extracted data 
 
 
 
Table 6.6: Communalities of the Agency Conflict Construct 
 
 
                                               Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
 
 
 
Table 6.7: Total Variance Explained of the Agency Conflict Construct 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.17: Scree Plot of the Agency Conflict Construct 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.
,650
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity
Approx. Chi-Square
129,149
DF 3
Sig. ,000
Initial Extraction
XI.1 1,000 ,602
XI.2 1,000 ,787
XI.3 1,000 ,669
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 2,059 68,629 68,629 2,059 68,629 68,629
2 ,601 20,042 88,672
3 ,340 11,328 100,000
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Table 6.8: Component Matrix (a) of the Agency Conflict Construct 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
A 1 component extracted. 
 
 
 
VI.2.2. Reliability Analysis and Overall Measurement Quality 
 
According to Raykov (1997a) most psychological measures (e. g., inventories, 
questionnaires, scales, and self-reports) are assembled from a set of items. The 
measures produce scores of a construct that are sums of the scores on their 
components. Thus, it is necessary to verify the overall quality of the measurement of 
each construct. This is achieved through the reliability test, which defines how each 
block of indicators relates to its latent construct (Chin, 1998). 
In research, the term reliability means ‘repeatability’ or ‘consistency’, leading 
one the idea that a measure is considered reliable if it would give the same result 
over and over again (Trochim, 2006). The use of data with low reliability may result 
in: (a) a high probability of adopting a non-valid measure – the result can tell us 
nothing about the construct which it was intended to measure. And, even if the 
measure was valid, (b) the error would be high, since the observed variability affects 
the outcomes of any statistical test, increasing the probability of non-significant 
results (Maroco & Garcia-Marques, 2006).  
In technical terms, a measure is valid when it leads to a proper and correct 
conclusion about the population, using the sample as a valid basis for analysis. Any 
measure to be valid as part as a construct, has to be necessarily reliable. This means 
that reliability is a necessary but not sufficient condition to achieve validity. Therefore, 
measure reliability is the first step to discover its validity. But after guaranteeing its 
reliability, it is also necessary to prove its validity (Maroco & Garcia-Marques, 2006). 
In order to estimate the reliability of each scale constituents of the 
questionnaire administered to the 152 respondents, an internal consistency reliability 
Component
1
XI.1 ,776
XI.2 ,887
XI.3 ,818
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test should be applied. The most commonly used one, in the majority areas of social 
sciences as well as in many other disciplines, is Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficient, a 
reliability estimator for composite measures containing multiple components. It is 
considered by most researchers, with the exception of those who dedicated 
themselves to psychometric studies, to be the universal recommended reliability 
coefficient for a metric scale analysis, whatever its characteristics (Maroco & Garcia-
Marques, 2006). This ubiquitous use occurs due to its flexibility (Osburn, 2000) and 
due to the fact that it does not require more than one test administration (as does the 
test-retest method), or more than one parallel test form (as does the parallel-forms 
method), or the splitting of a test into two parallel halves (as do the split-half 
methods) (Huysamen, 2006). On the other hand, several investigators have noted 
that an internal consistency reliability coefficient, like Coefficient α, based on a single 
administration of a test, may overestimate reliability because such coefficients assign 
transient error due to differences in test administration, temporary changes in the 
examinee, and so on to true-score variance (Guion, 1965; Schmidt & Hunter, 1996). 
In addition, if the errors made in responding to test items are positively correlated, 
Coefficient α may be inflated (Komaroff, 1997). 
Although it is true that Coefficient α may sometimes be inflated because of the 
conditions mentioned above, a potentially more serious problem is its tendency to 
underestimate the true reliability when items do not measure the construct with equal 
strengths. This means that unless the measures have the same factor loadings and 
measurement errors, a critical assumption when Alpha’s formula is derived, 
Coefficient α renders a lower bound estimate (Maroco & Garcia-Marques, 2006; 
Osburn, 2000). The assumption underlying the fact that Coefficient α underestimates 
the true reliability is identified as tau equivalence. And tau equivalence is an 
important consideration when examining reliability as most generalization studies 
‘assume that all items measure the same latent trait on the same scale, with the only 
variance unique to an item being comprised wholly of error’ (Graham, 2006, p.935).  
The tau-equivalence follows the same unidimensionality principle of the 
parallel model, requiring that all test items measuring a single latent variable have to 
be exactly equivalent to one another. All items must measure the same latent 
variable, on the same scale, with the same degree of precision. The only difference 
between both models is that while in the latter all error scores are equal across items, 
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in the first there is a possibility of different amounts of error (Raykov, 1997a). Another 
possible model of reliability estimation is the essential tau-equivalent model which is, 
as its name implies, essentially the same as the tau-equivalent model. Essential tau-
equivalence assumes that each item measures the same latent variable, on the 
same scale (similar variances), but with possibly different degrees of precision 
(different means) (Raykov, 1997b). The difference between item precision and scale 
is an important distinction to make. Whereas tau-equivalence assumes that item true 
scores are equal across items, the essentially tau-equivalent model allows each item 
true score to differ by an additive constant to each pair of variables (Raykov, 1997b). 
The inclusion of an additive constant affects only an item’s mean, not its variance or 
covariance with other items. As reliability is a variance-accounted-for statistic, it is 
unaffected by differing means. Therefore, for the purposes of estimating reliability, 
tau equivalence and essential tau equivalence would be considered identical, 
implying that the correlations between true scores are all unity and that the variances 
and covariances of the true scores on the components of the measure are all equal. 
Therefore, I refer, from now on, to essential tau equivalence simply as tau 
equivalence (Osburn, 2000). 
Finally, a least restrictive, most general model of use for reliability estimation is 
the congeneric model, which assumes that each individual item measures the same 
latent variable, with possibly different scales, with possibly different degrees of 
precision, and with possibly different amounts of error (Raykov, 1997a). That means 
that if the components of a measure are congeneric equivalent, the correlations 
between the true scores are unity but variances of the true scores may vary 
(Jöreskog & Sörbom. 1990). Congeneric equivalence implies that the measure is 
unidimensional, but the factor loadings and error variances may vary. 
The conclusion is that tau-equivalence hedges the use of measures which 
represents different aspects of the latent constructs. Thus, if prior research indicates 
a priori multidimensionality of the data, tau-equivalent methods of estimating 
reliability, like Cronbach’s α, should be avoided. The simulation performed by Osburn 
(2000), for instance, computing different data sets, from congeneric equivalent or 
multidimensional to essentially tau-equivalent measures, shows that as heterogeneity 
increased the Coefficient α underestimation became considerably worse. His 
conclusion is that the use of alpha coefficient is inappropriate in situations in which 
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the assumption of essential tau-equivalence is clearly violated, indicating that the test 
items measure the same latent variable in different scales. Just the presence of even 
a single item that is not tau-equivalent to the other items can have a dramatic impact 
on the accuracy of Coefficient α (Graham, 2006). 
It is important to notice that tests with a greater number of items are less 
vulnerable to underestimation when tau-equivalence is violated than tests with only a 
small number of items (Raykov, 1997b), which is the case in most constructs of this 
study. This is due to the fact that, when a single item violates tau-equivalence, the 
proportion of true score variance that is congeneric to the other item true scores is 
smaller when one has a greater number of items than when one has fewer. 
Although Coefficient α is widely used in practical work, a significant body of 
literature has developed in which several less familiar internal consistency reliability 
coefficients have been proposed. All of these coefficients have in common an 
attempt to reduce the underestimation of reliability when the components of a 
measure are not equivalent. 
Thus, in this study, the decision was to adopt more than one reliability test, as 
suggested by Maroco and Garcia-Marques (2006): besides the Cronbach's α 
evaluation, I also run the Composite Reliability (CR) and the Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE) tests.  Among all of them, the preference is for the use of the 
Composite Reliability, considered a better coherent approach to reliability of the 
items used in this study. The composite reliability coefficient (the sum of the loadings 
squared, divided by the sum of the loadings squared plus error) is superior to 
Cronbach’s α because it does not assume that all indicators are equally weighted 
(Martensen et al., 2007). 
A third measure that has been proposed is the Average Variance Extracted 
(AVE), created by Fornell and Larcker (1981). It is a statistic involving the percentage 
error variance in a measure, representing on average how much the constructs 
explain the variance of the indicators and then, giving an idea of the general degree 
of association between the constructs and the indicators. In different terms, AVE is a 
measure of the error-free variance of a set of items. The higher AVE value, the more 
representative are the indicators of the construct on which they load.  
The next table presents these indexes: 
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Table 6.9: Quality of the measurement of the scales 
 
Scales AVE Composite 
Reliability 
R Square Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Abuse of privilegie 0.70 0.82 0.21 0.60 
Agency Conflict 0.69 0.87 0.38 0.77 
Altruistic selection 0.71 0.83 0.00 0.71 
Comprehension/acceptance of corporate roles 0.63 0.83 0.00 0.70 
Familiy and business interaction 0.55 0.83 0.00 0.73 
Family power on the Board 0.63 0.77 0.00 0.43 
Imparcialitty 0.76 0.91 0.53 0.84 
Legitimacy of family managers 0.70 0.83 0.31 0.58 
Management Control 0.53 0.84 0.00 0.76 
Managers’ competence 0.50 0.74 0.00 0.48 
Moral hazard 0.59 0.81 0.42 0.65 
Shirking and misappropriation 0.51 0.76 0.36 0.52 
Social alignment 0.63 0.77 0.11 0.41 
Strategic alignment 0.61 0.89 0.59 0.84 
Strategic role of the board 0.48 0.72 0.05 0.54 
Successor’s legitimacy 0.55 0.78 0.04 0.62 
Transparency 0.55 0.83 0.41 0.72 
Trust between owners and managers 0.48 0.73 0.39 0.48 
 
PS: the numbers in bold represent values below the limits considered for each indicator. 
 
 
According to Cronbach’s α, numbers above 80% would be considered an ideal 
reliability criterion (Netemeyer et al., 2003). However, in cases where the scale is 
especially developed for a study, numbers around 0.70 are acceptable and, even a 
minimum of 0.60 (Malhotra, 2001). 
The acceptable cut-off for composite reliability would be the same as the 
researcher sets for Cronbach’s α since both attempt to measure true reliability. In an 
adequate model, composite reliabilities should be greater than 0.70 (Nunnally, 1978).  
Notice that some Cronbach's α coefficients are below the expected limit, but in 
all cases the Composite Reliability is above 0.70. This reveals the violation of the tau 
equivalence assumption, indicating that Composite Reliability should be applied as 
the adequate reliability estimator. 
To use a latent variable, its AVE should be greater than 0.50 (Chin, 1998; 
Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Following this criterion, AVE values reported in Table 6.9 
demonstrate internal consistency for most of the indicators of the latent variables, 
except managers’ competence, strategic role of the board and trust between owners 
and managers. Considering the importance of these constructs for the proposed 
model, as well as the fact that the numbers are very close to the borderline, and even 
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that other authors, like Bollen (1989), accept the lower limit of 0.40, all constructs 
were considered reliable. 
 
 
VI.2.3. Convergent and discriminant validity 
After finding an adequate level of quality of the overall measurements, it is 
time to realize the evaluation of validity of the scales (Churchill & Iacobucci, 2002). 
This analysis consists in testing the congruence between the research tool and the 
theoretical constructs (Netemeyer et al., 2003). For this purpose, it is necessary to 
apply structural equation modelling techniques which are able to cope with 
measurement errors in a multiple hierarchical relationship between constructs using 
a unique tool (Fornell & Lacker, 1981; Bagozzi et al., 1991; Mackenzie, 2001). 
Structural equation modelling is based on the analysis of covariance using 
procedures of maximum-likelihood (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004) which has been 
popularized by Jöreskog and Sörbom (1989) and implemented in programs like 
LISREL and AMOS. 
However, due to violation of the normality assumption and the size of the 
sample used in this study, the PLS method is the better alternative to be used. 
According to Chin (1998) the PLS approach is appropriate for samples which are at 
least 10 times bigger than the construct with the greatest number of indicators or with 
the large amount of dependency relations. In this study, the construct with the larger 
number of items has five indicators, revealing that the sample surpass the 
boundaries of the required sample size. 
The next step consists in doing the convergent validity and discriminant 
validity tests which are commonly regarded as subsets of construct validity. 
Convergent validity tests if there are enough strong correlations between the 
indicators, in order to certify that such measures are reflexes of the same latent 
construct. Thus, the factorial loading obtained through PLS validate the construct 
through a one-tailed test, where the critical t is t= 1.97. 
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Table 6.10: Convergent validity tests 
Indicators and Constructs Relationship Original 
Sample 
(O) 
Sample 
Mean 
(M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
T 
Statistics 
(O/STERR) 
I.1 <- Successor’s legitimacy 0.579 0.544 0.195 2.969 
I.2 <- Successor’s legitimacy 0.775 0.733 0.156 4.967 
I.3 <- Successor’s legitimacy 0.844    0.817    0.100 8.458 
II.1 <- Legitimacy of family managers 0.854 0.851 0.027 31.870 
II.2 <- Legitimacy of family managers 0.823 0.819 0.038 21.814 
III.1 <- Social alignment 0.759 0.755 0.071 10.688 
III.2 <- Strategic alignment 0.811 0.811 0.027 30.399 
III.3 <- Strategic alignment 0.797 0.796 0.036 22.403 
III.4 <- Strategic alignment 0.791 0.792 0.029 27.502 
III.5 <- Strategic alignment 0.762 0.763 0.039 19.477 
III.6 <- Strategic alignment 0.731 0.730 0.041 17.859 
III.7 <- Social alignment 0.825 0.824 0.055 15.065 
IV.3 <- Familiy and business interaction 0.717 0.718 0.053 13.535 
IV.4 <- Familiy and business interaction 0.849 0.850 0.023 36.927 
IV.5 <- Familiy and business interaction 0.772 0.773 0.043 17.890 
IV.6 <- Familiy and business interaction 0.618 0.616 0.069 8.936 
IX.3 <- Family power on the Board 0.871 0.808 0.286 3.043 
IX.4 <- Strategic role of the board 0.444 0.447 0.158 2.816 
IX.5 <- Strategic role of the board 0.630 0.625 0.093 6.762 
IX.6 <- Family power on the Board 0.711 0.647 0.267 2.661 
IX.7 <- Strategic role of the board 0.922 0.906 0.050 18.334 
V.1 <- Shirking and misappropriation 0.790 0.786 0.039 20.144 
V.10 <- Trust between owners and managers 0.754 0.750 0.053 14.113 
V.2 <- Shirking and misappropriation 0.696 0.686 0.072 9.695 
V.3 <- Abuse of privilege 0.734 0.726 0.078 9.381 
V.4 <- Shirking and misappropriation 0.648 0.652 0.065 9.947 
V.5 <- Abuse of privilege 0.929 0.927 0.026 36.247 
V.6 <- Trust between owners and managers 0.489 0.499 0.094 5.220 
V.7 <- Trust between owners and managers 0.802 0.798 0.041 19.366 
VI.1 <- Managers’ competence 0.863 0.854 0.032 26.851 
VI.2 <- Managers’ competence 0.503 0.493 0.106 4.746 
VI.3 <- Managers’ competence 0.701 0.702 0.068 10.358 
VI.4 <- Transparency 0.795 0.792 0.038 21.172 
VI.5 <- Transparency 0.845 0.843 0.022 37.683 
VI.6 <- Transparency 0.577 0.580 0.056 10.297 
VI.7 <- Transparency 0.719 0.721 0.050 14.283 
VII.1 <- Management Control 0.748 0.748 0.033 22.742 
VII.2 <- Management Control 0.786 0.783 0.039 20.307 
VII.3 <- Management Control 0.864 0.865 0.018 48.578 
VII.4 <- Management Control 0.706 0.701 0.051 13.939 
VII.5 <- Management Control 0.459 0.463 0.078 5.903 
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VIII.1 <- Imparcialitty 0.877 0.876 0.022 40.352 
VIII.2 <- Imparcialitty 0.900 0.900 0.016 55.225 
VIII.3 <- Imparcialitty 0.840 0.841 0.021 39.777 
VIII.4 <- Moral hazard 0.730 0.724 0.046 15.868 
VIII.5 <- Altruistic selection 0.990 0.985 0.014 70.699 
VIII.6 <- Altruistic selection 0.665 0.645 0.138 4.840 
VIII.7 <- Moral hazard 0.791 0.789 0.040 19.662 
VIII.8 <- Moral hazard 0.775 0.770 0.051 15.240 
X.1 <- Comprehension/acceptance  of 
corporate roles 
0.836 0.835 0.023 36.578 
X.2 <- Comprehension/acceptance  of 
corporate roles 
0.836 0.835 0.025 34.111 
X.4 <- Comprehension/acceptance  of 
corporate roles 
0.691 0.683 0.060 11.480 
XI.1 <- Agency Conflict 0.758 0.753 0.047 16.051 
XI.2 <- Agency Conflict 0.906 0.905 0.015 59.486 
XI.3 <- Agency Conflict 0.813 0.813 0.033 24.603 
 
PS: This table presents: (O) the standard factorial loads of the sample, which means the correlation 
between the indicator and the latent construct: (M) the averages of the sub-samples obtained via PLS; 
(STERR) estimated standard error; (O/STERR) the T value which is the proportion between the 
loading and its standard error. Numbers above 1.97 represent an estimate of the 5% one-tailed test.  
 
We can see from Table 6.10 that the sample values are all greater than 0.4 
demonstrating, according to the criteria of Hulland (1999), good validity of the items. 
In addition, all the T values were significant in general. The only item excluded due to 
lack of convergent validity was X.3 (i), since its factor loading was less than 0.400 
and it was therefore, not significant. Then, the discriminant validity test was 
conducted, checking if the scales conceived to measure such construct are more 
related to it or the others constructs (Nunnaly & Bernstein, 1994). For this purpose, a 
method suggested by Fornell and Larcker (1981) was used, comparing the average 
variance extracted from the constructs with the shared variance between theoretical 
constructs (R2 was obtained through the correlation of the estimated scores in the 
PLS). Thus, when two scales conceived to measure distinct constructs share more 
variance between themselves than the variance shared among their indicators, 
absence of discriminant validity is verified. 
Comparing the constructs in pairs using the Fornell and Larcker (1981) 
criterion, all of them have discriminant validity, which allows us to assert that the 
scales of each construct measure distinct latent dimensions. These results are 
shown in the next table: 
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Table 6.11: Discriminant validity test  
 
Construct N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Abuse of privilege 1 0,70                  
Altruistic selection 2 0,01 0,71                 
Agency Conflict 3 0,12 0,07 0,69                
Compr. /acceptance of corporate roles 4 0,21 0,04 0,27 0,63               
Familiy and business interaction 5 0,17 0,00 0,27 0,31 0,55              
Family power on the Board 6 0,00 0,03 0,02 0,00 0,02 0,63             
Imparcialitty 7 0,08 0,05 0,28 0,38 0,22 0,00 0,76            
Legitimacy of family managers 8 0,07 0,06 0,25 0,29 0,26 0,00 0,30 0,70           
Management Control 9 0,10 0,04 0,21 0,32 0,17 0,00 0,39 0,18 0,53          
Managers’ competence 10 0,08 0,00 0,24 0,23 0,29 0,00 0,34 0,31 0,33 0,50         
Moral hazard 11 0,12 0,15 0,23 0,35 0,24 0,01 0,46 0,31 0,34 0,24 0,59        
Shirking and misappropriation 12 0,10 0,04 0,21 0,29 0,18 0,01 0,29 0,23 0,32 0,22 0,28 0,51       
Social alignment 13 0,08 0,01 0,18 0,16 0,11 0,01 0,16 0,09 0,15 0,11 0,13 0,14 0,63      
Strategic alignment 14 0,11 0,02 0,25 0,39 0,32 0,00 0,40 0,29 0,49 0,41 0,26 0,33 0,16 0,61     
Strategic role of the board 15 0,07 0,04 0,11 0,26 0,19 0,05 0,23 0,08 0,15 0,12 0,30 0,13 0,09 0,18 0,48    
Successor’s legitimacy 16 0,09 0,01 0,06 0,07 0,04 0,02 0,08 0,01 0,08 0,04 0,07 0,09 0,12 0,03 0,08 0,55   
Transparency 17 0,09 0,00 0,24 0,31 0,25 0,00 0,27 0,20 0,41 0,26 0,25 0,17 0,18 0,38 0,20 0,08 0,55  
Trust between owners and managers 18 0,12 0,07 0,18 0,19 0,23 0,01 0,21 0,26 0,19 0,22 0,30 0,24 0,09 0,23 0,11 0,04 0,21 0,48 
AVE  0,70 0,71 0,69 0,63 0,55 0,63 0,76 0,70 0,53 0,50 0,59 0,51 0,63 0,61 0,48 0,55 0,55 0,48 
CR  0,82 0,83 0,87 0,83 0,83 0,77 0,91 0,83 0,84 0,74 0,81 0,76 0,77 0,89 0,72 0,78 0,83 0,73 
 
 
(i) The values on the main diagonal indicate the average variance extracted of the constructs. The values below the diagonal show the percentage of 
variance shared between constructs. When the value of shared variance between constructs is greater than the values of the AVE of the row or column 
of reference, there is a violation of discriminant validity. 
 
(ii) Comparing the squared correlation with the Average Variance Extracted of the constructs, it is noted that the constructs had discriminant validity, since 
in all cases the shared correlation between the constructs is less than the variance that the constructs share with their own indicators. 
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VI.3. Nomological validity – Test of the model 
The last component of construct validity is nomological validity. In this 
procedure, the objective is to assess if the relationships between the latent variables 
of the model are supported by empirical data (Netemeyer et al., 2003), testing if the 
hypotheses are supported based on the observation carried out in the study. This is 
the most relevant criterion for assessing the validity, because it has been the sine 
qua non condition of the quality of the underlying theory (Hunt, 2002). From the 
results obtained in the factor analysis, when starting from the initial constructs new 
factors were extracted, I opted for the reconstruction of the theoretical model 
originally proposed, without deviating from the observations from the case studies 
and the necessary theoretical underpinning. Some hypotheses were confirmed and 
others were proposed, as is shown below: 
 
Figure 6.18: Theoretical model modified after EFA 
 
To test the new theoretical model, PLS was used, showing the results that can 
be seen in Figure 6.19:  
Agency
Conflict
Successor’s 
legitimacy
Social
Alignment
Comprehension
of social roles
Impartiality
Trust
Moral hazard
Manager´s
competence
Shirking and
misappropriation
Family and 
Business 
Interaction
Acceptance of the
Board role
Management 
Control
+
-
-
-
+
+
+
+
-
+
+
-
-
-
+
+
H1a
H2a
H3a
H4
H5
H6
H7
H8a H9a
H10a
H11
H12
H13
H14a
H15
H16
Transparency
Strategic
Alignment
-
H1b
+
H3b
Family power on
the Board-
H2b
Legitimacy of 
family managers
H8b
+ H9b
+
Abuse of privileges
-
H10b
Altruistic selection
H14b
-
H17 +
262 
   
Figure 6.19: Research Model tested via PLS 
 
  
(i) The values expressed within each arrow indicate the estimated standard weights. The values placed inside each oval represent the R2, i.e., the percentage of 
variance explained by the structural model. 
 
(ii) It should also be pointed out that the variables presented in the model with zero variance are exogenous, in other words are those which are not explained by 
any other variable in the model. For this reason they necessarily have a variance explained equal to zero. 
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(iii) In the model shown in Figure 6.19, the hypothetical relationships and standardized weights 
obtained are presented. To simplify the demonstration of relationships between constructs, I 
chose to keep only the design of the latent variables, omitting the observed variables. 
 
Next, in the Table 6.12, the overall results of the explanatory model of the 
dependent constructs are presented:  
Table 6.12: Results of the hypotheses of the model proposed by the dissertation 
 
     Source: Data from the survey. 
HYPHO-
TESES
INDEPENDENT DEPENDENT SAMPLE POP ERROR T VALUE SIG.
H1a Social alignment Agency Conflict -0,194 -0,198 0,071 2,75 p < 0,01
H1b Strategic alignment Agency Conflict -0,175 -0,165 0,084 2,075 p < 0,05
H2a
Acceptance of the 
Board role
Strategic alignment -0,09 -0,093 0,049 1,822 0,070
H2b
Family power on the 
Board
Acceptance of the 
Board role
0,22 0,231 0,095 2,301 p < 0,05
H3a
Familiy and business 
interaction
Social alignment 0,338 0,353 0,076 4,443 p < 0,001
H3b
Familiy and business 
interaction
Strategic alignment 0,299 0,297 0,062 4,859 p < 0,001
H4 Management Control Strategic alignment 0,542 0,546 0,055 9,943 p < 0,001
H5 Management Control Transparency 0,641 0,642 0,043 15,053 p < 0,001
H6
Trust between 
owners and 
managers
Agency Conflict -0,166 -0,171 0,07 2,369 p < 0,05
H7 Transparency
Trust bet. owners 
and managers
0,19 0,19 0,067 2,847 p < 0,01
H8a
Successor’s 
legitimacy
Trust bet. owners 
and managers
-0,017 -0,021 0,07 0,237 0,813
H8b
Legitimacy of family 
managers
Trust bet. owners 
and managers
0,282 0,285 0,071 3,983 p < 0,001
H9a
Managers’ 
competence
Successor’s 
legitimacy
-0,194 -0,224 0,072 2,69 p < 0,01
H9b
Managers’ 
competence
Legitimacy of family 
managers
0,553 0,559 0,046 11,96 p < 0,001
H10a Abuse of privilege
Trust bet. owners 
and managers
-0,13 -0,139 0,06 2,177 p < 0,05
H10b
Shirking and 
misappropriation
Trust bet. owners 
and managers
-0,227 -0,225 0,076 2,969 p < 0,01
H11 Impartiality Agency Conflict -0,265 -0,271 0,073 3,625 p < 0,001
H12 Moral hazard Impartiality -0,475 -0,466 0,069 6,861 p < 0,001
H13 Moral hazard
Shirking and 
misappropriation
0,319 0,322 0,081 3,929 p < 0,001
H14a
Comprehension / 
accept. of corporate 
roles
Abuse of privilege -0,453 -0,466 0,061 7,433 p < 0,001
H14b
Comprehension / 
accept. of corporate 
roles
Shirking and 
misappropriation
-0,352 -0,348 0,081 4,354 p < 0,001
H15
Comprehension / 
accept. of corporate 
roles
Moral hazard -0,535 -0,535 0,053 10,108 p < 0,001
H16
Comprehension / 
accept. of corporate 
roles
Impartiality 0,34 0,35 0,075 4,546 p < 0,001
H17 Altruistic selection Moral hazard 0,284 0,292 0,055 5,191 p < 0,001
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PS: a) SAMPLE is the standard weight obtained for the full sample; b) POP is the average weight 
obtained in the bootstrapping; c) ST. DEV. is the standard deviation of the estimate d) The error is the 
estimated error of the estimate; e) The T VALUE is the ratio of the non-standardized weight by its 
standard error. f) SIG is the significance level corresponding to t test probability with 148 degress of 
freedom and two sided tests. For one sided tests the significance levels could be considered half the 
presented value. 
 
In Table 6.12, the model's hypotheses tested are presented, together with their 
respective weights obtained in the structural model (PLS). The absolute sizes of the 
standardized values of the sample are sufficient to demonstrate the relationship 
between the constructs (whether positive or negative) by interpreting the relationship 
of each dependent construct with its independent constructs. 
 
 
VI.4. Summary of the quantitative results 
This chapter has presented the empirical study carried out into the 
hypothesized relationships among the constructs. Table 6.13 summarizes the 
hypotheses and results. Overall, the hypotheses were well supported in the empirical 
tests. 
Table 6.13: Results of Hypotheses Testing 
 
HYPHO
-TESES 
DESCRIPTION OF HYPOTHESIS RESULT 
H1a The greater the social alignment among the family owners, the lower the 
agency conflict. 
Supported 
H1b The greater the strategic alignment between family owners and the 
managers, the lower the agency conflict. 
Supported 
H2a The more strategic is the role of the Board, the greater will be the 
strategic alignment within the company. 
Not 
supported 
H2b The greater the power of the family within the Board of Directors, the 
greater will be its strategic role. 
Supported 
H3a The better the interaction between family members, and between them 
and the company, the greater the degree of social alignment. 
Supported 
H3b The better the interaction between family members, and between them 
and the company, the greater the degree of strategic alignment. 
Supported 
H4 The more developed the system of management control in the family 
business, the higher the prevailing strategic alignment. 
Supported 
H5 The more developed the system of management control in a family 
business, the greater is the level of transparency. 
Supported 
H6 The higher the existing trust in the family and business spheres, the 
lower the agency conflict. 
Supported 
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Source: Research data 
 
 
 
 
VI.5. The Family Business Agency Conflict Model - validated version 
 
 
Below, the final model validated by the multivariate analysis carried out. 
 
 
 
H7 The higher the level of transparency in management transactions, the 
higher the level of trust prevailing in the family business. 
Supported 
H8a The lower the successors’ legitimacy in their entry into the company and 
at the moment of the succession, the lower the trust prevailing within the 
family firm. 
Not 
supported 
H8b The lower the legitimacy of family managers, the lower the trust 
prevailing within the family firm. 
Supported 
H9a The higher the competence, the greater the legitimacy achieved by the 
successor with the family members and employees. 
Supported 
H9b The higher the competence, the greater the legitimacy of family 
managers with the other family members and with employees. 
Supported 
H10a The higher the abuse of privileges, the lower the level of trust prevailing 
in the company. 
Supported 
H10b The higher the presence of shirking and misappropriation, the lower the 
level of trust prevailing in the company. 
Supported 
H11 The more impartiality in the treatment of family and non-family 
managers, the lower the agency conflict prevailing. 
Supported 
H12 The greater the moral hazard, the less impartiality in the treatment of 
family and non-family managers. 
Supported 
H13 The greater the moral hazard, the greater the risk of occurrence of 
shirking and misappropriation. 
Supported 
H14a The lesser the degree of comprehension of their social role, by owners 
and managers, the greater the risk of abuse of privileges. 
Supported 
H14b The lesser the degree of comprehension of their social role, by owners 
and managers, the greater the risk of misappropriation and shirking. 
Supported 
H15 The lesser the degree of comprehension of their social role, by owners 
and managers, the greater the risk of moral hazard. 
Supported 
H16 The lesser the degree of comprehension of their social role, by owners 
and managers, the lesser the impartial treatment afforded to family and 
non-family managers 
Supported 
H17 The more the altruistic selection, the greater the moral hazard. Supported 
 
266 
   
Figure 6.20: Reduced level of agency conflict 
 
 
Source: Research data 
 
 
 
VI.6. Findings 
 
VI.6.1. Control variables for conflicts in family businesses 
I sought to identify if there are differences in the existence of conflicts when 
taking the following control variables into account: 
(A) Agency
conflict
(B1) Social
Alignment
(D.2) 
Comprehension
of social roles 
(B4) Impartiality
(B3) Trust
(C.7) Moral hazard
(D.1)Manager´s
competence
(C.6) Shirking and
misappropriation
(C1) Family and
Business Interaction
(C2) Management 
Control
(C3) Transparency
(B2) Strategic
Alignment
(C4) Legitimacy of 
family managers
(C5) Abuse of
privileges
(C.8) Altruistic
selection
-
-
-
+
+
+
+
-
+
-
-
+
+-
+
-
+
-
-
+
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Table 6.14: Summary of findings 
 
Another question that I sought to answer is if it could be argued that the fact of 
the CEO being family or nonfamliy had any relation to business performance. 
According to the Chi-Square Tests (p = 0.871), no significant differences were found. 
 
 
Control variables Findings 
Companies with versus those without 
Board of Directors. 
Through ANOVA significant differences were 
found, leading to the conclusion that firms 
with a Board suffer less from conflict. 
Companies with Board, which have 
independent board members versus 
those with only internal board members. 
No significant differences were found. 
Companies with versus those without 
Family Council. 
No significant differences were found. 
Companies whose CEOs are not from 
the family. 
It was not possible to compare because the 
power rates were low due to small sample 
and small effect size. 
Companies whose CEOs are from the 
second and third generation, compared 
to the first generation. 
No significant differences were found. 
Limited Liability Company in relation to 
Publicly Traded Corporation and 
Privately Held Corporation  
The limited liability companies had a higher 
level of conflict in two cases: between family 
and non-family managers and among family 
members with each other. Regarding the 
conflict between family managers and the 
family outside the company, family conflict 
levels are similar for the three kinds of 
companies 
Larger companies (more than R$ 60 
million revenue) versus smaller 
companies. 
The analysis was carried out through the 
Spearman correlation which did not indicate 
any significant correlation, concluding that, 
according to this sample, there is no 
relationship between conflict and size. 
Companies that are performing below 
the average level for their sector. 
Higher levels of conflict between family and 
non-family members and among family 
members were found in companies with 
inferior performance. 
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VI.6.2. Analysis of the Family Business Agency Conflict Model as a whole 
 
Initially, one must assess the variance explained (R2) of the constructs, 
checking if the theoretical model displays adequate predictive power. Regarding the 
agency conflict construct, the value found of 38% is considered quite reasonable for 
studies in the area of applied social sciences. Cohen et al. (2003), for example, 
states that a correlation (R) of a size equal to 0.3 is moderate and values of 0.5 
represent a high level. These values correspond, respectively, to the R2 of 
approximately 9% and 25% of the dependent variable and its independent 
constructs. According to this criterion, several constructs have a high proportion of 
variance explained, namely: Strategic alignment (58.7%); Impartiality (53.1%); Moral 
hazard (42.5%); Transparency (41.0%); Trust between owners and managers 
(38.9%); Shirking & misappropriation (35.8%) and Legitimacy of the family members 
(30.6%). But, even those constructs at levels lower than 25%, are still at moderate 
levels in relation to their coefficients of determination. This is the case of Social 
alignment (11.4%) and Abuse of privileges (20.6%). The fact of their explanatory 
capacity being lower, demonstrates that the model variables can explain only a 
relatively small part of the variability of these constructs. Identifying new endogenous 
constructs or trying to improve the validity/reliability indexes9 may be a way of better 
understanding the relationship of these variables with others in the model. 
The two constructs with low R2 values, the case of Strategic role of the Board 
(4.8%) and Successor’s legitimacy (3.8%) were withdrawn from the final model, as 
the significance of their correlations with the latent constructs were lower than the 
acceptable minimum. 
In fact, the great majority of the correlations were supported by the multivariate 
analysis, based on the criterion that a t value greater than 1.655 supports the relation 
in a one-tailed test with 5% of significance. 
The Successor’s legitimacy and Trust between owners and managers relation 
is the first to be refuted by a low t value: only 0.237. For the relation between 
Strategic role of the Board and Strategic alignment it can be seen that the t value 
                                                 
9
 As the PLS is not as efficient in dealing with errors of measurement as the traditional methods (Maximum-
likelihood, e.g. software such as LISREL) it is more susceptible to the attenuation of the correlations. This 
suggests that in such methods, the correlations could possibly be stronger. 
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borders significance for a one-tailed test: 1.822. But the one-tailed test may only be 
applied when the sign of the weight is equal to that expected under the alternative 
hypothesis. In this case, as there exists a weight contrary to that expected under the 
model hypothesis, the one-tailed test cannot be used with the critical value equal to 
1.655 (one-tailed t value with 150 degrees of freedom and 5% of significance), the 
two-tailed test being appropriate with critical t value of 1.975. In this case, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected that the relation between these constructs is equal to 
0, that is does not exist in the population. Therefore, the relation proposed by the 
model cannot be supported, but neither is there sufficient evidence to affirm that the 
relation is the contrary of that expected by the model. 
 
 
VI.6.3. Analysis of each construct and comparison with qualitative findings 
 
(A) Agency conflict construct 
 
According to the loadings identified via PLS, the item with the most influence 
in agency conflict construct is, by far, the Family owner/managers versus family 
managers with loading of 0.906 (XI.2). This is followed by Family owner/managers 
versus non-management family members (X.1) with a loading of 0.813, and finally 
Family owner / managers versus nonfamliy managers with loading of 0.758 (XI.3). It 
is worth noting that when evaluating descriptive statistics, we find that the highest 
average among the three questions is precisely the (XI.2). Therefore, it is clear that 
the most critical conflicts in family businesses are those that can be effectively 
identified by agency conflicts, which are those between the family members who 
being the principals also assume the role of agents. 
Also from this study, we learn that among the four latent variables related to 
the agency conflict construct, social alignment, strategic alignment, trust and 
impartiality, the latter is that which presents the greatest estimated standard weights 
( = -0;265), therefore, that best explains the existence of agency conflict in the 
companies in the surveyed sample. 
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(B) Alignment 
Alignment was initially proposed as being a category arising out of the 
observations of the Milk & Candies case, explained by the strong fellowship existing 
between its two principal shareholders: Edgar Mills who exercises the role of 
shareholder/manager and Friedrich Haag, co-founder of the company in its present 
configuration. In fact, both of them also have, strong social alignment (encompassing 
principles, values, cohesion, integration between the families) such as strategic 
alignment (shared vision regarding the future), which pointed to these elements as 
being essential for the mitigation of agency conflicts. In reality, I initially took the 
proposal of alignment to be one unique factor, but the EFA indicated two distinct 
constructs, even if both ended by being considered indirectly related to agency 
conflict. The analysis of structural equations confirmed these relations, even 
indicating a greater weight of the Social alignment construct ( = - 0.194) than the 
Strategic alignment ( = -0.175) in relation to the agency conflict construct. 
It is important also to emphasize that via the Bental case, the importance of 
remuneration as a factor promoting alignment was revealed. The company has 
developed a management model called Network Company, which considers the staff 
more as associates than employees and whose essence is in the process of 
delegation of responsibilities, and in variable remuneration linked to the achievement 
of business results. The high commitment achieved made me understand that this 
had been one of the principal tools responsible for sustaining Bental in its turnaround 
at the most critical moments. During the EFA, this item was confirmed as part of the 
Strategic alignment construct. 
 
(B1) Social alignment 
The points examined in social alignment are two: 
 (III.1) alignment as regards the process and the moment of succession. For 
this item, descriptive statistics shows a neutral tendency regarding possible 
misalignment on such issues (4.08 on the Likert scale). 
 (III.7) the importance of the existence of a shareholders’ agreement or similar 
instrument designed to promote corporate alignment is the one with the 
highest load on this construct (0.825). In addition, descriptive statistics shows 
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that on average the respondents actually perceive its relevance (4.82 on the 
Likert scale). 
The variable that impacts this construct is family and business interaction with 
relatively weak relationship, although of some significance (= 0.338). 
 
(B2) Strategic alignment 
Regarding this construct, the items with greater loading are two:  
 (III.2) the one that identifies the sharing of vision and values between 
shareholders and managers, which however does not demonstrate a very 
significant level of agreement (4.87 on the Likert scale). 
 (III.4) the one related to the existence of an ordered strategic planning 
process. This also does not demonstrate a high level of agreement (4.71 on 
the Likert scale). 
Strategic alignment is impacted by family and business interaction ( = 0.299), 
but receives a greater weight from the variable management control (= 0.542). 
 
(B3) Trust 
The importance of trust had already made its first appearance in the first case, 
when the minority shareholder of Milk & Candies, John Harris, identified the essential 
point for supporting the Mills management, and accordingly reducing agency costs in 
the search for alignment between minority and majority, as being trust in the 
managers. And in fact, the multivariate analysis found that the greater the trust 
between owners and managers the less will be the agency conflict ( = - 0.166). 
It is worth noting that, regarding trust as a factor of selection, the clear 
preference is for family managers: 39% of the respondents state that they have gone 
through situations that led them not to unconditionally trust nonfamliy managers. On 
the other hand, 26% of the respondent companies have experienced situations that 
have led to decreased trust in family managers. 
272 
   
Concerning embeddedness 47% see that the indication of nonfamliy 
managers by members of their social network is the best way of guaranteeing the 
selection of trustworthy executives and 43% disagree with this position. 
It is also important to note that among the latent variables that are correlated 
with the construct Trust, the one that presents greatest weight is Legitimacy ( = 
0.282). 
 
(B4) Impartiality 
In the Milk & Candies case practices of recognition & remuneration, evaluation 
and promotion of family and nonfamliy managers were identified apparently 
equitable, and there was an agreement that this was an important factor for the low 
presence of agency conflict in the company. However, it could be seen that with the 
arrival of the third generation, if the rules thought out were not implemented, the gain 
of a low incidence of conflict could be reversed in the future. 
The weight of – 0.265 sustains the relationship between Impartiality and 
Agency Conflict. 
Regarding the questions that constitute the impartiality construct, performance 
appraisal is the one that has the highest loading (0.900) and therefore the main item 
that would tend to impact positively or negatively on the perception of impartiality in 
family businesses. 
Analyzing the answers to questions related to the impartiality variable, some 
additional findings were made: 
 Question (VIII.1) shows that there is a slight majority of respondents, 48%, 
(sum of the options 1, 2 and 3 on the Likert scale) who disagree that family 
and nonfamliy managers should receive the same sort of error treatment. 
Another 42% advocate equal treatment (sum of the options 5, 6 and 7 on 
the Likert scale) and 10% are neutral (option 4 on the Likert scale). 
 This theme is also reflected in the perception of 45% of respondents in 
identifying in their organizations the existence of different criteria for the 
evaluation of the performance of family and nonfamliy managers. Another 
45% see the performance assessment as equivalent (VIII.2). 
273 
   
 However, for the hiring and promotion for and to key positions, 67% say 
they prioritize the level of competence of the candidate, regardless of 
kinship ties (VIII.3). 
 
(C1) Family and business interaction 
None of the four cases analysed had strained family relationships that had 
crossed the limits of the family and reached the company. However, the very fact of 
concern for the maintenance of family harmony, always emphasized in most 
interviews, showed us the importance of its verification in quantitative research. But 
in fact, descriptive statistics showed that there is no widespread disharmony in the 
sample studied. To question (IV.3), for example, the disagreement was relatively 
large regarding a possible lack of good interaction between family members (2.85 on 
the Likert scale). 
Item (IV.4) is the one that measures this construct with greatest loading 
(0.849). It exams to what degree family members are aware of the history and values 
of the company and also, it presents a high level of agreement in the descriptive 
statistics (5.64 on the Likert scale). It has appeared so evident in the Bental case, 
where we see that via the Family Council, there was concern in maintaining the 
trajectory of the founder and attention to the new generations knowing and 
preserving the foundations that led to the birth and growth of the company. The 
transmission of values from one generation to another was also measured and a 
small majority believes that family ties are strong enough to support this transition 
(4.62 on the Likert scale). Finally, the choice of social interactions in augmenting the 
ties between the controlling families and the employees (IV.6), as a category, came 
from the Milk & Candies case. In spite of living outside Brazil, Friedrich Haag 
attaches value to participation in social festivities during his trips here. This, in his 
view, increases the ties with family and nonfamliy managers, and has a positive 
effect on alignment. The descriptive statistics shows that respondents disagree, 
mostly regarding the existence of relatives' disinterest in maintaining social contact 
with the company and its employees (3.32 on the Likert scale). 
Although not having remained in the model after the factorial analysis it is 
worth investigating information collected in the survey on the Family Council. The 
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Family Business Survey conducted by PwC (2011) identifies the Family Council as 
one of the most common mechanisms adopted to minimize conflicts among family 
members, with a proportion of 44% of companies surveyed. It is interesting to note 
that this is the alternative most adopted in emerging countries, 70% of companies, 
different from the 39% of companies in mature markets, who are betting more on the 
adoption of a shareholders agreement (PwC, 2011). 
Thus, my survey found that this formal governance mechanism in family 
businesses is being adopted by only 27% of companies in this sample. However, 
70% recognize it as a vital element in ensuring family harmony and a good 
relationship between the family and the company. 
 
(C2) Management Control 
This category emerged from observation of the Bental case, in its growth 
phase, when the absence of a formal control system made the process of alignment 
difficult, resulting in there being no shared targets and with every family member in 
the management conducting their responsibilities in accordance with their own 
business vision (or its absence). Allied to the great diversification, this was one of the 
principal causes of the crisis that supervened. 
Another point which contributed to the discussion of this category was the 
perception that companies whose founders are entrepreneurs, normally lack more 
developed controls, as because of their nature, such entrepreneurs tend to 
concentrate all the information in their own person and personally supervise the 
working of the company. The fact is that with the growth of the company and the 
natural increase in complexity, the need to establish management instruments which 
lead to the alignment of everyone becomes fundamental. In the case of Minas Agro 
for example, with the sudden departure of its founder from the management, such 
alignment was damaged profoundly, as he, personally, was the director of the 
organization’s destiny, without formal plans that would allow the successors to 
engage more easily in the business and share the same ends and objectives with the 
nonfamliy managers. 
Through the descriptive statistic, we realize that while 64% of family-owned 
firms claim to adopt a rigorous internal control system to monitor the operations of 
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their company, 56% of them recognize that they have already experienced situations 
where the managers have taken decisions harmful to the company, which were not 
detected in time by the shareholders, due to them having adopted a more laissez-fair 
oversight. Even so, 70% of respondents say the economic and financial monitoring 
by the shareholders and their representatives occurs on a regular and continuous 
basis. 
It is noteworthy that 71% of companies believe in negotiating the levels of 
autonomy in order to guarantee agility in decision making. 
Another point to highlight is that although 83% of companies surveyed agree 
that CEOs, even if members of the controlling family, should be evaluated for their 
performance, only 38% of the family-owned companies surveyed adopt a clear and 
formal process for the evaluation of the performance of the CEO. 
It is worth pointing out that management control has an even higher weight in 
relation to the construct transparency ( = 0.641) when compared to its relation with 
strategic alignment ( = 0.542). 
 
(C3) Transparency 
In relation to the transparency construct, it is noteworthy that 68% agree that 
the succession process is not openly discussed regarding the criteria for its 
implementation. Also, 74% of the respondents confirm that the executives from their 
firms have the habit of providing information, positive and negative, over and above 
what is obligatory, to all stakeholders, to facilitate the correct comprehension and 
evaluation of the organization. 
On the other hand, regarding disclosure, firms show concern in establishing 
the essential controls, financial and non-financial, giving unrestricted access to their 
stakeholders, as mentioned by 70% of respondents. There is, of course, a difference 
between intention and putting into practice, since only 57% of them admit to having 
effective channels for disseminating information. 
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(C4) Legitimacy 
Legitimacy was the construct most often mentioned across the cases studied. 
Starting with Milk & Candies, trust existed between the minority and majority 
shareholders, the latter at the head of management, due to the competence 
demonstrated in carrying out their duties. It is important to note that trust through 
competence was also achieved by the heirs of the 2nd generation of the Mills family, 
but the arrival of the 3rd generation into management brought legitimacy to the Model 
as an important category. This happened because, despite the existence of rules for 
family members’ entry in management, these were neither formalized nor followed. 
From Bental, we saw a well prepared process for building the legitimacy of 
Pedro Talma, 3rd generation, in his rise to become CEO and the establishment of 
rules for the entry of family members into management. 
From Prize, the category legitimacy also appeared in evidence. Elton had 
great difficulty in establishing himself with the nonfamliy managers, a team that had 
been formed by the founder. His father’s degenerative disease, which gradually 
removed him from the company’s daily activities, together with the fact of not having 
had any specific preparation, made this a hard task. The staff did not recognize his 
competence and thought that he was there only because of family ties. Also in Prize 
tensions were identified as regards the entry of the third generation, demanding a 
shareholders' agreement that established clear rules. 
Legitimacy also appeared as the predominating factor in the case of Minas 
Agro. The disregard of the building of the successors’ legitimacy, probably due to 
their youth and the premature death of the founder, resulted in great difficulty arising 
in the relations between the owners and the nonfamliy managers. The founder’s wife, 
in spite of being respected by all, did not have the capacity to take over the company, 
and the daughters, who were graduates in the area, were rejected by the managers 
because they were not identified with the business. Some of these managers even 
had to be substituted, which generated tensions and loss of accumulated knowledge 
in the company. 
When statistical analysis was carried out, the importance of legitimacy in the 
model construct was confirmed by the significant relationship between Legitimacy of 
the family members and Trust between owners and managers ( = 0.282). 
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In this construct a slight convergence in the respondents’ replies (4.6 on the 
Likert scale) that family managers are recognized by all employees as competent for 
the exercise of their current functions should be mentioned. On the other hand, the 
rules for the entry of family members into the company still do not appear to be clear 
in the majority of companies, which could be a factor making the process of 
legitimation difficult (3.8 on the Likert scale disagree that they are clear and/or 
obeyed). 
Although the successor legitimacy construct is not supported in the theoretical 
model, it is worth mentioning some other findings related to it. For example, 70% of 
respondents believe that the principal challenge faced by the successor is the 
difficulty of obtaining immediate recognition of his/her authority from family members 
and staff in the running of the company. As for the possible shadow that the 
predecessor could generate over his/her successor, there is a division of 
perceptions: 49% of respondents think the image of the founder is so pervading and 
honoured by all, that it inhibits the family successor in naturally coming into his or her 
own. Another 45% disagree with this position. Interestingly, 43% of these companies 
are still in the first generation, which could cause distinct perceptions between 
predecessors and successors. 
 
(C5) Abuse of privileges  
In no case were there explicit situations of opportunism via expropriation of 
minority rights by the majority, nor did expropriation through remuneration and 
excessive bonuses exist. But the concern precisely that such acts should not occur in 
any circumstances, led to the test of the hypothesis that the abuse of privileges leads 
to reduction in trust, a hypothesis which was verified, albeit with a degree of 
significance near to the borderline (t value of 2.177). 
And in fact, through descriptive statistics (V.3 and V.5 questions), we could 
see the high level of agreement of respondents regarding the absence of abuse of 
privileges in their companies, neither by the executives, nor on the part of the 
majority against the minority. 
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(C6) Shirking & Misappropriation 
The Milk & Candies case also discussed opportunistic behaviour through 
practices of misappropriation. The company was the victim of the opportunistic action 
of nonfamliy managers, fraudulent activity that damaged the company. The 
consequence was the dismissal of several managers, the solution for the agency 
conflict that had been established. Also in this case, the concern of the founders in 
trying to avoid practices that confounded personal with company property can also 
be considered as an element that increased trust, not only of the other blocks of 
owners, but of the staff itself that identified this attitude as ethical. 
The presence of shirking was clearly the consequence of the altruism reigning 
in Bental, in its first decades of existence, where several family managers were 
working with less than the effort needed to achieve the required results. 
The descriptive statistics shows that the practice of shirking does not seem to 
be a reality common in Brazilian family business (question V.1 with 3.36 on the Likert 
scale); even less the existence of attitudes of misappropriation by managers (V.2 
question with 2.13 on the Likert scale). In fact, respondents show total disagreement 
relative to attitudes of misappropriation, even when only considering the 'use of 
company resources for his or her own benefit' (question V.4 with 1.88 on the Likert 
scale). 
Throughout the PLS analyses, we found a significant relationship between 
Trust and Shirking & Misappropriation with weight of -0.227. 
 
(C.7) Moral hazard 
In the case of Bental, the fact that the founder, Benedito Talma, does not see 
the company from a predominantly economic perspective, resulted in the presence of 
altruism with manifest moral hazard, which has consequently led to shirking. 
Multivariate analysis showed relationship of both variables: Moral hazard and 
Shirking & Misappropriation ( = 0.319). 
In the same case, it is observed that moral hazard leads to a justification of 
opportunistic behaviour of family members, who start to be treated in a privileged 
manner in the treatment of errors, which would not be accepted in the case of 
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nonfamliy managers. The multivariate analysis also demonstrates high significance in 
the relationship between moral hazard and impartiality ( = -0.475). 
Among the questions that measure this variable, that of greatest loading 
(0.791) is (VIII.7) that affirms that Family affection leads to unconditional acceptance 
of behaviour related to the firm, even if inappropriate. There is, nevertheless, strong 
disagreement (2.8 on the Likert scale of 1 to 7) that would lead to the conclusion that 
the respondents are not favourable to altruistic practices. 
In the same way, another altruistic perspective is denied by the respondents in 
indicating in question (VIII.4) that the well-being of the family members is not 
prioritize to the detriment of the company’s economic objectives. 
What in fact appears to raise doubts are the neutral replies of the respondents 
(3.9 on the Likert scale) to question (VIII.8), regarding the continuation of the family 
managers in the company even when they discharge their functions less than 
competently. This is typically an altruistic attitude that leads to the moral risk of 
accepting family members in managerial functions even when one knows beforehand 
that nothing will be done about inappropriate behaviour/performance. 
 
(C.8) Altruistic selection 
Also in the case of Bental it was clear that altruistic selection in the choice of 
the family for management had favoured the appearance therein of attitudes of moral 
hazard. And. it is sustained via multivariate analysis that altruistic selection leads to 
moral hazard ( = 0.284). 
The question (VIII.5) has high loading on this construct (0.990), and 
descriptive statistics shows a slight disagreement that the respondent companies 
have been a natural way to accommodate family members who wish to work in them 
(3.52 on the Likert scale). 
 
(D1) Manager´s competence 
Looking at the qualitative analyses, the variable was a relevant category in two 
cases. The Milk & Candies case presented the breakdown of trust in a nonfamliy 
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CEO, not because of opportunistic attitudes, but inability to meet the new demands 
and assume the risks which the shareholders wanted in the search for growth, a 
typical action of agency conflict due to incompetence, in accordance with that cited 
by Hendry (2002). In the case of Bental, in spite of the tough measures introduced by 
Giuseppe Mancini with the dismissal of the entire family, his attitude helped the 
family itself, after a while, to understand the need to establish limits for the entry of 
family members into the company based on criteria of competence. 
The variable manager's competence has a significant weight on legitimacy 
(= 0.553) which shows its importance in the model. 
Looking deeper into this variable, we found that a significant number of family 
businesses, 80% see their managers as the main cause in the achievement of their 
strategic outcomes. This percentage contrasts, however, with a not inconsiderable 
number of 35% of respondents who do not see the family managers as having 
sufficient capacity for conducting the significant necessary changes, if they require 
the breaking of traditions in the company (59% see to the contrary and 7% are 
neutral). And 51% of them identified nonfamliy managers as more ready to take risks 
in times of change than family managers (41% disagree with this position and 8% 
have neutral opinion). 
 
(D2) Comprehension of social roles 
The comprehension of one’s social role has various direct relationships, as 
supported by the model. 
When there is no clear distinction of the role of being a family member or an 
employee, this could leads to opportunistic behaviour: shirking & misappropriation   
( = -0.352) and abuse of privileges ( = -0.453). This occurs also regarding altruism: 
the mixture of roles leads to moral hazard ( = -0.535). 
Thus, the reasons of the existence of a direct relationship between this 
construct and Impartiality ( = 0.340) is easily understandable.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
VII.1. Closing remarks 
 
At the end of the last century the literature tended to concentrate its studies 
more on public companies than family businesses (Litz, 1997). Lansberg et al. (1988) 
argued that this was happening due to the widespread belief that the distancing 
between capital and control was a definite tendency in general business, adopting an 
increasingly professional management instead of being owned and controlled by 
families. However, family businesses are still being not only seen as a viable form of 
enterprise, but are also increasing their importance in the economy of most countries. 
This leads to a growing body of researchers willing to investigate a wider range of 
issues concerning family business as noted by Craig and Salvato (2012) 
The debate over whether family business is a worthwhile research pursuit 
has been won. Whether the metric is the number of special issues in highly 
ranked journals, the number of minted PhDs, the list of established scholars 
publishing family business papers, open faculty postings that include family 
business as a preferred concentration, or citation impact factor standings, 
irrefutable evidence can now be provided that pursuing research in the 
family business space is not the career death knoll it arguably once was 
(Craig & Salvato, 2012, p.109). 
It is, however, important to identify which fields of research in family 
businesses have been given more attention from scholars. Yu et al. (2012) have 
evaluated 257 empirical family business studies from 1998 to 2009, identifying 327 
different dependent / outcome variables. The authors categorized these variables in 
seven clusters: performance, strategy, social and economic impact, governance, 
succession, family business roles, and family dynamics. Among them, governance 
appears with the greater frequency of use (20.47%), showing how significant it 
became in the current reality of family businesses. On the other hand, conflict in 
family-owned firms, which is the main subject of inquiry in this thesis, represents just 
3.13% of frequency of use, which confirms the importance of this research in 
deepening studies in one facet of governance of family-owned companies yet little 
explored. 
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The conflict that has been shown throughout this study to be the most 
important for analysis is the one between family members themselves in their family-
owned firm. That is, family members in the role of agent, tend to develop agency 
conflict more easily in relation to the principals that they represent, than do nonfamliy 
managers. This can be explained because in this type of company, ‘the familial 
relations, conflicts escalate much more easily and can rapidly shift to the personal 
level’ (Frank et al., 2011). This is an important finding, where the prevalent belief that 
trust arising out of kinship is in itself sufficient to mitigate agency conflicts, not taking 
into account a number of other key elements in the enhancement of agency conflict, 
as addressed by this study. 
Recognizing that family firms are not homogeneous entities, I decided in this 
study to investigate the phenomenon of agency conflict in Brazilian family-owned 
companies, regardless of the constitution of their capital or the type of involvement of 
family in business: whether they were family-owned, family-governed or family-
managed. Of the four companies analysed as case studies, two were privately held 
corporations and two were limited liability companies. But the four were all run by 
family members of the controlling family. 
In the survey, questionnaires were distributed to family businesses in general. 
The final sample was represented by 61% of limited liability firms, 34% privately held 
and 5% publicly traded corporations, which was a good representation of the 
spectrum of Brazilian family businesses, medium and large. 
As for the participation of family members in the management, the sample 
shows that only 9% of companies were managed by a nonfamliy CEO (which does 
not mean that family members were not working in other executive functions). 
Therefore, we consider that this research deals with agency conflicts in family 
businesses where the controlling family effectively manages the company. 
It is important to note that 83% of the respondents were family members, and 
among those who reported, 57% are from the second generation, 21% from the first, 
18% from the third and 4% from the fourth generation. This distribution was important 
since it avoids possible intergenerational tension bias. 
Moreover, 70% of the respondents are shareholders, 89% work in the 
researched firms and among the companies that have a Board, 29% are Directors. 
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This demonstrates that I had access to a privileged public, with good knowledge of 
the dynamics of family and business relationships and with adequate capacity for 
critical analysis that requires a survey of this nature, including sensitive issues such 
as research on the existence of conflicts. 
I should stress that the questionnaires were completed by manufacturing, 
services and agribusiness companies. Also, companies from Brazil's major economic 
regions have taken part: south, southeast and northeast. This is important to ensure 
a sample that is representative of a country with such a huge territorial extent and 
with significant regional cultural differences. 
Therefore, this sample has made possible the development of a theoretical 
model, identifying the principal inducers of agency conflict in family businesses, 
which was the main objective of this thesis. This goal was accomplished with a set of 
interrelated variables of the model able to explain 38% of the variance in agency 
conflict. 
 
 
VII.2. Contributions to knowledge 
 
Academic research is ultimately about theory – the lenses through which we 
view, interpret, and test real-world data. For Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan (2007) 
theory may be determined in terms of relationships between independent and 
dependent variables. Other scholars, on the other hand, have defined theory in terms 
of narratives. Following this perspective, as suggested by Eisenhardt (1989b), ‘theory 
is evaluated primarily by the richness of its account, the degree to which it provides a 
close fit to empirical data, and the degree to which it results in novel insights’ 
(Colquitt & Zapata-Phelan, 2007, p. 1281). 
The use of grounded theory via case studies has enabled the construction of 
accounts which after being categorized and grouped as factors have resulted in 
causal relationships being established between the factors, giving meaning to the 
model developed, as recommended by Whetten (1989): 
Relationships, not lists, are the domain of theory. [...] theoretical insights 
come from demonstrating how the addition of a new variable significantly 
alters our understanding of the phenomena by reorganizing our causal 
maps. (Whetten, 1989, p. 492). 
284 
   
The final product of this research, entitled Family Business Agency Conflict 
Model, is a genuine contribution to the theory and practice of corporate governance 
in family businesses. 
 
VII.2.1. Theoretical and empirical contributions 
 
Agency conflict is typically seen as a phenomenon of large corporations 
resulting from the pulverization of the share control which ends by promoting the 
separation of ownership and management. This separation brings with it as a 
consequence a new role for the shareholder who ceases to participate in the daily 
running and basically confines him/herself to evaluating the results and investing 
capital in the most profitable. Thus the owners start to procure professional people in 
the market for taking the decisions that maximize the value of the corporation, the 
wealth of the shareholders and the return on investments.It is just that once 
contracted and having a large part of the control of company decisions in their hands 
these managers can try to  further their own ends, generating what is identified as 
agency conflict. 
A good part of the scholars, until recently, understood that family companies 
given the absence of a separation of ownership and management, would be immune 
to agency conflict. But, in fact, this only occurs when the company is run by the 
founder without any partner. But from the moment the founder acquires a partner 
each with his/her distinct roles, there exists potencial for agency conflict. If the 
owning family chooses to contract an executive to run the company, agency conflict 
becomes latent, and in succession processes with the entry of second and 
subsequent generations when a family member assumes the role of being the agent 
of the others, that is being the main executive acting on behalf of the other family 
members, agency conflict is potentialy explosive.    
The result of this work concerns basically three possibilities of conflict in the 
family company: family managers versus family managers; family managers versus 
non-family managers and family managers versus family members outside 
management. In the universe researched the confict with the most impact occurs in 
the first case: between family managers (loading of 0.906), which is an important 
empirical contribution to agency theory in family companies.  
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The question that should be asked is: how can one inhibit the appearance of 
such agency conflicts that cause attrition and impact business dealings? The most 
usual tools in publicly held companies are surveillance and incentives to align 
interests which end up being unsufficient for family companies because of their 
particular characteristics and complexity. 
Chami and Fullenkamp (2002), reinforce these usual elements of surveillance 
and incentives as the key factors in the management of the agency conflicts 
Two general strategies for dealing with agency problems have emerged from 
the academic literature and found practical application in many corporations. 
One strategy is to avoid the agency problem entirely by expending some 
effort or paying some cost to improve the principal’s ability to monitor the 
agent, so that the principal and agent can contract directly on the task to be 
performed. […] The other strategy is to align the incentives of principal and 
agent. The main mechanism for aligning incentives, which was suggested in 
the voluminous academic literature on executive compensation, is through 
compensation contracts that alter the agent’s incentives. For example, by 
making executive compensation depend on a measure of firm performance - 
generally, the stock price - shareholders give executives the incentive to act 
in the shareholders’ interests (Chami & Fullenkamp, 2002, p. 1787). 
However, although both strategies are correct, the belief that it is possible to 
mitigate agency conflict only via monitoring and aligning incentives is an extremely 
reductionist view, since the environment of the family business is governed by more 
complex issues. 
This study represents a pioneering piece of research in the study of agency 
conflict in family businesses, by identifying three main alternatives for reducing 
conflict: promoting alignment (either strategic or social), enhancing trust and 
embracing impartiality. Thereby, it contributes to knowledge by proposing safe 
pathways for family business to escape from threats and losses arising from 
divergences between principals and agents. 
 
 Mitigation of agency conflict in family firms by the promotion of social 
alignment 
Strategic alignment is linked primarily to the existence of cohesion between 
partners, translated by some formal instrument such as a shareholders' agreement, 
for example. Its existence typically reduces the existence of agency conflicts. 
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 Mitigation of agency conflict in family firms by the promotion of strategic 
alignment 
Strategic alignment is the convergence of strategic purposes in terms of the 
same vision, consensus on the path to follow, common goals, and acceptance of the 
same level of risk. It is achieved on the basis of shared values and principles 
between managers and shareholders. Thus, the presence of managers who do not 
share the same values as the owners will probably be a source of conflict. So that, 
incurring agency costs in the promotion of alignment is essential for the reduction of 
conflict, as pointed out by several authors (Ensley & Pearson, 2005; Haugh & Mckee, 
2003; Pieper et al. 2008). 
Our model also reveals, given the strong significance between both 
constructs, the importance of adopting systems of control and monitoring of 
managers for the increase of strategic alignment. 
 
 Mitigation of agency conflict in family firms by the enhancement of trust. 
In the model developed in this study, trust is negatively impacted by 
opportunistic behaviour and abuse of privileges, and shirking & misappropriation. 
Therefore, avoiding such attitudes is essential so as not to undermine trust, which 
would lead to an increase in agency conflict. At the same time, implementing a 
culture of transparency is a factor that impacts positively on trust. But, ultimately, the 
legitimacy of family members’ is the key factor to attend to, if we want to increase 
trust in the family business. And it must be remembered that the model generated in 
this study, indicates that competence is the key factor for legitimacy occurrence. 
Thus, subsequent generations of the family should be the subject of a succession 
plan that gives them legitimacy before taking executive positions in the company, 
avoiding the emergence of conflict. 
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 Mitigation of agency conflict in family firms by the embracement of 
impartiality. 
This study indicates that companies are less susceptible to the presence of 
agency conflicts, complying with criteria of justice and meritocracy in the evaluation 
of their managers, adopting fair error handling practices, not distinguishing between 
family and nonfamliy managers and avoiding nepotism. This finding is in line with 
Van der Heyden et al. (2005) who identify lack of fairness in the management 
decision-making process as one of the main limiting factors on commitment and trust 
of the individuals involved with the family business. 
 
To sum up, this thesis is an important contribution to the theoretical analysis of 
agency problems in family businesses, probing further than the usual variables used 
to reduce agency conflicts. 
In fact, the model developed in this thesis includes compensation and 
incentives as an item that promotes strategic alignment (loading of 0.731). But this is 
just one factor among several others. These have an even higher loading: Vision & 
values (loading of 0.811); Harmonic actions / attitudes (loading of 0.797); Ordered 
planning process (loading of 0.791) and Risk taking (loading of 0.762). Therefore, the 
fact of just valuing the incentives to promote alignment makes the relationship merely 
mercenary, neglecting other more relevant criteria, as demonstrated by this model. It 
should also be noted that in family businesses where the manager is a family 
member, the incentive via compensation has even less impact, since, as Gomez-
Mejia et al. (2003, p. 19) affirm ‘executives with family ties to owners receive lower 
total pay than professional managers’. Thus, the compensation factor carries less 
weight with family managers who require less calculating and utilitarian contracts 
than do nonfamliy managers, because they are more emotionally attached to the firm 
and because they have fewer employment options in an open labour market 
(Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2001; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). 
Monitoring is also part of the proposed model identified as Management 
Control construct. It relate both to the strategic alignment ( = 0.542), as to 
transparency ( = 0.641). Transparency in turn affects trust ( = 0.190) in a directly 
proportional way in the same manner that the legitimacy of the family managers does 
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( = 0.282). This myriad of correlations shows the number of elements that are part 
of this model to explain agency conflict, confirming the level of the theoretical 
contribution of this study, which goes beyond the understanding of the variables 
ordinarily presented by the literature. 
Thus, this study aimed to develop a better understanding of family firm 
governance by addressing both the procedural aspects (such as boards, 
agreements, systems, procedures) that regulate the relationship between the owners 
and the management, and the social aspects of governance that are considered 
important to promote a healthy interaction between the family and the company 
(shared vision, trust, impartiality, altruism, competence, and so on). Therefore, this 
thesis submits a more comprehensive analysis, through a model that proposes and 
tests relationships among constructs of different nature in a family firm governance 
context. 
 
 
 
VII.2.2. Practical Implications 
 
Beckhard and Dyer (1983) pointed out the risks that may generate conflicts 
that paralyse decision-making processes in family businesses. Glasl (2002 cited in 
Frank et al., 2011, p. 131) therefore advocates the development of a conflict 
management system to detect and prevent conflicts emerging and entering into an 
escalation process that is difficult to deal with. 
As described herein agency conflicts tend to impact corporate performance, 
and since family-owned firms are particularly prone to conflicts, the value of the 
proposed model is extended. 
Through the analyses carried out, it is possible to return to the questions 
initially posed in the early development of this thesis, whose answers make an 
immediate practical contribution to the reality of family businesses. 
1 Who are the main actors in conflict in Brazilian family-owned companies? 
The conflict in family businesses is mainly between family managers. This 
finding is obtained both in the multivariate analysis with its greater loading on the 
construct, and in the analysis of the means, through descriptive statistics. It is 
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observed therefore, that when a family member holds a management position, 
his/her chance of experiencing an agency conflict with other family members/owners 
who are also in management, is greater than in the case when a nonfamliy manager 
is appointed. 
In fact, authors such as Kellermanns and Eddleston (2004) recognize that, the 
more concentrated in the hands of the family the management is, the less will be the 
level of conflict related to the execution of tasks. However, the tendency for personal 
conflicts to occur between the family members, because of the superposition of roles, 
will be greater. 
 
2 Is the type of capital structuring of the company related to the level of conflict? 
Agency conflict (between owners and managers, family members or 
otherwise) was found to be higher in limited liability companies. That is, the legal 
requirements and the resulting professionalization of corporations are factors 
reducing agency conflicts. In this sense, authors such as Songini (2006) affirm that 
the process of professionalization is important in attenuating the informal atmosphere 
of the organization, introducing more formalized systems and, consequently, 
increasing the systematic use of information to orientate management. That is, it is 
possible to infer that family-owned companies that exhibit more complex capital 
structures, in adopting more formal management models and more efficient control 
systems, will be able to minimize the level of agency conflict existing in the 
organization. 
 
3 Does the size of the company influence the level of conflict? 
Initially, it should be pointed out that the low number of large family-owned 
companies is frequently attributed to the desire of the owner to restrict the growth of 
the company to maintain his control and property in the family (Daily & Dollinger, 
1993). Other studies, however, such as those of Ward (1997), Loan-Clarke et al. 
(1999) and Harris et al. (2004), attribute the reduced number of large family-owned 
companies to a lack of efficacy and the informality of their management systems. 
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Frank et al. (2011) claim that there are different views in the literature on the causes 
and implications related to the size of family-owned firms in the market. 
The fact is that the findings of this research indicate that the size of the 
company does not influence the level of agency conflict. Thus, it is not growth that 
makes a company more susceptible to agency conflict. Rather, the way it develops 
and converts its management and governance in a professional manner tends to 
reduce such conflict. 
 
4 Do companies with economic and financial performance better than the average 
of the segment to which they belong have a lower level of conflict? Does inferior 
performance imply a rise in it? 
It was shown that firms with performance below the average level of 
companies in the sector have increased agency conflict. Kellermanns and Eddleston 
(2004, 2007) postulate that the greater the level of conflict, the greater will be the 
tendency to poor performance in the company. Likewise, Elbanna’s (2009) studies 
done on Egyptian companies identified that affective conflict is a significant predictor 
of firm performance. He himself cites Amason (1996) who had already reported the 
significant and negative relationship between affective conflict and organizational 
outcomes. 
Several authors such as Schulze et al. (2003b), Dyer and Handler (1994) and 
Kets de Vries (1993) also call attention to the low efficiency in family-owned 
companies associated with psychological conflicts, such as, disputes among 
successors, autocratic leadership and the spreading of family conflicts into the 
business field. 
 
5 Are the conflicts very different in a family firm managed by the first generation 
owner-manager from those in a family firm controlled by a second, third and 
subsequent generations and an extended family? 
Several authors like Davis and Harveston (1999, 2001) and Frank et al. (2011) 
seek to establish the relation between the level of conflict and the generation 
responsible for management. For these authors, the level of conflict will be greater in 
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family-owned companies run by the third generation if compared to organizations 
administered by the second or by the founder. On the other hand, independently of 
the degree of conflict, Westhead et al. (2002) found in their work that multi-
generation companies, run by two or more generations, tend to be better 
administered than first generation companies. 
In the present study, I have not identified a higher level of conflict in the 
second and third generations, compared to that in the first. From this result it is 
possible to infer that the generation in power should not be taken in itself as a central 
category to explain the breaking out of conflicts, but should be analysed with 
reference to its constituent elements such as the increase in the complexity of 
management; the presence or otherwise of regulatory mechanisms of the relations 
between family and company; the manner in which power relationships form between 
the generations and; the degree of access of the different generations to the 
decision-making process in the company. 
 
6 Do companies with nonfamliy CEOs have a higher level of conflict? 
Due to the small number of cases of respondents in this situation, I cannot 
address this question. Nevertheless, if we revert to the literature, it is possible to find 
several authors like Chitoor and Das (2007) who maintain that passing over 
management to nonfamliy managers minimizes considerably the risk of conflicts 
during the succession process and the day-to-day activity in the company.  This view 
is not new, Levinson (1971, p. 98) having been one of the first to set out the various 
intra-family conflicts that surround succession in family-owned companies, 
recommending to the entrepreneurial family that it: ‘move to professional 
management as quickly as possible’. Dyer (1986) perceives the option of delivering 
over the management to nonfamliy professionals as a rational alternative to confront 
the nepotism and family conflicts that plague family-owned companies. The author 
further argues that nonfamliy CEOs lead the business to a new level of leadership 
and, specifically to a new strategic direction, focused on growth and expansion. 
Westhead and Howorth (2006), however, stress that it is common to find 
owners of family businesses who prefer the CEO to be a member of the owning 
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family, in order to ‘protect the store of family wealth, as well to provide jobs for 
current and future family members’ (p. 305). 
On the other hand, Dyer (1989) also warns of the difficulties inherent in 
choosing nonfamliy managers by indicating that, very often, a lack of understanding 
can be seen on the part of them in relation to the human aspects that traditionally 
guided the company. In addition, nonfamliy managers tend to present a short-term 
view focused on financial business performance, so that faults in communication can 
occur, and a lack of synergy between the new CEO and the members of the 
business family, leading to serious problems, misunderstandings and even real 
agency conflicts (Hall & Nordqvist, 2008). 
 
7 What about the tools and practices of management control: are they found to be 
in evidence in the Brazilian family business? 
Authors such as Songini (2006) emphasize the importance of formal systems 
of control and management to guarantee the efficient running of operations and 
stimulating the interest of shareholders in the business. Sundaramurthy (2008) 
stresses the difference between the evolution of control systems in family and 
nonfamliy-owned companies. For him, in the case of nonfamliy-owned companies 
formal contracts and control systems represent essential prerequisites for starting up 
business. In their turn, in family businesses the opposite tendency can be seen, 
where initially family relationships are responsible for sustaining informally the whole 
organizational system and, only with the development of the business, formal 
complementary control systems assume significant importance in stimulating the 
necessary competencies and the satisfactory monitoring of the business 
(Sundaramurthy, 2008). 
In the family businesses surveyed here, there is a clear emphasis on financial 
control by shareholders and directors, where 70% of respondent companies indicate 
that they do regular monitoring of indicators of this nature. 
The companies also seem to be acting through rigorous internal control 
systems to monitor their operations, as indicated by 64% of the respondents. Thirty 
percent of the respondents admit that their control systems are fully adjusted to their 
needs. However, when questioned on the occurrence of management decisions that 
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were harmful to the company and that were not foreseen by shareholders due to 
slack control, 38% admit that this has happened in their company. 
 
8 What is the real relevance of transparency and disclosure in family business and 
how can it be achieved? 
This relationship between trust, management control and transparency can be 
found in many studies in the literature of the field. Sundaramurthy (2008) defends the 
idea that transparency, the formalization of operational activities and a good system 
of communication can reinforce a positive cycle of trust. Thus, a family company that 
heeds these essentials can reinforce interpersonal trust between its members and 
contribute to the maintenance of organizational trust as the family evolves. In this 
sense, it is fundamental to make transparent the rules and traditional values which 
guide the entrepreneurial family, to engender trust. 
In their turn, authors such as Paine et al. (2005) maintain that transparency is 
not synonymous with total openness, but presenting with certain precision relevant 
information that could impact directly the financial or personal health of the members 
of the family organization. In this sense, the clear divulging of results and important 
information permits the integration of family values with those of the company within 
well-defined limits and helps to establish confidence in the family business system 
with all its stakeholders. This transparent stance may also be essential to 
communicate the desire of the family to maintain the business, but at the same time 
stresses the commitment to meritocracy and not nepotism. (Ward, 2004). 
 
9 Are the criteria for succession negotiated and made explicit in the Brazilian family 
business? And also, is there convergence on the natural process and the timing 
of its implementation? Is competence the most considered factor for hiring and 
promotion, regardless of the ties of consanguinity? 
Regarding succession, there is a division in the perception of the existence of 
alignment in the succession process, as well as on the right timing for its execution: 
39% who agree and 45% that did not perceive its existence. And a significant 
proportion of 63% point to the absence of a succession process that can be openly 
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discussed and treated with transparency as to the criteria for the choice of the 
successor. 
For Ward (2004) there is a visible relation between transparency in the 
succession process and agency conflict. For this author, the establishment of clear 
policies to guide the succession, regulating the entry of family members into the 
business and establishing salary standards and the criteria for promotion of family 
members can reduce the ambiguity of the process and minimize the risk of 
occurrence of conflicts. 
Concerning competence as a primary factor for selecting the successor, there 
is a clear division of viewpoints among the respondents: 47% believe that despite the 
fact that they consider competence as an important criterion, kinship ties are still the 
main consideration in choosing the successor. Another exactly 47% disagree with 
this position. 
For Dyer (1989) competence would be fundamental for the survival of the 
family company. In this sense, the author points out that as the company grows, the 
search for the abilities needed to run the business in the different areas (financial, 
marketing, controller) should be placed above the ties of kinship. Thus, particularly in 
a complex environment, it is improbable that the family holds all the talent necessary 
to fill the key positions in the company. In this context, in addition to the incentive to 
the training of family successors, the option arises of obtaining nonfamliy managers 
in the marketplace to guarantee the maintenance and development of the business 
(Dyer, 1989). 
 
10 Is the Brazilian family-owned company basically managed by family members? 
Are they considered competent acting as managers? 
Based on the selected sample, I can say that the two main functions of 
command are in the hands of family members. Ninety-one percent of the family-
owned companies are led by a family CEO. Thirty-nine percent of the companies 
said they had boards of directors, and in 93% of these the Chairman was a family 
member. 
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Regarding the family managers' competence, it is observed that 35% believe 
that a family manager is not capable enough to lead significant changes, if that 
requires a rupture with the traditions of the company (59% disagree with this 
statement and 7% are neutral). As 83% of the respondents are in fact family 
members, one cannot say that 35% is negligible percentage. 
Furthermore, 51% reported that nonfamliy managers are more prepared to 
take risks in times of great change, than the family managers (41% disagree with this 
statement and 8% are neutral). Therefore, this research shows that there is a 
majority view of the family members themselves involved with the business, that 
family managers may not be the best alternative to lead turnarounds. This idea is 
confirmed by Kesner and Dalton (1994) who argue that external managers are best 
placed to take on companies which are performing poorly, and raise them again, 
because they are least compromised by the past.  
In fact, authors such as Donckels and Fröhlich (1991) and McConaughy et al. 
(2001) say that family managers tend to present an attitude averse to risk, and prefer 
a conservative and informal management style. This view is shared by Westhead 
and Howorth (2002) when they provide evidence that family managers do not 
generally place their trust in outsiders, even those professionally qualified, to take 
over the management of the family patrimony. The authors point out that this 
reluctance to rely on outside managers and investors can retard the process of 
growth or even impact negatively the survival of the business (Westhead & Howorth, 
2002). 
In their turn, nonfamliy managers usually work to a short-term time frame, 
orientated by profit and attracting investments, to reach the goals established by the 
owners. In addition contracted agents tend to set up more formal management 
systems, making possible a more transparent accountability process to make 
shareholder control more feasible (Daily & Dollinger, 1993; Kotey, 2005). 
 
11 Has the Board of Directors been a feature of governance adopted by Brazilian 
family businesses? Is its presence a factor in mitigating agency conflicts? What 
are its level of independence and efficiency? 
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As already pointed out, 39% of the sample have Boards of Directors, 
demonstrating that although the majority is not required to do it by law, as most of 
them are not listed firms (in fact, only 5% are), they have made such a choice 
because they recognize their value. And indeed, it seems that one of the measurable 
benefits of adopting Boards of Directors, as demonstrated by my research, is that 
companies that have them showed lower levels of conflict. In fact, the literature 
indicates that a Board of Directors is particularly important in situations where the 
potential for agency conflicts is most critical (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Pearce & 
Zahra, 1992).  
To ensure the independence of the Board, among the 39% who adopt such an 
instance of governance, 42% have outside directors. Fama and Jensen (1983a) 
agree with the importance of balancing the presence of inside and outside board 
members to have an effective and independent board. Cotter and Silvester (2003) 
add that firms with boards that are dominated by insiders may suffer from collusion, 
which certainly affects the alignment. These authors also affirm that external 
members may act in the arbitration of the disagreements.  
It was therefore expected that the relationships proposed in the theoretical 
model regarding the level of independence and efficiency of the board (via its 
constructs derived from the EFA) and the alignment influencing, ultimately, the 
agency conflict  would be supported through the multivariate analysis, but this did not 
happen. One possible reason is the fact that 61% of respondents do not adopt the 
Board of Directors. As the questions were framed so that even companies without a 
Board could answer them, it appears that most of the responses have been given by 
the respondents replying as if their company had a board, rather than their real 
situation. 
I can also infer that one reason for the hypothesis relative to the strategic role 
of the board and family power on the board was not supported, may be that the 
power of owners was perceived by the respondents to be greater than that of boards. 
Indeed, over half of respondents (55%) claim that the decision-making power has to 
be concentrated in the family, the independent board members, therefore, not having 
the same level of authority. This represents an apparent contradiction, since 64% 
disagree that in its constitution, all family blocks should be represented, rather than 
guaranteeing the presence of experienced and competent board members. Similarly, 
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64% of the respondents disagree that the presence of external board members 
causes discomfort.  
Other issues related to the Board may also be mentioned. For example, 74% 
of the respondents agree that a Board of Directors has to have a more directive role 
considering it is the ultimate instance in making strategic decisions. Also, 69% say 
they would never accept a rubber stamp board. 
 
In addition to answering the initial questions, some other practical suggestions 
to be adopted by family businesses that can mitigate agency conflict are: 
i. Promote strategic alignment, since this is a cause of agency conflict. In 
addition to my findings, I turned to PwC's research (2011) which 
indicates that the main cause of discord in family businesses is 
disagreement about the future strategy of the business. 
ii. Family and business interaction was found to be a process central to 
promoting the formation of a shared vision and strategic alignment. 
Owner families can induce more varied social interactions by 
implementing various family institutions, such as family council and 
shareholders agreement. Also research of PwC (2011) shows that the 
most common mechanisms to minimize conflicts among family 
members are the shareholders’ agreement and the family council. The 
adoption of both is highly recommended to prevent the emergence of 
agency conflicts. 
iii. Mandatory disclosure is one that exists in order to produce information 
to meet legal requirements of the stakeholders. It is suggested that the 
vast majority of companies not listed, such as the sample used, adopt 
voluntary disclosure as a way to keep themselves always attractive to 
new investment opportunities, when they need or choose them, not 
suffering setbacks when a major change in a process of going public is 
requested. Such transparency, as already discussed, generates trust, 
which in turn minimizes agency conflict. 
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iv. The results of this research Indicated that legitimacy improves trust, 
which consequently diminishes the risk of the emergence of conflict. 
Therefore, developing the legitimacy of family managers, either 
establishing rules for their entry, or building their competence in the 
fields of knowledge, skills and attitudes is a recommendation for owners 
who want their family members assuming management positions in the 
companies. 
v. Understand that altruism is a natural attitude of parents toward their 
children and therefore this will hinder a critical view of the level of their 
actual competence, which is essential for one to work more 
professionally in the selection process, evaluation of performance and 
promotion. Adopting existing tools on the market is a way to avoid the 
mistakes of altruistic selection, which can lead to attitudes of moral 
hazard. Otherwise, there will be a relative risk of developing 
opportunistic attitudes and emergence of lack of fairness in the 
treatment of family and nonfamliy managers. 
 
 
 
VII.3. Limitations and directions for further research 
 
The first limitations of this study are related to Grounded Theory. The use of 
this methodology demands some caution, such as: the measures used are more 
subjective and they are more subject to the observation bias of the researcher 
(Suddaby, 2006); grounded theory does not analyse changes over time (Egan, 
2002); a grounded theory approach has the effect of emphasizing the readily visible 
and observable in detriment to the commingling of the structural characteristics of 
social situations with activities (Layder, 1993). 
The use of Grounded Theory was combined with the development of multiple 
case studies seeking into each of the observed realities to allow inductively the 
emergence of the main elements. And a case studied, indeed, is an excellent 
alternative to be adopted, since it is grounded in on-going reality. Some limitations to 
the use of a case study are the fact that there is too much data for analysis and that 
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the complexity examined is difficult to represent simply (Hodkinson & Hodkinson, 
2001). This is precisely minimized by the Grounded Theory methodology for 
distinguishing the main ideas in an orderly manner, and arriving at categories which 
will constitute the constructs of the model that is finally proposed. However, there is 
the danger that an inexperienced researcher can get lost in the various possibilities 
that this process offers. 
In the use of quantitative techniques, it is worth mentioning that I worked with 
a convenient sample, one in which the researcher selects the most accessible 
members of the population (60% of respondents are companies that are current or 
past clients of the FDC's database) representing a more established family business. 
This limits the generalization of the results, making the hypotheses tests to be 
evaluated with parsimony. Furthermore, the small sample size restricts the 
application of conventional methods of structural equation which could have been 
used for overall adjustment of the model, and its adhesion, to construct a more 
comprehensive theory. Further studies should then retrieve a larger and more 
representative sample (random), to assess the robustness of the hypotheses raised 
here. 
It must be stressed that four constructs presented KMO below the acceptable 
level of 0.600: Level of Independence and Efficiency of the Board, Trust, Legitimacy 
and Competence. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistics is a measure of the 
quality of the factorial analysis conditions carried out, indicating whether the 
correlations between variables can be explained by other variables in the dataset 
(Mooi & Sarstedt, 2011). These low values found, however, represent a limitation on 
the quality of the factorial analysis. Nevertheless, given that the AVE and CR are in 
fact the measures of quality of the questions in themselves, and these being in 
accordance with the desired standards, I preferred to maintain these constructs. To 
obtain a better KMO, we should have a larger sample, a greater number of questions 
per variable, as well as the revision of those existing. 
It should also be noted that the moderate levels of reliability and validity of 
some measures, as well as the exclusion of questions and dimensions that could be 
relevant in future studies also suggest the possibility of refining, adapting and 
creating new measures for the constructs of interest and testing the model in new 
contexts and different samples. 
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We cannot overlook the possibility of some bias in the questionnaire 
responses, because the admission that conflict exists is a sensitive matter. At the 
pilot stage, I took care, after completion of the survey, to talk to six respondents, and 
one of the points discussed was how comfortable they felt filling out section (X) of the 
questionnaire. There was no evidence of discomfort. However, it should be noted 
that in the pilot test, I was with a group attending a training programme precisely on 
management in family businesses, which one would expect to demonstrate, a degree 
of maturity and openness on the part of respondents. We cannot, however, rule out 
the possibility that respondents to a questionnaire, would choose to minimize any 
conflicts, for the sake of appearances. 
I need to stress that the questionnaires were mostly completed by senior 
family managers and owners. Despite this representativeness, it would have been 
ideal to collect data from multiple sources. Understanding the perception of agency 
conflict of a nonfamliy manager would therefore be quite relevant for comparison with 
the vision of the owners. In fact the central debate in family businesses has 
concentrated on the nature and consequences of principal-agent behaviour when 
both actors belong to the same family (James et al., 2012). I, therefore, make 
recommendations for future research to consider the viewpoint of the nonfamliy 
manager, since most investigations of agency conflict presented in the literature are 
given from the viewpoint of the principal rather than the agent. 
Another point is that the survey is of a cross-sectional nature, thus limiting our 
ability to examine the dynamic interaction among the constructs studied. The use of a 
longitudinal approach would help to obtain better insight into what influences agency 
conflict in family businesses. This is an opportunity for future research. 
It would also be interesting to work with a meaningful basis of listed family 
businesses that would enable us to compare whether the regulatory elements of the 
capital market exert some influence on governance, and, consequently, on the 
agency conflicts in family businesses. A weak point which should be recognized in 
the model developed concerns, the importance of boards of directors for family 
businesses. It is a vital body of governance of any company, and according to the 
ANOVA test, it can be seen in the sample studied, that companies with boards of 
directors are less prone to agency conflict. However, after multivariate analysis, both 
variables related to the level of independence and efficiency of the board did not 
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remain in the model because the correlations among themselves and with the 
alignment construct showed no significance. It is suggested, therefore, that new 
researches should adopt more profound and consistent analysis of the role of boards 
of directors in mitigating agency conflict in family businesses. 
 
There are a number of questions that this research has not been able to 
address fully and which warrant further investigation: 
 Analyse only family-owned firms listed on the stock exchange, having 
boards of directors to see how the same variables included in the 
present study would behave in relation to agency conflict. 
 Since the majority of respondents in the present study are family 
members, it would be interesting to carry out new research exclusively 
with nonfamliy managers of family businesses to check their point of 
view, and examine which constructs would change in this model. 
 When the entry of a nonfamliy CEO in a family business generates 
more agency conflict: whether it is the 1st, 2nd , or 3rd generation which 
is in charge? 
 To examine the validity of the same model in enterprises with other 
forms of ownership and control: corporations, state enterprises, 
cooperatives? Which constructs would be retained? Which constructs 
would be kept? Which new ones should be added? 
 To investigate whether companies that are adopting corporate 
governance by way of evolution, seeking the benefits of the contribution 
from a broader view of experienced board members, promoting 
alignment, and developing trust and practicing fairness, are subject to 
less conflict than those who embrace governance only for its regulatory, 
procedural and surveillance nature? 
 
The fact that the used sample is focused on Brazilian firms limits the 
possibilities for the generalization of the results. Brazilian culture is strongly 
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relational, which clearly involves different behaviours and different influences on the 
constructs from that which should occur in more transaction-oriented cultures that 
exist in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Also, the power distance index10 in Brazil is high, showing that many 
underlying conflicts cannot be captured in surveys of this nature, simply because 
managers more easily accept the command of owners and tend not to oppose their 
interests. Although for Mustakallio (2002, p.215) the ‘national cultures are likely not to 
exercise a significant influence on how different governance mechanisms function 
within a family firm’, applications in other countries and cultures are encouraged in 
order to verify and contrast the differences found here. 
Finally, despite the limitations just described, it is believed that this study offers 
an advance on previous research in the field of the corporate governance of family 
firms. It contributes some insights and provides empirical support for, or comment on, 
theoretical propositions present in the literature. It is hoped that the theoretical 
framework proposed and validated in this research can offer a useful basis for future 
studies.  
                                                 
10
 Hofstede’s Power distance Index measures the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations 
and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. It suggests that a 
society’s level of inequality is endorsed by the followers as much as by the leaders. 
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‘This survey takes approximately 25 minutes to be completed’. 
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A. Your perception of your company (or corporate group) 
 
In this section, most questions are presented as statements. You should choose always using a 
number from 1 to 7, according to the following scale:  
 
 
Totally disagree 
 
Totally agree 
 
1: means you disagree completely with the statement 
2: means you largely disagree with the statement 
3: means you somewhat disagree with the statement 
4: means your opinion is indifferent about the statement 
5: means you somewhat agree with the statement 
6: means you largely agree with the statement 
7: means you agree completely with the statement 
 
NA: means this statement does not apply to your situation or you do not have 
enough information to assess it. 
 
 
 PLEASE CIRCLE ONLY ONE NUMBER PER QUESTION OR THE OPTION 
‘NA’. 
 DO NOT LEAVE ANY QUESTION IN BLANK. 
 
 DO NOT EVALUATE BASED ON WHAT YOU IMAGINE TO BE THE IDEAL 
STAGE TO BE REACHED BY YOUR COMPANY IN THE FUTURE. REPLY 
ACCORDING TO THE PRESENT SITUATION. SHOULD SOME IMPORTANT 
CHANGE IN THE COMPANY’S GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE HAVE 
OCCURRED, THE RISE OF A NEW GENERATION TO ASSUME CONTROL OR 
A CHANGE IN THE SHARE PARTICIPATION, YOUR ASSESSMENT SHOULD 
TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THIS NEW SITUATION. 
 
 CONFIDENTIALITY: I REALIZE THAT SOME QUESTIONS ASK FOR 
POTENTIALLY SENSITIVE INFORMATION AND I GUARANTEE TOTAL 
CONFIDENTIALITY IN RELATION TO SUCH INFORMATION IN YOUR 
ANSWERS. NOBODY, BESIDES MYSELF WILL ACCESS THIS 
QUESTIONNAIRE. THEREFORE, I ASK FOR TOTAL SINCERITY IN YOUR 
ANSWERS. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Company (group) evaluated: _________________________________________________ 
 
 
Section I: In relation to the successor 
 
                                                                                 Totally                                   Totally 
                                                                                              disagree                                    agree 
 
I.1 The principal challenge faced by the successor is 
the difficulty of obtaining immediate recognition 
of his/her authority from family members and 
staff in the running of the company. 
        
 
I.2 Despite the fact that we consider competence in 
the job an important criterion, kinship ties are still 
the principal one in choosing the successor. 
 
        
 
I.3 Within our company, the image of the founder is 
so intense and honoured by all, that it inhibits any 
family successor from coming naturally into 
his/her own. 
        
 
 
 
Section II: Family managers in the firm 
 
                                                                                                Totally                                   Totally 
                                                                                                disagree                                   agree 
 
II.1 The employees recognize that our family 
managers are competent in the functions they 
exercise. 
 
         
II.2 In our company the rules for the entry of family 
members into the management are clearly 
negotiated and followed, without exception. 
         
 
 
 
Section III: Alignment 
 
                                                                                                Totally                                   Totally 
                                                                                                disagree                                   agree 
 
III.1. The various members of the controlling family 
have a distinct notion of the process and the 
best moment for the succession.  
         
 
III.2. In our company, shareholders and managers 
share a common vision and the same values in 
relation to the running of the business.  
         
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
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III.3. In the decisions of great strategic impact in the 
recent history of the company, shareholders 
and managers have shown harmony in their 
thinking and acting. 
         
 
III.4. We adopt an ordered planning process that 
promotes consensus as to the long-term 
strategic objectives of the organization. 
 
         
 
III.5. Shareholders are in total agreement regarding 
the standard of risk assumed by the executives 
in the search for results. 
 
         
 
III.6. The remuneration and incentives practised by 
our company have constituted an instrument 
capable of producing alignment of the interests 
between the executives and shareholders. 
        
 
III.7. The existence of an instrument regulating 
interests (shareholders' agreement, social 
contract or statute) has shown itself to be 
fundamental for the promotion of cohesion 
among the various partners. 
        
 
 
 
Section IV: Family interaction 
 
IV.1 Is there a Family Council whose object is to represent the family as a whole and prepare 
the formal meetings of its members? 
❑ Yes ❑ No  
 
                                                                                                Totally                            Totally 
                                                                                               disagree                            agree 
 
IV.2 We do not think that is vital the constitution of 
a Family Council to guarantee family harmony 
and a good relationship of the family with the 
company. 
        
 
IV.3 Relationships between the members of our 
family have been extremely strained, hindering 
the possibility of a good family interaction. 
 
        
 
IV.4 The members of our family know the history of 
our company and are interested in the values 
that guide us in managing it. 
     
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
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IV.5 Our family ties are sufficiently strong to 
guarantee the transition of the founders’ values 
to future generations. 
   
 
IV.6 The members of the owner-family (ies) show 
lack of interest in participating in events and 
celebrations of the company to improve their 
closer relationships with employees and 
nonfamliy managers. 
   
 
 
 
Section V: Trust, Integrity and Risk Perception 
 
                                                                                                 Totally                      Totally 
                                                                                                 disagree                      agree 
  
V.1 In our company it is common to find managers 
(family or nonfamliy) whose work shows 
shortcomings and whose attitudes can typically 
be classified as ‘shirking’. 
         
 
V.2 In our recent history there have been several 
situations involving the improper use or 
misappropriation of funds that could be 
characterized as ‘white collar crimes’. 
         
 
V.3 The managers of our company are not in the 
habit of establishing excessive levels of 
remuneration or unjustifiable dividends or 
bonuses in their own benefit. 
 
         
V.4 It is acceptable that an individual, being part of 
the owner family, makes use of company 
resources for his or her own benefit. 
         
 
V.5 In spite of having effective control of the 
company, the majority shareholders have never 
used this power to create privileges at the 
expense of the rights of the minority. 
         
 
V.6 We have already faced situations that have led us 
to no longer trust, unconditionally, nonfamliy 
members. 
         
 
V.7 All family members that work, or have worked 
in the company, have always demonstrated high 
professional integrity, possessing similar beliefs 
and values to those of the founder(s). 
         
 
V.8 The indication of nonfamliy managers by 
members of our social network is the best way 
of guaranteeing the selection of trustworthy 
executives. 
         
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
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V.9 The shareholders perceive that the actions 
taken by the managers always have the final 
objective of protecting their interests, or at least 
not to run counter to them. 
 
         
V.10 Managers feel that they should not openly 
reveal their difficulties to the shareholders (or 
board members, if they exist) for fear of this 
being used against them in the future. 
 
 
 
         
Section VI: Competence and disclosure 
 
                                                                                                 Totally                     Totally  
                                                                                                 disagree                     agree 
 
VI.1 The family managers have always 
demonstrated that they are totally capable of 
conducting significant necessary changes, even 
if these have required breaking with tradition. 
         
 
VI.2 In times of change, family managers tend to 
demonstrate less disposition in running risks 
than nonfamliy managers would if they were in 
the same position. 
         
 
VI.3 The competence of our managers has shown 
itself to be the principal cause of reaching the 
results that we have. 
         
 
 
VI.4 All shareholders have at their command 
unrestricted access to the financial and non-
financial information which guide business 
action in the attempt to create value. 
         
 
VI.5 Efficient channels exist for the dissemination of 
information aimed at the public of interest, 
whether they are internal or external to the 
company. 
         
 
VI.6 Something that we lack is a succession process 
that is openly discussed and treated with 
transparency as to the criteria for the choice of 
the successor. 
         
 
VI.7 Our executives have the habit providing 
information, positive and negative, in addition 
to what is obligatory, to all interested parties, to 
facilitate the correct comprehension and 
evaluation of the organization. 
         
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
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Section VII: Management Control 
 
                                                                                                  Totally                          Totally 
                                                                                                   disagree                     agree 
 
VII.1 There exists a clear and formal process for the 
evaluation of the performance of the CEO and 
of his/her executive group, in reaching the 
objectives for the shareholders. 
         
 
VII.2 Financial controls and the indicators of return 
are regularly followed by the shareholders 
and/or their representatives. 
         
 
VII.3 We adopt a rigorous internal control system to 
monitor the operations of our company. 
 
         
 
 
VII.4 The levels of autonomy of the managers are 
negotiated guaranteeing agility of decision 
without releasing them from responsibility for 
the results arising therefrom.  
         
 
VII.5 Within the present control mechanism 
situations have arisen where the managers have 
taken decisions harmful to the company, which 
were not detected in time by the shareholders 
due to their having adopted a more laissez-fair 
oversight. 
 
 
 
         
Section VIII: Impartiality 
 
                                                                                                Totally                      Totally 
                                                                                                disagree                     agree 
 
VIII.1 In our situation, an error of a family manager 
in the performance of his/her functions 
deserves the same sort of treatment given to a 
nonfamliy manager. 
         
 
VIII.2 The criteria for the evaluation of the 
performance of the family manager do not 
differ in any detail from those used for the 
nonfamliy manager. 
         
 
VIII.3 In our company the criteria used in the 
selection to key positions prioritize the level 
of competence of the candidate, and are 
completely independent of kinship. 
         
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
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VIII.4 The economic objectives of the company are 
always prioritized, even if they are in 
detriment to the well-being of the family 
members. 
         
 
VIII.5 Historically, the company has been a natural 
path for giving sanctuary to family members 
interested in joining it. 
 
 
         
VIII.6 The owning family perceives the company as 
a source of opportunity for career 
development for future generations. 
         
 
 
VIII.7 Family affection leads to unconditional 
acceptance of behaviour, even if 
inappropriate. 
         
 
 
VIII.8 Even if a family manager does not discharge 
his/her executive functions with excellence, 
the tendency is that we choose to let him/her 
stay on. 
         
 
 
 
 
Section IX: Board of Directors 
 
IX.1 Is there a Board of Directors formally established? 
 
❑ Yes How many members does it have? ____________ 
❑ No  
 
 
IX.2 Are there any independent members on the Board (members who do not participate in 
the management nor belong to the owner-families)? 
 
❑ Yes How many? __________  
❑ No  
❑ NA  
 
 
Reply to all the questions below, independently of the existence or not of a formal Board of 
Directors in your organization: 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
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                                                                                   Totally                       Totally 
                                                                                                 disagree                      agree 
 
IX.3 In the constitution of a Board it is more 
important that all family groups feel that they 
are adequately represented than to guarantee 
the presence of Board Members of recognized 
competence and experience. 
         
 
IX.4 A Board of Directors that tends merely to 
validate the opinion of the CEO regarding the 
strategic direction of the organization without 
any questioning would never be accepted in our 
organization. 
         
IX.5 The members of the controlling family of our 
company definitely recognize (or would 
recognize in the event of future installation) the 
Board of Directors as the maximum authority 
and highest court for strategic decisions. 
         
 
IX.6 It is understandable that family board members 
should have greater authority in strategic 
decisions, than external members, because of 
their connections and interest in the business.  
         
 
IX.7 The presence of board members from outside 
the family is cause for discomfort when they 
demand the sharing of strategic information 
and invade the family space in the company  
         
 
 
 
Section X: Understanding of social rules 
 
                                                                                                 Totally                       Totally 
                                                                                                 disagree                       agree 
 
X.1 The family active in management can clearly 
distinguish family from professional issues, 
insuring that each is dealt within its proper 
place. 
 
          
 
X.2 In a succession process the family CEO, retiring 
or taking up another position has demonstrated 
(or would demonstrate in the event of a future 
succession) total acceptance of his/her new role 
without imposing him/herself on the successor. 
 
          
X.3 It is acceptable that a CEO, member of the 
controlling family and consequently an 
interested part in the company results, rejects 
having his/her performance formally evaluated. 
           
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
348 
   
X.4 The shareholders, family or otherwise, that do 
not participate in the management, understand 
their role and ensure their rights through the 
proper channels, without directly interfering in 
the day-to-day running of the company. 
 
 
 
          
Section XI: Existing or latent tensions 
 
 
Please, evaluate the existing or latent tensions between family members, staff and 
shareholders, using the scale from 1 to 7 - from the existence of no tension of any kind to a 
high tension situation. 
 
Please, do not leave any pair in blank. When one of the actors does not exist, obviously no 
analysis is applicable. In this case, just circle the option NA. 
 
                No tension of                              High 
                   any kind                                 tension 
 1. Nonfamliy 
managers  
 
 2. Family managers 
 
 
XI. Family 
owner/managers 
versus 3. Non-management 
family members   
 
 4. Nonfamliy 
shareholders  
 
 5. Board members 
 
 
 
 
XI. Nonfamliy 
managers  
 
 
versus 
6. Non-management 
family members  
 
 7. Board members 
 
 
 
 
XI. Controlling 
family (majority 
shareholders) 
versus 8. Minority 
shareholders  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
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XI. Controlling 
family (majority 
shareholders) 
versus 9. External board 
members  
 
 
XI. Chairman  versus 10. CEO  
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Information of the company (group) surveyed 
 
 
B.1 Year of foundation or acquisition by the controlling family: ____________________ 
 
 
B.2 Who at present is at the head of management in the company (CEO)? 
 
❑ A family manager 
❑ Nonfamliy manager 
From which generation? ___________  
 
       Since when __________ 
 
 
B.3 Is the present Chairman a member of the owner family? 
 
❑ Yes ❑ No ❑ NA 
 
 
B.4 Is the company: a Publicly Traded Corporation, a Privately Held Corporation or a 
Limited Liability Company? _____________________________________________ 
 
 
B.5 What is the number of permanent staff maintained by the company? 
❑ up to 19. 
❑ between 20 e 99. 
❑ between 99 e 499. 
❑ 500 or more. 
 
 
B.6 Into which annual invoicing band does your company fall? 
❑ lower than R$250 thousand. 
❑ between R$250 thousand and R$2.5 million. 
❑ between R$2.5 million and R$60 million. 
❑ between R$60 million and R$170 million. 
❑ over R$170 million. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  NA 
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B.7 Regarding economic and financial performance, would you say that the results of 
your company are: 
❑ lower than average for the sector to which it belongs. 
❑ average for the sector to which it belongs. 
❑ above average for the sector to which it belongs. 
 
 
 
C. Your data (optional) 
 
 
Name:             
 
Contact address:            
 
Post code / City / State:           
 
Phone / e-mail:            
 
Company where you work / position:         
 
 
 
Reply to the question below that identify the type of bond that you have with the company: 
 
C.1. Are you a member of the owner family? 
❑ Yes ❑ No If yes, which generation do you belong to? ______ 
C.2. Are you a shareholder in the company? 
❑ Yes ❑ No 
C.3 Are you a member of your companies’ Board of Directors? 
❑ Yes ❑ No 
C.4 Do you work in the company? 
❑ Yes ❑ No 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for completing this Survey! 
 
